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vSUMMARY
The period between the depression of the 1930s and the long post-war boom saw the development of the
contemporary shape of the labour movement's economic thought, with its dichotomy between moderate andleft
. nationalist currents. This development is examined in terms of the nature of the mainorganisations of the labour
movement, economic conditions, the ideological proclivities of different classes andthelevelof theclass struggle.
The main areas of economic thought examined are theories of Australia's placein the world economy, the class
anatomy of Australian capitalism andof economic crises. .
During the late 1930s laborites continued to express a longstanding commitment to national development through
tariffprotection andwariness of overseas loans. Moderate ideas of thepossibilities for overcoming class conflicts
increasingly displaced radical Money Power theory after the depression. While monetary and real
underconsumptionism continued to be the main explanations of economic crises offered by laborites, both ALP
politicians and union officials became aware of Keynesian economics and the legitimacy it provided for long-
standing Labor policies. The advent of the Popular Front period in the international communist movement saw
the Communist Party of Australia move from a revolutionary internationalist towards a politically more
conservative leftnationalist position, sharing assumptions withMoney Power theorists, despite therise in thelevel
of industrial struggle. The Communist conviction in radical underconsumptionist theory of inevitable economic
crises began to weaken. '
World War II and the advent of the Curtin Government saw the leadership of the ALP embrace Keynesian
economics and its priorities. This was expressed in both foreign economic and domestic policies, but was
qualified by a keen appreciation of the requirements of the Australian economy for both protection and foreign
markets and the level of the class struggle. The promotion of Keynesian ideas and divisions in the labour
movement was successful after 1947 in countering working class militancy. While retaining a fervent nationalism
theCommunist Party'spolicies shifted after theWar from strong support for theGovernment during theWartoa
veryradical and anti-American position after 1947. Bolstered by a return to radical underconsumptionism and a
focus on the conspiratorial role of the Collins House monopolists, the Party believed it could challenge the
authority of the ALP and the Chifley Government, on the basis of working class industrial struggles. But the
Communist Party made its attempt when the level of united struggle was already in decline. Between 1949 and
1952 thebalance of class forces shifted sharply in favour of capital.
Moderate laborites havecontinued to accept the mainpropositions of orthodox economics, while the bulkof the
left in the labour movement has been nationalist and, aftertheCommunist Party's break with Moscow, committed
to a version of Keynesian economics. Although the adequacy of bothapproaches to working class interests is in
doubt and theyhave not consistently promoted its struggles, their hegemony over the labour movement has not
prevented theemergence of militant working class action.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The oil crisis and thenslowerinternational economic growth rates of the 1970s and 1980s signalled the endof the
long post-war boom. The new circumstances of highunemployment andchronic economic difficulties generated a
debate in the western labour movements on appropriate strategies. The debate was spurred on by continental
Eurocommunism's loss of vitality, with the failures of the ItalianCommunist Party's "historic compromise" and the
coalitionof theleft in the 1977 Frenchelections, and the demiseof the Callaghan LabourGovernment in Britain. I
An Australian debate on working class strategy took place particularly during the years of the Fraser Government
and drew on themes elaborated in Britishcontroversies. Three, moreor less distinctschools of thought emerged.
Individual adherents of the schools differed on points of detail and sometimes lined up with proponents of rival
currents on specific issues. The explicit goals of the schools, however, provided a clear basis for distinguishing
them. The traditional Labor approach concentrated on responsible economic management to promote growth. Its
rationale was to improve social welfare through the generation of a larger socialproduct. The Parliamentarism of
the Hawke, Wran and Cain Governments have illustrated the traditional Labor means of implementing policy and
achieving its goals.2 The "left nationalist" strategy looked to the gradual transformation of society in the direction
of socialism. In theclassicalsense,it has beenreformistin outlook. But it has alsoseen extra-parliamentary action,
by unions and social groups as.necessary adjuncts to Parliamentary methods for achieving its goals -- the expansion
of state ownership and the extension of popular participation in the management of society. The organisational
focusof left nationalism has been certaintrade unions, the Communist Partyof Australia and the left factions, in the
Labor Party) The third strategy, which was both revolutionary and marxist, aimed at the replacement of the
existing state machine by another, based on workers' councils. The small political organisations and individuals
advancing this viewsaw the working class as the key means for transforming society.s
With Federal Labor in office from early 1983 and the "Prices and Incomes Accord" between the ALP and ACTU
the relative influence of the three schools shifted in favour of the first. The pragmatic economic managers in the
ALP led by Hawke, whose perspectives in many ways differed little from their conservative predecessors,
effectively controlled the Federal caucus and the national ALP machine. The emphasis in the left nationalist
strategy shifted away from mass activity towards political and Parliamentary measures. Left nationalists now
concentrated their energyon trying to influence the policiesof theLaborParty through theParty's structures andby
negotiation rather than the exercise of industrial muscle or by means of militant public demonstrations.J
Revolutionary groups became more marginal and less clear about the practical implications of their strategy, based
on the workingclass's own activity, in a period when the class struggle was at a low ebb. Nevertheless, it is still
possibleto distinguish the latter two currents insidethe Australian labourmovement.
All three schools justify their strategies in terms of their interpretations of the Australian economy. Different
assessments of the economy's internal dynamic, vitality and relationship with the world economy legitimise their
policiesand proposals for action. Briefly, the mainstream of Labor thought has regardedeconomic fine-tuning and,
more recently, the restoration of the marketmechanism in domestic policy and Australia's international economic
relations as thekey to overcoming difficulties and promoting growth. For this school, as for orthodox economists,
capitalismis perfectible. Left nationalists tend to blameAustralia's economic difficulties on the worldeconomy,
multi-(or trans-)national corporations and capitalism's inability to match demand to supply. Socialism is the
supersession of such problems through the isolation of the national economy from international influences and
increasedstate control. Revolutionary marxists have seen Australian capitalism's difficulties as inseparable from
the inherent problems of world capitalism. Their solution to economic crisis is the control of societyby worker's
councils basedin the workplaces, on an international scale.
1.For discussions of "alternative economic strategies" see, for example, S. Holland The Socialist Challenge Quartet, London 1975, Conference
of SocialistEconomists London Working GroupThe Alternative EconomicStrategyCSEBooks,London 1980,B. Rowthom "The Alternative
Economic Strategy" International Socialism 2(8) 1980pp85-94, alsoseethe debatein IntemationalSocialism 2(6) to 2(9).
2. For example, B. Hayden "FacingEconomic Reality" ID J. North and P. Weller (eds)Labor: Directionsfor the EightiesIan Novak, Sydney
1980: "Labor's cardinal principle is economic prudence, and reforms will be madein strictaccordance with theabilityof the economy to sustain
them" p240, "Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions Regarding Economic Policy"
February1983. -
3. For example, the very widely distributed Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union Australia Uprooted Sydney 1977and its
successorpamphlets; Communist Party of Australia Towards Socialism in Australia: Programof the Communist Party ofAustralia Sydney
1979; L. Carmichael "A Transitional Programme to Socialism" in G. Crough, T. Wilshire and T. Wheelwright (eds) Australia and World
Capitalism Penguin, Ringwood 1980 pp240-50; F. Stilwell "Towards an Alternative Economic Strategy" Journal of Australian Political
Economy 12113 June 1982 pp40-59; A. Hopkins and R. Curtain "The LabourMovement and the Protection versus Restructuring Debate: A
Proposal" in ibid, pp74-92. .
4. For exampleSocialist Workers Party Towards a SocialistAustralia: How the Labor Movement Can Fight Back Pathfinder Press, Sydney
1977;R. Kuhn "Alternative Strategies: Left Nationalism and Revolutionary Marxism" Journal of Australian PoliticalEconomy 12113 June
1982pp93-109; M. Armstrong andP. Griffiths TheCrisis...and the SocialistAlternative toLaborRedback Press,Melbourne June 1984.
5. For an indication of the trendof leftnationalist thought in anticipation of Labor's Federal election victory in 1983seeM. Burford "Prices and
Incomes Policy and Socialist Politics" in Journal of Australian Political Economy 14 April 1983 pp7-32, also F. Stilwell "The Economic
SummitandBeyond" Arena63 1983ppI6-25.
2This thesis seeks to throw somelight on contemporary debates on working class strategy by examining the merits
and faults of their antecedents in the history of the Australian labour movement's economic ideas. The period
understudy is that between the depression and thestart of the post-war boom, during which the mainstream of the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) came to embrace orthodox academic economics, "at that stage Keynesianism, as its
own and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was transformed from a revolutionary internationalist
organisation into an exponent of left nationalism. The close of the period saw important defeats for both
organisations. Despite some innovations, neither has subsequently changed the main contours of its economic
ideas. The ALP and CPA were not the only political organisations in the Australian labour movement between
1934 and 1941, but theywerereference points formostworkers. T4eothersubstantial working classorganisations,
the trade unions, defined theirpolitical and, generally, theireconomic positions in relation to the two working class
parties. So they constitute the focus for thisstudy, although thepositions expressed in a number of trade unions are
also considered.s Unfortunately space has not permitted a systematic treatment of the interesting, but usually
uninfluential ideas of the thirdlargest, though tiny, political current in the labour movement during thisperiod, that
of theTrotskyists.
Where Do Incorrect Ideas Come From?7
The labour movement's economic thought is approached from a materialist perspective: ideas are regarded
primarily as the products of the socialcircumstances andespecially the relations of production in which they are
expressed. They arealsoseenas having significant effects on theshaping of thosecircumstances. AsEngels put it
"Although the material mode of existence is the primus agens this does not prevent the ideological
spheres fromreacting uponit andinfluencing it in theirturn, but this is a secondary effect."8
While this study hardly reveals the triumph of revolutionary politics in the labourmovement, it does convey an
optimistic message for marxists. The courseof theclass struggle can behelped or hindered by the ideas, including
the economic thought, of the labour movement. But neither misleading ideas inside the labour movement nor the
conservatising effects of capitalist society can permanently abolish the class struggle whose circumstances
eventually help to encourage theories and practices premised on the importance of working class self-activity.? On
a less abstract level, the following historical account draws attention to the adverse effects of specific economic
ideas on the course of the class struggle: underconsumptionist explanations of economic crises, in their radical,
reformist or trade union, wage oriented versions have not generally served well as predictors of events or as the
basis for solving economic problems; conceptions of Australia's place in the world economy premised on the
supposed advantages of alliances with particular great powers or the growth of an independent Australian
capitalism to the working class havenot led toeffective strategies for defending working class interests; ideas about
theclass anatomy of Australian capitalism which stressed conspiracy on the one hand or the priority of nationality
over class have proved inferior, as guides to working class action, to those drawing on Marx's analysis of class,
determined above all by places in therelations of production.
The approach to the ideas of the working class employed in later chapters is summed up in the following
propositions:
"Falseconsciousness is not something which is simply fed to workers by the ruling class (although
theyare only too willing to do this). It is something which is both inevitable and natural for a class
which is oppressed andexploited butnot yet in the actof fighting back."
"Reformist ideas and worse have a real basis in workers' experience and theirperceptions of the
system. It is a change in thatexperience which is theprecondition of sucha change in ideas." 10
Particular statements and formulations therefore tend to be examined in terms of their relationship with the
experiences of classes rather thansimply as the products ofnotable individuals. The perspective adopted contrasts
on the one hand with those which present the history of ideas as accounts of the effects of concept, defined in
relative abstraction from specific social circumstances, on the course of events. On the other hand it rejects the
6. It has not been possible to study eachof the State Labor Parties in detail. Most attention is paid to the New South Wales and Victorian
Parties,the largestState organisations, and the Federal Party. Distinctive developments in the other States are, however, noted. The term
"Iaborite" is employed in this thesisto denotethosewhosemainpolitical reference pointwas theALP,l.e, in the senseofferedby theMacquarie
Dictionary. For examples of the use of the term "Iaborite" to meansupporters of the ALP see recruiting material in LaborNews, the official
paperof the NSW ALP, 1713/23 p4,3113/23 p6, 1417123 p4,4/8123 p2. 1/9/23 pp2,7 andG. M Prendergast LaborIn Politics: Its Influence on
Legislation Australian LaborParty Victoria, Melbourne 1922ppl5, 16. The PartyjournalCommunist Review,pamphlets and Workers Weekly
(from 1939 Tribune) are used to assess the ideasof the Communist Party. Workers Weekly was produced in Sydney, the seat of the Party's
nationalleadership. In viewof the centralised structure of the CPAand the generally consistent behaviour of itsmembers, the Sydney papercan
be used as an exemplarof the Party's stances on general economic questions, without the need for extensive reference to the newspapers
produced in othercities.
7. The answerMao Tse-Tunggave inhis article"WhereDoCorrectIdeasComeFrom?" in his Four Essays on PhilosophyForeign Languages
Press, Peking 1968 ppl34-6 also explained the origins of "incorrect" ideas - "they come from social practice". This slogan is fonnally
satisfactory whentaken out of context, unfortunately, in thecontextofMao's articleit has little to do withan answerto the abovequestions in
termsof a marxistclassanalysis.
8. F. EngelsLetterson Historical Materialism: 1890·94Progress Publishers, Moscow1980p7. "
9. On theconservative influence of the political structures of liberal democratic capitalism see R. Miliband's impressive Capitalist Democracy
inBritainOxfordUniversity Press,Oxford 1984. Onthe conceptof working classself-activity see F. Engels"Preface to theGennanEdition of
1890"in K. Marx and F. Engels The Manifesto of the Communist Party Progress Publishers, Moscow 1971 p25: "The emancipation of the
workersmustbe theact of theworking class itself."
10.J. Rees"Struggle and Ideas" Socialist Worker Review(Britain) April 1985 pp22-3.
3view that ideas may be interesting products of, but play no part in the mechanisms of social development. The
mode of explanation preferred is to trace the origins of ideas in material reality and experience followed by
consideration of the reciprocal shaping of the material world and people's experiences by those ideas. A brief
outline of the long history of this approach, going back to Marx's and Engels's early writings, is a useful
introduction to the concepts employed in the substantive account of the Australian labour movement's economic
ideas.
Marx and Engels developed a coherent theory of labourmovement ideology in thecourseof theirpolitical activities
andas a concomitant of theirintellectual evolution. The origins of this theory of ideology, "falseconsciousness" or,
more crudely, "incorrect ideas", goes back to Marx's discussions of religion during the 1840s. In 1844 he argued
that "the criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism".!1 By criticism he meant the process of under-
standing the world. At that stagereligion was by far the mostpotent and widespread ideology. Marxlaiddown
someguidelines for the understanding of ideology when he wrote that .
"Religioussuffering is at one and thesametimethe expressionof real suffering anda protestagainst
real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heartof a heartless world and the
soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.
"The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real
happiness. To call on then to give up their illusions about theircondition is to eaU on them to give
up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the
criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo." 12
Ideology, then, derived from thenature of the material world. Subsequently Marxused this critique of religion asa
modelfor criticisms of political and economic ideas. The concept of alienation was the common denominator of
his approach. People, he argued, raised the objects of their own intellectual, political or economic creation over
themselves as eternal powers governing theirlives,overwhich theyhadno control. Sogod,an abstraction based on
humanity's own creativity was bumped into heaven as the creator of and divine legislator for humanity and a
spiritual justification for the status quo. It is not by accident that his activities benefit those whose oppressive
behaviour leads others to seeksolace in religion. Similarly theoppressive stateis seen as the only possible way to
administer society, rather than as an institution whose existence is determined by historically specific human
activity. Marxpointed out that these forms of alienation couldonly be understood on the basis of the alienation of
peoplefrom theirlabour, whathe eventually called"exploitation". That is workers' products do not remain under
theircontrol but become the property of their employers. In fact employers buy workers' labour powerand try to
control it in the veryprocess of the production of comrnodities.tf In the form of private property, alienated labour
comes to dominate the lives of workers.· Economics appears to be a matter of the relationship amongst
commodities: the labour of one worker is not compared directly to the labour of another, but only through the
medium of the commodities they produce. This ideological notion is based on the reality that workers do not
control their products, but conceals the deeper reality that the key to understanding the dynamics of an economy or
society is the way things are produced through an exploitative relationship between capitalists and workers. The
focus on supplyand demand that characterises orthodox academic economics and theeconomic thought of much of
the labour movement sees nothing in the wagecontract but an exchange of equivalents, a view summed up in the
catch-cry "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay" or vice versa. The peculiar nature of labour power as a
commodity which creates more value than it costs to produce itself is missed and along with it the secret of the
origins of new wealth. The fetishism of commodities, although basedon a partial appreciation of reality, conceals
an important aspect of theworldfrom viewandtherefore challenge.
At first sight the implications of the above view of ideology for social change seem hopelessly conservative. If
capitalism grows its own camouflage of incorrect ideas in a more or less spontaneous way, then a conscious
workers' revolution is out of the question. Marx initially avoided this difficulty by arguing that "the proletariat
fmds its intellectual weapons in philosophy",14 In other words in the correct ideasproduced by Or Marx himself.
This solution to the problem presented by materially grounded incorrect ideas was not satisfactory. It was still
coloured by Marx's idealist, Hegelian background because it did not consistently account for the origins of correct
ideas in materialist terms. Later in 1844 Marxoffered an improved explanation of theexistence of possibilities for
changing society. In The Holy Family Marx saidof theproletariat
"Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of labour. It is not a question of what
this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its aim. It is a
question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with its being, it will historically be
compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its ownlife
situation as wellas in the wholeorganisation of bourgeois society today. There is no needto explain
11. K. MlIrx Ii A Contribution to the Critique ofHegel'sPhilosophy ofRight. Introduction" in his EarlyWritings Penguin, Hannondsworth 1975
1i4rbid. p244, emphasis inthe original.
13. for an early expression ofthis view see K. Marx "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" in Early Writings op,clt, pp325 et seq., the
same idea isdeveloped under the heading the fetishism ofcommodities in K. Marx Capitalvi Penguin, Hannondsworth 1976 ppI63-77. N.
Geras "Marx and the Critique of Political Economy" in R. Blackbum (ed.) Ideology in Social Science Fontana, Glasgow 1975 pp284-303
discusses the importance ofthe concept offetishism to Marxist economics.
14. K. Marx "A Contribution...of Hegel's Philosophy" op, cit. p257.
4here that a large part of the English and French proletariat is already conscious of its historical task
and is constantlyworking to develop that consciousness into completeclarity."15
"Correct ideas" were now explained in materialist terms, as the consequence of the proletariat's existence and
oppression under capitalism, rather than as the product of an heroic individual. The fact that workers were
exploited meant that .they had an interest in abolishing capitalism and that they therefore developed a
revolutionary consciousness. This argument represented an advance and was undoubtedly influenced by the
emergenceof an independent and militant workingclass current in the Chartist movement in Britain. Marx had al-
ready been collaboratingwith Engels who had first hand experienceof the British developments. However the new
explanationof the possibility of revolutionary change gave rise to two, contradictory propositions. First that capi-
talist society gave rise to ideologies that stood in the way of revolution and were spread with the aid of the
considerable resources at the disposal of the dominant classes. In the words of the German Ideology, written in
1845-6,
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: Le., the class which is the ruling
material force of society is at the same time the ruling intellectual force."16
The second proposition was that the existence of the working class gave rise in a more or less automatic way to
revolutionaryideas.
The "Theseson Feuerbach",of 1845resolved this contradiction. The third thesis concluded
"The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be
conceived and rationally understoodonly as revolutionary practice."17
The last thesisproclaimed that
"The philosophershave only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."18
The missing element which Marx thus discoveredwas "practice"•• the struggleof the workingclass, imposedupon
it by its daily exploitation, can give rise to a revolutionary consciousness. Such struggles can demonstrate the
collective power of the working class in the face of capital. It was no longer a matter of the static reality of
workers' daily lives generating correct or incorrect ideas, but of workers' struggles transforming their way of
thinking. In the 1847Poverty ofPhilosophy Marx put it as follows:
"The economic conditions had first transformedthe mass of the people into workers, The domination
of capital had created for this mass a common situation, commoninterests. This mass is thus already
a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle...this mass becomes united and
constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends becomeclass interests. But the struggle
of class against class is a political struggle." 19 .
Lukacs's concept of "imputed class consciousness" can be equated with Marx's "class in itself'. That is, the
working class has objective interests whether it recognises these or not.20
The Communist Manifesto included Marx's satisfactory solution to the problem of false consciousness. The
Manifesto'S third section was also devoted to the analysisof widespreadincorrect ideas on working class strategyin
the labour movement. Marx and Engels's criticisms in that section were no longer mainly a matter of settling
accounts with their former ideas and colleagues,in order to clarify their own thoughts, as their earlier criticismsof
contemporaryauthors had been.21 Rather, these criticisms were part of the struggle to transform the working class
into a class for itself. Unlike their previous writings, the Manifesto was directed at a specifically working class
audience. A large part of their criticisms consisted in demonstrating how the conditions of existence of other
classes had given rise to ideas which also found some following amongst workers. The insights of section three of
the Manifesto are considered in more detail below, in the context of their applicationto intellectualdevelopments in
the Australianlabour movementbetween 1934and 1950.
Marx and Engels's experiences during the 1848 revolutions and later political observations led them to add an
appreciation of conjunctural economic and political factors to the general class-oriented theory of working class
ideology elaborated in section three of the Manifesto. While workers' consciousness of their sectional interests is a
commonplacephenomenon, a class-wide concern with the overthrow of capitalism is not. The distance between
"imputedclass consciousness" and actual class consciousness, the problem of "false consciousness", cannot simply
be bridged by an analysis of the relations of production, although that is the necessary startingpoint To understand
15. K. Marx and F. Engels TheHolyFamilyProgress Publishers, Moscow 1980 p47, emphasis in the original.
16. K. Marx and F. Engels The GermanIdeologyProgress Publishers, Moscow 1976 p67, emphasis in the original. Without entering into the
vast literature ofGramsci exegesis, it will beassumed below that the fruitful aspects ofhis concept ofhegemony, especially in relation toan
understanding of "common sense" are elaborations on this position of Marx's, see A. Gramsci Selections from the Prison Notebooks
International Publishers, New York 1975 pp326, 330,421.
17. K. Marx "Theses on Feuerbach" inhis EarlyWritings op,cit. p422, emphasis inthe original. Engels made the same point, ina less general
fonn in his TheCondition oftheWorking.ClassinEnglandProgress Publishers, Moscow 1977 p230, itwas wriUen in1844-5.
18. ibid. p423. . .
19. K. Marx The PovertyofPhilosophy Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975 ppI59-60, emphasis inthe original, also The German Ideologypp60,
85-6. For comments on the relationship between political organisation, struggle and class consciousness see "Marx to Friedrich Bolte"
23/11/1871 in K. Marx and F.Engels SelectedCorrespondence Progress Publishers, Moscow 1982 pp254-5.
20. see G. Lukacs History and Class Consciousness Merlin, London 1971 pp50-79. H. Draper Karl Marx's Theory ofRevolution: volume II
ThePoliticsofSocialClassesMonthly Review Press, New York 1978 p47 put itthis way:
Marx's theory asserts that only the proletariat, by the conditions ofits existence, embodies a social program pointing toan
alternative tocapitalism,"
21. see Engels' "Preface' toThePovertyofPhilosophy op,cit. p9. K. Marx and F.Engels TheManifesto op, cit. pp56-66.
5phenomena as diverse as the consciousness of French or German workers during 1848, the usual reformism of the
Australian working class, the revolutionary actions of the Hungarian working class in 1956 or the militancy of
British miners during their 1984-5 strike, it is necessary to supplement an appreciation of external class influences
in the labour movement with a different, more concrete level of analysis. In The Class Struggles in France Marx
pointed out how the economic slump of the late 1840s had"accelerate[d] the outbreak of the revolution". But,
given the defeat of the revolution and the economic recovery"a new revolution is only possible as a result of a new
crisis".22 Marx and Engels argued that, in the first instance, the mid 19thCentury hiatus in the struggles of English
workers was a result of the lesson taught by the severe defeats of the revolutions of 1848 and Chartism. In the
Inaugural Address of the First International Marx explained also this passivity, between the collapse of Chartism
and the mid-1860s, in terms of the prosperity of British capitalism:
"Formerly active members [of the working class] were caught by the temporary bribe of greater work
and wages..."23
Britain's prosperity at that stage was a product of its monopoly position on the world market as supplier of
manufactured goods.24 Marx and Engels argued that there were "economic roots of reformism", a concept
elaborated by Cliff to explain aspects of working class politics in Britain during the post-World War II boom.25 In
a more general form the argument is that during a period of economic growth it is possible for workers to be
generally and quickly successful in winning isolated shop-floor disputes over wages and conditions. In such
circumstances the advantages of uniting on a class-wide basis to win demands is much less evident, while
capitalism's apparent ability to deliver the goods does not make its overthrow a pressing question. The
circumstances of defeat can, for a time, induce quiescence in the working class. The period between 1850 and
1870s was particularly quiet because recent British working class experiences had led first to negative conclusions
about the possibilities for the proletariat to initiate dramatic social change. This conclusion was reinforced because
the logical response of large sections of the working class to the following period of sustained economic growth,
during which gains could be made by means of limited struggle, was thatreformism could be a successful strategy.
It is useful to distinguish, at least in theoretical terms, between this working class reformism and reformism
grounded directly in the interests of other classes. Thus while Marx and Engels explained the attitudes of the
English workers during the period of British economic domination of the world in term of the former, they believed
that opportunist tendencies in the independent German workers' party was due to contamination by other classes,26
The phenomenon of modem parliamentary reformism was still embryonic when Marx died.27 The appeal of a
Parliamentary road to socialism was limited inmost of Europe where workers were excluded from the Parliaments
or responsible parliamentary government was non-existent Engels had a greater chance to comment on the
development of a reformist current in the British labour movement He drew attention in particular to the policyof
tailing the Liberal Party pursued by the "aristocracy of labour", the most skilled and best paid amongst the
workers,28 In attributing the supineness of the working class to this layer Engels combined the economic
explanation of reformism with the class contamination explanation: the labour aristocracy had been created pre-
cisely by theconditions of British prosperity. He believed that once Britain had lost its monopoly position of the
world market "the economic basis of the political nullity of the English workers" would be gone.29
The crisis of international social democracy on the outbreak of World War I and the preceding period saw marxists
"The truth is this: during the period ofEngland's industrial monopoly the English working class have, to a certain extent,
shared inthe benefits ofmonopoly. These benefits were very unequally parcelled out amongst them; the privileged minority
pocketed most, but even the great mass had, atleast, a temporary share now and then. And that is the reason why, since the
dying- out ofOwenism, there has been no Socialism inEngland. With the breakdown ofthat monopoly, the English working
class will lose that privileged position; itwill find itself - the privileged and leading minority not excepted - on a level with
itsfellow-workers abroad. And that isthe reason why there will be socialism again inEngland."
see Draper Volume II op,cit, pp60-6 for Marx'sand Engels's comments along these lines.
25. T.Cliff "Economic Roots ofRefonnism" 1957 republished inhis NeitherWashington Nor MoscowBookmarks, London 1982 pp108-117.
26. "Marx and Engels toAugust Bebe1, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Wilhelm Bracke and others ('Circular Letter)" ininMarx and Engels Selected
Correspondence op, cit. pp303-7.
27. Marx did, however, draw attention to "parliamentary idiotism", the effect of membership of parliamentary bodies on workers'
representatives "Marx toFriedrich Adolph Sorge" 19/9/1879 ininMarx and Engels SelectedCorrespondence cp. cit, pp308-9.
28. see Draper Volume II op. cit. pp106-13 for Marx and Engels' comments, for a discussion ofthe debate over the nature and significance of
the labour aristocracy see E.Hobsbawm "Debating the Aristocracy ofLabour" inhis Worlds of LAbour Weidenfeld, London 1984 pp214-27.
29. "Engels toAugust Bebel" 301811883 inMarx and Engels SelectedCorrespondence op, ciL pp343-4.
22. K. Marx "The Class Struggles inFrance: 1848 to1850" inhis Surveysfrom Exile Penguin, Hannondsworth 1973 pp40, 131 also see "The
British Constitution" inibid. p281 and F.Engels "On the History ofthe Communist League" inRevolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany
Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1977 p187.. . .
23. K. Marx "Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association" in his The First International and After Penguin,
Harmondsworth 1974 p78. F. Engels used asimilar argument inhis 1892 "Preface tothe English Edition" ofhis Condition of the Working Class
inEngland op,cit, pp31, 35. This argument was used by the Communist International toexplain the ebb ofthe revolutionary wave after World
War I, for an Australian example see "The Class Struggle inAustralia" a resolution adopted bythe Militant Minority Movement Conference
26112128 p2, typescript Mitchell Library:
"The illusions ofreformism were fostered byeconomic expansion which caused the capitalist class toconcede higher wages
and shorter hours, and improved conditions.
"...Reformist politics, opportunist politicians, the continuation ofcraft unionism, class collaboration officials, and arbitration
court influance [sic) are only explained bythe economic conditions which enable capitalism [to concede?) practically all that
was asked ofit by workers, by the inability of capitalism in such conditions to force every issue and by the fact that the
workers do not need tostruggle. With[out?] struggle there isno organisation, without struggle there isno knowledge ofsocial
forces, without struggle there is no desire to fight orknowledge ofhow tofight - and consequently there isa leadership in
conformity with the prevailing conditions."
24. "Bagels to Marx" 7/1011858 inMarx and Engels SelectedCorrespondence op. cit, pp102-3; F.Engels "Preface" tohis the Condition op,cit,
p35-6:
6trying to explain the abandonment of revolutionary politics by large sections of the parties of the working class.
The process was initially apparent in the "revisionism" and "reformism" of the right wings of the German and
French Parties and then in the "opportunism" of the majority centre of the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD),
the senior party of the Second International. Citing Bngels, supporters and opponents of these developments,
especially in the SPD attributed these developments to the influence of the aristocracy of labour.w Michels :
extensivelydocumented the growing moderationof the leadership of the SPD in his Political Parties. He offereda
number of explanations: the conservative influenceof the labour aristocracy; the logic of a primarilyParliamentary
strategy leading to the watering down of Party policy to attract votes31; the moderation engendered by the
bureaucratic life-style of the leaders of the SPD and its associated trade unions, which separated them from their
constituents; and the conservative nature of bureaucratic organisation in general. Following Mosca, Michels con-
cluded that the emergence of a conservative "political class" was inevitable, even in an organisation formally
committed to democratic policies,32 In 1915 Zinoviev offered a detailed explanation of opportunism in marxist
terms. While he drew on Michels' studies and identified similar factors as being responsiblefor the opportunism of
the German Party, Zinoviev's argument was more systematic and his conclusions different. He attributed
opportunism primarily to the influence of alien class forces inside the workers' party: petty bourgeois Party
members, the labour aristocracy (created by imperialism) and the labour bureaucracy. Zinoviev also attached
significanceto the Party's concessions to non-working class voters for electoral reasons. He concluded that it was
necessary and possible to struggle against the interests of the labour aristocracy to create a truly socialist
movement.33
Lenin's explanation of imperialismbecamemore widelyknown than that ofZinoviev. Even more than Zinoviev's
version, it rested on an interpretation of Engels's commentson the labour aristocracy. So Lenin saw reformismnot
primarily as a the result of the working class's own experiences but as reflecting the interests of a particular social
stratum, defined by its place in the relations of production. He held that the capitalist class had created the the
labour aristocracy, by using its imperialist super-profits to bribe a section of the working class. The explanatory
model was thus section three of the Manifesto. Lenin left the reasons for reformism's appeal to other sectionsof the
workingclass unexplained. He put his case forwardin The Collapse ofthe Second International in September1915
and more briefly in Imperialism, the Highest Stage ofCapitalism in 1916,34
Although Zinoviev had offered a more comprehensive account of opportunism, it was Lenin's briefer though
similar explanation that became the reference point for several generations of Communists after World War V 5
Schlesinger and Cliff point out that Lenin's argument is not a satisfactoryone. If imperialist super-profits enable
the capitalists to make concessions to the labour aristocracy, there is no reason they shouldnot also be made to the
rest of the working class. Lenin's position provided socialists with a consolation that their minority situation was
due to the undemocraticnature of the labour movement,rather than a sober recognition that. for the time-being they
were swimming against the currentof the short-terminterests and orientationof the majorityof the workingclass.36
Using the same kind of analysis applied by Marx and Engels to the mid-19th Century British working class Cliff
makes a convincing case for the irrelevanceof the labour aristocracy, arguing that reformism arose because:
"The expansion of capitalism through imperialism made it possible for the trade unions and the
Labour Parties to wrest concessions from capitalismwithoutoverthrowingit."
The circumstances of expanding capitalism also generated a labour bureaucracy whose life situation gave it an
interest in reformist politics whether capitalism was expanding or not. The full-time labour bureaucracyforms a
30. R. Schlesinger Central European Democracy and Its Background International Library ofSociology and Social Reconstruction, London
1953 p80.
31. Two early writers on the ALP drew attention to the logic of Parliamentary politics and the conservatising influence of Parliamentary
institutions onLabor politicians: W. R. Winspear Economic Warfare International Socialist,Sydney 1913 pp22,24,37-8 and V. G. Childe How
LabourGoverns Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1964, first published 1923 pp25, 31, 72-3, 80. Much later A. Davies and G. Serle (eds)
"Introduction" to Policies for Progress Victorian Fabian Society, Melbourne 1954 p5, two ALP members, also spelt out the logic of
Parliamentarism: .
"As a mass party seeking an electoral majority, it [the ALP] has had to appeal to other sections ofthe community, toplay
down its radical tendencies and, when in power, endeavour toreconcile sectional and national interests."
32. R. Michels PoliticalPartiesJarrold and Sons, London 1911 pp304-11, 382-3, 386-9, 393-6.
33. G. Zinoviev "The Social Roots ofOpportunism" New International 1(2) Winter 1983-4 pp97-137. He used the example ofAustralia to
illustrate his case against the labour bureaucracy because "the reactionary role ofthe 'socialist bureaucracy' appears nowhere soostentatiously
asin Australia, that veritable Land ofPromise ofsocial reformism" p113. Zinoviev said ofMichels that "He vacillates back and forth between
vulgar reformism and quasi-revolutionary syndicalism...But his observations, and the material which the author has collected, are .of great
interest", p115.
34. V. I. Lenin The Collapse of the Second International September 1915 Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975 pp401-1, where Lenin also
mentions the "bureaucracy" of the working class aswell as the aristocracy, V. I. Lenin Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism inhis
Selected Works Volume 1 Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977 pp714-5, 728-9, see also V. I. Lenin Imperialism and the Split in Socialism
October 1916 Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975 ppl3-4 where Lenin quotes from Engels on the labour aristocracy. Schlesinger 0(,. cit. pp81-2
argued that Lenin made an original contribution by attributing the rise ofthe labour aristocracy toimperialism ingeneral and not Just Britain's
monopoly situation during the 19th Century.
35. For early examples ofthe orthodox status ofthis interpretation ofthe basis ofreformism see e.g, the very widely distributed and read N.
Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky The AlJCof Communism University ofMichigan Press, Ann Arbor 1977 pp141-3j L. Trotsky ''Theses ofthe
Third World Congress on the International Situation and the Tasks ofthe Comintern" in A. Adler (00.) Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos ofthe
First Four Congresses ofthe ThirdInternational Ink Links, London 1980 p198. Note that these writers and other marxists explaining reformism
did not entirely neglect the role ofthe labour bureaucracy. For indigenous Australian analyses of the labor aristocracy see L. L. Sharkey in
Tribune7/10/43 p3 and E. J. Rowe, Commonwealth Councillor ofthe Amalgamated Engineering Union on his own members "New Processes
Demand New Union Policies" Communist Review January 1944 p188-9, for a more realistic picture ofthe engineers see T. Sheridan Mindful
MilitantsCambridge University Press, Melbourne 1975.
36. Schlesinger op. cit. pp82-4, Cliff"Economic Roots" op. cit.
7layer in organic contact with the working class and has many of the features attributed to the, in some senses
mythical, labour aristocracy. The full-time officials of the trade unions are distinguished from workers by their
privileged wages and working conditions and functions as managers of large organisations. Their relationship to
the means of production is different to thatof any worker. Trade unions are fundamentally organisations concerned
with the retailing of the commodity labourpower. As such they are inherently a capitalistphenomenon -- theyonly
make sense under a mode of production where labour power is a commodity.s? Labour bureaucrats shrink from
risks which could endanger their organisations and hence their jobs. For labour bureaucrats, as a.social group,
revolution falls well within the definition of an unacceptable risk. The managers and elected representatives of
parties based on the workingclass and committed to parliamentarisrn, that is working within the institutions of the
capitalist state, and especially those constituted out of the trade unions, share many of the characteristics of trade
union officials. Members of both the ALP and trade union bureaucracies are in an excellentposition to propagate
their world view inside the workingclass. They are leadersof organisations with which many workers identify and,
especially before the 1970s, the vast majority had working class origins risen froni the rank and file of the class.
They can expect, in the first instance, that their utterances will be greeted with less suspicion than those of the
media,public servants, teachers and conservative politicians.
Although Lenin's explanation of reforrnism was deficient, this did not vitiate his argument that the elimination of
false consciousness (and the eventualoverthrow of the capitaliststate) wouldbe advancedby the existenceof an in-
stitutional focus for the consistent, conscious expression of working class interests. He maintained that such an
.institution, a revolutionary party, should be made up of the most class conscious and militant members of the
working class. Working together in a disciplined way, rather than individually, they would be more effective in
overcoming the unevenness of working class consciousness, by raising its general level. Lenin regarded a
revolutionary party as a means for the proletariat to become a "class for itself' .38 A corollary of this view is that
effective organisations in the labour movement, constitutedaround the ideologies of classes or strata other than the
proletariat,can increase the influenceof "incorrectideas" in the working class too.
An important implication of the insights of the marxist tradition outlined above is that the working class's own
experienceof struggleand the conflicting attempts of the most conscious adherents of the working class's interests
and the labour bureaucracy form the basis of an understanding of the development of the economic ideas of the
Australian labour movement. This is another way of expressing the dictum "that men make history in
circumstances not of theirown choosing" and serves to ground a historyof ideas in the actions of real human beings
rather than in impersonal, suprahuman social structures. The circumstances of the development of the labour
movement's economic ideas went beyondevents internal to the organisations of the workingclass. To establish the
context of these ideas it is, therefore, necessary to offer a schematic account of important developments in
Australian and world capitalism that go beyond the local events in the labour movement or even in the struggle
between capital and labour. In particular,chapters two and five examine Australia's place in the world capitalist
system during the years 1934-41 and 1941-50, as well as key economic andpolitical developments. This approach
permits an assessmentof how adequate labourmovement thought on the nature of Australiancapitalismwas to its
subject. The relevance of past deficiencies in labour movement economic analyses and their implications for
working class strategycan thus be more effectivelyrelated to those ideas which still form a part of the outlook of
sections of the labour movement. .
With a few notable exceptions there has been very little study specifically devoted to the economic thoughtof the
Australianlabour movement, apart from the ideas of leadingALP politicians when in office,39 C. D. W. Goodwin
deals briefly with economic ideas in the labour movementbefore World War 1. In this regard his work has been
superseded by Verity Burgmann's excellentIn Our Time.40 Many labour historians touch on labour's economic
ideas only in passing. Where they have dealt with the period 1934-50 their work is considered below. L. Louis
examines these ideas in greater detail than most in his Trade Unions and the Depression, as his period dictated.s!
37. for A. Gramsci's particularly clear exposition ofthis analysis ofthe role oftrade union officials see "Unions and Councils" inhis Selections
from PoliticalWritings: 1910-1920 Lawrence and Wishart, London 1977 p99 and "Trade Unions and the Dictatorship" ibid. p105. M Dixson
GreaterthanLeninMelbourne 1977 p156 notes that during the 19208 ..
"the life-situation ofthe rank and file kept them more responsive, over alonger period oftime, to class struggle ideology, than
did that oftheir officials."
Fora more extensive account ofthe class position oftrade union officials see R. Hyman Marxism and the Sociology ofTrade Unionism Pluto,
London 1975 and T. O'Lincoln yRankandFileunpublished pamphlet inR. Kuhn's possession.
38. See V. I. Lenin WhatIs To Be Done? in his Selected WorksVolwnelop. cit, pp92-241, T. CliffLenin Volwne1: Building thePartyPluto,
London 1975 pp68-98, J. Molyneux Marxism and the PartyPluto, London 1978 pp56-95, C. Harman Partyand ClassSun Press, Highland Park
Michigan 1975.
39..Australia does not seem tobe much worse off, in terms ofstudies ofits labour movement's economic thought, than most other countries.
Britain has had the advantage ofa very good study (by an Australian), S. Macintyre A Proletarian Science: Marxism in Britain1917-1933
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1980, which deals with economic and other areas ofmarxist theory.
40. C. D. W. Goodwin Economic Enquiryin AUstralia Duke University Press, Durham 1966 pp36S-74, V. Burgmann In OurTime: Socialism
and theRise of Iabor 1885-1905 Alien and Unwin, Sydney 1985.
41. L. J. Louis TradeUnions and the Depression: A Studyo/Victoria1930-1932 Australian National University Press, Canberra 1968 based on
his 'Victorian trade Unions in the Depression 1930-32' M. A. Thesis Melbourne University 1964. J. Hagan The History 0/ the A.C.T.U.
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1981 apart from being the best proxy available for a history ofthe Australian labour movement in the 20th
Century, also provides valuable information and comments on labour movement economic ideas.
8Other studies of the depression period, by B. McFarlane and D. Clark concentrate on individuals.42 B. Berzins
deals with the impact of Douglas Credit theories on the ALP.43 The period after the depression and before the
Curtin Government is a relatively barren one for studies of the ideas associated with the ALP and the Communist
Party of Australia (CPA). The CPA's historians pay only limited attention to the Party's economic theories despite
its claims to perspectives informed by a materialist interpretation of history.44 When "labour history" becomes the
study of Governments it attracts many more exponents. The relatively extensive literature devoted to the
Keynesianism of the Curtin and Chifley Governments is considered in chapter six. The outstanding and pioneering
work in the field of the history of labour's economic thought is P; LOve's Labour and the Money Power.45 While
the following chapters on the ALP do not always bear out Love's conclusions, they owe much to his valuable study.
42. B. McFarlane Professor Irvine's Economics in Australian Labour History Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Canberra
1966, D. Clark "E. G. Theodore: HisEconomics andHisInfluence" Economics 10(1) March 1975 pp27-33; D. Clark "Was Lang Right?" inH.
Radi andP. Spearritt (eds) Jack Lang Hale andIremonger andLabour History, Sydney 1977 pp138-59; D. Clark "'FoolsandMadmen'" in J.
Mackinolty The Wasted Years AlIen andUnwin, Sydney 1981 ppI75-193. B. Carrol "William Forgan Smith" inD. J. Murphy andR. B. Joyce
Queensland Political Portraits 1859-1952 University of Queensland Press 1978 p409 argues Queensland Premier Forgan Smith introduced
Keynesian policies. .
43. B. Berzins "Douglas Credit and the ALP" in R. Cooksey (ed.) The Great Depression in Australia, Labour History 17 1970 pp148-60: B.
Berzins 'TheSocial Credit Movement inAustralia to 1940' M.A. Thesis University ofNSW 1967.
44.Themost extensive histories areA.Davidson The Communist Party ofAustralia: A Short History Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1969
and, withsomewhat more attention to Communist thought R. Gollan Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and the Australian Labour
Movement 1920-1955 Australian National University Press, Canberra 1975. T. O'Lincoln Into the Mainstream Blood on the Wattle Press,
Sydney 1985, presents a superior analysis forthe post-World War II period. R. Day'sexcellent study The 'Crisis' and the 'Crash': Soviet
Studies of the West 1917-1939 NewLeft Books, London 1981 fills some ofthegapinourknowledge ofCommunist economic theory leftbythe
historians oftheCPA, given theAustralian Party's considerable dependence onRussian economic ideas.
45.P. Love Labour and the Money Power: Australian Labour and Populism 1890-1950 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1984 andhis
'LaborandtheMoney Power: A Study of Australian Labor Populism' M.A.Thesis LaTrobe University 1980.
9CHAPTER TWO
THE DEPRESSION AND BEFORE
The period between the depression and the post-war boom was one during which the contours of contemporary
labourmovement economic thought wereestablished. It wasa period of important transitions. An appreciation of
the intellectual equipment the labour movement hadearlieraccumulated andits adequacy to thephenomenon of the
depression is necessary for an understanding of these transitions. Moreover, someitemscollected before the mid-
1930s havecontinued, in moreor lessmodified form, to be features of thelabourmovement's economic thinking.
TheRussian Revolution crystalised out the characteristic organisational division of theAustralian labour movement
for the next fifty years -- that between the ALP and the CPA. This organisational dichotomy also involved a
polarisation in theeconomic perspectives of the labourmovement. While the ALPcontinued to include a diversity
of political currents after theestablishment of the CPAin 1920-2, marxism increasingly came to be associated with
Communism. The whithering away of the Victorian Socialist Party, which had overlapping membership with the
ALP,was a symptom of this tendency. Nevertheless, the ALPhas continued to include marxists as individuals and
organised as factions since the 1920s. In a few circumstances, suchas theNSWSocialisation Units, theyhave been
able to have a 'significant, if temporary impacton theParty.
Laborite Economic Thought Before 1934
Frank Anstey's writings during the pre-depression period provided a synthesis of laborite arguments that was
uncharacteristic of the rest of the labour movement. Elsewhere the same ideas were expressed, but they were
infrequently integrated into anexplicitanalysis of Australian capitalism. As a member of the Victorian and then the
Commonwealth Parliament where he was deputy leaderof the opposition from 1922 to 1927, Anstey exercised a
considerable intellectual influence in the labour movement.! His The Kingdom of Shylock of 1917 offered a
critique of WorldWar I in terms of a theory of the international conspiracy of theMoneyPower. That book was
suppressed by the authorities, but his 1921 Money Power continued its analyses, as did Facts and Theories of
Finance written in 1930 when he was the Minister for Health andRepatriation. Thesepublications, in particular,
gave an account of very widely held laborite views on Australia's economic relationships with the rest of the
world, theclass anatomy of Australian capitalism and thenature of economic crises.
In Anstey's thought Australia's placein the international economy and mostothereconomic questions werelargely
a function of his theory of theconspiracy by a world"Money Power". Australia was dominated by this conspiracy
the"foreign financial yoke".2 Anstey andothers, especially during thedepression believed that the banks andsome
individuals who had a preponderant influence in Australia, including the Bruce-Page Government, were agents of
the "evil machinations of overseas money managers" or at leastof foreign interests.s Morebasicto laborite thought
thaneven thisMoneyPowerview, though not incompatible with it, was an Australian nationalism which identified
workers' with the national interest. While there were republicans on the left of the Labor Party who favoured
severing all ties with Britain, laborite nationalism often involved hostility to certain of the British Governments'
policies but not to theBritish Empire per se. TheLabor Party thus continued thepolicies thathadled it to establish
theAustralian Navy, as a unit within the Empire and into WorldWar I in Britain's wake. During the early 1920s
the ALP opposed the proposal for an Empire Federation, with Dominion representatives .in the Parliament at
Westminster, but
"The looser the legal ties that bind us, the more each entity [within the Empire] with its varied
customs, claims and environments are allowed to freely develop along lines suited to their own
aspirations, the stronger will be 'crimson threads of kinship' that bind us together to our mutual
advantage."4
1.On Anstey's career see B. R. Nugent 'Frank Ansteyand Victorian Politics' M. A. ThesisUniversity of NewEngland1974jI. Turner"Anstey,
FrancisGeorge" in B. Nairnand G. Serle (eds)Australian DictionaryofBiography MelbourneUniversity Press, Melbourne1979 p80jP. Cook
"Frank Anstey: Memoirs of the Scullin Government" Historical Studies 18(72) April 1979 pp36S-392. P. Love is presentlyworking on a
biographyof Anstey. LaborNews 18/2122 pl recommended that
"Candidatesfor Parliamentin the Labor interestsand Labor speakersand writers generallywould do well to keep on hand a
copyof FrankAnstey's littlebook 'Money Power'. Anstey is one of the brainiestand straightest menin the Australian Labor
Movement,and anythinghe writes is well worth reading. Anyonewho has the contentsof this little volumeat his fingerends
will have no difficultyin flattening out the solemnnonsensetalked in anti-Labor circles and published in anti-Labor dailieson
the subjectof nationalfinance."
Alsosee LaborNews 14/4/23. The CPAacknowledged Anstey's influencein the labourmovement, thoughnot his capacities in TheProletarian
27, 1/4123 p17: .
"The most this intellectual giant of the A.L.P. could contribute to the education of his class was the following statement:-
'In Great Britain,Germanyand France therehave been men who have, at least recognised that certainfundamental principles
of Socialism are capable of being applied with profit to capital and industry.'
Such is the intellectual leadership of the A.L.P," .
2. F. AnsteyMoneyPowerFraserandJenkinson,Melbourne1921p124.
3.Labor Daily221411930 p4, editorial8/9/26p4. Alsosee UnionVoice 10/1131 p3, 414131 p3.
4.LaborNews 2616120 p7.
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Oneof the most important economic expressions of laboritenationalism was protectionism. Hagan has argued that
protectionism, along witha commitment to arbitration and the White Australia Policy were the distinctive features
of Australian Iabourism.S While laborites advocated tariffs and other protective measures to increase Australia's
production and henceindependence of Britain and the rest of the world, the principle of Britishpreference wasnot
subjectto particularattack.e Anstey's position on protection in 1921, a typical one, was more or less implemented
by the ScullinGovernment:
"If we want Australia to be a self-sustaining community we shouldplace such a duty upon imported
articles whichwe canproduceas to prohibittheir entrance."?
The NSW Labor Government, under Jack Lang, introduced protectionist measures in 1926 by providing for
preference first to Australian and secondly for British commodities in its Local Government Amendment
(Preference to Australian andEmpireGoods) Act. Lang's Government alsosubsidised protectionist propaganda, in
the form of the Australian Made Preference League's Exhibition Train.f The centre-piece of the Scullin
Government's policiesfor combating thedepression was its imposition of veryhigh tariffs againstmost imports.
Protectionism was integrated with other aspects of laborite economic thought: underconsumptionism, and hostility
to theMoneyPower. Louiscomments that during thedepression:
"Prominent in union thinking was the ideal of a self-sufficient Australia which would not be .
dependant on overseas financiers and manufacturers, and one of the principal instruments for
achieving thiswas to be the tariff,"?
Protection also fitted in snuglywith Australian racism, oftenjustified on economic grounds. Cheap wage labour
overseas was widely identified in the labour movement as a threat to Australian living standards: tariffs kept out
the goods produced by such labour and the white Australia policy kept out the "cheap" labourers themselves. A
poem by the lectureron the Australian MadeProtection League's GreatWhite Exhibition Train expressed this link:
"DearAustralia, here's to you,
Till earth sinks in finalnight,
May your sons be free and white,
White in soul andbody too,
WhiteAustraliathrough and through,
Dear Australia, here's to you." 10
Protectionism was not simply a spontaneous working class ideology. The idea that tariffs and similar measures
were in workers' and the national interests primarily benefited manufacturers. Industrialists and their political
representatives were active in promoting protectionism's acceptance by the Australian working class. The brief
interlude of the "New Protection" before World War I had served to convince most laborites of the virtues of
protectionism. The "New Protection" was enshrined in legislation by a Liberal Government, with Labor support
and tied certain protectionist measures to the paymentof "fair and reasonable" wages by manufacturers. Many
manufacturers were not convinced that the alliance with a large section of the labourmovement forged by the New
Protection warranted the concessions made. They were probably right: even though the legislation was soon
invalidated by the High Court, the ALP remained committed to the New Protection in principle and almost any
formof protectionin practice.
As manufacturers faced increasing competition from imported. goods and the considerable influence of rural
interests hostile to tariffs in the Bruce-Page Cabinetduring the 1920s, they took steps to increase the identification
of the prosperity of Australian industry with better wages and secureemployment. Large manufacturers, including
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd (BHP), set up the Australian Industries Protection League and the Australian Made
Preference League. The Protection League, a national body, not only lobbied Parliamentarians but also hired a
lecturer to inform workers of the benefits of protection (during their lunch breaks of course) and distributed
pamphlets and leaflets such as What Protection Means to the Worker.ll The Preference'League had a clear
orientation towards converting workers, as consumers, to the benefits of buying Australian goods. It had a regular
columnin the Labor Daily during late 1925and sponsored the tour of NSW by the Great White Exhibition Train,
withshowrooms for the products of 32 companies.R Individual companies also conductedtheir own protectionist
propaganda.U
5. Haganop, cit. pxi. .
6. A twotieredtariff structure hadbeenintroduced in 1908,with lowerdutiesbeingcharged on Britishgoods.
7. Australian Worker18/8/21 p17. AlsoseeAnsteyMoneyPowerp125. Anstey saw protectionism as beingpossible in the contextof anassault
on the MoneyPower, throughthe nationalisation of the "instruments of exchange". For other protectionist statements in the labourmovement
see e. g. Australian Worker14/4/21 p20,Editorial 27/11129 p3, 4/12129 ppl, 6,8, 9j LobarDaily819/26, fora formof wordssimilarto Anstey's
see a resolution of the FebruarylMarch 1930Australasian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU, also abbreviation for the same organisation, later
known as the Australian Council of TradeUnions) in Haganop. cit. p95.
8.LobarDaily4/11/25j M. Goat"RadioLANG" in H.Radiand P. Spearritt op,cit. p126.
9. LouisTrade Unionsop, cit. p26.
10.LobarDaily28/1/261'6.
11.P. C.Grey 'Tariff Policy1919-1929' B. A. Honours Thesis,Department of theGovernment, University of Sydney 1970pp19,20.
12 For theactivities of the Australian Made Preference League seeLobarDaily24/8126 p8, 10/9/26 p7and itsown publications Souvenir of the
Australian MadePreference Leagueand theGreatWhiteTrainSydney 1926andPresentDayAustralia 1927Sydney1927.
13.e. g. advertisements by Australian Ironand SteelLobarDaily 11/3/26 p3 and 1813/26 p3.
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Despite the claims made for the beneficial effects of protectionism, the Scullin tariffs, with their 80 per cent.
increase in the British Preferential Rate (higher for the General Tariff) between 1928-29 and 1931-32 did not
prevent wage cuts or an unemployment levelof about 30 per cent. during the worstof the depression, never falling
below 8 per cent. during the "recovery",14 The possibility that tariffs might reduce workers' living standards by
leading to higher prices was simply denied by leading laborites, on the basisof assertion rather than evidence.U
The evident failure of higher tariffs to cure the depression, while it did not discreditprotectionism, did lead to an
increasedinterest in Money Power theoriesin the labour movementafter 1929:
"The Scullin tariffs have not been as effective as hoped, owing to the intervention of the banks
refusing credit."16
These theories constituted the only explicit alternative in the labour movement to a marxist analysis of the class
anatomy of Australian capitalism. Anstey, who offered one of the most extensive expositions of Money Power
theory, maintainedthat
"It is the cuttingof industryinto stocks and bonds and scrip thatmakes the capitalistsystemrelatively
modem andrelativelydistinctive."11
Capitalism was thus characterised by its financial arrangements rather than the relationship between wage labour
and capital. For Ansteybankersand financiers were the coreof capitalismand directlydetermined its course:
"Financiersare the Dictators of Policies,
-- the UnseenPower in Democracies." 18
The "bondholding oligarchy" controlled the Australian economywith a view to securing interest payments on its
loans and was responsible for depressions. They imposed the canons of orthodox finance on Governments,
reducing purchasing power and hence restricting consumption and. choking production. In a more moderate
formulation it was asserted that the withdrawal of credit facilities by banks greatly intensified the 1930s
depression.ts For Ansteythe most important cleavage in society was that between producers and the Money
Power: "All producers, primary or secondary" had a commoninterest in the face of international interestpayments.
By producers he meant not just workers but alsoemployers engagedin manufacturing or rural industries.20 Money
Power was thus a scapegoatfor the whole capitalist class. Money Power theory let the capitalist system off the
hook by focusingworkers' anger at their exploitation or unemployment on a tiny, mainlyoverseasgroup)1 Anstey
sought to justify his theory of the Money Power conspiracy by means of an empirical accountof the interlocking
ownershipand directorships of Australian companies. MoneyPower revealedthat
"Three, committees of financiers -- the English, the Sugar, the Metal -- constituteAustralia's Trinity
of 'Economic Masters'."22
This preoccupation with ownership patterns in discussing the dynamic of Australiancapitalism and even Anstey's
"Trinity"were seminalin the development of the economicideas of the Australian labour movement. Such an ap-
proach has been very useful for understanding the coherenceof the capitalistclass and divisions inside it, but it can
throw little light on the relations betweencapital and labour. Ownership studies have formed a part not only of
anti-MoneyPower populisttheories but also those which have identifiedthe key cleavagein societyas that between
the people and the monopolies or the multinational corporations.23
The experience of the depression seemed to confirm many aspects of Money Power theory, most notably the
important role of the banks in determining Government policy. It required no great leap of the imagination to
blame the depressionon the influence of Sir Otto Niemeyer, the Bank of England emissaryto Australia, and on Sir
Robert Gibson the orthodoxGovernor of the Commonwealth Bank. In this view, the depression had been created
by the "evil machinations of overseasmoneymanagers":
14. Tariff level calculated from A. T. Cannody "The Level ofthe Australian Tariff: AStudy inMethod" Yorkshire BulletinofEconomic and
SocialResearchJune 1952. . .
15. See especially E. G. Theodore Labor's Campaign Manual 1928 ALP State ofNSW, Sydney 1928 plO; also Australian WorkerEditorial
21/11129 p3. Scullin argued that protection could promote "healthy competition within the country" Australian Worker 11/3/26 p16.
16. A. C. Paddison TheLang Plan: The Casefor Australia LaborDaily,Sydney Second Edition 1931 p31. For the increased interest in Money
Power with the onset ofthe depression see the NSW and Queensland newspapers ofthe ARU, the Railroadand Advocate during 1929-30.
11. Anstey MoneyPower op, cit. p16. Love Labourand the MoneyPower op. cit, isa history ofMoney Power ideas in the Australian Labour
Movement.
18. F. Anstey Factsand Theories ofFinance Fraser and Jenkinson, Melbourne 1930, inside front cover.
19. See Anstey MoneyPowerop.cit. ppI38-9, FactsandTheories op. cit. pp1. There was agreater stress on the international nature ofthe
financial oligarchy in MoneyPowerthan Factsand Theories orTheKingdomofShylockLabor Call Print, Melbourne 1911.
20. Factsand Theories op, cit. pp1-8. Also see LaborDailyEditorial 2214130 p4:
"The money capitalist isthe gentleman who isengaged inaconspiracy throughout the capitalist world todrive him to the wall
who issometimes called the industrial capitalist."
Also ALP Socialisation Committee Sociallsation ofCreditSydney 1933 p1.
21. See, e. g., R. F. Irvine The MldasDelusionHassell Press, Adelaide 1933 p223. Lang's radical sounding slogan "the socialisation ofcredit"
was used precisely toundermine the explicitly anti-capitalist Socialisation Units in the NSW ALP during the early 19308, see R. Cooksey Lang
and Socialism Australian National University Press, Canberra 1976 p71.
22. MoneyPowerop. cit. p66. The KingdomofShylock p,rovided an earlier and briefer outline ofthe structure ofAustralian capitalism which
mentioned only two committees the "metal gang" and the 'sugar gang", pp40-1.
23. See S. Encel "Power in Australia" Arena 6 1965 p4 for an identification ofAnstey's seminal role. J. N. Rawling Who Owns Australia
Modem Publishers, Sydney, Second Edition 1931 acknowledged his debt to Anstey. As late as 1951 R. Gibson "Monopoly Rules Australia"
Communist ReviewFebruary 1951 described Australia's monopoly groups in almost the same termAnstey used.
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"In the Commonwealth and the majority of the states the legislature has been replaced by a banking
dictatorship."24
The labourmovementcame to pay muchmoreattention to "monetary causes andcures" .25
The most spectacular phenomenon associated with the renewed interest in the Money Power was the political
mobilisation aroundJ. T. Lang, the leaderof theNSW ALP. Lang hadnot displayed a particularconcernaboutthe
Money Power during the 1920s but quickly emerged as the main antagonist of the financial dictators during the
depression,26 His militant anti-Money Power rhetoric was an important factor in a political mobilisation of the
working class in NSW, andeven other states. The near collapseof workers' ability to defendtheir interests through
their own activityin the trade unions led to a searchfor an alternative meansof combating the drasticeffectsof the
depression. Staid labourism and protection had not succeeded in improving matters. Lang's militantrhetoric and
his position of authority as State Premier or plausible aspirant to that office seemed to offer a radical solution to
radical problems, without the need for workers to exert power themselves. Lang, it was widely hoped, was a
saviourwho would fix things for the workers.27 Hence the passiveresponse whenGovernorGame sackedLangas
Premierand undermined illusions that Lang was a substitute for devastated union organisation. During the period
of Lang's ascendancy he providedone of the few remaining means by whichtrade unionofficials, mainlyin NSW,
could legitimise their positions in the eyes of their members. They could not defend workers' interests in their
capacityas leaders of industrial organisations or in the course of industrial action. But theycould claim to do so by
virtueof their relationship withLang. Unionofficials,who hadpreviously shownno great interest in MoneyPower
(andsubsequently werenot to do so), were attractedto such ideas and hence to Lang during the worst years of the
depression,28 During the post-depression recovery Money Power ideas and Lang proved to be obstacles to the
revivalof the class struggleand the interests of trade unionofficials. As the mass support for such ideas fell away,
a sectionof the union bureaucracy movedagainstLang. .
Some sections of the Labor movement went further into the labyrinth of Money Power theory than those who
simply followed Lang. The doctrines of Douglas Social Credit attractedsome following inside the working class
during the depression.29 On the other hand Labor leaders and their followers who were not prepared to adopt
Lang's radical rhetoric or subordinate themselves to him made concessions to Money Power theory. This was
especially the case after Lyons's split to the right in 1931 had even further discredited concessions to orthodox
economic theory inside the Labor Party. Lyons had been the main advocate of financial orthodoxy inside the
Federal Parliamentary Labor Party. The right wing of the Party was not averse to occasional statements about
MoneyPower conspiracies, but, in contrast with the Langites, tended to lay more stress on the inadequacies of the
financial mechanisms in causing the depression rather than intentionally destructive acts by the bankers and their
associates. Nevertheless, especially during the 1934 federal election campaign, both the Federal and NSW
("Lang") LaborParties stressedthe importance of government controlover the monetary and banking system,30
Underconsumptionism was a common feature of both the adherents of Money Power theory and more moderate
laborites. An underconsumptionist analysis of capitalism explains economic crises as the consequence of the
deficiency of the purchasing power of the mass of the population, comparedto the quantityof goods available for
sale. Apart from the small minority who accepted orthodox economics, the entire labour movement during the
1920s and depression subscribed to one underconsumptionist theory or another and regarded wage cuts as
exacerbating the depression. The boundaries between different underconsumptionist theories were not usually as
clear cut as the following outlineof their contents might suggest.
24. LaborDaily 2214130 p4 andA. C. Paddison op, cit, p29.
25. Berzins "DouglasCredit" op, cit, p153:L. Ross "From Lane to Lang -- The Evolution of Labor Theory" AustralianQuarterly December
1934:for the ACTU see Haganop,cit, p95: "Asthe depression deepened, so the AcrU increasingly emphasized the importance of the creation
of credit" The ALPPlatformonly included a separate sectionon bankingfromMay 1930.
26. Lang rejectedrepudiation of interestpayments duringthe 1930Stateelectioncampaign, but tookthe policyup in 1931,DixsonGreaterthan
Leninop. cit, p164. .
27. See C. HadeEbenezerSydney1932,a bookof poemsto Lang. I. E. Young'ConflictWithinthe NSWLaborParty 1919-1932' M.A.Thesis,
Department of Government, University of Sydney1961 pp295-8, 333 pointsout that the rise in Lang's personal influencestartedin 1929-30,
that is, withthe depression and thathe "retained controlof the industrial wing"of the Partyuntilthe mid-1930s.
28. For exampleOscar Schreiber, Secretaryof the Furnishing Trades Union. BeforeWorld War I and shortly after he had been a marxistand·
advocateof industrialunionism. After the Warhe was associated with the TradesHallReds,whoseleaderLaborCouncilSecretary Gardenwas
in the CPAuntil 1926. But Schreibersubscribed to Hobsonian economics, ratherthan the rnarxism of other TradesHall Reds, duringthe early
1920s,DixsonGreaterthanLeninop,cit, p213. Duringthe depression Schreiber becamea supporterof Langandthe Furnishing Worker, edited
by Schreiber, ran material by a variety of Money Power theorists, including Soddy, Jennings Bryan and Douglas. He went on to play an
important role in the fight against Lang in the NSW Labor Party and was one of the first laboritesto recognise the meritsof J. M. Keynes's
GeneralTheory in 1936. For a selection of material Schreiberthought important at differentstates see Furnishi,!g TradesJournal5/9/13 p18,
10111113 p145 an extract from the German Socialist Party's Erfurt Programon craft unionism; Furn1. sh1.ng War ker 7/10/18
pS. Furnishing Worker's "In the Library" column of 1922-23 recommended a considerable amountof J. A. Hobson, see Furnishing Worker·
6111130 p2,615/32 p2, 1/111133 p3.
29. See Berzins"DouglasCredit" op. cit, p156:LoveLabourand the MoneyPower op. cit, ppI33-40. TheDouglasCredittheoryofthe Money
Powerlaid an even greaterstresson the needfor workers to collaborate with their employers, againstthe banksthan laboriteversions did. The
Secretary of the Victorian Australian Railways Union(ARU),a supporterof Douglas Creditlamented that:
"Unhappily business and employing interests in Australia are unable to recognise that their own immediate and intimate
welfareis completely interlocked with thatof the Australian wageearner." (Quoted in LouisTradeUnions op, clt, p48)
Sincejoiningthe railwaysMasseyhadheld supervisory positions, eventually veryseniorones,LaborCall 1114/40 p12.
30. See Scullin's policy1934ElectionSpeechppl-2; P. E. ColemanPresidential AddressFederalALP (NSWBranch)1934p24:J. Robertson J.
H. Scul/in University ofWesternAustralia Press,Nedlands1974p422:Australian LaborParty(Queensland Branch) Manifesto ofFederalLabor
Bxectaiveon UnityNegotiations 1934p9: J. T. Lang"The FutureBelongsto Youth" LaborDailyYearBook1934-5pS:"[NSW] Labor's Policy
of Credit Control" ibid. pp79, 81. John Curtinacknowledged, as Money Power ideas did, that an important cause of the depression was the
financial systemin his Australia'sEconomic Crisisand the£55,000,000 Interest Bill Westralian WorkerPrint,Perth1930p4.
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In terms of their strategic implications there were three broad strategic versions of underconsumptionism: the
revolutionary outlook of the CPA, Labor's faith in the effectiveness of government action and a trade union
perspective that better wages, achieved through direct action or other means, could mitigate the economic crisis.
For. Communists and some other marxists a deficiency of purchasing power was inherent in capitalism, because
employers restricted the wages of their employees to increase their profits. The only real solution was the abolition
of capitalism through nationalisation under workers control. "Radical underconsumptionists" in the Communist
Party believed that this meant revolution, most of those in the ALP did not.
Money Power enthusiasts, like Anstey, thought depressions resulted from deliberate conspiracies by fmanciers to
cut purchasing power. Their solution was essentially to implement the ALP's long-standing policy of bank
nationalisation.Jt Moderate Labor leaders favoured a governmental underconsumptionism, which stressed the
importance of remedying the defects in capitalism which led to depressions, by means of legislation, and
governmental measures to offset inadequate purchasing power. The tools available for this approach can be divided
into monetary measures, such as control over interest and exchange rates, the level of the money supply and "real"
or fiscal measures to change the distribution of income, like taxation and public spending. There was a
considerable area of overlap between Money Power theorists and advocates of a more active monetary policy
during the depression. The highest expression of governmental underconsumptionism was the "Theodore Plan",
with its calls for mild inflation, government expansion of credit and devaluation.32 The Scullin Government's
relationship with the Commonwealth and trading banks soon made it clear that such a plan could only be effectively
implemented after the Australian financial system had been reformed.
A "trade union underconsumptionism" had considerable appeal to ordinary workers. Its basic proposition was that
depressions could be overcome by increasing real wages (including by cutting working hours), thus increasing
workers' purchasing power directly.33 Although usually propounded during the depression in association with
other underconsumptionist theories and policies (because it made them palatable to the working class), this
approach can be distinguished from others as more effectively representing working class interests. Where other
non-Communist underconsumptionist theories gave an inherent priority to state intervention to secure an
improvement in workers' conditions, trade union underconsumptionism could justify action by the working class
31. Anstey MoneyPower01'. cit, 1'125:
"With banking made a socially owned and controlled function, thecapitalist nerve is cut, the situation is changed, thecontrol
of theinstitutes andinstruments ofexchange bytheinner ring ofcapitalist 'financiers'- thesource of their power - isgone."
Also see,forexample, Anstey Facts and Theories01'. cit, p9; Labor Daily Editorial 2411/31 p4; UnionVoice D. Cameron 2815/32 1'3, Berzins
"Douglas Credit" 01'. cit.; ALP Socialisation Committee The Soclalisation of Credit Sydney 1933, this committee was opposed to the
Socialisation Units. While socialism received more, serious consideration during thedepression than the I920s, theheyday ofstate enterprise as
theroad tosocialism hadpassed, apart from calls forbank nationalisation. DUring theearly and mid1920s in particular Labor Governments in
NSW, Queensland and Western Australia hadengaged in extensive experiments along these lines, see C.A. Bernays Queensland ., OurSecond
PoliticalDecade: 1920·30 Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1931 pp97-129; E. M. Higgins 'Queensland Labour Governments' M A. Thesis
Melbourne University 1957 1'1'13-4; G.M. Prendergast Labor inPolitics 01" clt, I'll; Labor News 6112119 1'8, 1116120 pS; Australian Labor
Party Western Australia 4 1/2YearsofLaborGovernment Perih 1'1'39-43. .
32.B.McFarlane Professor Irvlne01" cit, 1'38 sawtheTheodore Plan, allegedly inspired byIrvine, asa credible proto-Keynesian alternative to
the more orthodox Premiers' Plan. Clark "Was Lang Right'}" 01'. cit, 1'158 questioned Lang's credentials as an anticipator of Keynes, by
emphasising thatLang believed inbalanced budgets, butseeJ. Lang Why I Fight Labor Daily, Sydney 1934 1'188, fora critical assessment of
financial balance:
"'Balanced budgets'...wasa bogey that could be employed in a vigorous press campaign to lever the Labor Party from its
traditional ideals to serve theinterests ofHigh Finance."
33. e.g, Labor News 27/5/22 p4; Furnishing Worker 513128 1'1. Labor Daily 1114130 pS: "The only sane method of dealing with the present
industrial situation istoreduce theworking week to40hours andat least to maintain theexisting pay scales." Also seeW.J. McKell's proposed
remedies for unemployment, Labor News 15/9123 ps, 1.higher wages, 2.publicworks, 3.afforestation, 4. unemployment insurance. Despite its
potential, trade union underconsumption didnot necessarily provide anImpetus to working class action. It could simply justify pleas to the
government or theArbitration Court thatthey increase wages. With trade union organisation at its nadir, during thedepression this was infact
thewaytheargument was usually employed. TheACTU proposed measures consistent with governmental underconsumptionism, but saw an
increase in thebasic wage andtheforty hourweek asimportant steps towards economic recovery, Hagan 01'. cit,1'1'167-8. A.C.Paddison atthe
1931 basic wage inquiry "contended that theonly solvent to theunemployment problem was an increase in wage rates", "Economic Effect of
Wage Reduction" LaborDailyYearBook1933 Sydney 1933 1'29; LaborDailyEditorial 2812131 I'll. Intheir1933 case fortherestoration ofthe
1931 tenr.:rcentwage cutover thirty unions used thefollowing formulation ora very similar one
, It is impossible to restore industries inAustralia toa state of prosperity, or to absorb thethousands now unemployed, unless
anduntil thepurchasing power of thepeople is increased toallow theconsumption offoods now produced inoverabundance."
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court Registry 1933_Applications for Restoration of 10% Reduction mimeo. One of the
arguments used to justify this proposition was that higher wages would increase purchasing power by shifting income from employers to
workers in "overcapitalised" industries. Dethridge C.J. described it as"the Hobson argument" andwhile he conceded thatit "may possibly be
supported" the Bench didnotgrant any restoration ofwages, seeCommonwealth Conciliation andArbitration Court Registry 1933 Applications
for the Restorationof10%Reduction ofWages. Transcript ofProceedings mimeo 1'1'150, 154. Theunions cited G. D.H. Cole, J. M.Keynes
and the International Labour Organisation, along with lesser lights, to justify their case. Furnishing Workers 619/22, 616123 included extracts
from Hobson's books. ForHobson's influence onProfessor Irvine see McFarlane Professor Irvlne01'. cit, 1'31.
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itself to promote its interests.w It could, therefore, legitimise a form of working class mobilisation under bourgeois
hegemony: challenging capitalism in practice but not theory, because it held that higher wages would alleviate
economic crises under capitalism, if not eliminate them.35
Communist Economic Thought to 1934
The CPA carried on many of the traditions of Australia's pre-war socialist sects: most importantly their
commitment to the labour theory of value, militant industrial organisation and the need to overthrow the capitalist
state. To these the experiences of the Russian Revolution and membership of the "World Party of Revolution" --
the Communist International (Comintern) -- added a more coherent approach to interventions by the Party rather
than by individual members into workers' struggles and hence a greater recognition of the need to come to terms
with the local and international circumstances of those struggles. A substantial part of the analyses which helped
the CPA to come to grips with the realities of Australian capitalism was developed by the Comintern in its
assessments of the condition of world capitalism and the international workers' .movement, But the Party also
undertook its own examinations of Australian circumstances and criticisms of the arguments of its opponents,
usually within a framework established by the International. The CPA paid particular attention to Australia's place
in the imperialist chain and the closely related issue of the anatomy of the local capitalist class.
The Comintern touched on Australia's place in world capitalism at its third Congress, in 1921. Its theses on the
international situation noted that during the war
"The transoceanic countries which export raw materials, including purely colonial countries (South
America, Canada, Australia, China, India, Egypt and others), have in their turn utilised the rupture of
international ties in order to develop their native industries."36
This assessment, given that the placement of the commas was accurate, may have been sufficient in the context of
the Comintern's discussion of the European economic situation. But when the International came to pay more
attention to other parts of the world the characterisation of Australia as a purely colonial country was found
deficient. The fourth Congress in 1922 reversed the analysis, calling Australia imperialist and urging the CPA to
combat "national and racial antagonism".37 In the spirit of this analysis W. P. Earsman argued in the CPA's paper,
the Communist that Australian capitalists were looking to export to the eastern market, i.e. Asia,38
By 1925 the CPA had developed a more sophisticated understanding of Australia's place in the world economy
than that entailed in the uninformative dichotomy between colonial and imperialist nations. The Party's analysis
drew on some of the main concerns of the international Communist movement .- the decay of the British Empire
and interimperialist rivalry, especially between Britain and the USA. The political conclusion which the CP.A
justified with its analysis was the priority of fighting British imperialism and the Australian capitalists over loyalty
to the Empire or Australian nationalism.J?
In the first issue of the CPA's theoretical journal, The Communist, in 1925 E. M. Higgins spelt out the Party's
approach:
We live not merely in the imperialist era, but in the British Empire 'dripping from every pore with
blood and dirt', and it is with this we are particularly concerned ... For workers who are British
'subjects', however, the only real struggle against imperialism is the struggle against British
imperialism...In Australia, this struggle will have to take advantage ofevery conflict of British
imperial interests with those of the rising'Australia First' capitalists. But it will have to do this, not
along the lines of abatement of the class struggle against the local bourgeoisie, but rather its
intensification ...The alternative to the idea of 'the Empire lies, not in the petty-bourgeois 'cultivation
of an Australian sentiment', but in cultivation of the sentiment of the international working class."40
34. The most substantial organisational expression of radical underconsumptionism in the ALP during the 1920swas the declining Victorian
SocialistParty (VSP),which embodied the ALP's abstractcommitment to socialism. R. Ross, its leadingspokesperson had defineda socialist
strategy,not dissimilarto thoseof alternative economic strategists today, betweenBolshevism and exclusive Parliamentarism in his WhatNext?
Buildingthe IndustrialState Ross's Book Service,Melbourne 1921 p4. The VSP perspective of the 1920s,that capitalism could be reformed
into socialism, declinedin the ALP. Adherents of the VSP and individuals with a similar outlookin NSW revivedthe SecondInternational
perspective for socialism: whencapitalism collapsepolitical powerwouldfall into thehands of the workers' party, which would then usher in
the new society, see Union Voice 28/6132 "Approaching Collapse of Capitalism"; J. Braunthalllistory of the International 1864-1914 Nelson,
London 1966 pp195-6, 266. Also see G. G. Hewitt 'A Historyof the Victorian Socialist Party' M. A. Thesis,La Trobe University 1974.The
main current inside the NSW Socialisation Unitshad this perspective and in the spirit of pre-World War I British marxism reprinted Harry
Quelshand BelfortBax's "A New Catechism of Socialism", see Soclalisation Call 1(2)May 1931 p2, 1(4)August1931 pl, 2(1)June-July1932
pI.
35. The radicalunderconsumptionism of the Socialisation Unitswas premised on a radicalLabor Government whichwouldintroduce socialism
for the workingclass. For a discussion of workingclassmobilisation withinthe hegemony of bourgeois ideologysee R. W. Connell and T. H.
IrvingClassStructure in Australian HistoryLongman Cheshire, Melbourne 1980p23.
36. A. Adler(ed.) "Thesesof the Third WorldCongress on theInternational Situation and the Tasksof the Comintern" Theses, Resolutions and
Manifestos ofthe FirstFourCongresses ofthe ThirdInternational Ink Links,London1980p190,emphasis in the original.
37. ''Theseson the EasternQuestion" ibid.p417.
38. Communist 15/12122 p2. Earsman'sviewdid notgo unchallenged. G. MarksCommunist 1211123 p3 seemedto favourthe earlierComintern
positionwhenhe maintained that"Nativecapitalin Australia is too small"to competefor the Chinesemarket
39. See e. g. Workers Weekly 1313/25 p4for a "revolutionary defeatist" attitudeto the Empire's involvement in any war.
40. E. M Higgins"The BritishEmpire" TheCommunist 1,January1925p3.
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This analysis, though brief, was, in its realism, commitment to independent working class action and
internationalism, superior to anything the CPA produced after it became a hard Stalinist Party during the early
1930s. Higgins went on to examine the ambiguous relationship between Britishand Australian capital:
"Our native bourgeoisie may be trusted to go ahead carving a kingdom for themselves (or for Wall
Street), at the expense of Britain. At present their fight with Britainis largelya sham fight. Will we
do any good by going out of our way to assist them?
"N0, because such action wouldmake revolutionarypropagandaimpossible. So far from providing a
firmer footing for revolutionary work, it would tie the revolutionary movementto the tail of the of-
ficial labour movement, which is itself trailing behind the Australian manufacturers. and even
becomingthe manufacturers' own party.
"The 'Australia First' cry is being used to give counter-revolutionary significance to the slogan
'Protect the Australian workers' standard of living'. It is encouraging all kinds of romantic notions
about Australia as a world apart which may expect to reach social salvation by isolating itself from
the rest of the world...despite the experience of 1921-22 -- that it is overseas conditions that must
dictate the standardof life for the workersof Australia."
His summaryof the situationwas apt:
"Under the influence of the 'Australia First' fever, Labor once more appears convinced that it can
purchase paradiseon the instalmentplan."41
The above perspective on Australia's place in the capitalist world was continued during the rest of the 1920s and
throughthe CPA's left-sectarianism phase, after 1929,with some changes in emphasis inspired by Russian foreign
policy.42 It was used to interpret the role of the ALP as a Party which promoted the interests of national capitalist
developmentin Australia,43 to elaborate on Australia's tentative imperialismin the Pacific44 and to throw lighton
the relevance of Anglo-American rivalry for Australia.4S
On the basis of its analysis of the developmentof Australiancapitalism, the CPA criticisedthe ALP's protectionism
as primarily assisting Australian manufacturers rather than workers. The CPA's position on tariffs had been suc-
cinctly expressed by Mick Considine. A veteran of prewar marxist groups, he was the member of the House of
Representatives for the militantly working class Barrier electorate which included Broken Hill until 1922. He
publiclyproclaimed his adherence to the principlesof the Comintern and while still in the Parliament left the ALP,
althoughhe did notjoin the CPA.His positionon tariffswas that
"It is over the surplus value that is wrung from the working class in the place where they are
exploited that the importers and the manufacturers quarrel, and attempt to use the workers and the
political representatives of the workers to aid them in securing their respective share of the plunder
for their particularsections."
The New Protectionmeant
"that one section of workers will make an arrangement with manufacturers for which all other
workers will be obliged to pay."46
The CPA was particularlyconcernedto demonstrate that the Scullin tariffswerenot in the workers' interests.s?
Although the Communists were attuned to differences inside the ruling class and their implications, in terms of
strategyits position was the same as Considine's attitude to capitalists' debates over tariffs: "A plague 0' bothyour
houses."48 The Party's response to the efflorescence of Money Power theory during the depression was along
similar lines, pointing out that the basis of capitalism was the extractionof surplus value and that workers had an
interest in overturning that process rather than siding with productive capital against bank capital in their dispute
over the distributionof the spoils.49 The Party drew on Lenin's Imperialism to the effect that under contemporary
conditions the distinction between bank and industrial capital was largely meaningless, because of their fusion in
41. E. M. Higgins"Australia the Superiot' TheCommunist 2, February 1925 ppI2-3.
42. See WorkersWeeklyS13126 p2, Editorial 281S/26 p2 for a reference to "That Empire upon which the sun never sets and wages never rise.",
9n126p4, 23n126, 17/9/26 p3, 14/10/27 pl, 21110/27 p4,20/1I28 pS,6/4/28 p2, 6112129 p2, 118130 p2, 29/8130 p3j S. Carpenter "A Review of
Conditions inAustralia" Pan-Pacific Worker112130 p46; H. Moore (the Comintern Agent sent to"Bolshevise" the Australian Party and harden
up itsThird Period line) Australia and the WorldCrisis Communist Party ofAustralia, Sydney 1931 p21j H. Moore Workers Weekly 10/10/30
p3. There was a greater emphasis on opposition to the British Empire, per se, with some nationalist overtones during 1926-7 when the
Comintern was particularly hostile toBritain, but the CPA did not go nearly as far as the Canadian Communists, who sought an alliance with the
"national bourgeoisie", Workers Weekly3/9/26 p2, 7/1127 p2, 18/2127 p2, I.Angus Canadian Bolsheviks Vanguard, Montreal 1981 ppI67-72.
43. See WorkersWeekly20lS127, 1012128: "Our watchword can neverbe merelythe capitalist'Advance Australia;'but 'Workersof all Lands,
Unite!', 1114130 p2, 8/8/3p2, 16/6/33 p2, 14n133 p4.
44. The implications of Australian imperialism were mainly considered after the somewhat nationalist .campaign against the Empire was
dropped, Workers Weekly21110/27 pI, 18/11/27 p4, 20/1128 p2, 14/8131 pl, 18/9131 p2j R. Dixon "Tendencies ofDevelopment ofAustralian
capitalism: Growth ofImperialism' Labor Review 1(11) JUly 1933 p7j R. Dixon "The Australian Labor Movement in the Period ofCrisis"
LaborReview 1(13) September 1933 1'6.
4S. WorkersWeekly24n125 pl,9n126p4, 10112126 p3,27/1128 p3, Snl29 p4,20/9/29 p4, 4/10/29 pl, 118130 p2, 8/8130 pl, 3/4131 p2.
46. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v9S, April 1921 pp7890,7889. For the CPA's arguments see, e.g. Workers Weekly 816128 p2; J.
Kavanagh "Taxation and the Standard ofLiving" TheCommunist S February 1928 p26.
47.WorkersWeekly6112129 p2, 1114130 p2,2218/30 p3, 30110131 pp.1,3, 3/2133 pl, 29/6/34 p6. 1018134 p2, 17/8134 p6. On the implications of
the Ottawa Agreement between Britain and Australia for greatertanff preference see Workers Weekly2513132 p2, ISI1I32ppl, 4,21110132 pl:
"T. W." "The Failure ofOttawa" LaborReviewDecember 1932 ppl-2j Plebs League material, Mitchell Library.
48.Commonwealth Parliamentary Debatesop,cit. p7886. For the CPA's criticisms, along these lines, ofthe anti-profiteer hysteria ofthe period
immediately after World War Isee Communist 2111121 pl,
49. See WorkersWeekl;Y 10/4/31 p2, 3/2133 p2; M. Hade (a once and future Communist) Socialisation Call 1(1) April 1932 p2, this was before a
small section ofthe Unitsleft the ALP tojoin the CPA.
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financecapital.50 L. L. Sharkey argued that the cause of the crisis was "overproduction" rather than any deliberate
action by the Money Power credit crises were the consequence rather than the cause of crises of production.
Increases in bank credit would only exacerbate the problem by increasing output, while bank nationalisation, with
compensation would benefit finance capital by guaranteeing its income.51 This conclusion was expressed in the
first cartoon in the Appendix "Labour Movement Economics Illustrated" at the end of this thesis (Cartoon 1).
MoneyPower ideas divertedworkers from the struggleagainst the capitalistsystem to fight against the bondholders
or foreign capitalists:
"Thecapitalist crisis in Australiawas explained away [by the ALP] as being entirely due to external
causes, as a result of a 'conspiracy' of the international bankers, rather than being the inevitableresult
of the existence of capitalist relations in Australia. The objectivesituation of Australian capitalism,
being a second-rate imperialistpower and subject to the pressure of big imperialistpowers, and also
its huge agrarian production and small home market, which makes it very much more dependenton
the situationof the world's market,all tend to lend weight to this positionof Lang and co."52
"Niemeyerism", the deflationary program associatedwith the name of the Bank of England's depressionemissary
to Australia, was not simply in the interestsof the bondholders,
"In spite of the fact that Niemeyerrepresents the exclusive interests of British finance capital he also
proved useful to those capitalist elements, the Australian 'secondary industrialists' and Yankee con-
cerns, who are antagonistic to British finance capital. Although seeminglycontradictory, there's no
real contradiction when we realise that the entire capitalist class, regardless of its inner economic
conflicts, tries to place the wholeburdenof its deepening crisis uponthe toilingmasses."53
The CommunistParty followed the Comintern in regarding the post-WorldWar I period as being that of the general
crisis of capitalism, during which. increasingly severe cyclical crises would occur. Its explanation of economic
crises was underconsumptionist, in the wordsof the Party's 1928 Training Manual:
"Outputover-reaches the limits of the markets. Periodic slumps, gluts and crises result. Anarchy in
production. Unemployment becomes chronicand exploitation intensifies."54
The same argument of restricted markets was used to explain imperialism.55 By the early 1930s it was being
backedup with a quotationfrom VolumeIII of Capital:
"The last causeof all real crises remains the poverty andrestrictedconsumption of the masses..."56
This quotationwas subsequently trottedout by the Party for another thirty years to justify its anticipation of a new
crisis.S? The Communists' underconsumptionist position was more radical than those of others on the Australian
left because they maintained that, under capitalism underconsumption was inevitable, the profits of employers
dependedon restrictingthe purchasing power of their workers. .So no palliativemeasures could preventeconomic
crisis. Nevertheless the Party still justified working class struggle for higher wages. It did so on the basis of the
labour theory of value, Le.workers had a right to better wages becausethey produced all of society's wealth,rather
than the trade union underconsumptionist proposition that higher wages could off-set crises. Radical
underconsumptionism thus representeda justification for conscious working class mobilisation againstcapitalism,
unfettered by any concern for respectability within bourgeois common sense as trade union underconsumptionism
was, even when it was used to justify class struggles. During the depression the CPA attempted to articulate the
distinctiveness of its position:
"In keeping with the deception that the crisis is due, not to inherent contradictions in the capitalist
systemitself, butto a 'conspiracy of bankers', the 'laborites' emphatically denied that the Australian
crisis was greatly intensified by the world economiccrisis a crisis brought about because of the vast
disproportion betweenproductionand the worldmarkets."58
The first half of the sentence did identify a difference between Money Power and Communist analyses.
Communists located the source of the crisis as inherent in capitalist relations of exploitation between worker and
boss. But Money Power theorists agreed that the restriction of markets (by bankers' conspiracies rather than the
laws of capitalism,it is true) was an importantcause of the depression.
The CPA inherited its radical underconsumptionism from the earlierAustralian marxist sects, and the Comintern.59
50. Communist Party ofAustralia Australia'sPart in WorldRevolution Sydney 1930 p17.
51. L. L. Sharkey The Nationalisation ofBanking and the Sociallsation of Credit Communist Party of Australia May 1933 pp4, 9. Also see
WorkersWeekly 1/2/24 p4, 28/11130 p2, 29/1132 pl, 5/2132 pl,24/12132 pp1, 4,24/2133 p2, 313133p2, 1713/33 p2, 3118134 pS. -Foranalyses and
critiques ofDouglas credit ideas see Workers Weekly9/10/31 p2, 5/8132 p2, 1218132 p2, 19/8132 p2, 26/8/32 p2, 24/11/33 p2 2119134 p2 and the
best articles, by J. Kavanagh, the Party's leader during the second half ofthe 1920s, shortly before his expulsion from the CPA 29nJ32 p2,
9/9/32 p7, 1619/32 p2.
52. R. Dixon "The Australian LaborMovement in the Period ofCrisis" op. cit p6also see Workers Weekly215130 p3, 10/10130 p3.
53. H. Moore "The Meaning ofNiemeyerism" Pan-Pacific Worker 5/1131 p3, also see Workers Weekly29/8/30 p3.
54. Communist Party of Australia Party Training Manual Sydney 1928 p16, also "Theses of the Third World Congress" op. cit p185;
Communist 9/9/21 pt, "Notes ofthe Month" TheCommunist6,June 1925 pp2-4; Workers Weekly2113130 p2, 118130 pS, 17n131 p2, 3/6132 p2.
SS. Workers Weekly25/11127 p4,26n/29 p3, 2112130 p2.
56. L. Sharkey TheNationalisation of Banking op. cit, p2, also see Workers Weekly215130 p3.
57. E. g. E. AaronsEconomicsfor Workers Current Book Distributors, Sydney Second Edition 1961 p33.
58. H. Moore "The Meaning ofNiemeyerism" op, cit p4.
59. See V.Burgmann In Our Timeop. cit p6 for the stress placed by these groups, even before 1905 on the reconquest ofsurplus value. The
CPA placed considerable emphasis on the importance ofthe education ofits members in basic marxist theory. Most Party publications carried
advertisements for classical Marxist works and publications such as the PartyTraining Manualop, cit. were used instudy classes.
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The pre-World War I textbooks of marxist economics associated crises with underconsumption.60 However in
Capital Marx had himself criticisedunderconsumptionism and Lenin alsodid so in The Development ofCapitalism
in Russia. "it is sheer tautology", Marx maintained,
"To say crises are caused by the scarcity of effective demand...if one were to attempt to give this
tautology the semblanceof a profounder justification by saying that the working-class receives too
small a portionof its own product and the evil would be remediedas soon as it receives a largershare
of it and its wagesin creased in consequence, one could only.remark that crises are always prepared
by precisely a period in which wagesrise generallyand the working class actuallygets a largershare
of that part of the annualproduct which is intendedfor consumption."61
Lenin explicitly refuted the radical underconsumptionist conclusions Communists drew for decades from Marx's
commentsabout" the last cause of all real crises":
"Marx's analysis of realisation showed that...compared with means of production, articles of
consumption play a minor role in the formation of thehome market ..The contradiction between the
drive towards the unlimited expansion of production and limited consumption is not the only
contradictionof capitalism,which cannot exist and develop at allwithout contradictions..."62
The problem with underconsumptionism, even radical underconsumptionism, was its indeterminacy. If its logic
was correct then capitalism should have been in a continuous state of crisis. On the other hand, once it was
conceded that capitalists used the surplus value they had extracted in the process of production to make new
investments, were in fact compelled to do so by competition, and that these investments constituted an
augmentation of purchasing power as much as higher wages did, crises evaporated all together. Radical
underconsumptionism could not differentiate betweenthe causes and features of short term movements in thetrade
cycle and longer term developments such as stagnation or prosperity lasting for many years. Because radical
underconsumptionism could not explain why crises occurred at some times but not others, it left a way open to
reformism.es Under the impetus of its accommodations to the ALP during the late 1930s and more explicitly as
World War II was drawing to a close, the CPA started to move in this direction. In the mid-1960s, after
proclaiming the imminence or onset of crisis for twenty dogmatic years, the Party dropped its radical
underconsumptionism and concludedthat Governments could fill the gap betweenproductionand markets.ss
In contrast 10 radical underconsumptionism, Marx's explanationof crises was in terms of the rate of profit. Not
only was this theory articulated in Volumes II and III of Capital, but it was also outlined in a number of marxist
textbooks available to the CPA and had somecurrency in the international Communist movement until the early
1930s.65 Before the late 1930s, and then only briefly, Australian Communists displayed no familiarity with this
theory in their writings. However, the explanationof crises in terms of the tendencyof the rate of profit to fall, its
counteractingtendencies and disproportion between different departments of production while at least noticed by
marxistsoverseas was anathematised in Russia and thence the Comintern from the late 1920s.66 The neglectof this
theory in Australia, before the CPA was Bolshevised is understandable in terms of the paucity of the Party's
resources, its inheritancefrom earlier AustralianandEnglish marxistgroups. Rosa Luxemburg's explanation of the
stagnation of marxist economic theory to 1903 also applied to the CPA's situation. She pointed out that when
Volume III appeared socialists had been carrying on their agitations "with the aid of the unfinishedmaterial con-
tained in the first volume",further the problems addressedin that volume, "howeverimportant from the outlook of
pure theory, are comparatively unimportant from the practicaloutlookof the class war". She concluded that
"Both in his detailed and comprehensive analysis of capitalist economy, and in his method of
historicalresearch with its immeasurable field of application, Marx has offered much more than was
directly essentialfor the practicalconductof the class war.
"Only in proportion as our movement progresses, and demands the solution of new practical
problems do we dip once more into the treasuryof Marx's thought, in order to extract therefrom and
to utilise newfragments of his doctrine. But since our movementlike all the campaigns of practical
60. See L. S. Boudin's very widely used The Theoretical System 0/Karl Marx Monthly Review Press, New York 1967, first published 1907,
p165. For the lineage ofthe Comintern's radical underconsumptionism and the legacy ofRosa Luxemburg see Day The 'Crisis' and the 'Crash'
op. cit, pp12-21.
61. K. Marx Capital Volume II Penguin, Harmondsworth 1978 pp486-7.
62. V. I.Lenin The Development ofCapitalism in Russia inhis Collected Works v3, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1972 p58.
63. Day The 'Crisis' and the 'Crash' op, cit, p143.
64. See B. Taft "Changes in Modem Capitalism" Australian Left Review I,June-July 1966 pp4-5.
65. Original studies on the basis ofthis approach were not undertaken inEnglish before World War I. R. Hilferding's Finance Capital of1910
was only translated into English in 1981 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), while only a small proportion ofthe material from the Russian
economic debates ofthe 1920s isavailable in English. For an early underconsumptionist explanation ofcrises and imperialism see W:Morris
quoted in E. P. Thompson William Morris Pantheon, New York 1976 p429. For explanations ofthe tendency ofthe rate ofprofit tofall see
Boudin The Theoretical System o\" cit, pp120-3, who, however, preferred the radical underconsumptionist explanation ofcrises, also see M.
Starr A Worker Looks at Economics Labour Publishing Company, London 1925 pSI, Starr used this theory to explain imperialism too, p84.
Note, however, that Lenin's explanation ofimperialism inhis Imperialism the Highest Stage 0/Capitalism inhis Selected Works Volume--1,
Progress Publishers, Moscow 197 did not offer an underconsumptionist account, Also see E. Varga The Decline ofCapitalism Communist
Party of Great Britain, London 1924; Programme 0/ the Communist International First Australian Edition; Communist Party of Australia,
Sydney 1929 p16j E. Bums What is the Communist Party Modem Publishers, Sydney 1934 p4. For the diversity ofRussian economic theory
Day The 'Crisis' and the 'Crash' op. cit,
66. Day The 'Crisis' and the 'Crash' op. cit, For an impressive recent application of this approach see C. Harman Explaining the Crisis
Bookmarks, London March 1984.
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life, inclines to go on working in old ruts of thought, and to cling to principles after they have ceased
to be valid, the theoretical utilisation of the Marxist system proceeds very slowly."67
The experience of the 1930s depression did not challenge, but rather seemed to confirm a radical
underconsumptionist conclusion that capitalism was doomed to permanent stagnation and the theory provided a
telling justiflcation for the CPA's commitment to overthrowingcapitalism. After World War II this was no longer
the case. The theory and reality intersected very little. The marxist movement, in its dominant Communist form,
had fallen into a dogmatic crevasse rather than a rut, from which a leap of theoretical innovation consonant with a
commitment to working class self-activity was impossible. Markovic points out Marx's approach to economic
analysis was unsuitable as a rationale for Soviet development under Stalin,
"Stalin's critique [of western capitalism] deals only with those factors which are associated with
private ownership of the means of production, overemphasizing in such a way the discontinuity
between capitalism and the system existing at that time in the Soviet Union."
"Where Marx thought of profound change of human relationships and of the very nature of economic
activity (abolition of alienated labour, abolition of fetishism of commodities, transcendence of the
narrow division of labor, reduction of working hours and liberation of time for free, creative non-
economic activity, etc.,) Stalinism saw only the need for centralisationof all productive powers in the
hands of the state, rigid administrative planning and accelerated technological development None of
this is specificallysocialist."68
It was left-to tiny revolutionary groups to explain the long post-war boom in marxist terms. When the Stalinist
monolith crumbled in Australia during the 1960s the CPA' s radical underconsumptionism gave way to reformist
underconsumptionism as the Party's perspectives moved in a liberal directione''.
... ... ...
The polarisation in the labour movement between the CPA and ALP expressed in the differences in their economic
ideas, established during the 1920s has continued, although the positions of the poles have shifted. After the
depression, the mainstream of laborite thought increasingly conformed with bourgeois economics, while
Communist economic ideas converged with the left nationalism of certain Money Power theorists. The following
chapters examine the years during which these shifts took place. They are divided into two major periods, bounded
by the accession of the Curtin Government and the beginning of the CPA's enduring embrace of Australian
nationalism in 1941. For each major period there is a chapter outlining the general background, one devoted to
developments in laborite economic thought and another to Communist economic ideas.
67. R. Luxemburg "Stagnation and Progress ofMarxism" inD. Ryazanoff (ed) Karl Marx Martin Lawrence, London 1927 ppl08, 112-3, first
published 1903. Itshould also benoted that Engels's popular presentation ofthe contradictions ofcapitalism inSocialism: Utopian and
ScienuficForeign Languages Press, Peking 1975 extracted from his Anti·Duhring Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1976 did not refer to the
tendency ofthe rate ofprofit tofall.
68. M Markovic "Stalinism and Marxism" inR. C. Tucker (ed.) Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation Norton, New York 1977 pp305,
309. Also see R. Nordahl "Stalinist Ideology: The Case of the Stalinist Interpretation ofMonopoly Capitalist Politics" Soviet Studies26(2),
1972p252:
"The ideological elements in the Stalinist model of monopoly capitalist politics served for Stalin'S regime four general
functions: 1) to justify specific domestic and international policies ofthe regime; 2)tominimize the dissatisfaction ofSoviet
citizens concerning domestic conditions; 3)tomaximize the hostility ofSoviet citizens towards the West; and 4) tolegitimate
the existing authoritarian structure ofthe regime,"
69. T. O'Lincoln op, cit,
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CHAPTER THREE
AUSTRALIA AND THE GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM
The development of economic ideas in the labour movement between 1934 and 1941 was shaped by the
contradictions of Australia's economic recovery from the depression. This chapterexamines theextentandlimits
of the recovery; the dilemmas that the international and domestic economic situation posedfor Australian capital-
ism and the Government; the problems of national defenceduring the second half of the 1930s; the courseof the
class struggle;and the influence of thesefactors on the development of the CPA and ALP.
"Recovery" from the depression
For forty years, until the mid-1960s, Communists frequently proclaimed that capitalism was in the midst of a
"general crisis". As against the orthodox economic account that there was significant recovery after 1932, the
1930s was the one decade, since the foundation of the CPA,for whicha convincing case for the existence of such
a crisis could be made'!
As a result of the depression, governments in many countries assumed new responsibilities for economic
management. They steppedin to bolsterthe position of local capitalists on the world market, by means of tariffs
and other import controls, and in many cases intervenedto restructure or regulate particulareconomic activities,
notablythose of the banking sector) As a result there was a closer identification between localstatesandnational
blocks of capital, competing with each other on the world market Capitalist competition increasingly took the
form of rivalry amongst national capitals backed by their respective states, rather than amongst "free" private
capitals.
The nature of international economic competition after the depression disadvantaged Japan, Italy and Germany.
Unlike Britain, France, the U.S.A. and Russia, they did not have privileged access to the markets and raw
materials of a formal or informal empire. All three developed militarised economies and attempted a process of
autarkic development, Germany and Japan with greater success than Italy. Because "the forces of production
internationally had long since developed to the point where they cut across national boundaries" sucha strategy
could only be sustained through territorial expansion.3 Economic competition increasingly became military
competition.
Australia was forced to respond in kind to the "widespread effects of economic nationalization [Le. state
intervention]... so feverishly pursued by most countriesv.s The Scullin Government used import controls and
devaluation to overcome balance of payments difficulties and securethe domestic market for local producers. At
the same time attempts weremadeto shift the burdenof the economic crisis onto the working class through speed-
ups andcuts in livingstandards.
Thanks to tariff protection, lower raw material and wage costs, manufacturing was the leading sector of
Australia's recovery. More than 40 per cent of the increase in employment between 1932-33 and 1936-37
occurred in manufacturing.S The metals industries, including iron and steel, engineering and vehicle building,
were particularly importantin the recovery. Steel output in 1939, for example, was almost three times its 1929
level. So the expansion of manufacturing industries' share of GrossDomestic Product(GDP), already apparent in
the 1920s,continued during the post-depression period: between 1926-27 and 1928-29 manufacturing outputcon-
tributed 16.1 per cent of GDP; between 1936-37 and 1938-39 the figure was 17.3 per cent., Contemporary
advocates of rapid industrialisation welcomed this development, pointing out that a larger manufacturing sector
could help to stabilise the Australian economy. So long as the home market was protected, manufacturing pro-
duction was much less susceptible to fluctuations originating in the worldmarket than primary export industries
were.6 Protectionism had another advantage for Australian development, because by restricting international
commodity flows, it encouraged international movements of capital. The Scullin tariffs attracted direct in-
vestmentfrom overseas, so that foreign exporters could maintain theirshareof the Australian marketbyproducing
behindthe tariff barriers,"
The costs of protection were borne by consumers, that is, employers in non-manufacturing industries and workers.
1. See the standardworkon the depression in Australia C. B. Schedvin Australiaand the Great Depression Sydney University Press, Sydney
1970pp283et seq, .
2. For the nature of state responses to the depression see C. P. Kindleberger The World in Depression 1929·30 AlIen Lane, London 1972
pp281-3i C. HarmanExplaining the CrisisBookmarks, London 1984pp62-71.
3. HarmanExplainingthe Crisisop. cit, p67.
4. D. B. CoplandandC. V.Janes (eds) AustralianMarketing ProblemsAngusand Robertson, Sydney 1938pxix.
S. Schedvin Australiaand the GreatDepression op.cit, pp290-1, 309.
6. See, for example, E. W. Holden "The Censusand Secondary Industry" in G. V. Portus (00) What the CensusRevealsPreece and Sonsand
the Australian Instituteof Political Science, Adelaide 1936pl 08.
7. Schedvin Australiaand the GreatDepression op. cit, p29S.
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But by 1937most Australian employers, evencommercial interests and the "mostvocal representatives of primary
industry" had acceptedthat at least a moderate degree of protection was vital to Australia's prosperity.f
Although manufacturing was the leading sector in Australia's recovery, it could not sustain a general revival of
growth on its own, given its limitedshareof totaloutput. As in 1928, primaryindustries in 1938-39 still produced
about 23 per cent of national product and the bulk of export earnings, which contributed about 18 per cent. of
national product.? While the export price index did not recover its 1928-29 level until 1944-45, there were
improvements in some prices during the secondhalf of the 1930s, notably thoseof.gold, wool and wheat. Export
volumes also grew for importantcommodities and this even led to increased export receipts for butter and base
metals despite mainly static prices)O So more than 30 per cent. of the rise in money incomes between 1932-33
and 1936-37 came from rural industries, as against only 20 per cent. frommanufacturing)1 .
In view of the continuing importance of primary production to the Australian economy, the Government's
economic policies had to balance the interests of agricultural, pastoral and mining producers with those of
manufacturers.t- Neither the conservative UnitedAustraliaParty (UAP) administration,ledby "Laborrat" Lyons
between 1932 and his death in 1939, nor one led by the Laboropposition, could have done much to influence the
pricesor the quantities of commodities demanded on international markets. But state action could bolster export
industries by subsidising theirexports,especially through organised marketing schemes. During the late 1930sthe
FederalGovernmentwas
"Driven... into the regulation of output, prices and finance in primary industries. The impelling
motive here... [was]the increasing pressure from theprimaryproducers for economicsecurity."13
In terms of the scopefor state intervention, Australia'sexport industries fell into two groups: thoseproducing for
bothdomesticand exportmarketsand thoseproducing mainlyfor export.
State actioncould have a significantimpacton the prosperity of the export industries which realised a significant
part of their income on the local market. .The "home" price for their produce could be raised to subsidiseexport
prices, through cartels backed by legislation or direct subsidies)4 Known as "protection-all-round" during the
1920s, these measureswere strengthened for the sugar,fruit and butterindustries, after the depression. From 1931
wheatproduction also receivedsubsidies and in 1938 a homeprice for wheatwas established. Both schemes were
underwritten by a tax on flour, introduced in 1933. The burdenof assistance was thus borneprimarily by thoseon
lowerincomes who had to outlay a greaterproportion of their incomeon bread thandid the rich)S The Australian
Government's attempts to promote primary exports were analogous to those of the Japanese state to promote
secondary exports by means of manufacturers' associations)6 Both countries' measures of state intervention to
boosttheir exportswere in part foiled by stateintervention in other countries, taking the form of tariffs and other
barriers to imports.
The 1932Ottawa AgreementbetweenAustraliaandBritain provideda meansof gainingaccess to export markets
for meat, fruit, butter sugar and wheat under circumstances of higher levels of protection around the world.t?
Premised on the idea of a greaterself-sufficiency within the BritishEmpire, the Agreementitself was a step in the
hardening of trade blocks during the 19308.18 In practice it meant increased trade between Britain and the
Dominions and the colonies, rather than amongst the outposts of Empire. Australiagained preferential access to
the British market for primaryproducts, while the difference between Australian tariffs on British and "foreign"
goods was increased. Asa result Britain became a more important trading partner for Australia, against the long
term trendin the diversification of Australia's tradepattern. .
8. D. B. COpland and CO V. Janes(eds) Australian TratkPolicy Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1937 pxxiii.
9. Schedvin Australia andtheGreat Depression op,cit,p377.
10. Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics The Australian BalQ1lCe of Payments 1928-29 to 1949·50 Government Printer, Canberra
19S2 p83; Schedvin Australia andtheGreatDepression op.cit p293.
11.ibid,p290. .
12.SeeW.K, Hancock Survey ofBritish CommonwealJh Affairs, Volume 11Problems of Economic Policy 1918-1939 Oxford University· Press,
London 1940p2S1. .
13.D. B. Copland in Copland andJanesAustralian Marluting Problems op, eit, p447. TheOttawa Agreement and stateintervention to support
primary industries neutralised opposition to tariffprotection. U. EllisA History of the Australian COWltry PartyMelbourne University Press,
Melbourne 1963p221 points outthatby 1937, "Ihe tariffceased. •• to bea violent issuebetween the government parties."
14.ibid. p498: "The Statethrough itsMarketing Board dismisses market priceas the agency of control in favour of its ownprice." Alsoibid.
30. .fs. Forassistance to the wheat industry, the second mostimportant export industry afterwool,see G. SawerAustralian Federal Poluics and
Law192949 Melbourne University Press. Melbourne 1963.Jlp18, 46, 78, 106; N. G. ButIin, A. Bamard and J. 1. Pincus Government and
CJpiJalism George AlIen and Unwin, Sydney 1982p86; andE.Dunsdorfs TMAustralian Wheat Growing Industry 1788-1948 Melbourne 1956
p290.
16.J. Shepherd Australia's Interests andPolicw in theFarEastInstitute of Pacitic Relations, NewYork1939 p133.
17.At the 1932OttawaConference of Empire countries a series ofbilateral treaties forpreferentiaI tarifftreatment werenegotiated: theOttawa
Agreements. Themost significant in thecontext of Australian development was the Anglo-Australian Agreement, referred to belowas the
~NC':~~ustraliaandtheWorldEconomy" inH.C.Grattan (eeL) Australia University of CaIifomia Press, Berkely 1947 p179.
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Table 1. Importance of British Trade to Australia 1928-29 and 1938-39
Year Aust exports to Britain Austimports fromBritain
as % of totalexports as % of total imports
1928~29
1938-39
37
55
40
41
Source: Commonwealth Bureauof Census and Statistics The Australian Balance ofPayment, 1928-29to 1949-50
Government Printer,Canberra 1952p88.
The costs of preference under the Ottawaregime were very similarfor Australia and Britain. In terms of revenue
forgone, preference to Australia cost Britain L5.6 million in 1934-35 whilepreferences to Britain cost Australia
L5.7 million,19 In return for their loss of tariff revenue Australia gained some increase in the security of
producers with Britishmarkets. About45 per cent. of Australian wool andwheatexportsand71 per cent.of other
exportswent to Britain. Empire preference thus complimented the strictly domestic protectionist measures Taken
by Australia in response to the depression.
There was less scope for the state to promotethe welfare of the secondgroupof export industries, those producing
almostentirelyfor the exportmarket, most importantly wool and base metals. The mechanism of the home price
wasnot available to subsidise export prices,while the costs of direct subsidies to reduceexportpriceswouldhave
been prohibitive as they earned 37 per cent of Australia's export revenue between 1932-33 and 1938-39.20
Becauseof Australia's commanding position on the world fine wool market, however, the local industry could
exercise some short term influence over international prices. Australian wool growers and brokers probably
rejectedthe introduction of a floor priceon woolexportsfor thisreason.u The availability of substitutes for wool
was also a disincentive to attempts to raiseexport prices substantially. TheGovernment was therefore constrained
to use Australia'S high tariff barriers as a bargaining tool in trade negotiations with other countries, to secure
increased woolexports.
In addition to the conscious efforts of the Scullinand thenLyons governments, the processof the crisis itself laid
the preconditions for economic recovery. In a crisis some enterprises are bankrupted or face the prospect of
bankruptcy. Hence stronger firms can buy up assets (constant capital) at bargain prices, below their value (in
terms of the labour embodied in them. or required to build replacements). Without any increase in productivity,
the new ownercan achieve a higherrate of proflt on such means of production, becauseof thelower costs.22 In
this way crises serve to devaluesomeconstantcapitals and even to destroyothers (when they are sold for scrapor
. allowed to rust away), lower the ratio of wage labour (variable capital) to constant capital (the organic
composition of capital)and raise the rate of profit,
The Australian iron and steel industryprovided a striking exampleof thedevaluation of capital. Duringthe 1920s
Australiahad two steel producers: Hoskins Brothers and BrokenHillProprietary Limited (BHP). Shortlybefore
the depression Hoskins began to relocate its operations from Lithgow to Port Kembla and to expand them in
association with British firms, The relocated operation was called Australian Iron and Steel. The depression
caught the company in the middle of the transfer, without the resources to complete the new facilities at Port
Kembla. For this reason and others associated with the contraction of the Australian market for iron and steel,
BHP's expanding production and technical considerations Australian Iron and Steel ran into difficulties and was
sold to BHP at a bargain price.23 The depression facilitated horizontal as well as vertical integration in the steel
19.H. L. Harris Australia'sNatioMIInterests andNational PolicyMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1938 p93.
20.E. A. BoehmTwentieth Century Economic Development inAustralia Longman, Melbourne 19721'69.
21. See Copland and JanesAustralian Marketing Problems op. cit pp359-60. 364-5 for statements from various organisations in the wool
industry on thesematters.
22 This pointcanbe demonstrated algebraically:
s >__ s __ Le, the rateof profitfor the newowneris greaterthanthatof theoldowner.
(c-d)+v C+V _ '.
where: c is the costof constant capital (themachinery etc)of the original owner.
c-d is the costof thatconstant capital to thenewowner.
v is the costof labourpoweror variable capital (wages) necessary to operate the constant capital.
s is the surplus value(profit) produced by the labour powerinvolved in theproduction process.
Thetransaction betweenthe two owners does not change the amount or valueof labourpowerrequired to operate the constant capital or the
surplus value that labourpowercreates. The new owneris evenable to realise the abovehigherrateof profit.whenselling at a lowerprice.
whichreflects his or her lowercosts[(c-d)+v+s). thanthe previous owner's (c+v+s).
23. See H. Hughes Australian Iron and Steel Industry Melbourne University Press.Melbourne 191)4 pUS and A. Trengove 'What's Goodfor
Australia..l" Cassel,Stanmore 1975ppI51-2.
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industry. BHP increased its holdings in or acquired Vickers Commonwealth Steel the Structural Engineering
Companyof Western Australia, Lysaght BrothersLtd of Sydney, Titan Nail and Wire Company Limited and the
Lambton and Burwoodcollieries between1930 and the end of 1933.24 It thus not only becamea monopolist steel
producerbut also guaranteedits supplies of raw materials and local markets. During the thirties "Australian steel
earned a reputation of being amongst the cheapest in the world", despite the disincentive to efficiency of a
domesticmarketprotectedby high tariffs.25
By 1937-38 the steps taken by the Australian state and the more autonomous processes of the crisis at home and
overseashad led to a significantrecoveryfrom the depression in Australia. Costs had fallen, markets had become
somewhatmore secure and profits had risen.26 On the basis of a number of indicators the orthodox economic
accountof the post-depression period as one of recoveryis vindicated. In current pounds GDP surpassed its pre-
depression peak in 1937-38, probablyearlier in real terms.27 Gross (money) Non-residential Capital Formation
passed its pre-depression peak during the same year. As output and investmentrose, unemployment fell from 29
per cent. in 1932 to 8.7 per cent. in 1938.28 The fact that such a cyclicalupturn had occurred after the depression
is important to an understanding of the nature of the class strugglebetween 1934and the outbreakof WorldWar Il
and henceof some of thedomesticproblemsfaced by the Government and Australian capitalistclass.
Despite the cyclical recovery it is still legitimate to assert that, in Australia, the general crisis had not been
overcomebefore WorldWar n. There were large "accumulations" of idle variablecapital throughout the interval
betweenthe depression and World War II -- unemployment did not fall below 8.7 per cent..29 Total domestic
capital formation was a lowerproportionof GDP after the depression comparedto the years between 1925-26 and
1928-29.30 The value of production per head was only three per cent. above its 1928-29 level in 1938.31 The
recoveryhad only seen a limited restoration of profit rates through the process of devaluation of constant capital,
becausemost large enterprises remainedin business. At the same time, the limitednature of the recoveryoverseas
was boundto effect Australiathroughthe still restrictedscope for export sales.
The weakness of the international and Australian recoveries becameparticularly evident with the start of a new
and precipitous economic downturn late in 1937. From August the United States economy. began to contract.32
International commodity prices started to slip during the second half of 1937, while the Australian export price
index fell during both 1937-38 and 1938-39,33 "In 1937-38 a peak of economic prosperity was reached, but. ..
before the end of the year a perceptible declinehad begun" in Australia.34 In the last pre-war yearfalls in export
receipts led to a drop in the level of aggregate GDP. Unemployment also rose. While manufacturing industry
helped stabilise the economy, thanks to the protected domestic market, adverse international developments could
not be entirely shut out, given the weight of export industries in the Australian economy. The new economic
down-turn also affected manufacturing: between 1937-38 and 1938-39 the value of manufacturing production in
constant prices fell for the first time since the early 1930s, with the largest fall in the previouslydynamic metals
e]sector.35 In the last years beforethe War Australian capitalismhardly presenteda picture of a social system on
the verge of a period of prosperity. Overseas markets for Australia's expanding produce were stagnating. The
coalescenceof world capital into national or imperial blocks, in which the Australian Governmententhusiastically
participated, heightenedmilitarytension throughout the worldand failed to ensureeconomicsecurity.
International Economic Impasse
The Ottawa Agreementprovided Australiawith some stability in export markets. But, because the Empire was
not self-sufficient, privileged access to the British market could not provide a comprehensive solution to
Australia's trade problems,36 Wool, wheat and base metal exports were vital to the well-being of the Australian
economy,yet Britain, while the largest, was not a sufficient marketfor them. Australianeeded additional markets
24. Hughes Australian Iron and Steel Industry op. cit, p113. See P. L. Swan 'General Motors-Holden's and the Automobile Industry in
Economic Perspective' PhDThesis Monash University 1972 p315 for similar developments in the car industry.
25. Schedvin Australiaand the GreatDepression op. cit, p306.
26. For the decline inthe wages share in value added in Australian manufacturing see G. M. Richards "Wages and the Wage Share: Australian
Manufacturing inthe 1920s" Australian Economic HistoryReview20(2) September 1980.
27. N. G. Butlin Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing 1861-1938 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1962
ppll,461.
28. Commonwealth Bureau ofCensus and Statistics LabourReportsfor the relevant years. Note that this measure ofunemployment isin terms
ofthe proportion ofunion members out ofwork. .
29. ibid.
30. Butlin Australian Domestic op,cit. p7.
31. B. D.Haig ''Manufacturing OUtput and Productivity 1910.1948/9" Australian Economic HistoryReview15(2) September 1975 p153.
32. KindlebergerThe WorldinDepression op. cit, p272.
33. W. A. Lewis Economic Survey 1919-1939 Alien and Unwin, London 1965 pp71-2; Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics
Australian Balanceof Payments o{'. cit, p83. .
34. Commonwealth Grants Commission Seventh ReportGovernment Printer, Canberra 1940 p29.
35. Haig "Manufacturing Output" op. cit. p145. .
36. D. B. Copland in Copland and JanesAustralian Trade Policyop. cit, pp15o.l noted:
"In 1936 slightly more than half ofBritish exports were sold inforeign markets [i.e. outside the Empire] while 60 per cent. of
British imports came from foreign countries. Australia in 1936 found markets for half her exports outside the United
Kingdom, while 60 per cent. ofher imports came from countries outside the United Kingdom. Not more than 30 per cent. of
Australia's exports are affected bythe Ottawa Agreements. True, the exports affected such as butter, meat, fruits. and sugar
are greatly assisted by Ottawa and subsequeat agreements with Great Britain. But it is becoming increasingly clear that
Australia and other Dominions must look for opportunities oftrade expansion inforeign countries."
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in a world where they were hedged around with substantial protectionist barriers.s? In 1937 Commonwealth
Attorney-GeneralR. G. Menzies summed up Australia's trade strategy in the post-depression period:
"We are guilty of no want of appreciation of the Empire spirit, and what it has done for us, or the
supreme value of the British market, when we say that Australia, as a young country on the
threshold of her development, must look to the whole world for her markets."38
As early as 1933, Australia took steps to maintain markets outside the Empire. In a dispute over barriers to the
entry of sheet glass, the Governmentmade concessions to guarantee the continuation of Australia's positive trade
balance with Belgium. The resulting arrangements were a precedent for later Australian attempts to secure
bilateral trade agreements,39 In 1934 a delegation visited Asian countries in search of export markets. The
following year an Australianmission went to Europe
"To afford opportunities to European countries to increase their purchases of Australian primary
products, particularly wool, as a result of concessions. . . [which would] increase their exports to
Australia."4Q
In 1935 this approach to trade promotion led to the introduction of an "Intermediate Tariff' between the levels of
the Preferential and General Tariffs, to accommodate reciprocal arrangements between Australia and countries
outside the Empire. The mid-1930s thus saw Australia's first consistent attempts to establish formal trade links
outside the Empire. Grattan argues that Australia's independentforeignpolicy grew out of its tradepolicy.O The
successofnegotiations along these lines, however,was severelyrestrictedby the consolidationof the main trading
blocks.
The 1936 "trade diversion" episode illustrates the intractabilityof the problems of internationaleconomicrelations
faced by Australian capitalism. In May the Governmentinitiated a policy designedto overcomeAustralia's trade
difficulties by altering relations with the USA, Japan and Britain. Since 1934 the United States had rebuffed
Australian overtures for a trade agreement, despite American willingness to make arrangements with some of its
less important trade partners. The Lyons Government was concerned at Australia's consistent balance of trade
deficits with the USA: the figure for 1935-36 was LlO million.42 Many Australian primary exports, especially
wool and dairy produce, were effectively excluded form the US market.43 Regarding the United States' large
trade surplus with Australia as a bargaining counter, the Government attemptedto bring the US Governmentto its
senses by erecting more substantial barriers to the entry of American goods. As applied to the USA, the trade
diversion policy had three main goals:
1) to elicit a trade agreementwith the United States Governmentand hence greater access for Australian exports to
the US market.44
2) to shift away from the USA to Britain,with whom Australia had a tradesurplus, as a source of importsand thus
consolidate Australia's. claim to a substantial share of the British market for primary products.o
3) to promote Australia's manufacturing industries, particularly automobile production, at the expense of US
imports.46
Australia had also been negotiatingwith Japan over the the reductionof textile imports into Australia, in returnfor
the application of the Intermediate Tariff to Japanese imports in general. British textile exports to Australia, a
major component of Anglo-Australian trade, were being undermined by Japanese competitions? The Lyons
Government felt that this situation could jeopardise Australian access to British primary produce markets, a
worryingprospect in view of Australia's .
"complete reliance on the market of the United Kingdom for the absorption of our exportable
surplus of all difficult selling commodities."48
Japan was Australia's second best customer and their balance of trade favoured Australia by L12 million in
1935-36.49 A large proportion of Australian exports to Japan was fine wool. The Australian Government
assumed that the difficulty of replacing Australian wool would make retaliation against its higher tariffs on
Japanese goods, imposed after the Japanese Government had failed to reduce textile exports, difficult, With
37. See Copland and Janes Australian TradePolicyop. cit. pxii and Shepherd Australia'sInterestsandPoliciesop. cit. p155.
38. Quoted inHarris Australia'sNationalInterestsop. cit. p88.
39. See Nicholson Australia'sTrade RelationsCheshire, Melbourne 1955 pp83, 106, 133-8 for details ofthese efforts.
40. D. F. NicolsonAustralia'sTradeRelationsop. cit, p81.
41. C. H. Grattan The UnitedStatesand theSouthwest PacificOxford University Press, Melbourne 1961 pp146, 151.
42 Commonwealth Bureau ofCensus and Statistics Australian BalanceofPayments op. cit. p88.
43. H. Burton "The Trade Diversion Episode ofthe Thirties" Australian Outlook22(l) April 1968 p12.
44. R. A. Esthus FromEnmityto AllianceMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1965 p46.
45. Burton "The Trade Diversion Episode" op. cit. p8, J. B. Brigden pointed out that the British market could not simply betaken for granted,
Copland and Janes Australian Trade Policyop. clt, p178. Also see J.B. Brigden "The New Tariff Policy" Australian Quarterly 51 September
1936.
46. H. Gullett, Minister inCharge ofTrade Treaties, Copland and Janes Australian TradePolicyop. cit. p336.
47. Shepherd Australia's Interests and Policies op, cit. p46, also see D. C. S. Sissons "Manchester v, Japan: The Imperial Background of
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49. Commonwealth Bureau ofCensus and Statistics Australian Balance ofPayments op. cit. p88.
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respectto Japan, trade diversion aimed to reduce competition againstBritish textile imports and hence strengthen
ties withBritain.50
Trade diversion failed to coerce either Japan or the USA into trade agreements on Australia's terms. The USA
retaliated by depriving Australia of Most Favoured Nation Status and hence of some tariff concession. Trade
relations on the basis of the status quo ante were resumedin 1938, without any real concessions on either side.51
Japan proved more able than expected to find substitutes for Australian wool. At the end of 1936an agreement
was reached restricting Japanese textile exports to Australia and Australian wool exports to Japan -- to the
detriment of Australia's balance of payments surplus with Japan. Subsequently Japanese restrictions on imports,
due to the stringencies of its armaments programand war in China, reducedthe surplus evenfurther.52
Trade diversion did have some, very modest, positive results for the development of Australian manufacturing
industry and some short termgains weremade in relations withBritain. The Government's actions encouraged a
few US companies to invest in Australia to retain their marketshare, behind the barriers to imports. Armco de-
cided to manufacture sheet steelfor car bodies, in association withLysaghts, andnew investments were made for
the production of refrigerators, airconditioning, wirelesses and lawnmowers.53 But the episodedid not lead to the
establishment of local automobile engineor chassis production.
The Government had been concerned that Britishtrade agreements with Denmark and Argentina mightjeopardise
the interests of Dominion meat and dairy productexporters. In November 1936 the Angle-Argentine agreement
expiredand a new one was concluded, more favourable to the Dominions. Trade diversion no doubt gave added
weightto the Australian caseon this issue and helped remind the BritishGovernment of its earlier assurances on
Dominion access to theBritishmarket.54 .
Despitea short term strengthening of access to theirmostimportant marketfor Australian primaryexporters, trade
diversion could not overcome the inherent weaknesses of thepolicy of Empireself-sufficiency. The key obstacle
in the wayof the policy was the absence of a singlepowerful state controlling the entire territory such as thoseof
Francethe USA, Germany, Russiaand Japan. Coherent local capitalistclasses had emerged in Canada, Australia,
South Africa and New Zealandwhose interests the state institutions of the Dominions advanced. This was the
case in Australia, for example, despite formal subordination to the British Crown and a willingness to leave the
conductof most foreign affairs to Whitehall. The metropolitan powercouldnot, therefore, suppress economic and
political strains by administrative means, even if its.enforcement of certainpolicies would have strengthened the
Empireas a whole in its competition with otherblocks of nationalcapital. Hancock summedup the situation that
emerged from the 1932OttawaConference:
"The Ottawa Conference... was not altogether an attempt at imperial integration; it was also a
struggle of clashing national interests within the Commonwealth and of clashing sectional interests
within the nations of theCommonwealth."55
Thus the Australian Government had established the margin of preference to Britain agreed at Ottawa largely by
raising the level of the General Tariff rather than by cutting the British Preferential Tariff.56 Moreover, unlike
New Zealand's approach to theOttawaAgreements, the Australian Government ensuredthatBritishmanufactures
would not compete on equal terms with domestic products on the local market. The Tariff Board's principles
guaranteed Australian manufactures a "marginal advantage".57 Its approach and the British Government's
encouragement of domestic agricultural production were contrary to the ideal of the complimentary development
of the economies of theEmpire.58
Shortlyafter the trade diversion episodeit became acutelyevidentthat the divergent interests of the memberstates
of the BritishEmpire blockwere tearing it apart. In 1938 Britainand theUnitedStatesreacheda tradeagreement
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which sacrificed a number of preferences to Empire goods, including Australian wheat and fruit.59 The
Agreement had more than economic implications: .
. "On the British side the most powerful motive for the Angle-American rapprochement of 1938
appears to have beenpolitical in view of theworsening European situation."60
In association with the agreement, Britain and Australia produced a Memorandum of Conclusions. It spelt out
each country's trade interests, including those inimical to thestrengthening of theEmpire block.61 Together
"Thesedevelopments wereextremely important because they implied the virtual abandonment of a
self-contained British economic block which had lain at the roots of the Australian trade diversion
policy."62
With the limitations of Empire self-sufficiency starker than ever, the prospects for the alternative of opening up
newexportmarkets werealsofar from brightin 1938:
"Australia... failed since the introduction of the Ottawa system to find an appropriate economic
policy.'~63 ,
This failure was not, at root, due to the ineptitude or other inadequacies of 'the Lyons Government but was a
feature of the international economic situation. A viable trade policy forAustralia wasdependent on therevival of
theworldeconomy, adevelopment which was a world warand almost tenyears away.
The Military Bind
During the 1930s, as before, Australia's defence policies rested on a close relationship with Britain andcollective
security agreements. The treaties arising out of the Washington Conference of 1921-22 relieved international
tensions after World War 1. The Naval Treaty restricted the size of the fleets of the major powers and was
augmented by the 1930 London Naval Treaty. Underthe FourPower Treaty, Japan, the British Empire, France
. and the USA agreed to proscribe aggression in the Pacific for ten years to 1932. As a precaution against the "
failure or lapse of these treaties, Australian defence was to be secured by the British naval base at Singapore,
eventually completed in 1938.64 In theeventof a threat to theEmpire, eastof Suez, the basewould be the centre
of operations for a fleet sent fromBritain.65
After the depression the context of Australian defence policy changed. When the depression prompted almost
universal policies of economic nationalism and thus a curtailment of international trade, those largepowers most
disadvantaged by thenewsituation, Germany, ItalyandJapan turned to military means to alterit in their favour. .
Trade diversion can be interpreted, in part, as a response to and a development which exacerbated military
tensions in the Pacific.66 The development of a complete domestic automotive industry would have strengthened
Australia's defence capacity, while the consolidation of Britain's stake in the Australian market had military as
wellas economic implications.67 For theJapanese tradediversion andAustralia's 1938 ban on the export of iron
ore drove home the importance of direct control over its markets and sources of raw materials.68 As Japan,
Germany and Italy sought to make good their economic disadvantages by augmenting the territories under their
control (Manchuria, China, the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudentenland.. Abyssinia, Albania) the foundations of
multilateral peace treaties and the collective security of the League of Nations collapsed. The League proved
incapable of preventing aggression by Italy andJapan against Abyssinia and China and in 1936 the Washington
andLondon NavalTreaties lapsed. By 1937 theexisting territorial division of the world couldno longer be taken
for granted and an international arms race began:
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"The'economics of siege' werebecoming partof everyday life... In the conditions of international
anarchy which wererapidly returning to the world, no nation, not even the most isolated one, could
escape altogether fromthe pressure of this irrational necessity."69
The increasing international military tensions of the late 1930s gave rise to a marked ambiguity in Australia's
defence policies. Elements of a strategy based on self-reliance werepursued through thedevelopment of the army
and airforce, the establishment of defence industries and plans for military operations in Australia's own mini-
empire in the Pacific. After the trade diversion episode, the Government madethe expansion of the automobile
industry a priority: apartfrom themilitary valueof motorvehicles themselves, the industry provided training for
largenumbers of workers in skills necessary in the conduct of modem warfare.70 A local aircraft industry was
important for the same reasons. The Government encouraged the establishment of the Commonwealth Aircraft
Corporation, with the involvement of General Motors and its decision to produce an American designed
aeroplane. In this case the Government put defence requirements before the bonds of Empire.Tl During the late
1930s the capitals of Papua and New Guinea were amalgamated at Port Moresby, on the more easily defended
southcoastof the island. Oilprospecting andthe expansion of private industry wasencouraged in NewGuinea to
bolster Australian claims to the League of Nations Mandated Territory, as against German claims for its prior
rights. Plansweremade to establish a military baseat PortMoresby.72
Afterthe startof the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Australian defence expenditure wassignificantly increased. The
new program of expenditure devoted resources especially to the airforce and army, which were the key to an
independent defence strategy. The navy also benefitted from the the Australian arms build-up. It remained the
key to theGovernment's defence strategy. Thenavywas to be Australia's contribution to Imperial forces based in
Singapore which could withstand an assault by a major power on Australian or British interests in the Pacific.
Heightened military tension, however, tended to place the value of this supplement to Australia's own armed
forces in somedoubt. McCarthy argues that, by 1934, it wasclearthatBritain wouldnot be ableto spareadequate
forces for Singapore to meet a threat in the Pacific, in the event of war in Europe. The ALP, sections of the
Australian army and of the conservative parties made this point, advocating a more substantial build-up of
Australia's groundandair forces.73 TheGovernment's ownsteps in thedirection of self-reliant defence indicated
its less than absolute faith in the British connection. But when faced with the military resources of Japan no
independent measure an Australian Government could conceivably taken would have been able to replace
assistance from a great power. The Government therefore adopted policies designed to prevent or at least
postpone a Pacific war. Between 1936 and 1937, Lyons advocated a Pacific non-aggression pact. Except for
China and Russiano country expressed any interest in the idea, which was dropped on the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese war. The 1937 Imperial Conference, in which the UAPGovernment participated, adopted a policy of
appeasement. Following the outbreak of WorldWar 11 in Europe, the Australian Governments did its best to ap-
peaseJapan.74
The involvement of US capital in the Australian aircraft industry during the late 1930s is suggestive of the war-
time and post-war alliance. This is misleading. The USA was not an alternative source of military support for
Australian defence before World War11:
"Thepolicy which seemed to be indicated to Australians was not to seek active association with an
American nation which appeared to bewithdrawing fromthe western Pacific."75
The link with Britain, whatever its limitations, was the onlyhope for international military as well as economic
security in the period before the outbreak of hostilities. Hence the Government's willingness to maintain it evert
after its economic value, with the Anglo-American trade agreement, and the likelihood of the British navy
splashing to therescue haddeclined.76
The Australian Government was faced with military and tradeproblems it couldnot solve, giventhe international
situation. Neithera turn to greaterprotection and reliance on the domestic market nor free trade, as a means of
reducing costs, couldsolve the problem of export markets. Neither greater self-reliance in arms production and
changes in thesize andcomposition of theAustralia's armedforces norcloserintegration intoa scheme of Empire
69. Hancock Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs op. cit. p286, for a very similar assessment from a marxist perspective see Hannan
Explaining the Crisisop, cit, p71.
70. Swan 'GeneralMotors-Holden's' op, clt.; S. J. Butlinand C. B. Schedvin War Economy 1942-1945 Australian War Memorial, Canberra
1977pp753-4 andGullettin Copland andJanesAunralianTradePolicyop, cit. p336.
71. For the waymilitary considerations werea solventof the EmpireseeHancock SurveyofBritishCommonwealth Affairsop, cit. p287. .
72. Shepherd Australia'sInterestsandPoliciesop. cit. pp117, 120-1 andM. Simington "The Southwest PacificIslandsin Australian Interwar
Defence" AustralianJournalof Polltlcsand History23(2) August 1977 p176. In late 1937the officerstraining facility, Duntroon was also
73.1f.~Carthy Australiaand ImperialDefence1918-39 University of Queensland Press,St Lucia1976pp129,132,136,alsoseeJ. CurtinTo
Build and Defend a Happy and Self-Reliant Australia Australian Labor Party Sydney 1937 piS, "A Correspondent" "Australia's Defence
Policy" Australian Asiatic Bulletin 2(2) June-July 1938 pl I: M. Dunn 'Curtin's Call to America' honours Thesis Department of History
Australian National University 1975 p16; and J. J. Dedman "Defence PolicyDecisions beforePearl Harbour" Australian JournalofPolitics
andHistory 13(3) December 1967pp331-2.
74. EsthusFromEnmityto Allianceop, cit, pp23-33, 73j A.WattAustralian Foreign PolicyCambridge University Press,Cambridge 1967p38j
N. Mansergh SurveyofBritishCommonwealth Affairs: Problems ofExternalPolicy1931-1939 OxfordUniversity Press,Oxfordpp89,174-5.
75. F. AlexanderAustraliaand the UnitedStatesWorldPeaceFoundation, Boston1941 p26.
76.Megaw"Australia andthe Anglo-American TradeAgreement" op, cit. p20S.
27
defence could guarantee military security. These objective considerations contributed to growing crisis of
conservative politics at theendof the 1930s.77
DomesticEconomicManagement
Otherproblems which emerged from the depression were more amenable to domestic solutions than theneedto
find additional exportmarkets andmilitary security. Thesubjective failings of the conservative governments can
legitimately be identified as the reason for the persistence of these more purely Australian problems, until the
accession of the Curtin LaborGovernment latein 1941. Thefailings related to themanagement of the Australian
financial system andthe containment of Government expenditure and working class discontent through a scheme
of nationalinsurance.
Although the Australian financial systemdid not cause the depression, it undoubtedly exacerbated the effects of
the crisis. De Brunhoff has suggested that the depression accelerated the development of the state's role as the
formulator of "global economic policy", that is, overall and coherent perspectives and measures for the
management of national economies,78 Given that the autonomous economic processes of crises were no longer
sufficient to restore economic prosperity, the state activities to this end were expanded. In Australia the
institutional arrangements for state management of theeconomy werewelldeveloped in someareas (notably arbi-
tration and tariff making) and underdeveloped in others, such as control over the economic and financial system
and the scope for a nationally co-ordinated taxation policy.
The financial expedients adopted during the depression were minoradvances. TheCommonwealth Bank's roleas
a central bank remained underdeveloped and the freedom of action of the trading banks largely untrammelled
during the 1930s.79 In the USA the Roosevelt administration had instituted a series of reforms of the flnancial
system, as had the Swedish Government, in Britain the Macmillan Commission had made recommendations for
reform, whilethe International Labour Organisation andacademic economists alsoadvocated changes in monetary
policies and arrangements.
Professional economists hadcome into their own as policymakers and government advisors with the depression,
after a trial run with the 1928 Brigden Committee on the Australian tariff. During the 1930s they exercised a
growing influence on laborite economic thought. A group of economists produced the first draft of the 1931
Premiers'Plan for Australian depression policy, though their
"real function was to embellish the government-bank compromise [embodied in the Plan] with a
veneerof impartiality."80
The most significant individual influence on the Australian economics profession during the 1930s was John
MaynardKeynes. Keynes hadcommented on thePremiers' Planin 1932, but a nativeandacademic following for
his ideas only emerged in Australia from 1933. Other people had previously made policy proposals similar to
Keynes' calls for increased public works and expansionary monetary policy. They were, however, usually
associated with the left-wing or radical fringes of politics. Keynes's ownimpeccable credentials as a supporter of
capitalism and his presentation of such measures as a means of preserving capitalism made them acceptable to
orthodox economists.s! From about 1933 Australian academic Keynesians provided a respectable critique of
financial management during the depression. Cain has identified E. R. Walker as the first anointed Australian
Keynesian economist. Walkerreturned fromCambridge University, where Keynes was intellectually hegemonic
amongst economists, in 1933. WhileL. F. Giblin, one of the architects of thePremiers' Plan,had already begun to
advocate public works as an anti-depression policy in 1932, Walker criticised orthodox deflationary policy in
general and promulgated the latest theoretical Bulls from Cambridge. Over the next few years many influential
university economists and others accepted the new Keynesian orthodoxy.82 Keynes's General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money published in 1936had a prompt appeal in academic circles, winning converts
77. L. F. Fitzhardinge The Little Digger1914-1952: A PoliticalBiography ofWilliam MorrisHughes Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1979
pp644, 649; L. Watson "The United Australia Party and Its Sponsors" in C. Hazlehurst (ed.) AustralianConservatism Australian National
UniversityPress,Canberra 1979p86,G. SawerAustralianFederalPoliticsandLaw 1929-49 op. cit. plOO-1.
78. S..de BrunhoffTheState, Capital and Economic Policy Pluto, London 1978 pp66, 75, also see P. Mattick Marx and Keynes Merlin,
London1974pp13O-2.
79. See L. F. GiblinThe Growthofa CentralBankMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1951.
80. SchedvinAustraliaand the GreatDepression op. cit, p218.
81. Keynesrecognised the importance of the rateof profitto continued growthundercapitalism andthe needto sustainit:
"Unemployment, I mustrepeat, existsbecauseemployers have beendeprived of profit. The loss of profit may be due to all
sorts of causes. But, short of going over to Communism, there is no possible means of curing unemployment except by
restoringto employers a propermarginof profit."
He knew whichside of the barricades he was on: "The classwar wilIfind me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie." To these insights he
addedthe established Britishrulingclassvirtuesof xenophobia, anti-Communism andanti-semitism: Commenting on the moodof oppression
~~.~~ .
"In part, perhaps, it is the fruitof somebeastliness in the Russian nature- or in the Russian andJewishnatures when,as now,
they are allied together."
J. M. KeynesEssays in Persuasion MacmilIan, London1931 pp275,323,310. On Keynes's relations with the academic community see l?
Winch Economics and Policy Walker and Company, New York 1969 p175, who also points out that G. D. H. Cole, who made pohcy
recommendations similar to those of Keynes belongedto the tradition of Ruskin and Hobson, which was alien to Keynes and the academic
establishment. Foran excellentexposition of the reasonsfor Keynes'sappeal see R. Skidelsky "Keynes and the Reconstniction of Liberalism"
Encounter52(4),April1979.. . . ... . . .
82. See N. Cain Australian Keynesian: The WrltUlgs of E. R. Walker 1933-36Working Papers ID Economic History No. 13, Austrahan
NationalUniversity, Canberra 1983p18.
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amongst the younger generation of economists as wellas more established economists.83 Theywerereinforced by
overseas trainedeconomists fresh from English Keynesian seminaries.84 Walker interpreted The General Theory
for the Royal Commission on Banking, By way of private contacts and official arrangements, such as the
Commonwealth Government's advisory Finance andEconomics Committee, established in 1938, Keynesian ideas
came to influence public policy making. This process was accelerated during World War II as professional
economists were increasingly recruited to the Commonwealth Public Service.85 For a briefoutline of the major
tenets of Keynesian theory andits efficacy see the appendix to thischapter.
The first major impact of Keynesian economics on Australian society tookplace through the RoyalCommission
on the Finance and Banking System, which dealt with the problems raised by depression financial policy and
institutional arrangements. In thecourse of the 1934 Federal election campaign both the Country Party, seeking to
mollify rural constituents adversely affected by thecontraction of bankcreditduring the depression, and the ALP
advocated the establishment of a Royal Commission on the banking system.86 Late in the campaign, Prime
Minister Lyons promised an inquiry. TheRoyalCommissioners, eventually appointed in October 1935 included a
number of establishment personages andBen Chifley, a former ALPMember of theHouseof Representatives and
future Labor Treasurer. Influenced by the publication of J. M. Keynes's General Theory in 1936, theReport of
the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Monetary and Banking Systems at Present in Operation in
Australia (the Banking Commission Report) of 1937 recommended a significant strengthening of the Central
. Banking role of Commonwealth Bank, including its ability to supervise theactivities of the trading banks. As well
as structural changes in the financial system, to be implemented by means of legislation, the Report argued for
new counter-cyclical policies, including the use of expansionary credit by the Commonwealth Bank to "raise the
levelof business activity andemployment" whennecessary. The Reportembodied a beliefin the perfectibility of
. capitalism butcautioned thatmonetary reforms werenot a cure-all.s?
Despite the far from radical credentials of the RoyalCommissioners and the reemergence of someof the factors
that had led to the economic crisis of 1929-33, UAP Governments to 1941 were unable to bring themselves to
implement their recommendations. Some changes to the financial system were drafted into Bills, but these were
allowed to lapseafterobjections from thetrading banks. Eventually, and onlyunderthe coercive influence of the
War, theFaddenGovernment reached a voluntary agreement with the private banks which embodied in enfeebled
formsomeof thecontrols theBanking RoyalCommission hadrecommended for theCommonwealth Bank.88
The question of social insurance was another area in which UAPGovernments proved incapable of implementing
reforms necessary for effective economic management andalsodesirable for thecontainment of theclass struggle.
During the late 1930s UAPpoliticians andTreasury officials saw proposals for a national insurance scheme, with
a range of new benefits, as a means. of covering the transition from the funding of old age pensions from
consolidated revenue to a contributory arrangement. Without additional means of raising revenue, old age
pensions were predicted to become a ruinous drain on Commonwealth Government resources, especially in the
context of growing economic difficulties after 1937.89 Moreover,
"If the financial implications of a growing pensions burden provided a core motivation for
introducing national insurance in 1938, otherfactors were also at work. Certainly one of the other
key features was the role of progressive conservatives within the government who argued for a
version of Disraelian reform to win theAustralian working class to theUAP."90
A dispute over the proposed national insurance legislation was the occasion for Deputy UAP leaderMenzies's
resignation from Cabinet in March 1939. Despite continuing Cabinet discussions to 1941, conservative
governments were not able to bring forward legislation for such a scheme. Differences between and inside the
UnitedAustralia andCountry Parties over thecostsof national insurance for employers, as wellas thehostility of
Friendly Societies and the British Medical Association contributed to the demise of the proposals. The
conservative governments of 1939 to 1941 werenot able, as a consequence, to lessen the financial burden of old
agepensions on Commonwealth revenue or to take thisstep to promote the illusion thatworkers had a stake in the
system, which warranted dying for it TheCurtin Government was ableto acteffectively on bothproblems.
Divisions emerged in the UAP over domestic economy policy to complicate those over defence questions and
while they and various "personal" rivalries no doubt existed in some form throughout the period of Lyons's
administration, they began to disrupt the effectiveness of conservative government more seriously from 1938,
83. H. C. Coombs TrialBalance Sun Papennac, Melbourne 1983 pp4-5.
84. The imports included Colin Oark and W. B. Reddaway.
85. B. S. Stevens, shortly after his fall from the post ofPremier ofNSW in1939 wrote a more orless Keynesian tract Planning for War and
PeaceAngus and Robertson, Sydney 1940. Cain Australian Keynesian op. cit. p22-3, Coombs Trial Balance op. cit. pp5-6 for the careers of
some of these economists.
86. This account ofthe Royal Commission draws on Love's useful summary, Labourand the MoneyPowerop. cit. ppI44-8.
87. Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Monetary and Banking Systems at Present in Operation in Australia
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1937 pp204, 205.
88. Giblin TheGrowthofa CentralBanlc op. cit, pp260, 284.
89. In 1934 Country Party leader E. Page had been explicit in calling for anew system ofnational insurance to keep down the costs ofsocial
welfare expenditure, U. Ellis AHistory of theAustralian Country Partyop. cit. pp233-4.
90. R. Watts "The Origins ofthe Australian Welfare State" in R. Kennedy (ed) Australian Welfare HistoryMacmillan, South Melbourne 1982
p23S. Watts provides an excellent study ofthe issues at stake inthe national insurance pror..osals. Also see J. Curtin WhyLabor Opposed the
LyonsGovernment's NationalInsurance Scheme. . , andHowIt CouldBe Improved People sPrinting and Publishing Co., Perth 19381 pp7-12.
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against the background of the deteriorating military and economic situations.v! Geoffrey Grimwade, a business
backer of the UAP commentedin 1943 that
"The political forces opposed to socialism suffered from two great handicaps -- parties and leaders
which were short of a policy and out of touch with the people and with reality, and controllingparty
organisations which were virtuallydefunct"92
The structure of the UAP further hindered its ability to develop a coherent direction in the face of these
difficulties. In the course of the 1930s the extra-parliamentary organisations of both the UAP and the Country
Party declined. In any case throughoutthe period United Australia "party membership was small". At the federal
level, UAP organisation went little beyond Lyons's co-ordinating activities.93 The Party was fmancially
dependent on state-basedcommittees of big businessmen which were outside its formal structure except in South
Australia. This arrangement was a major obstacle in the way of an effective Party organisation.94 The finance
committees had helpedcohere different anti-Labor organisations during the early 1930swhen the problem (Labor
Governments) and the solution (deflationary policies) seemed clear. Later in the decade the problems appeared
more complex. Differences amongst capitalists made the identification of straightforward policy options more
difficult for the Government.95 So no substantial party bureaucracy existed to help sort out the policy issues,
options and leadership conflicts. Instead Lyons came to perform a mediating role between factions and cliques.
The conflicts deepened to the extent that by the time of his death he was crucial to their containment96 With
Lyons gone the UAP-CountryParty coalition broke up for about a year. In 1941 Menzies was replaced as Prime
Minister by A. Fadden and then as UAP leader by W..M. Hughes. Both conservative parties lost support in the
1940 federal elections and were decimated at the 1943 poll. A decade of conservative government of the
Commonwealth was ended on the votes of a dissident farmer and a dissident businessman.v? Lonie sums up the
crisis of conservativepolitics at the end of the 1930s:
"The decline into corridor politicking, back-stabbing and vitriolic character assassination was a
consequence of the way the United AustraliaParty had been established, the way it was run and the
broad situation of inter-imperialist rivalry which it could neither properly comprehend or man-
age."98
By the beginning of the 1940s, a decreasinglyeffective Government was faced with the persistenceof the general
economic crisis, expressedin the downturn of the late 1930s, and militaryproblems, in addition to the demands of
a working class at least partly reorganisedduring the recovery. These problems and the Government's responseto
them were important in shaping the economic thoughtof the labour movement
91. G. Fairbanks "Menzies Becomes Prime Minister, 1939" AustralianQUarterly 40(2) June 1968 p19 and J. Lonie "From Liberal toLiberal:
The Emergence oflhe Liberal Party and Australian Capitalism" in G. Duncan (ed.) Critical Essays in AustralianPolitics Edward Amold, Port
Melbourne 1978 pp66-7, for the conflict between Lyons and the Western Australia UAP over protection policy. Also see P. Hasluck The
Governmentand the People:1939-1941 Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1965 ppl06, 109; E. Page TruantSurgeon·Angus and Robertson,
Sydney 1963 p281.' .
92. Quoted inC. D. KempBig Businessmen Institute ofPublic Affairs, Melbourne 1964 p76.
93. D. Aitkin The CountryParty in N.s.W. Australian National University Press, Canberra 1972; Watson "The United Australia Party and Its
Sponsors" op,cit. pp80; P. Hartr'The Piper and the Tune" inHazlehurst AustralianConservatism op. cit. p133.
94. R. S. Parker "Group Interests and the Non-Labor Parties since 1930" inC. Hughes (ed.) Readings in AustralianGovemment University ofQueensland Press, StLucia 1968 p389.
95. ibid. p388, Hart "The Piper and the Tune" op,cit. p137; Lonie "From Liberal toLiberal" op,cit. p65.
96. Hart "The Piper and the Tune" op. cit. pp124, 133 and C. Lioyd 'The Formation and Development ofthe United Australia Party 1929-37'
PhD Thesis Australian National University 1984 p459-63. For some ofthe details ofCabinet infighting during the late 1930s see U. ElIis A
Historyofthe AustralianCountry Party op,cit. p237.
97. The decline ofconservative politics also affected state parties. J.McCarthy "After Lang: 1932-35" in H. Radi and P. Spearritt (eds) Jack
Lang Hale and Irernonger, Sydney 1977 p189 argues that B. Stevens was de{'Osed asUAP Premier ofNSW in1939 because:
"Recession was deepening into another depression in NSW, and It is possible that the party's managers had decided that
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inhis attacks on the working class. Also see J. R. Robertson "1930-1939" in F. Crowley (ed.) A New History of Australia Heinemann,
Melbourne 1976 p440 for divisions in the Victorian Country Party. .
98. Lonie "From Liberal toLiberal" op. cit. p70. See also R. W. Connell and T. H. Irving Class Structure in Australian History Longman
Cheshire, Melbourne 1980 pp288-9.
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Working Class Politics
The process of economic recovery in Australia created difficulties for employers inside their own businesses, in
addition to the obstacles to continued capital accumulation presented by the international military and economic
situation or the problems of national economic management. An obstacle at the core of the production process
itself was the working class whose self-confidence and militancy were renewed during the second half of the
1930s. This development made the prospects for placing the burden of the economic down-turn after 1937 and
then the war effort onto the working class more difficult.
In some parts of the world governments took a universal anti-depression measure to its logical conclusion. Not
only were attempts made to cut real. wages and erode working conditions, in order to boost profit rates, but
working class organisations were smashed. Such a process increased the rate of surplus value for over a decade in
Germany after 1933 and Austria after 1934. The effects were even more long lasting following the assault on
workers' rights in Russia of the early 1930s. Despite the spectacular, but brief career of the fascist New Guard in
NSW, no attempt was made to eradicate working class organisation in Australia during the 1930s. Even the
persecution of the CPA was not significantly harsher than during subsequent decades or the 1920s and pales when
compared to the measures used against the Industrial Workers of the World during the First World War.
Employer harassment, starting with the disputes in thestevedoring, coal and timber industries in the late 1920s,
and high unemployment smashed some unions for a period. Yet the legal status of trade unions was not
significantly altered. Although unemployment was very high, the dimensions of the economic crisis and the
weight of the petty bourgeoisie were not sufficient in Australia to sustain the kind of mass fascist movement
necessary if the working class was to be atomised.
Because of the obvious powerlessness or even demise of official trade unions and the inadequacy of their leaders,
the Communist dominated Minority Movement was able to rally and harden militant forces in the unions between
1930 and 1934. The Communist Party's influence and membership grew rapidly during the depression and the
flrst stage of the recovery, while the Labor Party was still disorganised by the differences over economic strategy
which had emerged after 1930.
The emergence of certain manufacturing industries as the leading sectors of the recovery meant increased
employment in enterprises where workers were concentrated in large numbers and educated in coordinated
activity by the production process itself. The iron and steel industry is a good example, but the same principle
applied to a number of other areas of the metals industry. In some areas, such as coal mining and stevedoring, the
defeats of 1928 to 1930 had severely weakened union organisation but had not eradicated long traditions of
solidarity and militant industrial action. As the economy picked up, workers reasserted these traditions in some
older industries and developed them in some newer ones. The textiles industry was one of the first to recover
from the depression. Its largely female workforce engaged in a number of militant and at least partially successful
strikes in 1932 and 1933.1
The pattern of industrial disputes is an indicator of the revival of working class confidence.
1.Schedvin Australiaand the GreatDepression op. cit. p303. J. Stone"Brazen Hussies and God's Police: Feminist Historiography and the
Depression" Hecate 8(1)1982p14.
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Table 2. Industrial Disputes 1930 to 1941
Year
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
number
183
134
127
90
155
183
235
342
376
416
350
567
workers involved
54222
37667
32917
30113
50850
47322
60587
96173
143954
159830
192597
248107
days lost
1511241
245991
212318
111956
370386
495124
497248
557111
1337994
459154
1507252
984174
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Census andStatistics Labour Reports.
The level of industrial disputation, in terms of number of disputes, workers involved and total days lost started to
rise from 1934. The rate of unionisation rose over the same period. The Commonwealth Bureauof Census and
Statistics reported no industrial disputes of "outstanding magnitude" in 1933 or 1934, but the four month
Wonthaggi coal miners' strikeof 1934 marked an important point in the recovery of the Miners' Federation, and
presaged its major campaigns of 1937, 1938 and 1940.2 The second half of the 1930s saw hard fought and
increasingly successful disputes in the textiles, metal, rubbergas and even biscuitmaking industries. Australian
coal miners and gas workers adopted themilitant tactic of the"stay-in" (or"sit-down") strike, pioneered byFrench
and US workers.3 During 1938, 1,500 iron workers at Lysaghts wereout the gate for fourteen weeks. Dunlop's
rubberworkers at its Drummoyne operation were in dispute for six weeks in 1939. The militancy continued after
the start of World War IT: in November 1939 NSWmeatworkers struck for two weeks, while almost two and a
half thousand munitions workers at Lithgow wona sixday strikein 1940.
In the faceof the revival of trade union activity, employers were largelysuccessful in persuading the Conciliation
and Arbitration Courtto limitthe growth of the BasicWage. Thedepression cut of ten percent. wasonlyfullyre-
stored in 1937 and there was no further increase unti11946, although war loadings were widespread after 1941.
Some workers, however, won substantial increases in their awards and even above award rates of pay. The
continuation of substantial levels of unemployment remained an important factor in industrial relations after the
depression. But unemployment in some industries declined considerably. For example, only three per cent. of
Amalgamated Engineering Unionmembers wereunemployed in 1938. In 1936theAEUhad already succeeded in
winning above award pay in Melbourne. Sydney engineers forced the Metal Trades Employers Association to
recommend a 3/- overaward payment to its members in 1938.4 Even where improvements in the employment
situation were not so dramatic, they could improve the morale of unionists. While the amountof full-time work
rose, the number of coal miners only increase from 21,300 in 1931-32 to 22,011 in 1938-39.5 Yet the Miners'
Federation won a restoration of theHarvester ratioof 10:7 (between the wages of skilled andunskilled workers) in
1937, for the first time since the early 1920s. Through its campaigns the union also restored miners' wages to
predepression levels, gainedfurther payrises,pensions, annual leaveand theforty hourweekfor mostmembers.e
Printers in Melbourne won shorterhours in 1936, Brisbane meatworkers in 1937 and Brisbane printers in 1939.7
They alsowonannual leavein 1936and thesteelworkers achieved thisgoal in 1939.8
Increased working class combativity after the depression was accompanied by changes in the leadership of a
numberof trade unions and the balance between the CPA and the ALP in the wider labour movement These
developments areconsidered in theremainder of thischapter.
2.LabOur Reports 1933and 1934.
3. B. RossA History of the Miners' Federation of Australia Australian Coaland ShaleEmployees Federation, Sydney 1970pp369, 371;D.
Gillies"TheGasworkers' Strike" Communist Review October 1937 ppl-2
4. T. Sheridan Mindful Militants Cambridge University Press, Cambndge 1975 pp130-38.
S.J. HaganThe History of theACIU Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1981 pp65-6 for changes in employment levels.
6. E. RossAHistory of theMiners:" op.cit. pp374-S.
7. J. HaganPrinters and Politics Australian National University Press, Canberra 1966 p2S8; North Queensland Guardian 31n137 pI; L.
Donald "FortyHourWeek" Communist Review September 1938.
8.R.Munay andK.WhiteTheIronworkers Haleandlremonger, Sydney1982pp96-8.
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From Red Leader to Trade UnionLeader
The accession of Communists to senior unionoffices was more an effect than a cause of rank and file milltancy.?
Indeed, although Communists were elected as union secretaries, presidents, organisers and executivemembers be-
cause they were among the best militants in leading and supporting disputes, the CPA's approach to work in the
trade unions was much more conservative after 1934 than before. The change primarily derived from a shift in
Russian foreign policy, but the responsibilities of office also militatedagainst the more irresponsible sloganising
of the Third Period. The victories of fascism in Germany and Austria, which both owed a great deal to the
sectarianpolicies promotedby the Comintern between 1928and 1933,constituteda threat to Russia's security. In
order to off-set this threat, Stalin sought alliances with other world powers and, to that end, Russia joined the
League of Nations.I? The "Third Period" line of revolutionary phrase-mongering was dropped by the Comintern
in favour of the PopularFront. For a Third Period approach to advertising Christmas celebrations see Cartoon 2.
The new line was consecratedat the Seventh Congressof the Communist International in 1935 and called for the
national unity of all anti-fascistforces, as a prerequisites for an international front of democratic countries. The
. Comintern leadershipmade it clear that .
"From the point of view of the prospects of the revolution, what was essential was not to wage the
revolutionarystruggle in the capitalistcountriesbut to ensure thedevelopmentof the USSR."11
The very existenceof the USSRled to the
"possibility of creating a broad front of the working class, of all working people, and of entire
nations against imperialistwar."12
Nationalism,even in imperialistcountries,could thereforeplay a progressive role. The desire of the old colonial
powers to defend their territories against Germanywould force them into an alliance with Russia,13 In Australia,
the Popular Front strategy meant attempting to secure the election of a Labor Government committed to anti-
fascistpolicies, pursuitof changes to the foreign policy of the BritishEmpire and attempting to win sections of the
Australian bourgeoisie to this cause.t- Taken to its logical extreme, the Popular Front line meant opposing
workers struggles where these threatened progressive regimes or relations with Russia. Hence the role of the
FrenchCommunist Party in demobilising the militantworkers' movementin May-June 1936and the preparedness
of the SpanishParty to physicallyliquidaterevolutionaries during 1937and 1938,15
As early as 1928 Trotsky drew attention to the implications of the theory of socialism in one country which
justified making the defence of Russia the first priority of the Comintern. His analysis throws important lighton
the CPA's behaviour, especially in its trade union work after 1934. On the one hand, Trotsky argued, the
CommunistParties would tend to become "frontierpatrols" for Russia - simply instruments of Russian foreign
policy. On the other hand the theory of socialismin one countrycouldjustify non-revolutionary, nationalpaths to
socialismfor the Communist Parties outside Russia, Le. the same kind of "social patriotism" that characterised
mostof the parties of the SecondInternational,16 Davidson, in his historyof the CPA makes a similarpoint:
"Stalinist theory was turning away from the notion of world revolution toward the notion of
proletarianrevolutions that could be made on a national basis. But,more importantwas the fact that
the Comintern had become a "branch" of the Russian foreign office, and was no longer in a position
to conduct worldrevolutionanyway."17
The logic of social patriotism was compatiblewith a Communist Party giving priority to the defence of Russia
where this entailed collaboration with the local bourgeoisie to persuadeit of the value of an alliancewithRussia,18
So a CommunistParty's socialpatriotismandrole of "frontierguard"couldcomplementeach other,19
After 1934 (until the mid-1960s), the CPA's combinationof social patriotismand the pursuit of Russian interests
had straightforward implications for its attitude to Australian foreign policy. The Communistposition could be
read off current Comintern (i.e, Russian foreign) policy. In every case the Party argued that Australia's national
9.1.Merritt •AHistory ofthe Federated Ironworkers Association, 1909-1945' PhD Thesis Australian National University 1967 p2S6 points out
that .
"Communist agitation wassignificant atshop floor level, but there was unrest in many sectors ofthe metal industries where
communist influence was negligible... Men inall metal unions,leaders and rank and file alike, had scores tosettle, and there
were plenty ofnon-communist advocates for direct action,"
Merritt documents the progress of CPA influence in the PIA. For other gains see R. Gibson The People Stand Up Red Rooster Press,
. Melbourne 1983 p293.
10. On the origins ofthe Popular Front policy see F. Claudin The Communist Movement Penguin, Harmondsworth 1975 p182-3; B. Pearce
"From 'Social Fascism' toPeople's Front" inM. Woodhouse and B.Pearee Essaysin theHistoryofCommunism in BritainNew Park, London
1975206-12
11. F. Oaudin TheCommunist Movement Penguin, Harmondsworth 1975 p189.
12 Executive Committee of the Communist International ''Mayday Manifesto 1936" in J. Degras (ed) The Communist International 1919-
1942: Documents Volume 3Cass and Co.,London 1971 p390.
13. Seventh Congress of the Communist International in Degras The Communist International op, cit. p366, Claudin The Communist
Movement op, cit, p197.
14. See, for example, R. Dixon France at the Cross Roads Modem Publishers, Sydney 1936 p2; T. Wright We Defend Peace Modem
Publishers, Sydney 1938(1) p4; Communist Party ofAustralia Unite for Peace,Freedom, Democracy Draft Resolutions for the 12thNational
Congress, Communist PartyofAustralia November 1938 p9. .
15. For France see Oaudin The Communist Movement op, ciL ppl99, 210, for Spain see F. Morrow Revolution and Counter-Revolution in
SpainPathfinder, New York 1976. ACommunist slogan inFrance was "The Popular Front isnot the revolution".
16. L. Trotsky The ThirdInternational AfterLenin Pathfinder, New York 1982 pp61,72. J. Molyneux uses the term "frontier patrol" in his.
admirable discussion ofTrotsky'sposition inLeonTrotsky'sTheory of Revolution Harvester, London 1981 pp147-8.
17. A. Davidson TheCommunist Partyof Australia Hoover Institution, Stanford 1969 p73.
18. Trotsky TheThirdInternational op,cit p61.
19. See Molyneux LeonTrotsky'sTheory op. ciL p248, footnote 15.
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interests would be served best by a foreign policy in accord with Russia's international interests.20 But where the
Party could most influence the course of Australian events, in the trade unions, matters were not as clear cut.
There the Party was not pulled in just two directions, by its frontier guard role towards the Russian ruling class
and by its social patriotism towards the Australian bourgeoisie,but in three. Like the ALP, the CommunistParty's
base of support in Australian society was a section of the working class and, increasingly, a section of the trade
union bureaucracy. The actions of neither party can be explained withoutreference to their attempts to retain their
mass bases and the pressure of their working class supporters on them.21 The adoption of the Popular Front line
meant that the Party had to adjust its policy in the area most important to the maintenance of its working class
base: industrial strategy. It is worth considering Communist industrial strategy in some detail, as it was very
influential in determining how large a problem increased working class militancy would be for the Government
and capitalist class, during the late 1930s. The CPA's Popular Front strategy helped direct working class
militancy along the lines of restrained direct action, focusing on reform within the system, rather than of a
challenge to Australian capitalism.
The CPA's industrial work during the Third Period was mainly conducted through the Minority Movement.22 It
had three key aspects: first Communists stressed the importance of independence from trade union officials,
Militants were encouraged to organise through Militant Minority units, i.e, caucuses, or through shop committees.
Inthis way they could initiate action in defence of wages and conditions whether or not union officials supported
it. Secondly, Communists supported workers in struggle and even encouraged them when they made demands
which both employers, union officials and ALP leaders thought outrageous, unrealistic or unreasonable. Finally,
the CPNMinority Movement strategy was directed towards the initiation of a general strike. While this was
undoubtedly a mechanical response to any industrial dispute, the slogan did embody a general approach to
working class politics •• the need for militancy: and.to extend disputes in order to win them. It provided a link,
however crude, between routine industrial struggles and revolution, because the Party still believed that the class
(rather than trade union or sectional) solidarity and organisationrequired for the overthrow of capitalism could be
shaped in the course of day to day strugglesover wages and conditions. Cartoon 3 is the front cover illustrationof .
the first issue of Red Leader, the Minority Movement's newspaper. During the depression the most basic
demands could often only be won by means of militant and generalisedstruggles. The miners, timber workers and
wharfies had all been defeated in the depression or the late 1920s, without the active, as opposed to fmancial,
support of other workers. To workers unsatisfied with the capitulation of most trade union leaders, the Minority
Movement, organised across unions and industries, committed to rank and file control and direct action, embodied
a credible alternative approach.
Lloyd Ross summed up the CPA's industrialpolicies during the Third Period :
"Only by constant pressure can the capitalist system be overthrown. If one demand is satisfied, the
militants press for another, and must keep on pressing until capitalism collapses."23
During the Popular Front period, on the other hand, the defence of Russia no longer required revolution in
capitalist countries, but the winning of whole nations as allies for the Soviet motherland.24 The trade unions
offered the best opportunities for the CPA to enhance its influence in Australian society. Communists could win
support from rank and me workers and hence union offlce by demonstrating that they were more capable of
delivering the industrial goods than their opponents. Official positions could then be used to propagate Popular
Front policies to rank and me unionists, the public and within the ACTU or ALP. Economic struggles were
essentiallymeans to political ends:
"The struggle on these immediate issues must be intensified, and the working class roused..
organised and brought into action as the most effective means of hastening the end of the Lyons
administration and securing its defeat in the next elections."2S
Yet, in winning control of trade unions Communists were concerned not to antagonise the bulk of the Labor and
union bureaucracies as the CPA sought to secure the election of a Labor Government and win the ALP to its
20. See,example,D. Morey"Mr. Curtlnand the Defenceof Australia" Communist ReviewMay 1936pp31-2.
21.Molyneux Leon Trotsky'sTheory op, ciL p238tends to conflatethe Communist tendencies to social patriotism with the fact that it had a
following in the workingclass,but theParty's most extremephaseof socialpatriotism, between 1941 and 1945, saw it lose support in some
strongholds of workingclass support, such as the coalfields,seechapter5. On the otherhandthe Partygrewmuchmorerapidlyduringits still
internationalist Third Period phase, despiteits sectarianism, than during the subsequent Popular Front period. The CPA had less than 300
members in 1929,over 2,800 in 1934and about 4,000 in 1940,Davidson The Communist Party of Australiaop. ciL pp69, 82. P. Morrison
'The Communist Partyof Australia and the Australian Radical SocialistTradition, 1920-1939' PhD Thesis University or Adelaide 1975p312
arguesthat theCPA' s growthduringthe secondhalfof the 1930swas largelya consolidation of the periphery built earlierin the decade.
22. This accountrelies on T. O'Lincoln's excellent, but unfortunately unpublished, pamphlet Rankand File 1983 and his forthcoming The
Minority Movement. AlsoseeR.GibsonThePeopleStandUp Red RoosterPress,Melbourne 1983p38.
23. Quoted in HaganTheHistoryof theACTUop, ciLplOD.
24.Miles"NewGuinea"op. cit. p50 put it thisway:
"Themajor issueat the moment is not to end capitalistexploitation in New Guineaor Australia, but to fight fascismand its
allies." .
The PopularFront in Australia went through a numberof stages, as the CPA sought to increase its influence and the prospects of having
Russian foreign policy's assumptions accepted) by recourse to substitutes for the working class, more and more removed form the working
class itself. The processstartedwitha "unitedFront" overture to the ALP in 1933anda concomitant softeningof the Party's position on trade
unionofficialsafferHitler's rise to power,Davidson TheCommunist Partyof Australia op, ciL pp64,58-9. .
25. L. L. Sharkey "Questions of the Day" Communist Review December 1936 p16. Also see J. B. Miles"For a Better Life in Australia"
Communist ReviewApril 1937p8:
"Economic problems providea startingpointso essential to the organisation of theunitedfront for peace."
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policies. Since the CPA sought to win trade union office from ALPsupporters and to win friends amongst themat
the same time, the industrial policies of the Third Period did not fit the bil126.
There was a way out of the Party's dilemma: a policy of sectional militancy. Certainly the policy would not take
maximum advantage of the renewed confidence of the working class, inspired by the economic recovery. But it
did relate to and encourage those struggles without incurring the drawbacks of the Minority Movement strategy.
Independent rank and file organisation across industries was a challenge to the authority of established union
officials and thus a handicap in winning friends amongst the better elements of "reformist" officialdom.27 Now,
rather than defying them, the Party either wanted to win them over politically or defeat them in union elections.
Laborite officials were no longer the "left-wing of fascism", in fact they could be vital in the anti-fascist
movement. It was necessary to "help them overcome their reformism, and break the last threads linking them to
class collaboration."28 This approach had a number of successes, with some longstanding union officials joining
the CPA.29 Because union leaders varied in their sympathies with the CPA, Communists came to adopt different
degrees of collaboration with them in their industrial work, rather than upholding the principle of the independent
organisation of militants. Moreover, where CPA members already held senior union positions, rank and file
groups could be a fetter on their freedom to implement the policies and compromises they thought necessary, both
in the areas of industrial tactics and wider politics.
Sectional militancy had another advantage over the politics of the Minority Movement when victory in union
elections replaced defiance of recalcitrant reformist officials on the shop-floor as the main priority. The
consistency of Communist support for militant action could have the lowest common denominator appeal
necessary for winning union elections only in a few circumstances. Sectional militancy stressed the need for self-
sufficient industrial action to win disputes, rather than the need for extension to other workers and for active
solidarity with those on strike, even if it condoned sympathy action in some circumstances. During industrially
quiet periods, this approach had a much greater electoral appeal to many union members, beyond the militants
than that of the Minority Movement.30 As a corollary, the task of winning elections became primary, there was a
tendency to regard rank and file militancy as following on from a change in the leadership of a union rather than
vice versa:
"Where militants have won the leadership of the workers' organisations there is to be observed
greatly increased activity on the parts of the workers concerned."31
The change in the CPA's industrial orientation was indicated by the liquidation of the Minority Movement in 1935
and the change in the name and format of its newspaper. In August 1935 Red Leader became the monthly journal
Trade Union Leader, which only survived until November 1936.32
The experience of the Seamen's strike of 1935-36 seemed to confirm the CPA's turn towards sectional
militancy.33 Communists were prominent on the rank and file strike committee which directed the three month
dispute over cuts in wages and conditions in a new award.34 It became obvious that only extension of strike action
26. J. B.Miles maintained that
"IfLabor Party leaders, if trade union leaders really fight forthe interests ofthe masses, we do not want to replace them."
Workers Weekly 16/6136 p3 .
27. F.Farrelllnternational Socialism and Australian LabourHale and Iremonger, Sydney 1981 p215.
28. R. Dixon "The Rise of the Strike Movement in Australia" Communist Review April 1937, O'Lincoln Rank and FUe op. cit, p25. G.
Baracchidescribed the content of the Popular Front, onleaving the Communist Party in 1939 in 'Baracchi Replies to CPA CC Questions'
December 1939, Baracchi Papers National Library ofAustralia folder 7:during the late 19308 there was a
"degeneration of the 'united front' into truckling to trade union bureaucrats and Labor politicians, onthe ground that the
'leftward movement ofthe masses was pushing them towards us... As if the trade union bureaucrats had really been coming
leftwards tous,instead ofthe actuality that wewere going rightward totheml."
29. For example Fred Lowden, President ofthe Southern District oftheMiners' Federation, who joined theCPA in 1936, see L. Richardson
'The Labour Movement in the Wollongong-Port Kembla Region 1929-41' PhD Thesis Australian National University 1974 p252 Also see R.
Dixon "Industrial Policy inthe 30s" Australian LeftReview27October-November 1970 p28.
30. R. Dixon Towards Militant Unionism Modem Publishers, Sydney 1935 pS, O'Lincoln Rankand Fileop. cit, p23. Also see B.A. Mitchell
'AHistory ofthePublic School Teachers' Organisations inNew South Wales 1855-1945' PhD Thesis Australian National University 1969 and
R. Gollan Revolutionaries and Reformists Australian National University Press, Canberra 1975 p76 for the secrecy of Communist work inthe
Teachers' Federation. Some prominent leaders ofthe Seamen's Union only "joined.. "the CPA after they had been elected tooffice during this
period, B.Fitzpatrick and R. CahillTheSeamen'sUnionofAustralia 1872-1972 Seamen's Union, Sydney 1981 pl09.
31. R. Dixon Towards Militant Unionism op, cit, pS. (the work would be better titled "Towards Less Militant Unionism".) Also see L. L.
Sharkey TheTrade Unions NSW Legal Rights Committee, Sydney 1942 p27.
32 For a debate between protagonists ofthe CPA'sold and new industrial strategies see Common Cause 9/11/35 p4 and 7/12135 p6.
33. Even before the Seamen's strike, Communist union officials had been hesitant about calling for the extension of disputes. During the
Wonthaggi strike Orrhad delayed spreading the dispute, despite support forsuch a move among Victorian miners and workers inMelbourne,
P.Cochrane "Wonthaggi Coal Strike 1934" inJ. Mackinolty (ed.) The Wasted Years Alien and Unwin, Sydney 1981 pp85,90. In 1936, Orr
did not warm to the idea ofextending the Port Kembla ironworkers' strike to Newcastle, even though South Coast miners and wharfies had
already extended it locally. During this dispute the CPA's formal position had been forextension, butthis was regarded asa question oftactics,
the delay oftrade union officials inextending the strike toNewcastle was excused bytheir laudable "unity" with Communist officials during
the strike, "Mac"."The Port Kembla Steel Workers Strike" Trade Union LeaderMay 1936; E.A Knight "We Enter Our Second Year" Trade
Union LeaderSeptember 1936 p36. Inthe absence of extension to Newcastle, the iron workers failed tohave compulsory overtime abolished,
the main objective ofthe strike, although they did make some other gains.
34. There are three significant recent, published accounts of the strike. B. Fitzpatrick in Fitzpatrick and Cabill The Seamen's Union of
Australia op, cit, pp8Q-l believes that "the union should have been wiser after the events of 1928-30" and that the policies of the rank and file
strike leaders, who had formed thecore of the Minority Movement in the union, were disastrous. For L.Louis "Recovery from the Depression
and the Seamen's Strike of 1935-6" LabourHistory 41 November 1981 p86 the conduct ofthe strike represented a miscalculation bythe CPA
ofthelevel ofhostility of reformist trade union officials and provided "valuable lessons" for"a more realistic policy". Hagan The History of
the ACTU op, cit, pl04sees theepisode and its aftermath as illustrating the difference between Third Period and Popular Front Communist
strategies. All three therefore work within the frame work ofPopular Front assumptions that the entire approach of the Third Period was
disastrous. The problem with Communist strategy in the dispute isthat it straddled the strategies of the Third Period and Popular Front. It is
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to other groups of workers could win the dispute, despite the solidarity of Seamen's Union members.35 In the face
of hostility from the ACTU, the CPA and its members leading the Miners' Federation called for sympathy
action. 36 In 1934, thanks to the efforts of the Miners Minority Movement, which they had helped build,
Communists Bill Orr and Charlie Nelson had been elected General Secretary and General President of the union
while CPA members won control of the Victorian District Subsequently the Miners Movement had been allowed
to run down,37 Despite its leadership of the Federation, the membership rejected the proposal, except in Victoria
where the experience of the 1934 Wonthaggi strike had left a particularly militant tradition and stronger
commitment to rank and file organisation,38 The miners' decision can be attributed in large part to the decline of
the Minority Movement in the coal mining industry,39 There was no longer any organisation, extending across the
boundaries of unions and industries which could effectively attempt to mobilise rank and file support for the
Seamen. The practice of cossetting reformist officials and letting Communistunion leaders get on with the job,
without having to worry about an independent organisation of militants, was adequate to the CPA's Popular Front
industrial perspective of sectional militancy, but was not suited to a perspective of extension in the face of hostile
union bureaucrats and adverse public opinion.
In the absence of solidarity action by other workers the seamen were defeated. The.CPA attributed the defeat to a
neglect of the importance of unity with union leaders including through official structures such as the Labor
Councils and the Acru and to insufficient propaganda on the coal fields.40 Already set on the path of Popular
Front policy by the Comintern, the Seamen's strike led the CPA to recognise that it had to be consistent in it's
perspectives. Given its rejection of the Minority Movement strategy for overcoming sectionalism, the Party was
now satisfied with sectional struggle or extension achieved only through pressure on or preferably unity with
reformist officials. This meant a more modest approach to industrial campaigns:
"Before any sectional stoppage is consciously commenced, the possibilities of achieving unity, of
enlisting support of being able to extend the struggle, must be carefully considered before the
struggle is embarked upon. Where it is seen that, after efforts have been made to achieve unity and
extend a sectional struggle in a given department or factory, we have not succeeded, and the
employers are procuring scabs, we must be fearless, even in the face of opposition from the strikers
themselves, in calling and working in the interests of a return to work, despite the achievement of no
results."41
After the Seamen's strike "the Party withheld support of large disputes for some years."42 The Miners'
Federation's campaigns of the 1930s were conducted in the light of experience of the Seamen's strike so as to
avoid the need for extension, even if this meant dropping some demands.43 Communist leaders of the Waterside
Workers' Federation (WWF) even opposed extending the 1938 strike over the shipment of pig iron to Japan, e-:en
quite clear that theCommunist Party still recognised therole ofihetrade union officials and their hostility, though this was expressed in more
moderate language than that of the high Third Period. After a preliminary dispute R. Cramm "The Seamen's Strike" Communist Review
October 1935 p30 commented:
"The reformist bureaucrats of theSeamen's Union and their prototypes in allied unions were exposed to thewide masses of
seamen and other workers asagents of theemployers within theworkers' ranks, following thesame lineas theshipowners,
theGovernment and thepress to force return towork."
Forthe increasing hostility of the right wing of the labour movement to the strike seeLabor Daily 9/1136 pl and 1011136 pl: Labar Call
2918135 p8,12112135 p8,19112135 p8, 1611136 p8, 23/1/36 p6,30/1136 p6, 2712136 p3.
35. During thedispute theParty remained committed totheThird Period policy ofextension. The weakness ofitsposition was itsadvocacy of
Popular Front means - pressure onand ifpossible collaboration with reformist officials - toachieve it,e.g. R. Dixon "Report ontheEconomic
Struggles and theTasks of the Communists in theTrade Unions" Communist ReviewFebruary 1936 p37. The winding up of theMinority
Movement four months before thestrike started was a sign thatthepolicy ofextension could not becarried through.
36. Fortheposition of theMiners' Federation leaders seeCommon Cause 1111136 pl.
37. A. P.Reeves 'Industrial Men: Miners and Politics inWonthaggi 1909-1968' M.A. Thesis La Trobe University 1977 p26Sobserves that:
"Communists had won control of the Victorian District through the M.M. in 1934, and wielded that control as District
Officials. Under such circumstances therank and file joborganisation languished."
O'Lincoln Rank and File op.cit, p26 quotes E. F. Hill, a Victorian Party leader from the late 1930s: "The persons elected to the leading
positions were never tookeen about maintaining thatorganisation." Also seeR.Dixon "Industrial Policies inthe30s" op. cit. p30. •
38.Reeves "Industrial Men" op.cit, p159, 172.
39. This was most obvious inMiners' Federation discussions about sympathy action:
"Each aggregate meeting was addressed by a member of the Miners' central Council and a representative of the Seamen's
Disputes Committee, who urged animmediate cessation ofwork, while from thebody ofthehallchief opposition was voiced
from leading lodge officials, whose attitude received emphatic endorsement." LaborDaily9/1136 pl.
Even allowing forthepolitical bias oftheLaborDailyagainst thestrike, thereport, which included accounts ofa number ofMiners' Aggregate
Meetings tallies with thecourse ofevents.
40. R. Dixon "The Seamen's Strike" Communist Review May 1936 and R. Cramm "Lessons of the Shipping and Port Kembla Strikes"
Communist ReviewJuly1936 pp44-S for theinadequacy ofcoal fields propaganda. They didnotconsider thatthere may have been anything
inadequate about themeans fordelivering thatpropaganda i.e. from thetop of the union down. During 1936 the CPA stressed that union
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LeaderFebruary 1936; "E. J. R. "Unity on theWaterfront" Trade UnionLeaderMarch 1936. This new preoccupation reflected theParty's
concern to achieve unity through the official structures of the unions rather than on the basis of rank and file solidarity through unofficial
organisations like theMinority Movement. The leaders oftheMiners' Federation adopted a position likethatof theCommunist Party. They
also acknowledged that there was a "definite weakness as far as the relations between the central and district and lodge authorities was
concerned incarrying outFederation policy". See Common Cause 18/1136 ppl, 4,5,8 and 29/2136 p4.
41. Cram "Lessons" op, cit. pSI.
42. Davidson TheCommunist PartyofAustralia op. cit. p88. Baracchi 'Baracchi Replies' op, cit. p41-2 offers a critique oftheParty's response
tothestrike from theleft. Hisdoubts about Stalimsm were awakened when .
"thesupport oftheMiners ourpress confidently promised theSeamen... was notforthcoming andby the lack of open self-
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though the issue involved was something closer to Communist hearts than bread and butter issues like wages and
conditions -- influence over Australia's foreign policy.44 One of the most widespread campaigns during the late
1930s was that for shorter hours. Under the laborite leadership of the labour movement it mainly took the formof
demonstrations, resolutions and delegations to Governments. The CPA took a. rhetorically more militant position,
but was not prepared to lead a campaign of generalised direct action which was necessary if the 40 hour week was
to be achieved for all workers, preferring to concentrate on those sections, like the miners who might win it
unassisted.45
Communist industrial practice during the Popular Front period was not distinguishable from that of the laborite
leaders of a number of unions. The ABU, for example conducted a number of militant campaigns during the
1930s, but did not have a Communist holding a full-time union position until 1942. Like Communist led unions,
the ABU used a mix of claims in the Arbitration Court and direct action to win its demands and was generally
successful. Unlike any Communist led union, the ABU was deregisteredby the Arbitration Court for a period. It
also encouraged action by shop committees to win local over-award payments.46 Sectional militancy allowed the
CPA to accommodate and extend its base in the working class and thus win the kind of influence it sought inside
the union bureaucracy and the ALP. By 1937Communists held twenty top level union positions and 1,000 lower
level posts (presumably shop steward or similar offices) out of a Party membership of around 4,000.47 Unions
controlled by the CPA or where the Party wielded considerable influence by the late 1930s included the NSW
ARU, Seamen's Union, FIA, WWF, Miners' Federation and Sheetmetal Workers Union. Even though CPA and
union leaders did not take advantage of the economic recovery. after thedepression to organise for the overthrow
of capitalism and Australian employers were able to accommodate their demands for wages and conditions to
some extent, their activities did exacerbate the economic problems presented by the international situation and
cyclical economic difficulties.
According to Hagan, the economic recovery after the depression presented the ACTU with two choices:
"Was the ACTU to use the improved bargaining position of the trade union movement to
concentrate on recovering wage losses by action through the Arbitration Court? Or was it to exploit
the economicrecovery for the purpose of overthrowingcapitalism."48
Clearly the ACTU opted for the former perspective. The recovery offered the CPA a similar choice. It could use
its ability to relate to the renewed militancy of rank and file workers as a means of wining official union positions
for Communists and of pressuring the ALPinto progressivepolicies, especiallyon international issues, or it could
attempt to build workers' combativity into a challenge to the capitalist system. The Party's commitment to Russia
determined that it would no more seek to exploit the new situation to end capitalism than the ACTU, even if it
declared that its policies were "revolutionary" in the light of capitalism's inability to meet ordinary trade union
demands and calls for democraticrights.49
At the beginning of the Popular Front phase, Australian Communists pinned their hopes for social change (and a
pro-Russian foreign policy) on a Labor Government, involving the CPA as an affiliate to the ALP. Later when the
ALP rejected all overtures and the European situation was becoming more desperate, the CPA clutched at straws,
calling for a Governmentof the ALP and dissidentUAP,and CountryParty members.50 In Australia, however, the
44. L. Richardson "DOle Queue Patriots" in1. lremonger (ed.) StrikesAngus and Robertson, Sydney 1973 p157 points out that:
"Rank and file militants demanded a general strike ofminers and industrial workers inPort Kembla, but strike leaders made
no call forsuch a move. McHenry [Communist Secretary ofthe Port Kembla Ironworkers] was adamant that the dispute
should be confined tothe waterfront."
After BHP had extended the dispute bydismissing 4,000 steel workers, WWFofficials tried to persuade their members toretum towork on
termsoffered more than a month earlier. They only succeeded atthe second mass meeting held inthree days todiscuss the issue. For other
accounts of the strike see E. W. Campbell ''No Pig Iron for Japan" Communist ReviewJanuary 1939 and J. White "The Port Kembla Pig Iron
Strike of 1938" LabourHistory 37 November 1979. See also Merritt 'The FIA' op. cit p257 on an abortive dispute atLysaght' s inNewcastle
in1938.
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hours. e.g, Common Cause24/9/38 pS. An example ofthe implications ofa sectional approach tothe hours issue was the case ofCastlemaine
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out. The Queensland Trades and Labor Council Disputes Committee took charge, but did not call for solidarity action. The workers were
totally defeated asa result The Trades and Labor Council then scape-goated the majority ofthe Disputes Committee, althoughthe constituent
unions, some strongly influenced byCommunists, could have taken solidarity action on their own accord. For an account ofthe dispute see the
Re~rt of the "militant" minority on the Disrutes Committee, North Queensland Guardian 27/11137 p3 also inAdvocate 15/11137 ppI5-6,
which concluded that the failure ofthe officia leadership toextend adispute "means sure defeat".
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militancy, W. J. Hargreaves History of the Federated Moulders' (Metals) Union of Australia 1858-1958 Sydney no date pp77-9. Before the
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Meatworkers' Union and the Waterside Workers Federation all had reputations for sectional, ifnot a more class conscious, militancy.
47. R. Dixon "The Rise ofthe Strike Movement" Communist ReviewApril 1937 p56.
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combativity of the working class was, if anything, rising. The potential of the situation for revolutionaries is
indicated by the growth of the Trotskyist Communist League of Australia during 1939and 1940.51 Aftera period
of confusion, the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the outbreakof WorldWar II led the CPA to return to the rhetoric of the
Third Period. On the invasion of Russia by Germany, however, Australian Communists reverted to an
exaggerated versionof thePopularFront.
A Party Fit for Office
The orthodox explanation of the ALP's transformation from the striferidden organisation of the early 1930s into
theParty of Government in 1941 is summedup byHasluck:
"It was the work of Curtin in gradually restoring coherence to the party from 1935 onwards that,
perhapsmore than anyothersinglefactor, preparedit for wartime responsibility."52
This "great man" explanation has also been accepted by historians of.a less conservative bent than Hasluck, who
served as a Minister in Menzies Governments of the 1950s and 1960s.53 Whatever Curtin's merits in pulling
himself and the Party together, after giving up the drink, there were more objective factors at work too: the
economic recovery, the reassertion of their influence in the ALP by a section of NSW union officials, the
resolution of many conflicts over foreign policy in a united response to the war and the deterioration of
conservative politics. The behaviour of theCommunist Partywas alsoan importantfactor in the revitalisation of
Labor. The order of exposition in thischapterhas giventhe CPA priorityfor this reason. Between1934and 1940
Communists played a more marked role in shaping developments inside the ALP, especially in NSW wherethe
divisions were deepest, than at any other time. In otherchapters the ALP is considered first, in viewof its greater
weightin Australian society.
The course of the economic recovery was a vital factor in the revival in the ALP's fortunes. The fact that
economic growth could still take place meant that the working class could again win some concessions from the
system.. As unemployment fell and wage levels rose reformism becamemore credible.54 The belief that gradual
legislative reform wasno longerviable, because capitalism was on the vergeof collapse, had been associated with
the rise of the Socialisation Units and consequent divisions in the NSW ALP.55 By the mid-1930s such a
perspective was less credible.56 1-
Curtin's election to the leadership of the ALP in September 1935 marked the accession of new figures to
prominent positions in the FederalLabor Party,displacing someof thosemost closelyassociated with thedebacle
of the ScullinGovernment. To some extent any new face would have done in electoral terms. At the same time
the memory of the deepestpolitical split in the ALP, thatof Lyonsand his followers in January 1931, faded as he
came to embodyconservative politics. '
With Labor in opposition in NSW and the Commonwealth there were fewer concrete issues to divide laborites.
The Lang and Official Parties had parted ways in March 1931 over the implementation of the Premiers' Plan,
whenLabor was in officeat the State andFederallevels. The reunification of theParty in NSW,essentially on the
basis of the liquidation of the OfficialParty intoLang's, owed a greatdeal to the recognition by the ALPFederal
Executive that they had failed to build an electorally credible alternative to Lang's machine. On the other hand
Crisp argues that the LangParty's financial andpoliticaldifficulties prompted it to seekreadmittance.J? Certainly
the poor showing of both Labor Parties in the 1935NSW elections cannot have enhanced Lang's standing in his
Party. The mantle of recognition by the FederalExecutive and the dissolution of a rival Party, which may have
had attractions to dissidents in his own ranks, would have appealed to Lang as a means of"strengthening his
position. '
Probablythe most importantfactorin thenormalisation of the ALP's internal regimein NSW was associated with
the reassertion of their rights in the ALP by trade unionofficials. During the depression officials had used their
relationship with a popularLangto legitimate their claimsto unionoffice, when they could not deliver the goods
by leading tradeunion struggles. They therefore tolerated and evenreveled in Lang's firm grip on theParty. The
economic recovery and decline in unemployment improved the prospects for trade unions to rebuild their
organisations and their capacity to win concessions through industrial action and arbitration. This new situation
helpedrestore the image of trade unionofficials as successful defenders of workers' interests. Inside the ALPthe
51. See Militant for this period.
52 P. Hasluck The Government and thePeople1939-1941 op, cit. p74. Also see Fairbanks "Menzies Becomes Prime Minister 1939" op, cit.
p20 and F. AlexanderAustraliaSinceFederation Nelson, Melbourne 1976 p20.
53. For example B. McKiniay TheALP: A ShortHistoryo/the Australian LaborPartyHeinemann, Melbourne 1981 pp71-4.
54. Reeves 'Industrial Men' op. cit. p224.
55. R. Cooksey Langand Socialism Australian National University Press, Canberra 1976 p47.
56. The Socialization movement inside the Victorian ALP started in1933 and was initiallY disrupted by the CPA, see R. Gibson MyYears in
the Communist Party International Bookshop, Melbourne June 1966 p23. By 1934, the Vietonan ALP leadership felt confident enough to
thwart the Central Socialization Committee by means ofinaction and financial constraint, C. A. Rasmussen 'Labor Politics in Coburg: 1919-
1940' M.A. Thesis Melbourne University 1978 ,Pp115-6. In September 1938 the Central Executive moved decisively against the Socialization
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him toover-dramatise the weaknesses ofthe Lang Party.
39
position of union leaders was thus improved as against that of Lang and his machine. Lang's electoral
performance between 1934 and 1938 also eroded his charismatic pretensions.58 A section of the union
bureaucracywere movinginto oppositioninside the Lang Party during 1935.59 They thwartedLang's attempt to
win control of the Labor Council's radio station 2KY in 1936. In January 1938 they set up the Industrial Labor
Party, sometimes known by the name of its leader in the NSW Parliament, R. J. Heffron, to secure Federal
intervention into the NSW ALP. In February 1938, they took control of the Labor Daily out of Langite hands.60
Early the following year the Heffron Party demonstrated its viability to Federal ALP authorities and vacillating
Members of the NSW House of Assemblyby winning two NSW State by-elections againstLang candidates. The
NSW ALP Conferenceof August 1939 was held under Federal auspices and gave control to the reunitedParty to
formerHeffronites.el Federal authoritywas thus reestablishedin NSW and survived two splits in 1940. In April
a small Langite group split to the right to form the ALP(Non-Communist), whose lack of success led to a return to
the official Party in March 1941. A State Labor Party, sympathetic to the CPA, was set up by some former
leaders of the Heffron Party and a minority of its members in August 1940.62 Its leadership fused with the
Communist Party at the beginning of 1944, though a majority of its members found their way back into the
ALP.63
The ALP was deeply dividedover foreign affairs issues during the second half of the 1930s. The Victorian Labor
Anti-War Committee's Labor's Case Against War and Fascism, issued early in 1935 to counteract Communist
influence on foreign affairs questions, found widespread support in laborite circles. But the ambiguity of its
assumptions soon became apparent in responses to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and as the CPA moved to
supportrather than denouncenationaldefence.
64 In 1935 differences over the Abyssinian crisis were papered over in an official policy of isolationism. The
ACTU adopted a similarpolicy.
The ALP retained a policy of nationalistisolationism throughout the interwarperiod, embodied in hostility to the
despatch of any troops overseas. But in Victoria several branches of the ALP had affiliated with the Victorian
Council Against War and Fascism (VCAWF), set up by the CPA in 1933,and continued to adhere to it when it
adopted the Popular Front principle of collective security.65 The foremost representative of the liberal
internationalism, as opposed to the isolationism of the Party leadership or the pro-Sovietism of Communist
sympathisers, in the ALP was Maurice Blackbum,a Federal Parliamentarian. He was expelled from the ALPfor
continuinghis membershipof VCAWF, after it had been proscribedby the ALP leadership. Reinstated thanks to
the support of rank and file ALP members in his electorate, he was again expelled over the issue of conscription
for overseas serviceduring the war.66
The Communist approach to foreign affairs also found support amongst laborite union leaders. The ACTU had
adopted an isolationist attitude to the invasion of Abyssinia, but supportedcollective security in 1937, under the
impact of the Spanish civil war.67. Deep divisions emerged in the Labor Party between Catholic supporters of
Franco and leftist supporters of the Republic.68 -
The Labor Party's lack of unity on foreign and defence policies continued after the start of World War n. The
German offensive of April-May1940, the rising prospectof Japanese aggression and the departureof thoseclosest
to the (now anti-war)CPA in August helped to overcome the differences. The ALP's underlying nationalism had
dissolved tacticaldisagreements, whenit becameclear that Australia's "nationalinterests" were under threat.69
The CPA played a significant role in the .rehabilitadon of the fortunes of the ALP and the reassertion of their
influencein the Party by NSW unionofficials. The Communistindustrialpolicyof sectionalmilitancy reinforced
58. D. W. Rawson 'The Organisation ofthe Australian Labor Party' PhD Thesis, Melboume University 1954 p277. Lang's lack ofelectoral
success had also turned rightwing laborites interstate against him, e.g,Wor Call 9/12/37 p16, 312138 p13, 1012138 p3, 17/2138 ppl, 3,3/3/38
p7etseq,for acampaign against Lang. .
59. M. Goat "Radio LANG" in H. Radi and P. Spearritt Jack Lang Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1977 p135. For example, O. Schreiber,
Secretary of the Furnishing Trades Union, had been a Langite during the depression but had moved into opposition by 1936, see F. Farrell
"Dealing with the Communists" in Radi and Spearritt JackLangop, clt, pp61-2, 67-68 for his political trajectory and, for his hostility toLang,
Furnishing Worker 1/5/36 p2, 5/11137 pI;LaborDaily26110137, 813138. The AWU also joined the union chorus against Lang,
60. For the history ofthe LaborDailysee R. B. WalkerYesterday'sNews Sydney University Press, Sydney 1980, especially pp9D-I03.
61. Crisp Ben Chifley ppl05-8. Even Langite union officials were concemed with the need for unity at the 1939 Conference, see E. J.
McFarlane 'The Hughes-Evans Labor Party inNSW during the Years ofOffice 1939-1940' M. A. (Qualifying) Thesis, Department ofHistory,
Australian National University 1969 p,p4, 18. It should be noted that the differences between the Lang and Heffron Parties, interms offonnal
policies, were minimal, see Baracchi Baracchi Replies' op. cit. p47, compare the policies in LaborDaily 813/38 pl and 913138 pl.
62. Crisp Ben Chijleyop. cit, pp124-7, 133.
63. G. Petersen "The Labor Movement and World War IT' lecture 7/12180 p9, transcript held by E. Petersen. D. W. Rawson 'The Organisation
ofthe Australian Labor Party' PhD Melbourne University 1954 p360 points out that
"Ifit was impossible tobuild a successful Labor Party without the support ofunion officials, those officials would not be
interested inbelonging toaparty which could never win elections. The same men had removed Lang principally because he
was an electoral liability. Now they acquiesced in the ousting ofHughes and Evans for the same reason."
64. Rose'Anti-War Organisations' op,ciL pp82-3, 164. -
65. White 'John Cain' op, ciL p198, Rasmussen 'LaborPolitics' op. ciL p147, 172.
66.See Rasmussen 'Labor Pohtics' op, cit, pp176-9
67. Hagan The Historyo/the ACTUop. ciL ppl05-6.
68. B. McKinlay TheALP DrummondlHeinemann, Melbourne 1981 pp72.3.
69. Dedman "Defence Policy Decisions" op. ciL p336-7, Mansergh Survey op, cit,1.174-5, E. M Andrews "Australian Labour's Foreign
Policy" LabourHistory9,November 1965 p31. For the evolution ofLabor views see . Curtin Australiaand the War Australian Labor Party
Federal Executive 1939 and J.Curtin NationalUnity: WhereLaborStandsFederal Parliamentary Labor Party, May 1941.
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the laborite conclusions that could be drawn from the economicrecovery: workers could improvetheir conditions
throughlimited struggle within the capitalist system. The Party's increasedinfluence in the trade unions also put
it in an excellentposition to foster more specificillusions in the ALP. During the 1920sand Third Period the CPA
had explained that the Labor Party's attackson the working class were a consequence of its commitment to using
the capitalist state to bring about gradualchanges in capitalism. With the Popular Front, Communists discovered
for the first time that the ALP could be won to a "really working class programme".70 As the ACTU, state Labor
Councils and elementsinside the LaborParty came to accept the samepositionson foreign affairs as the CPA, and
Communists themselves moved towards an industrial practice of sectional militancy, the CPA argued that "class
collaboration is falling into discard".71 It promoted the idea that assaults on the working class, like those of the
depression Labor Governments were unlikely to be repeated. With Communists at the head of an extra-
Parliamentary movement, a future "labor Government will be impelled by the militant masses to fulfill their
immediate demands".72 The approach envisaged was more than mass struggle forcing a government to make
concessions. Communists believed that the Labor tabby could change its stripes and suggested that ALP leaders
recognise:
"The need to depend more on unionismand the actionsof the masses than on a Labor Party majority
in parliament."73
In the late 19308, the CommunistParty identified the problem with the ALP as simply its "right wing" or a"little
clique" of leaders, rather than its electoral strategy and the organisational structure premissed on it. Once the
.clique had been defeated, the CPA believed, the way would be open for the adoption and implementation of
progressive policies.74 At the root of Communist support for the ALP was the objective of electing a Labor
. Governmentcommittedto a "progressive", Le.pro-Russian, foreignpolicy.
When the ACTU adopteda policy of collectivesecurity for Australiathe fight was" to make the policy of the trade
unions the policy of the Labor Party".75 With the failure of its applications to afflliateto the Labor Party, the CPA
conducted its fight to change the ALP and its policies from the inside. Communists holding union office had a
voice inside the Labor Party, by virtueof union affiliations to the ALP. The CPA also had secret members inside
the ALP. Together Communistunion leadersand covert Communists played an importantrole in the fight against
Lang and the reestablishment of Federal authority in the NSW ALP, by seeking and obtaining federal
intervention.76 L. Ross, Secretary of the NSW ARU, fell into both categories and became "one of the principal
framersof Labor's policy in New SouthWales.77 The Presidentand GeneralSecretaryof the NSW ALP after the
1939unity conferencewere both members of the CPA. They helped to strengthen Federal control over the NSW
Branch even further by removing themselves from the scene, when they led the left wing out of the Party in
1940.78
The Popular Front line meant that the election of the ALP to office, rather than the struggle for workers' power
becamethe main focus for CPA activity:
"From now on the centre of all our campaigns relating to economic demands and democratic
libertiesmust be the electionof fighting Labor governments."79
70. L. L. Sharkey "The State Elections" Communist ReviewMarch 1938 p16. For this reason the CPA sought affiliation tothe ALP. See
Davidson TheCommunist PartyofAustralia op. cit, pp75-6.
71. R. Dixon "New Developments inthe Labor Party Communist ReviewJune 1936 p49. In 1936 the ACIU endorsed the policy ofcollective
security, favoured bythe CPA.
72. J. B. Miles "All Together! For the Line ofthe Central Committee" Communist ReviewJune 1937 ppI3-4. D. Rose'AHistory ofAnti-War
Organisations inVictoria, 1933-1939' MA. Thesis, La Trobe University 1976 p158 cites asimilar statement byJ.D. Blake inMarch 1937.
73. J. B. Miles "Federal Conference ofthe Australian Labor Party" Communist ReviewSeptember 1936 ppl6-7. This perspective was revived
during the second half ofthe 19708 under the heading ofthe Alternative Economic Strategy. Compare A. Hopkins and R. Curtain "The Labour
Movement and the Protection versus Restructuring Debate" Journal ofAustralian Political Economy12113 June 1982 p87 with e.W. Campbell
"What IsNeeded" Communist ReviewDecember 1938 p3:
"What isneeded isVigorous mass action outside Parliament tosupport the activities ofthe Laborrepresentatives within."
74. R. Dixon Labour in Queensland Communist Party ofAustralia, Brisbane 1937, L. L. Sharkey "The Federal Elections" Communist Review
December 1937 pp3, 7.
75. Sharkey "The State Elections" op. cit, p16. Curtin repudiated the ACIU's decision, as the Federal Labor Party supported rearmament for
isolationist national defence, Hagan TheHIStory of theACTUop, cit, ppl71-2.
76. For example see Workers Weekly 11/4139 pi.
77. Rawson 'The Organisation ofthe ALP' op,cit,1.'321. .
78. On the CPA's role inside the ALP during this period and the 1940 split see E. Ross Of Storm and Struggle Australian Publishing
Cooperative, Sydney 1982 p67, C. Johnson "The COmmunist Party and Labour Unity" LabourHistory 40 May 1981 pp88-9, Petersen "The
Labour Movement" op. cit, p7,P. Weller etal. "State Power and Federal Intervention" in Radi and Spearritt Jack Langop, cit, p226. N. Willis
Shadesof Red Communist Arts Group, Lota 1980 p35 says Jack Hughes "Was the legal voice ofthe CPA", when itwas banned in1940, inhis
capacity of leader of the ALP (State ofNSW). See the security service's attempts toidentify Communists inthe ALP, Australian Archives
CRS AA 1984/260. Communists were also encouraged towork inside the ALP in Victoria during the late 1930s, Communist Party ofAustralia
DraftResolution on the InnerSituation and the Tasksof theVictorian District Communist Partyof Australia probably 1938, Mitchell Library.
In 1939, for example there were five orsix CPA members inthe Coburg Branch ofthe ALP, Rasmussen 'LaborPolitics' op. cit, p219. Rupert
Lockwoodstayed inthe ALP on joining the CPA inVictoria, R. Lockwood"The Making ofan Australian Communist" Interview Politics9(1)
May 1974 pplO, 14. In WA a Communist actually set up abranch ofthe ALP in an isolated country town in1937, S.MacintyreMilitant Alien
and Unwin, Sxdney 1984.
79. S.Mason 'The Next Task ofthe Australian Communists" Communist ReviewSeptember 1936 p27.
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While the Party still officially denied the possibility of a non-revolutionary road to socialism, its fellow travellers
could be forgiven for drawing the opposite conclusion from its pronouncements.w On the terrain of reformism
the ALP had two major advantages over the CPA: its larger size and its freedom from arbitrary policies
determined overseas.u The recovery of the ALP was thus aided by the CPA's Popular Front politics and the
consequent absence of a serious revolutionary alternative to reformism, ready to take advantage of rising levels of
struggle and declining credibility of conservative politics during the second half of the 1930s.
The modification ofLabor economic thought also played apart in the improvement in the Party's fortunes during
the late 1930s. This development is considered in the context of the discussion of laborite economic ideas in chap-
terfour.
80. L. H. Gould"Through Democracy to Socialism" Communist ReviewFebruary 1939pl08 arguedthat
. "The securing of such rights [to work. education, peaceand so on] in capitalist democracy, which could only resultout of
persistent struggleagainstcapitalism, opens up the path from capitalistdemocracy to the million-fold greaterdemocracy of
socialism."
Goulddid not mention that a revolution might intervene in this process. Arguingfrom the same premises on many issues, including that of
national defence, the CPA had some problems in distinguishing itself,fromthe ALP,to outsiders and evenits own members, Communist Party
of Australia "Draft Resolution•.. Victorian District" op. cit, pl, E. W. Campbell "The Nationalisation of Banking" Communist Review May
1937,R. Dixon"The Riseof the StrikeMovement" op. clt, p59. L10yd Rossfollowed through the reformist logicof the PopularFront,leaving
the CPA overthe implications of the Hitler-Stalin Pactto becomea stalwartof the ALP. See L. Ross Transcript of Interview 1973,National
Libraryof AustraliaTRC236.
81. The CPAheld that an armsbuild up under the UAPwasbad, but wouldbe acceptable undera LaborGovernment SeeR. Dixon"OP'p'0se
LyonsWar Plans"Communist ReviewJune 1938;E. W. Campbell "Betraying Australia" CommunistReview October1938pI; R. Dixon The
Fascist Danger" Communist ReviewDecember 1938plO; L. Ross "Defenceof Australia" Australian Left NewsFebruary19391i' Thiswas
quiteconsistent in terms of Russian. foreignpolicy,but the CPAtried to justifyit on the basisof Australia'sdefenceneeds. The P's defence
policy,on the other hand, allowed it the consistency of supporting rearmament for national defence under any government -- after all the
weapons would not dissolve on election day. There was also ample evidence that collective security was a very weak cornerstone for
Australia'sdefencepolicies.
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Keynesian Economics
Keynes's theory has been outlined on numerous occasions since the publication of the General Theory.
Accordingly only the briefest of outlines is offered here, to draw attention to the policy variables Keynes thought
relevant to economic management. His theory holds that an economy will be in equilibrium, Le. without a
tendency for aggregate income to rise or fall, when the amount spent on investment is the same as the amount .
saved. The rate of an individual's saving from his or her income is primarily determined by the level of that
income. The higher the individual's income, the more is likely to be saved rather than spent on consumption
goods. The amount people want to invest is determined by the rate of profit they expect to recoup on investment,
compared to the rate of interest on money they need to borrow to make the investment or, alternatively, on the
money they have which can either be invested or lent to someone else. The lower the rate of interest, comparedto
the expected rate of profit, the more investment will take place. The rate of interest, in turn, is determined by the
demand for and supply of cash, as opposed to other forms in which wealth can be held.. When the amount people
wish to invest is greater than that they which to save, total income will rise to a level at which savings equal
investment. As more resources are called into action to produce the new, higher level of income the number of
people employed rises. Full employment sets a maximum limit to the rate of expansion of income through this
process. There is no reason why savings and investment should equilibrate at the full-employment level.
The above framework can be used to justify policies operating through a variety of mechanisms. Keynes was
particularly concerned with policy action by Governments. The options include state intervention to:
1) change the rate of interest, e.g. through a change in the money supply;
2) change the level of effective demand (consumption plus investment expenditure), e.g. in the form of
supplementary state expenditure or tax cuts. Such measures may be implemented by means of unbalanced
budgets;
3) change society's propensity to consume (the ratio of consumption to savings in out of total income), including
the redistribution of income. Redistribution from low consumerslhigh savers (the rich) to high consumers/low
savers (the. poor) would increase total consumption and decrease total savings.
4) change the expected rate of profit e.g. by granting a wage increase.
The complexity of the General Theory, the variety of interpretations it allows and the different weights that can be
given to various variables within it provided ample scope for "Keynesians" to proffer divergent and even
contradictory policy advice in any given context. The theory's appeal was not universal, but its flexibility could
make it most things to most people. As we have seen, by the late 1930s the foremost adherents of the previous
economic orthodoxy in Australia had been converted.
Keynesianism provided a general justification for state intervention into national economies in a consistent and
coherent way. Unlike earlier rationales for such activity, which were generally produced by people on the left, it
also incorporated a profound respect for the rate of profit and the vitality of the capitalist system. In the
circumstances of the depression and after when "Interventions in the economy [had] been forced on capitalist
governments by circumstances beyond their control"1 in a novel peace-time context, Keynesian economics
provided a close to ideal rationalisation for state action. Amongst the main forces at work was the degree of
concentration of capital by the 1930s. The size of the most important units of capital meant that the restoration of
profit rates through bankruptcy of some capitals became a risky operation. Some units were so large that their
bankruptcy could disrupt an entire national economy. So the state stepped in to secure the continuation of national
capital accumulation, by taking over some of the functions of the market. Instead of the market determining the
redistribution of surplus value amongst capitals (through the equalisation of profit rates across different sectors of
the economy) and the capitals which would go to the wall, the state also took a hand through taxation and
subsidisation. We have seen the Australian state extending its role in this area during the 1930s. State inter-
vention in the financial system sought to prevent monetary developments from exacerbating crises of production
and distribution. Deficit financing was a means of mortgaging the future to the present, or, in de Brunhoff'swords
"indefinitely deferring fmal settlement".2 So long as the economy improved within a reasonable time, the
immediate effects of a recession could be off-set. If it did not the eventual recession was likely to be even worse.
Keynesianism was therefore more of an effect than a cause of the pattern of post-depression economic
development: .
"All the monetary and fiscal policies suggested by Keynes had already been employed at different
times by various governments to safeguard themselves and the society over which they presided.
By bringing the changed capitalist practice of his day into the frame of economic theory, Keynes
supported the expanding government control both practically and ideologically."3
While Keynesian policies could not overcome the underlying problems of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall
or the international planlessness of capitalism, they were an important means of coping with their effects and with
1.P. MattickMarxandKeynesMerlin. London 1974p132.
2. De BronhoffTheState.Capital andEconomic Policyop. cit, p180.
3. MattickMan andKeynesop. cit. pll4.
44
the changing structure of capitalist production. The needfor state intervention and "economic policy" to secure
the continued accumulation of capital in Australia was similar to that in otherprivatecapitalist countries. Hence
the conversion of academic and political representatives of capital to measures, such as expanded state
expenditures and reform of thefinancial systemwhich hadpreviously beenmoreidentified withthe ALP. In turn,
as thenextchapter demonstrates, moderate laborites began to absorb thenewKeynesian economic orthodoxy.
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CHAPlER FOUR
PREPARING FOR OFFICE
After the depression, as before, nationalism was a prominent feature of many of the labour movement's
perspectives. Nationalism was the common denominator of laborite economic ideas. It was therefore a theme
running through thediscussions of laborite thought on Australia's place in worldcapitalism, the class structure of
the economy and the natureof economic crises. The mapof Australia's relations with the rest of the world was
defined in nationalist terms. Attitudes to foreign investment and protectionism are the clearest examples of how
nationalism oriented laborite economic thought in this way. Nationalism also meant that the ALP regarded the
advancement of the national interest as a primary goal. So it coloured laborite views of the class anatomy of
Australian capitalism, both the explicit one of radical MoneyPower theorists and the more tacit assumptions of
moderate Labor supporters. The pursuit of the national interest also shaped laborite analyses of economic crises
andof the mostappropriate solutions to them.
Stifling Freetrade Aspirations in the Interests of Solidarity
During the second half of the 1930s, as today, capital and commodity flows were the most important links
between Australia and the worldeconomy. The amount of capital sent out of Australia to be invested overseas
wasnegligible compared with investment in, or lending to Australia It was not, therefore a matter of major con-
cernin laboritecircles) MostALP supporters, on theother hand, conceded thatnational prosperity depended on
thesuccess of the export trade, although manywouldhave been happier if exports could have beendiverted to a
largerhomemarket. Mostlaborite concern aboutcapital and commodity movements was directed against capital
inflows, which tooktheform of Government borrowings morethan they do today, and imports.
The experience of the depression had heightened hostility to foreign.borrowing by Governments and public
indebtedness to private lenders in general.2 When the Government proposed to recommence overseas borrowing
in the 1937, ScuIIin alluded to the consequences of the Bruce-Page Government's borrowing program andhis
opposition it. By trying to reduce the interest burden, he maintained, his own administration had taken measures
to extractAustralia fromtheeconomic mess the loans hadcreated. Butnow,
"WhenI see our nation indulging again in the dope of overseas borrowings, after having been, as I
thought, curedof theevil, I amalarmed."3 .
He was fearful that Australia would addto its burden of interest andrepayments, mortgaging its future to overseas
lenders. Borrowing would give overseas interests a lever with which to influence Australia's policies and
economic development.
Duringthe 1930snewoverseas borrowings neverevenapproached thelevels of theprevious decade, but a number
of loans wereconverted, Le. rolledover. Labor Callexpressed thefear that the 1937 loanconversion negotiations
in Londoncouldbe usedby Britain to forcedown the level of Australia's tariffs, themselves a means of reducing
dependence on theforeign borrowlng.s In 1934 J. Beasley, then the leaderof LangLabor in the Commonwealth
Parliament, had alsoexpressed faithin tariffs as an antidote to overseas loans as wellas imports:'
"Australian industry must be protected by a scientific tariff designed to promote industry. . . The
entire basis of the future Australian economy must be built around the local Australian market,
insteadof, as in the past, around ourexternal interestbill."5
Laborites had regarded tariffs as serving the national interest for decades. The period before World War I had
beenthe decisive one in winning the bulkof the labourmovement to protectionism. G. Meudall was too modest
(andpatronising) in his estimation of the extentof support for protectionism but expressed the widespread belief
in the efficacy of tariffs:
"A trifling section of the Labor Party from the outlying districts of the continent, who represent
shearers and miners, profess freetrade, but theLaborrepresentatives from the coastal regions being
greatlysuperior in intellect, will stifle freetradeaspirations in the interests of solidarity. The Labor
Party represents Trades Unionism in politics and Trades Unionism works hand in' hand with
1. Communists <lid object to Australian impetialism in the Pacific, which included the investment ofAustralian capital in the islands.
2. See, for example,lAbor Call 15/4137 p4 and 19/5138 p12.
3.Comnwnwealth Parliamentary Debates(CPD) 154, August 1937 p312. See F. M. Forde ibid, pp302-3 and J.Curtin CPD 155, December
1937 p70 and Lobor Call7/1137 p8 for other expressions ofLabor opposition to overseas borrowing. Note that· there were two budgets during
1937, due to an election.
4.LaborCall7/1137 p8: .
"Given reasonable tariffprotection and abetter balance between primaryand secondary industries, we can avoid repudiation[national insolvency]."
5.J. Beasley"Policy Speech" in D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes (OOs) Australian Trade Policy Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1937 p400.
Beasley argued that if the level oftariff protection were higher, there would be a greater domestic purchasing power to buy primary produce
now being exported. Also see Labor Daily 17/1/34 p4. .
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protection. Theruling principle of bothis to restrict competition in wages, hours and conditions of
work."6
Cartoon 4 demonstrates the relationship laborites saw between protectionism, full employment and the national
interest.
Several arguments, some economic, some political, were used to justify protectionism. Amongst the most
important were the assessment that manufacturing industry offered the greatest scopefor expanding employment
and the assumption that tariffs raisedthe level of wages. After the depression the employment argument cameto
the fore. The aims of Queensland LaborGovernments since 1915 had been to develop the State and its
employment opportunities. These led them to pay particular attention to the promotion of agriculture. At a
national level, on the other hand, manufacturing had a greater potential to provide openings for jobs and better
wages for workers, so Laborleaders looked more to it. Lowerunemployment, higherimmigration and improved
markets for primary products wereall seenas theoutcome of greaterprotection of manufacturing industry:
"Aprohibitive tariffmust be placedon all goods that canbe manufactured locally... In a short time
the demand for localgoods would be so immense that everywhere new factories wouldspring into
existence,"?
Despite the failure of tariffs to cure unemployment during the depression, most protectionists in the labour
movement saw tariffs as an unalloyed good. The Lang Labor Party did, however make the infant industry
argument, recognising that inflation and "unnecessary exploitation" couldresult from permanently high levels of
protection. That, fortunately, would not be required because, once they had been nurtured behind tariff barriers,
Australian industries would be able to compete successfully withimports. As an added precaution theLangParty
also favoured the "New Protection", still a plank in Official Labor's Platform too, as a guarantee for workers'
living standards.t
Some laborites justifiedAustralian tariffs in terms of trends towards protectionism in theworldeconomy:
"Wemust facefacts andtry to get out of the mess that the delusion of international trade being the
road to salvation has got us into... our only hope is in the expansion of secondary industries,
and the developmentof our internal markets,"?
In the best traditions of the nationalist double standard, an article written during the debate over tradediversion
condemned "economic nationalism" (whatothercountries do) and praised "self-sufficiency" through tariffs (what
Australia shoulddo). Tradediversion wascondemned not for its goal, butfor its lack of success.10 H. E. Boote,
editorof theAustralian Worker produced a "socialist" apologetic for protectionism alongthe linesof the "if others
do it wemusttoo" argument, dignifying it with thestatus of an inexorable lawof capitalism:
"In capitalism's worldof fierce competition tariffs havebecome as necessary as guns andbombs.
"Australia canno moreignore this fact thanothercountries do.
"It has to protect its industries against imported products...
"Industrial protection is thus an important element in an historical process that can only end in the
totalcollapse of thecapitalist regime."ll
Bootethus did his customary job of providing a left veneer for thepolicies of theAWU. Butelsewhere Australian
Worker maintained that thewell-being of "ourownindustries" was worth protecting in thenational interest, hardly
a position consistent with a view of protectionism as progressive because it brought aboutthe demise of capitalist
industry.12
Boote tried to justify tariffs by combining an economic fatalism. of the type subscribed to by the Second
International, with overt nationalism, which the International had eschewed until 1914.13 Maurice Blackburn
remained more faithful to the pre-World War I spirit of the International. From the left wing of the ALP, he
opposed the OttawaAgreement andtheBritish Empire as means by which .
"an association of whiteself-governing nations within theBritish Empire... [were] in partnership to
control andexploitthesubjectpeople of theEmpire."
Blackburn concluded thatan "internationalisation of theunderdeveloped territories of the world" wasnecessary.t-
Thisstance, favouring peacethrough thecollective exploitation of colonies by imperialist powers, ratherthantheir
6. Labor Call 18/4135 p13,also seehis articlein LaborCall 11/4135. By the 19308 the AWUandits numerous members in Parliaments infact
usuallytookas protectionist a stance as the stalwarts of the Melbourne TradesHall Council, like Meudall, whosepredecessors had pioneered
collaboration WIth manufacturers in the labourmovement, see, for example Australian Worker 1/1136: "The feeling is fairly general that we
havebeentoolenientto the importer, and notsufficiently mindful of the interests of our ownindustries," myemphasis.
7. LaborCall 2614134 p2 AlsoseeSenatorGordon Brown "Economic Nationalism" ALP Debaters Bulletin(Brisbane) August 1938, SenatorJ.
Collings "Senator CoIlings Expounds Labor's Immediate Policy" ALP DebatersBulletin April 1939. Note that there was opposition to
immigration (in addition to support for theWhite Australia policy) by somelaborites whenanyunemployment existedin Australia, e.g,Labor
Call 'JJ'JJ39 1'6, 25/5139 p5.
8. Special tariff Committee of the Executive, Australian Labor Party (State of NSW) ''The Australian Tariff: Labor's Constructive
Programme" inLaborDailyYearBook1934·5 Sydney 1935p135.
9.LaborCall 8/11134 p13,emphasis in the original. AlsoseeLaborCall 2419/36 p7.
10.LoborCall 416136 p9.
11.AustralianWorker27/5136 p3,alsosee 1n136 p3. .
12 Australian Worker 1/1136 andalsoEditorial1n136 p3whereBooterefersto "ourownindustrial develoyment".
13.See R. Luxemburg's critique of the position of the largestpartyof the Intemational, theGerman Socia Democrats, in herRosaLu.xemburg
Speaks Pathfinder, New York1970pp25Q-6.
14. CPD 158, November 1938pp2138, 2140.
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nationalself-determination, had a great deal in common with K. Kautsky's theoryof ultra-imperialism,15 World
War I had puncturedthat particular"peaceutopia".
The increased tensions of the late 1930s gave added weight to military arguments for protectionism, which the
ALP took up. Curtin's 1937electionstatementmaintained that
"No longer is that doctrineof self-sufficiency merely an industrial ambition. It is now the supreme
national necessity. Self-sufficiency has become increasingly a question of industrial
. preparedness."16
Some unions expressed their support for protectionism in (moderate) deeds, as well as words. They made
submissions to the Tariff Board for higher tariffs to ensure Australian self-sufficiency in products such as starch
flour, gas meters, tiles and sanitary ware)? State Labor Governments took protectionism to the boundary of
parochialismin their preferences to local industry.l8 After the depression, however, protectionism wasessentially
a conservative doctrine for many laborites and especially Federal ALP Parliamentarians. They were primarily
concernedto defend the achievements of the ScullinGovernment.
Its tariffs were widely regarded in the labour movement as the Scullin Government's enduring contribution to
Australia. This was certainly the case for F. M. Forde, a high tariffist in the Scullin Ministry and subsequently
deputy leader of the Parliamentary ALP. He deniedthat the Lyons Government had made anycontribution to the
recovery. On the contrary the reasons for the improvement in the economy to 1937 lay in circumstances outside
the control of the Commonwealth Government (an accurate point) and in the actions of the previous Labor
administration: "Foremost amongst them was the Scullin Government's tariff policy."19 While increased
protection did help boost manufacturing industry, the outstanding reason for the recovery in Australia was the
improved international situation. However, given the dominant view within the ALP that the Scullin tariffs had
started Australia on the road to recovery, there was a widespread fear that the Lyons Government with its
pronouncedBritish sympathies, was intenton undoingthis good work and"Liquidating Australia's Tariff'.2o
Until 1938, Labor Party leadersbelievedthat the Ottawa Agreement was a weaponin the fight against"reasonable
tariffprotection" .21 This is the mainpoint of Cartoon 5. Portraying itself as the true defenderof the nationalin-
terest the ALP could not credit the Lyons Government as a proponent of balanced and rapid economic
development. The entry of the CountryParty into the Government in 1934 was a protectionist's nightmare, as is
indicatedby a Labor Call headline:
"'Tariff Wrecking': Earle Page Triumphant: Australian Secondary Industries Sacrificed to the
Importer: More Unemployment in the Offing"22
The basis for laborite hostility to the Ottawa Agreement was the assertion that it provided for "the wholesale
flooding of British imports into Australia".23 But the Agreementdid not provide for even equal competition
between British and Australian manufacturers, as the Anglo-New Zealand Ottawa Agreement did. The Anglo-
AustralianAgreementprovidedfor a marginof advantage for Australian products on the domestic market.
While laborites could agree that the Ottawa Agreement was detrimental to Australian interests, they differed on
the desirability of the Empire preference in general. Scullin and Curtin favoured it.24 At the time of the trade
diversionepisode,AustralianWorker, LaborDaily and theLabor Premierof Queensland all affirmedtheir support
for some measureof preference for Britain.25 Forde accurately identified the dynamic of trade diversion,
"The bungling policy of the present Government, which has tried to please both free-traders and
protectionists, and has succeededin pleasingneithersection."26
15. For comments on Kautsky'stheory see V. I. Lenin Imperialism the Highest Stage.ofCapitalism inhis Selected Workf Volume 1 Progress
Publishers, Moscow 1977 pp722-3 and R. Day The 'Crisis'andthe 'Crash' New Left Books, London 1981 pp15-7.
16. J. Curtin To Buildand Defenda Happy and Self-Rellam Australia Australian Labor Party, Sydney 1931 p15.1n LaborCall 27/10138 p5
Curtin wrote
"the primary need inAustralia isthe building ofindustries until every possible requirement toself-defence can besupplied
within the Commonwealth."
Also see Labor Call 6110138 p6. Labor Daily 9/10137 p9 harked back to the voluntarist protectionism ofthe Australian Made Preference
League inits exhortation to purchase local products "For National Safety and Personal Security".
17.LaborCall 614139 p9, 1415/36 pll, 17/2138 pi,3/6137 p12, respectively.
18. See, for example, LahorCalI3/8139 p8 (reprinted from Westralian Worker) for the State MinisterofLand's."Stirring appeal toWestralians
tobuy locally made goods".
19.CPD 154, August 1937 p295. Also see Curtin CPD 151, 1936 p331 for his similar list ofreasons for the recovery.
20. Headline ofEditorial LaborDaily17/1/34)'4.
21. E.g. Scullin inCopland and JanesAustrallQn Trade folicy op. cit, poo, "Implementing Ottawa" inLaborDailyYearBook1934·5 op. cit.
pp141-2, LaborCall3/6137 p12. .
22. Labor Call 13112134 plO. Labor publicists sometimes even argued that the Ottawa Agreement was not was not ofsignificant benefit to
primary p,roducers, e.g,LahorDaily25/1134 p4:
'The Australian delegation to Ottawa sacrificed our secondary industries for ephemeral and inconsequential export
concession."
Also see LaborCall5m34 p4.
23.Australian Worker27/5/36 p7 also Scullin inCopland and Janes Australian Trade Policyop, cit. p91, lOO, Forde inibid. pl14, G. Sawer
Australian FederalPolitics andLaw,1929·1949 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1963 p98.
24.LaborCall 114137 p3, Scullin inCopland and Janes Australian Trade Policyop. cit, pp9Q-1, Forde CPD 154, August 1937 p301.
25. See Copland and Janes Australian Trade Policyop,cit. pp317, 318,323.
26. Forde CPD 154, August 1937 p295. Also see LaborCall7/1137 p11,' LaborDailyinCopland and Janes Australian Trade Policy op. cit,
p308; W. J.C. Riordan CPD 154, September 1937 p346, Scullin CPD 154, August 1937 p313.
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There was also a recognition amongst laborites that the Angle-American Agreement went against Australia's
interests.27
Some took their hostility to the Ottawa Agreement further than the Labor moderates who still supported British
preference. In 1934,Labor Call had argued that through Ottawa "Britain Sucks AustraliaDry".28 The following
year Lang Labor seemed to oppose differentialtreatmentof trade with Britain:
"Long term tariff preferences are detrimental to the development of new trade markets, while the
security they give to the recipientsof preference tends to stagnateold markets."29
Boote attributed the undesirable policies of the Lyons Government to British imperialism,30 an argument
illustratedby Cartoon 6, the front cover of an issue of Australian Worker. E. Ward saw the British connection in
similar terms.u
. Although the main concern of laborite protectionists was manufacturing industry, the ALP also favoured state
intervention to assist primary producers. The Scullin Government had attempted to establish a guaranteed
minimum price for wheat, although Labor opposed the Lyons Government's finance of such a scheme by means
of a tax on flour rather than throughCommonwealth Bank credit.32 In 1935Forde summedup the generallaborite
position on marketing legislation by labelling it "a form of socialismlt,33 There were differences within the
laborite labour movement over the appropriate attitude to the Government's 1937 marketing referendum. After
some legal problems in the administration of one marketing scheme, the Government attempted to extend federal
powers over in a referendumto change the Constitution. The ALP was divided in its attitude. While there was a
general endorsement of the principleof state intervention into primary produce markets, there were differences as
to how this should be secured,34 It is likely that the Labor "noes" were to some extent influenced by the
calculationthat any defeat for a Governmentinitiativewould be a good thing.
27. E. Ward CPD 158,1938 pl975,LaborCallll//38 p3, reprinted from Westralian Worker.
28.LaborCall 2614134 pi. Also see LaborCall 218134 plO and 28/1/37 pi.
29.LaborDailyYearBook1934-5 op,cit, p135.
30. AustralianWorker3/6136 p3. Alsosee AustralianWorker1m36 p3.
31. E. Ward CPD 154, September 1937 pp422-3 attributed trade diversion to"domination by the British capitalistic interests".
32. Scullin inD. B. Copland and C. V. Janes (eds) Australian Marketing Problems: A Book ofDocuments 1932-1937 Angus and Robertson,
Sydney 1938 pp289-91.
33. FordeinCopland and Janes Australian Marketing Problems op,ciL ppll-2.
34. See AustralianWorker27/1/37 p11 and 24/2137 for the different Labor positions.
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From Money Power to Monopoly
The ideas of moderate laborites about the class anatomy of Australian capitalism were' often not explicitly
expoundedduring the 1930s. But such ideas wereapparentin the moderates' commitment to thenationalinterest,
in matters such as defencepolicy, or in their analyses of the ills of capitalism. Economic problems were usually
identifiedas being due to defective, but remediable financial, distributive or industrial mechanisms, rather than
inherentcontradictions associated with class relations or conspiracies by a sectionof society. At their best strong
supporters of improvements in working class living standards, moderate laborites saw action to improve the
apparatus of capitalistgrowth as a means to that end. On the other hand,advocates of Money Power theory were
much more explicitabout their views on the structure of Australian capitalism. Their left nationalist position are
consideredin this section. Different approaches to the repair of capitalism's defects, including those embodying
the moderates' assumptions about the significance of classes in Australia, are specifically examined in the
following sectionon laboriteanalyses of economiccrisisand anti-depression policy.
There was a shift in the emphasis of laborite economic thought towards Money Power theories during the
depression. Not all laborites subscribed to the idea that the crisis was the result of a conspiracy of the financial
oligarchy, involving foreigninterests and successful attempts to cut purchasing power. But Money Power theory
seemed to explain a great deal of Australia's depression experience and therefore rapidly attracted a large
following.
The version of Money Power theory whichgained greatestpopularityduring the depression was less sophisticated
than Frank Anstey's earlier expositions. Jack.Lang became the rallying point for those opposed to the financial
oligarchy. His agitation focused on the Money Power to the virtual exclusion of the role of monopoly under
capitalism, to Which Anstey hadpaid considerable attention. Lang, a real estate agent andformerly a mainstream,
if particularly vigorous, Labor leader played down the socialist arguments associated with Anstey's and H. E.
Boote's presentations of the MoneyPower theory. That aspect onlyemergedin the NSW ALP's pronouncements
in an attenuated form as the "socialisation of credit", when Lang's machine moved against the popular
Socialisation Units. By stressing hostility to the Money Power, rather than support for socialism, the ALP
maximised support amongstlayers of society with a stake in capitalism but adversely affected by the depression.
Lang's appeal to the petty bourgeoisie was complimented by his novel mix of traditional Labor policies and a
crusading style, which attracted support from workers hoping he would restore jobs and wages when their
confidence in their ability to do this throughindustrialactionwas at a lowebb.
After 1934MoneyPower ideologydeclined in step withLang's waningpopularity because Lang's Party in NSW
remainedfor several years an institutional locus for the theory. But the "conception of the Money Power as the
commanding force in modem capitalism" continuedtohave currencyin the labour movement until the 1950s as a
distinctive interpretation of the class anatomy of Australian capitalism. Denunciations of the MoneyPowerwere a
step in the development of a modifiedconspiracy theory,already apparentin laboritecirclesduring the late 1930s,
whichfocused on the role of monopolies. The CPA took the development of this new anti-monopolism farthest,
by drawing on olderMoneyPower traditions in the labourmovement.
H. Lazzarini, LangiteMHR, speltout thenature of Australia's subordination to the fmancial oligarchyin 1934 in
termssimilarto thoseusedof multinational corporations today:
"Thesebig capitalists in Britaindo not represent the British people,but consistof a hybrid breed of
internationals of classes,colours and creeds, whose aim is that Australia shall remain nothing more
thana wheatfield or a sheep walk... "1
According to Money Power theory, the domination of society by fmanciers underlay all other problems. For a
view of the global influenceof the Money Power see Cartoon7. Arbitration and governments were the tools of
the fmancial institutions, which restricted the purchasing power of the people through their operations.s A
distinctive feature of Money Power theory was its tenet that the financial conspiracy had brought about the
depression.TheMoneyPowerwas opposedto the interests of the vast majority of society,even the
"Manufacturing or Employing Class -- is now subservient to thesmall butmorepowerfulgroup, the
'FinancialOligarchs'."3 '
Economic reconstruction wasprimarily a matter of restoring to Parliament the "power that has been usurped by a
number of private banking companies'vt This could be secured by nationalising financial institutions and the
operation of the nation's credit by the Commonwealth Bank, under government direction.5 Like moderate
laborites, Money" Power theorists had an instrumentalist view of the state, as a neutral tool: the grip of the
FinancialOligarchyover"all governments" could be broken,if only a LaborGovernment introduceda few simple
fmancial reforms.
1.H. Lazzarini CPD145,1934p370,alsoseeJ. Garden ibid.pp191-4.
2. Railroad(newspaper of theNSWARU) 10/5134j J. Garden CPD145,1934p830j H. Lazzarini CPD147,1935pS02.
3. Railroad10/4134 ppl-2 '
4. Reportof J. Beasley'selection policy speech LaborDaily 17/8134 p1.
5. See,for example, H. Lazzarini CPD 147,1935p805.
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At the height of the Lang movement or when expounded by particularly consistent interpreters, Money Power
theoryoffered an explanation that could accommodate the other aspects of Labor economic thought: tariffs were
necessaryto stem the tide of imports, loosed by the financial oligarchy;it was the MoneyPower that contrivedthe
underconsumption which resulted in the depression. With the immediate crisis of the depression passed,Money
Power theory proved inadequate to deal with complicatedproblems of economic management It did not provide
any guidelines for the conduct of a detailed fiscal, trade or even monetary policy. The emphasis in laborite
economic thinking shifted back to underconsumptionism and protectionism. While his views probably had not
changed, even Lang himself used less Money Power rhetoric on the hustings. His policy speeches for the 1935
and 1938 State elections omitted any reference to the Money Power or concepts based in Money Power theory,e
During the 1938elections it was difficult to distinguish the policiesof the Lang and IndustrialLaborParties," As
trade union officials moved into opposition to Lang they could replace denunciations of the Money Power (or
abstractmarxist denunciations of the evils of capitalism, for that matter)with real achievements and campaigns in
which there was a chance of success. For example, the Railroad carried a large amount of material against the
Money Power during the depression, but from late 1934 began to publish more marxist and moderate laborite
material,althoughthe editorship had not changed.8
When Lang Labor was receivedback into the fold of the Federal ALP in 1936, a new financial plank was agreed
for the Federal Platform. It was a compromise between the positions of the two Parties.s But even after the
demiseof the Lang Party there were enthusiasts who continued to propagateMoney Power ideas. The Australian
Worker, edited by H. E. Boote, kept up its long-standing crusadeagainst the MoneyMasters. Handbillsprinted in
the newspaperduring the 1937federal electioncampaignwere lurid in their presentation of the issues:
"STICK UP YOURHANDS!. .. Vote a Labor Government into Power and put a stop to the hold-
ups of the Usury Bandits. . • The whole nation is being robbed by their extortionate interest
charges."
"A SECRET JUNTA DICTATES THE POLICY OF THE LYONS-PAGE GOVERNMENT...
They represent THE INNERCIRCLEOF THE MONEYMASTERS•.. the head and font of Money
Power. . . the shipping companies, the beef barons, the wool kings, and other commercial,
importing, miningand financialconcerns."10
An official 1937ALP electionleaflet, authorised by Beasley,did not take up any MoneyPower ideas, even when
it dealt specificallywith the Commonwealth Bank and financialreform.11 Australian Worker used Money Power
flourishes in its election material, but otherwise it tended to reserve it for financial questions. So the Financial
Oligarchywas excoriatedover the proceedings of the Loans Council, the conduct of the Government's borrowing
policy and the crimes revealed in the Banking Commission Report, but was not mentioned in the context of the
trade diversioncontroversy,12
Although laborite Money Power ideas were most strongly represented in NSW, because of their association with
Lang Labor, they continued to be expressed elsewhere in Australia after the depression. In Melbourne, F. 1.
Conwaystill maintainedin 1939that the people must be told
"that nothing that they require -- food, clothing, shelter, social services, all the amenities of life --
need they be deprivedof but for one, the financial monopolists. It is the fmancial monopolists that
perpetratemisery,privationand untoldsuffering."13
Labor Call drew attention to the New Zealand Labour Government's successful policies for dealing with the
Money Power, through greater state control over the fmancial system. The moderation of the New Zealand
measures, falling far short of the "socialisation of credit", and theirconsistencywith a wide spectrumof economic
theory indicates that Money Power ideas constitutedmore of a view of the economic structure of society than a
practicalguide to action,14
A Western Australian "farmer-Laborite" clearly expressed the instrumental theory of government and the state
embodiedin MoneyPower ideas in 1940:
6.J. T. Lang "Policy Speech" typescript, 2614135, Mitchell Library Q329.311L and J. T. Lang Policy Speech of the Australian LaborParty
2613138, authorised by J. J. Graves, Mitchell Library 329.31/2181. Lang still used MoneyPower ideas inother contexts, however. At the West
Maitland ALP Conference inFebruary 1936 hesaid overseas financiers were planning tosabotage the coal industry and that Niemeyer was still
influencing Australian developments,Labor Daily 10/12136 pi.
7.Compare LaborDaily 813138 pi and 9/3138 pl,
8.Railroad10/10134 p4 carried acritique offetishism of the banks similar to those produced bythe CPA.
9.P.Love Labourand theMone., PowerMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1984 ppI44-6.
10.Australian Worker 13/10137; H. Lazzarini CPD 165, November 1940 p297 still held that the private banks had caused the depression.
11. The publication isatMitchell Library Pamphlet File 329.21-329.3/A.. . .
12 Australian Worker27/5136 p8, 3/6136 p3, 4/8137 p7, 1818/37 pl. Also see Australian Worker 3/6136 p3 explained attempts by the UAP
Premier ofNSW. B. Stevens, and Lyons to solicit investment finance from Britain asa consequence of their complete subservience to the
banks. The same editorial calls British capital "agoverning class twelve thousand miles away" rather than referring toBritish Money Power,
finance orbanks. For adiscussion oftrade diversion see Australian Worker27/5/36 p7.
13.Labor Call 2313139 p8, also see Labor Call 4/11/37 p5, 24/4/41 p3. For some Queensland comments ina Money Power vein see ALP
Debaters Bulletin April 1939 J. Collings "Senator Collings Expounds Labor's Immediate Policy" and S. F. AlIen "Hands Off the
Commonwealth Bank" May 1939 ppl, 3.
14. e.g. LaborCall216138 p7, 2817138 p3, 21/9/39 p12
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"Unfortunately the policy of the Government of this theoretically democratic nation is not directed
by those who elect the legislators, but by the secretpowerof international finance, which moves un-
seen behindthe visibleactivities of everygovernment."15
His sentiments were characteristic of a layer of rural petty bourgeois who subscribed to MoneyPower theory, in
the version propagated by the ALPor by Douglas Creditors and later theLeagueof Rights. In Tasmania, theState
with the smallest working class and a sizable small farming community, the influence of Douglas Social Credit
ideason the ALP wasmore pervasive than elsewhere.te With the labourmovement's MoneyPowertheory, shorn
of class rhetoric and bolstered by pseudo-scientific analysis, Douglas Credit ideas provided a rationale for the
petty bourgeoisie in the face of the depression, even if it couldofferno real solution to its problems. To theextent
thatDouglasites effectively exposed andpublicised the contradiction of "poverty amid plenty", which affected all
subordinate classes, they wereable to attractsome working classfollowing.l?
The increasedmilitancy of the working class during the late 1930s and the early part of the War, encouraged the
renewed expression of radicalism in the labour movement. Some looked back to Money Power ideas of the
depression for a suitable rhetoric, but others found a newer approach, although one which had affinities withand
roots in earlierdenunciations of the Financial Oligarchy.
Anstey's studiesof the MoneyPower had includedan analysis of the roleof monopolies in Australian capitalism.
He believed Australian industry was dominated by three monopoly "rings". These, in turn were dominated by
financial interests, a corollaryof subordination of productive capital, primary producers and manufacturers, to the
Money Power. During the depression the main focus of hostility was the Money Power rather than the
monopolies. But the monopolies stillcame in for a shareof criticlsm.ts
The depression accelerated the concentration and centralisation of Australian capital. We have brieflyexamined
howBHP expanded through thisprocess. Further, the recovery saw a decline in the importance of money capital,
especially overseas loans, in the Australian economy. Where the whole of the Labor Party favoured financial
reforms, more radicallaborites revived their interest in monopoly. Monopoly, though primarily that in land, had
been a major preoccupation during the early years of the Party.l9 Now monopoly in industry was the main
concern. This interest in monopoly was apparent amongstlaborites, butfound an organisational expression in the
PopularFront Communist Party, a development examined in chapterfour.
In 1934Labor Call publishedan articlecalled"'Sharing the Sacrifices': HowIt Pans Out". It featured a table of
the paid up capital, share value, reserves and undistributed profits of companies in major industry sectors.20 A
good example of anti-monopolism along these lines was also argued in the Federal Parliament during the same
year. F. Baker, a moderate on monetary questions, documented the existence of the same three trusts, to which
Ansteyhad drawnattention, and argued that they shouldbe nationalised.21 Others, still clearly within the Money
Power tradition, kept the issueof monopoly alive in subsequent years. J. J. Simpson reminded his readers thatthe
moneymarket was behind the monopolies, who in turn forced manufacturers to lowerprices, speed-up production
and sack workers.22 So, despite the focus on monopolies, they were identified with the Money Power and
manufacturers werestill let off the hook.
Shifts in Money Power theoryopened the way to a radical critique of capitalism which centred on monopoly, a
featureof the system now more salient than the power of the Financial Oligarchy. W. F. Ahern, stillnot averse to
damning conservativegovernments for their relations with the MoneyMasters, in 1936 preferred to identify the
NSW UAP·Government with profiteers, the combines and big business.23 When Labor opposition leader John
Cain (the first) attacked the Victorian Government's proposed companies bill, Labor Call documented the
holdings of the Baillieus, HowardSmith and Burns families.24 During the late 1930s Lazzarini, who had byno
means given up on theFinancial Oligarchy, also attackedthe "capitalistic profit mongers of the world", especially
BHP. He still saw governments as the puppets of outside interests, but now the monopolies too were identified
with the MoneyPower
. 15. Labor Call 3015/40 p7 reprinted from Westralian Worker. Also see G. W. Martens, aQueensland MHR with an AWUbackground CPD
151, 1936 pl159:
"the banks still determine the policy ofthis country, irrespective ofthe Government in power."
16. For a brief account ofLabor and Social Credit inTasmania see R. Davis EightyYears' Labor1903·1983Sassafras Books, Hobart 1983
pp24-6. The relationship between Douglas Credit and the ALP, strongest before 1934-35 when State Labor Parties proscribed membership of
the Social Credit movement, isdiscussed in Love Labourand the Money Power op, cit. pp133-40 and B. Berzins "Douglas Credit and the
ALP" inR.Cooksey (ed.) The GreatDepression in Australia, LabourHistory 17, 1970 pp148-60. C. B. Macpherson Democracy in Alberta
University ofToronto Press, Toronto 1953 for an excellent explanation ofthe class basis ofSocial Credit theory.
17. See Love ibid. and Berzins ibid. Because Douglas Credit's main appeal was not toworkers itisnot examined in further detail in this study,
however, for examples of its currency amongst some sections even ofmore skilled and organised workers see Railroad 10/6134 p5, 1017134
p13, 10/2135 p9 and Amalgamated Engineering Union JournalJune 1939 p16, September 1939 pp17-9 and October 1939 pp9-12.
18. See, for example, J.Curtin Australia'sEconomic Crisisand the1.55,000,000 InterestBillWestralian Worker, Perth 1930.
19. L G. Churohward "Introduction" in N. Ebbels TheAustralian LabourMovement 1850·1907 Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1983 ppI2-3, 23;
M. Davitt in ibid. p52 and R.Gollan RadicalandWorking ClassPoliticsMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1976 p105.
20.LaborCall 2213134 p3.
21. F. BakerCPD 145, November 1934 pp514-9.
22 LaborCall 3/1135 pi.
23.AustralianWorker26/2136 pS
24.LaborCall 13/8136 pS.
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"Theplain fact is that a huge monopoly whichdictates thepolicy of the Government is, apparently,
to be allowed to export pig iron and iron ore whereever it wished to do so... Woe to the money
changerand the profitmongerwhenscienceis appliedproperlyto government."25
Lazzarini deprecated the soullessness of limited liability companies compared with owner operated concerns.
Also appealing to a petty bourgeois audience, M. M. Nolan, who saw the "moneymachine" as the primus inter
pares of the monopolies, advocated the injection of credit "through the people who carry on the community's
work, whether they be producers or traders".26 The appearance of F. Lundberg's America's Sixty Families, with
its detailed analysis of the activities of monopolies in the USA, received a favourable reception in some quarters
of the laboritelabour movement, as did somelocalCommunist publications alongsimilarlines.27
Eddie Ward still expressed his greater orientation to the working class than Nolan or Lazzarini in his attacks on
the monopolies during the late 1930s:
The representatives of the vested interests who comprise the [Commonwealth Bank] board are
anxious for this country to be defended, because they want their wealth and privileges protected.
Their privileges include the control and ownership of the means of production, and the power to
exploit the workers."28.
Laboriteanti-monopolism flowered between the outbreakof World War IT andPearlHarbour. The working class,
whose bargaining position had been enhanced by the war, was expected by the Government to do some belt-
tightening. The CPA encouraged militantresistance to this, while the Federal ALP was supporting the War in a
half-hearted way. Most Labor Parliamentarians and moderate laborites were unprepared to condonewidespread
industrial action but many responded to the situation and the ineffectiveness of the Government with a radical
rhetoric. The ACTU endorsed the recommencement of the miners' campaign for shorter hours in 1940 and used
materialon the monopolies in a numberof its publications.29
Labor Parliamentarians andpublicists expressedconcern that monopolists and profiteers would take advantage of
the war andGovernment patronage. During the 1939budgetdebateLazzarini suggestedthat
"Allprofit making should be suspended until the war is over..• No indication is given in the budget
speech of any intention by the Government to deal with the real profiteers in this country who are
the banksand privatecompanies."30 -
Even moderates like Curtin werecaught up in the radical rhetoric. He maintained that "In peace the interests of
monopoly and big business are paramountwith a Government of the Menzies type" and that the War wouldmake
matters worse.31 By the timeof the 1940elections he judged it opportune to declare
"Theremust be no hesitationto assume control of the meansof production wherethat is essential in
the public interest."32
By December 1940,Curtin's rhetoricwas laggingbehindthat of the recentlysplitLang Party andsome dissidents,
like Ward, whoremained insidethe OfficialParty. They opposedthe budget, whichhad Curtin's imprimatur, and
called for the nationalisation of some industries.33 An article by C. A. MorganMHRreprinted from a Douglasite
publication as a pamphletoutlined the activities and holdings of BHP,Electrolytic Zinc, General MotorsHolden
and other large companies. Morgan attacked the Money Power and called for the nationalisation of munitions
industries and control of credit by the Government.34 In his hands the Money Power was a subset of the
monopolies rather than vice versa. This also seemed to be the case in an ARU pamphlet of 1941.35 As the
Government'sdifficulties increasedduring the second half of 1941,laborite attacks on the monopolies continued.
Even F. M. Forde made the appropriate noises,callingfor a Government takeoverof BHP.36
Pearl Harbour and then the adventof the CurtinGovernment dampened industrial militancy as well as the radical
rhetoric of Labor politicians and journalists. The "national emergency" was used as an excuse to drop earlier
proposals. Dissidents, some more principled than others, remained in the Federal Parliament, to continue with
25. H. Lazzarini CPD 158, November 1938 p1948, also see his speech atCPD 154, August 1937 p404.
26.LaborCall 614139 p13.
27. See, for example, the review in ALPDebatersBulletinAugust 1938 p2.
28. E. Ward CPD 158, 1938 ppl978-80. Ward still retained a concern for the well-being ofthe petty bourgeoisie. His attacks on the Anglo-
American Agreement of1938 were centred on its consequences.for Australian primary producers, rather than workers.
29. See the discussion ofthese in chapterfour below.
30. H. Lazzarini CPD 161, September 1939 pp517-8. M M. Nolan Labor Call 11/1/40 pScontinued tomake an appeal for petty bourgeois
support for the ALP on the baSIS ofanti-monopolism:
"Throughtheir UAP Governments, therefore, they r'big business leaders"] are initiating aseries ofmoves which are designed
tosqueeze out the small traders and harness Australian industry along lines closely resembling the worst features ofthe huge
trusts against the stranglehold ofwhich America has been fighting for generations."
Also see LaborCall 30/5/40p5 which was areprint from Australian Worker1515/40; LaborCall 13/6140 p2, 12112140 p2, 2813/40 p5. During
the 1940 election federal campaign Australian Worker oscillated between anti-monopolist and Money Power rhetoric when denouncing the
Government, e.g, AustralianWorker21/8140 p3, 2818/40 pi, 1119/40 ppl, handbills pplQ-l, handbills 18/9/40 pp1Q-1.
31. LaborCall 1512140 pl,
32 J. Curtin ThePolicyoftheLaborPartyAustralian Labor Party, Melbourne 1940 p7.
33. E. Ward CPD 165, December 1940 pp494-503 for a detailed account ofhow well the large companies were doing. See also M. Falstein
ibid. pS52; T. Sheehan ibid. p702; and F. M.J. Baker ibid. for the Government as atool ofbig business. Ward restated his position during the
debate over the 1941 budget, CPD 168, October 1941 p699.
34. C. A. Morgan Monopolies and theWarEffortUnited Electors, Melbourne 19417, reprinted from New Times.
35. T. Moroney and J. F.Chapple Trade UnionPlan for Post-WarReconstruction Australian Railways Union 1941 p9. The pamphlet only
mentioned Money Power inthe context offinancial policy. Itargued for socialism and moderate reforms in the mean time.
36. See the report inLaborCall7/8/41 pl, also LaborCall2417/41 p12.
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militantlanguage. Late in 1941 A. Calwell referred to Anstey's analysis of the three rings and made calls for the
immediate abolitionof the Commonwealth Bank Boardand the eventual nationalisation of banking)7 His stance
rapidlyreturned to that when he was a leaderof the ALP right in Victoriabefore entering Parliament, after hehad
achieved a place in the Ministry, in 1943. Ward continued to talk about nationalisation of basic industries for
some time. His radicalism was put to good use when he was assignedthe task of curbing industrial militancy for
the Government, as Ministerfor Labourand NationalService.
There was no clear cut transition fromMoneyPower theoryto anti-monopolism. Partly this was an organisational
question as the CPA was the main inheritor of the left nationalist tradition during the late 1930s and the 1940s.
Moreover, some laborites, like Lazzarini, slipped between the two approaches, giving more emphasis to one at
some times, to the secondat other times. But some importantassumptions underlay both approaches andremain a
feature of contemporary left-nationalist ideology,38 They all identified the main problem of capitalism with a
small section of the capitalistclass, not by virtue of its constitution as capital, Le. the exploitation of wagelabour,
but on the basis of other criteria -- their size, manipulation of financial markets or foreignness. So conspiracy,
rather than the dynamics of capitalistaccumulation and its interaction withpoliticaland ideological developments,
was used to explain developments in Australian politics and the economy. These ideas, like the mechanical
meliorisrn of laborite moderates, all had an appeal to workers and sometimes also to employers. But their
rhetoricalanti-eapitalism could generategreatersupportfrom workersdisillusioned with the established orderthan
moderate laborite thought, with its more obvious commitment to minor and piecemealchange. It was also often
possible, with a little imagination and stretching of definitions, to characterise any employer in particular as a
"multinational corporation", "monopolist" or lackeyof the "MoneyPower" and thus to justify a specificindustrial
struggle as a just fight. Proponents of these left nationalistideologies, on the other hand, could portray them as
taking the interestsof the petty bourgeoisie and some capitalists into account and attempt to win their support,
because they focusedhostilityon only a section of the capitalist class. The potentialof this appeal could only be
realised, however, if the anti-capitalistrhetoric was toned dOWl1, as the Langites did during the early 1930s, so as
not to scare off members of the respectable classes. Unfortunately for Lang, the enthusiasm of his supporters,
lookingfor a substitute for their own lack of industrialstrength, eventually intimidated mostof the middleclasses,
even though he wasnot a proponentof socialismhimself.
37. L. F. CrispBen Chifley Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1977pl44; LaborCall20/11141 pp3-4.
38. Ideasthatvery clearly derivefromMoney Powertheory, pure and simple, still sometimes surface; for example see N. Domey"An Open
Letterto the PrimeMinisterof Australia: WhyNot Finance JobCreation by Restoring the People'sBankT' Modern Unionist December 1983
pp23·S.
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Underconsumptionism: A Hundred and One Varieties
The recurrence of cyclical economic fluctuations undercapitalism has been a topic for study by economists for
centuries. It is also a matterof direct concern to the working class, who are more often thrown out of work by
depressions than are professional economists. In all but a very few cases, professional economists, especially
thoseat universities, have beenwedded to the existing order by their privileged status, remuneration and working
conditions and by the definition of appropriate behaviour for them by academic authorities. Making proposals for
improvements in the mechanisms of capitalism has beenregarded as one of the profession's legitimate activities.
The circumstances of working class life have not similarly restricted the labourmovement's economic thinking.
In fact they have encouraged a practical antagonism to the capitalist system on the shopfloor. Butcountervailing
factors, such as the ideological influence of other classes, experiences of industrial defeat and periods of
prolonged prosperity, haveencouraged the acceptance of the capitalist order by sections of the labourmovement.
The depression of the 1930s raised the issue of cyclical economic fluctuations for the working class in a
particularly harsh fashion. The way the labourmovement explained economic crises had important implications
for working class strategy -- it was crucial in determining if a perspective of reformwas credible. All currents
supporting the ALPafter the demise of the socialisation movement believed that a strategyof reformwas viable.
Underconsumptionis.t analyses of the depression, in one form or another, were the basisof this belief. Different
underconsumptionist theories, however, had divergent implications for the practical action of the labour
movement and of Labor Governments. Chapter one introduced a number of ways of classifying
underconsumptionisrn: governmental, trade union, radical and catastrophist, In order to understand the theories
of crisis currentamongst laborites during thesecondhalfof the 1930s, it will be useful to takea further lookat the
classification of underconsumptionist analyses.
Statedcrudely, the idea of underconsumptionism is that the productive potential of society is not matched by its
purchasing power or effective demand. At times resources -- machinery, land andlabourpower-- are idle,even if
socialneeds remain to be satisfied. Underconsumptionist theories differ over the reasons for the deficiency of
purchasing power and the bestsolution to the problem. Most of the theories can have at least a superficial appeal
to the working class, on the basisof the identification of inadequate purchasing power with workers' concern to
improve their ownlivingstandards. Macpherson's comments on SocialCredittheory's attraction for workers has
a widerapplication to underconsumptionist ideasin general:
"No doctrine could have been better designed to appeal to the middle class, whether independent
producers, smallshareholders, or managers andprofessional people; even wageearners wereoffered
a visionof shorterhours and an unearned income."l
Contemporary orthodox economics classifies underconsumptionist theories on the basis of their internal
consistency, rigourand self-validation. Nernrners, for example, maintains that
"Underconsurnption theory has followed two broad paths of development, not always separated.
.The first is the so-called 'real' explanation giving primary emphasis to the role of income
maldistribution or glutability of consumption wants as the causalfactor of underconsumption. The
second is the so-called monetary explanation giving primacy to the role of defects in the 'price-
system' interpreted as monetary phenomena, particularly the alleged existence of money costs not
matchedby money income."2
He madeHobson theepitomy of thereal andKeynes of the monetary schools.
Strachey, in his rnarxist phaseof the 19308, useda different taxonomy. He designated all non-rnarxist economics
as "capitalist" and divides economists we describe as underconsumptionists into "professionals" and "amateurs",
essentially on the basis of whether they held academic posts and their adherence to the analytical concepts
accepted as orthodox in universities.3
The following discussion interprets underconsumptionist theories according to their relationship with the life
experiences of social classes, in the context of a broad classification based their internal structure, Nemmers's .
maintaxonomic principle. Strachey goes someway to such a classbasedapproach in his references to "capitalist
economics". But his dismissal of underconsumptionism in general as "capitalist economics" is far too broad a
statement for a number of reasons. First, Strachey argues that it is possible to divide all economics between
"capitalist" and marxisttheory.s He makes a validdistinction between marxist and underconsurnptionist theories
and therefore placesall of the formerinto the "capitalist" basket. This, however, leavesout of account theradical
underconsumptionist arguments of Communists and some social-democratic currents duringthe 1920s and 1930s,
1.Macpherson Democracy illAlberta op,cit, p116.
2. E. E.NemmersHobson andUnderconsumptioll NorthHolland Publishing Co., Amsterdam 1956pl.
3. J. Strachey TheNature o/Capitalist Crisis Gollancz, London 1935p22.
4. Strachey's approach has much in common with the ideasthat "relatively to [the worIcing class]all other classesare only one reactIonary
mass", criticisedby Marx in TheCritique 0/theGotha Program ForeignLanguages Press, Peking1972ppI8-20. AlsoseeF. Engels'sletterto
August Bebel ibid. pp38-9. Strachey's position derives from his sharing the sectarian, Third Periodassumptions of the British Communist
Partywhenhe wroteTheNature in 1934. He appliedhis analysis to theeconomics of the BritishLabourParty:
"Thiscounsel is the deadliest of all poisons whichcanbe administered to the workers."(p371).
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which were touched on in Chapter One. These theories argued that underconsumption was inevitable under
capitalism and thatit should therefore bereplaced by socialism. Theytheories arenotmarxist, butneither do they
fit intoStrachey's definition of "capitalist economics", which supposedly
"Accept, consciously or unconsciously, the capitalist system of the private ownership of the means
of production, theiroperation for-profit, and of the distribution of the products of exchange, as the
immutable dataof theirinquiries."s .
Howthenarewe to categorise thenon-marxist, non-capitalist theories?
The second problem with Strachey's approach is that although it may be legitimate to regard some
underconsumptionist theories as capitalist under his definition, this would distort the class character of these
theories. Douglas and Hobson accepted the capitalist system and regarded economic crises as incidental rather
than inevitable. But there are important distinctions between the class implications of their theories and the
underconsumptionism of I. Fisher (with whom Strachey deals at some length) and Keynes, let alone the
deflationary approach of an economist like L. vonHayek (whom Strachey alsodiscusses). Undercapitalism more
than one class, the bourgeoisie, has an interest in the continuation of the system. Draper calls the petty
bourgeoisie the "Janus class", facing in twodirections: living by his or her own labour, rather than by the labour
of others, thepetty bourgeois can identify with working class opposition to the iniquities of capitalism. But as an
owner of means of production and possibly as employers of a few workers, he or she has an interest in
accumulation and the survival of the system.s Douglas's underconsumptionism reproduced the contradictions of
petty bourgeois production, because it expressed theirdesire to preserve capitalism, but if implemented it would
haveundermined it byreducing therateof profit, through income redistribution or disruptive monetary measures.
Classes other than the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie also have an interest in the continued existence of
capitalism, most significantly the "new middle class" which hasa position in therelations of capitalist production,
performing some functions (especially supervisory ones) on behalfof capital in return for wages and conditions
above those of workers," The function of trade union officials is only possible under capitalism, where wage
labour is a commodity and organisations, with their own managers, arrange its wholesaling. Like the petty
bourgeoisie, these groups also want to abolish certain aspects of capitalism and , in the case of union officials,
especially to improve thewell-being of workers.
Thirdly, Strachey's designation of all underconsumptionist theories ascapitalist ignores theirsocial consequences,
ultimately the most important criterion in a marxist assessment of an ideology. Thus "trade union
underconsumptionism", legitimising wageand otherworking class struggles, wascertainly not in the immediate
economic interests of the capitalist class. It is not useful to describe as "capitalist" such underconsumptionist
theories, which onlyhelp to maintain capitalism through a process of mystification -- especially those that appeal
to classes other than thebourgeoisie -- often byholding out thehopethatcapitalism can beperfected. Thetermis
betterreserved for economic theories which justify policies, developments and political practices in accord with
capital'smaterial interests. Strachey correctly points out thatprofessional economists tend to produce theories of
thiskind. During the 1930s, the moreorthodox of them, likeHayek, calledfor cost (Le. wage) cutting measures
by means of money and real wage cuts. Underconsumptionist professional economists, like Fisherand Keynes,
advocated real rather than money wage cuts as more realistic and legitimised greater intervention by the state
which, unlike Douglasite proposals for example, couldhavereal benefits forcapitalism evenif theycouldnot cure
it of cyclical crises.
Real Underconsumptlonlsm
The economic thought of the labour movement has been particularly concerned with the question of income
distribution. Workers themselves, the union officials and politicians whorepresent themhave sought to increase
theshareof national income going to the working class. Real underconsumptionism, of which trade union under-
consumption discussed above was a subset, provided an expression of thisconcern andlinkedit to theproblem of
economic crises. Hobson's version of real underconsumptionism waswidely used, usually unacknowledged, by
laborites.s It is worth examining his own presentation as he dealt with the arguments in a more coherent,
sophisticated and thorough waythanmostAustralians whoborrowed fromhimeverdid. Hobson maintained that
"The possession of an excessive proportion of 'power to consume' by classes who, because their
normal healthy wants are already fully satisfied, refuseto exert thispowerandinsist uponstoring it
S. Strachey TheNatureop,cit, p17,footnote 1.
6. SeeH. DraperKarlMan's Theory ofRevolution, Volume Il ThePolitics of SocialClasses Monthly Review, NewYork1978p291.
7. For a discussion of this classand the literature dealing withit see A. Callinicos "The 'NewMiddleClass' andSocialistPolitics"lnlernational
Socialism 2(20)1983pp82-119.
8. The currency of Hobson'sideasin the Australian labourmovement was probably similarto his influence inBritain,described by B.Wootton
PlanorNo Plan?Gollancz, London 1934pl24:
"It is, I think, no exaggeration to say thatMr. Hobson has converted to his views practically the wholebody of left-wing
liberalandright-wing socialist o~inion as dabbles in economic theories at all."
ForHobson's(Douglas'sand R.F.lrvine s) influence on LangseeD. Clark"WasLangRight?" in H. Radi andP. SpearrittJackLang Haleand
lremonger, Sydney 1977 plS2, IS4, IS6. Hobson's thinking, along with Douglas and various other monetary underconsumptionists, also
strucka chordwith R. F. IrvinewhohelpedE. Theodore drafthisalternative to the Premiers' Plan,B.McFarlane Professor Irvine'sEconomics
in AustraliJln LabourHistory Australian Society for the Study of LabourHistory, Canberra 1966. See J. A. Hobson Confessions of an
Econamic HereticAlienand Unwin, London 1938p126for his career. Hemadea transition fromLib-Lab to Lab-Lib politics in the course of
WoddWarl. .
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in unneeded forms of capital is directlyresponsible for the slack employment of capital and labour.
If the operationof industrialforces threw an increasedproportion of the 'power to consume' into the
hands of the working classes,who will not use it to postponeconsumption but to raise their standard
of material and intellectual comfort, a fuller and more regular employment of labour and capital
must follow. If the stronger organisation of labour is able to raise wages, and the high wages are
used to demand more and better articlesof consumption, a direct stimulus to the efficiencyof capital
and labour is thus applied."9
The starting point of the analysis is modem capitalismand the relationship betweenwage labour and capital. This
clearly distinguished his position from those of petty bourgeois underconsumptionists like Douglas, in whose
analyses the wage labour relationship, and often the workingclass, was absent. Hobson believedthat the taxation
of the "surplus income" of the wealthy to provide social services and public works would help alleviate
depressions and unemployment in much the way higher wageswould.
Hobson's arguments were used by many laborites to explain a variety of economicphenomena and, in particular,
to justify better wages and shorter workinghours. Early in 1934,R. Cheneyexplainedthe causes of povertyover
radio station 3KZ using a Hobsoniananalysis:
"The unequal distribution of income is also a potent cause of trade depression, inasmuch as the
impoverishment of the masses causes a disproportionate accumulation of capital goods and a
corresponding tendency to stultification of production and consumption of goods. There is thus a
chokage in the social circulatory system occasioned by the insufficient purchasing power of the
masses",1o
. A similar argumentwas used to prove that wage cuts were not in the interests of profit making, although it failed
to explain why, in that case, employers sought them.t! It is expressed in Cartoons 8 and 9. In addition to
favouring higher wages, Labor Call also advocated income redistribution through state controlled banking (a
"monetary" means of achieving a "real" end) higher taxationof moneycapital and incomes, greater expenditure on
national undertakings and social services. These were all means by which idle capital could be used "for the
purposeof raising the workers' living standard". The political implications were that: '
"Labor's policy must be to tax idle money or capital and use it to stimulate employment and
improve the positionof the workers."12
Real underconsumptionism also had negativeimplications. It was used to denigratethe arguments of Douglas and
others hostile to the ALP,13
In less specific terms than laborite journalists, Labor politicians expressed their adherence to real
underconsumptionist solutions to economic problems. During the 1934 Federal elections, the Official ALP
promised that a Labor Government would raise living standards as a means of increasing purchasing power,14
Lang undertook to increase the purchasing powerof the communityby raisingthe basic wage ifhe regainedoffice
in NSW. Underlying his promise and Curtin's reference to "the problem of maintaining the consumptive
capacity", lay the idea that the expansionof wageswould benefit the wholeof society.1S .
Union officials used the same argument. In a seriesof articles in the SydneySun during 1935 and republished as a
pamphlet, The WagesPolicyofOrganisedLabor Oscar Schreiber, Secretaryof the NSW FurnishingTradesUnion
and President of the NSW Trade Union Secretaries Association, presented a lucid and relatively extended
underconsumptionist analysis of the causes of depression. Schreiber was much more forthcoming than most
laborite union officialsabout the theoreticalfoundations of his position thoughnot politicallydistinguishable from
many of his fellows. It is, therefore, worth examining his pamphlet in some detail as representing a significant
current of opinion:
9.1. A. Hobson TheEvolution of Modern Capitalism Alien and Unwin, Fourth Edition, London 1965 p375. The first edition appeared in 1894,
but Hobson continued to propound his analysis ina series ofpublications over more than forty years, e.g, The Economics of Unemployment
Alien and Unwin, London 1922, Poverty inPlentyAlien and Unwin, London 1931.
10.Labor Call 25/1134 p3. Also see All-Australian Trade Union Congress 1934 PolicyMelbourne p2; D. McLeod "Educate, Organise and
Control" Amalgamated Engineering Union JournalFebruary 1936 pp7-9. For references toRoosevelt's policies to justify higher wages see
LaborDaily611134 p8, 13/1134 p8; LaborCall 1513134 p6; and O. Schreiber LaborCall28/6134 p7.
11. LaborCall 113134 p1, 2614134, editorial 1116136 p4, 18, 6,36 p4; Australian Worker editorial 15/1136, 30112136 p6. For an unconvincing
attempt toreconcile employers' support for wage reductions with real underconsumptionist theory see LaborCall 26114134p8.
12Labor Call2116134 p8, 28/6134 pS, 2613136, 5n138 p8. Coming close toa Keynesian position LaborCall 1111134 pIS supported the state
borrowing surplus capital, ifitcould not be taxed.
13. ScrutatorLaborCall21/3/35 p1 pointed out, for example, that
"Greater efficiency inproduction has not been stabilised and balanced bya corresponding efficiency in distribution. The
absence ofthat has brought about the present dislocation ofthe profit-production system.
"Attempts are being made - the Douglas Credit theory is, apparently one - toovercome the difficulty without dispossessing
the capitalists..'.. .. .
"These mermaids ofecononuc phantasy are making more frequent appearances along troubled shores ofdisputation as the
Capitalist crisis sharpens.
"Shoals ofthem have been disporting themselves offthe coasts ofthe U.S.A.. They were branded N.R.A just where the fishy
part ofthe creature joined the fleshy part. Professor Copland issaid tohave captured one, and another specimen isreported to
have been secured by the official economist ofthe Bank ofNew South Wales. Another species isfound all over the Fascist
countries."
Hobson had sat onthe British Labour Party's Committee on Douglas Social Credit in1921, Macpherson Democracy in Albertaop. cit. p123.
14.LaborCall23/S134 ppl-4, also 3/5135.
15.1. Curtin CPD 147, 1935 pSOO. He contrasted the increase in productivity with the decline ofthe "wages fund".
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"The most outstanding and significant feature of our present economy is the definite and persistent
tendency ofproduction to outrun consumption.
"ROOT CAUSE
"In this almost invariable trend lies the root cause of unemployment and underconsumption
accentuated. of course by financial policy imposed sometimes acutely and at all times restrictively.
upon both industry and the community.
"This consequence is due to the economically depressing effect of the low wages upon which the
greater portion of the people are compelled to exist the ultimate outcome being that industry is re-
stricted and trading activities depressed."
The demand for higher wages was a solution to the underlying problem,
"That there is a lopsided or maldistribution of the national income and that this is economically bad
and without justification."
Schreiber thought the state should play a key role in the redistribution. of income, with the Commonwealth
Parliament setting the level of the basic wage. This could counteract the effects of the "unearned increment" of
the employers which
"Is not used except to a very limited extent in the purchase of consumption goods, no matter how
abundantly this section' lives.
"Much of this surplus goes into investment" where it is largely superfluous and in the modern
financial era being no essential service to production."
Credit deflation only "accentuates" the underlying problem in the maldistribution of income,16 Schreiber's
concern that the Government should take action to increase wages was shared by other moderate union officials,
who found greater comfort in the thought of a Labor administration than a militant rank and me capable in winn-
ing improvements for thernselves.l?
Given the absence of a Federal Labor Government, laborites tried to convince the Conciliation and Arbitration
Court of the efficacy of its real underconsumptionist theories. Apart from demonstrating industry's capacity to
pay, P. W. Clarey maintained in the 1937 Basic Wage case that
"Because of the structure of. the capital market, finance was more readily available for capital
formation than for purchasing power; hence, he said, investment funds should be restricted so as to
make available more for consumption."
He contended that it was in the employers' interests for wages to rise,18 The Court called an academic economist,
W; B. Reddaway, to provide it with expert advice,19 On the basis of a Keynesian analysis, he recommended an in-
. crease in wages similar to that the unions had applied for. The 'Court accepted this advice and, despite union
opposition, his suggestion that the increase be made in increments over a period rather than all at once. Red-
daway's testimony and the Court's "resulting" decision made a considerable impact on laborite attitudes to
professional economists and were widely reported in the labour press. During the Basic Wage case itself, the
ACTU advocates made much of Reddaway's evidence, which justified higher wages as a means to dampen
employers' expectations in a boom situation.20 Yet their arguments were quite distinct from his. Where the
ACTU regarded workers' purchasing power as the key variable, for Reddaway it was the employers' expectations
of the rate of profit. In the ACTU's real underconsumptionist framework, income redistribution was a general
answer to the economy's problems. Reddaway's Keynesian framework led him to believe that higher wages could
provide a conjunctural solution to problems associated with a particular stage of the trade cycle. The ACTU
bolstered its case by referring to the work of Professor Ryan, a follower of Hobson, and with a cable from the
acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the effect that in New Zealand,
"The restoration of purchasing power to the workers had quickly reflected in improved business, and
was evidenced in increased customs returns."21
Apart from the economic rationales offered from traditional laborite and Keynesian perspectives by the ACTU
advocates and Reddaway, the professional economist made an argument to the Court which went to the heart of
the real forces behind its decision. He maintained that the threat of industrial unrest made some wage rise
advisable. The prospects of industrial action in 1937 loomed much greater than they had during the several
previous Basic Wage hearings.
16.O. SchreiberThe Wages Policyo/OrganisedLaborreprintedfromthe Sydney Sun pp2,4, 13,6, IQ-I,emphasis in the original.'Also see
O. Schreiber Unemployment •• Fromthe Standpoint 0/Organised Laborbroadcast over radiostation2BL supplement to Furnishing Worker
1/5134, reprinted from Labor Daily. In earlier chapters we saw Schreiber recommending Hobson, whose arguments he reproduced in the
pamphlet, to the readers of his union's newspaper during the 1920s, as a staunch Langite during theearly 1930s and thenas an Important figure
In the fightagainst Langduringthe late 1930s. Hispolitical trajectory was, in somerespects, archetypically that of a laborite unionofficial in
NSW.
17.Thiswas particularly trueof the extremely bureaucratic AWU,seeAustralian Worker 30/12136 p4:
"Theseverynecessary adjustments in industrial conditions will have to be madeby our Governments as matters of national
necessity to restore the equilibrium of thenation'seconomic machine."
18.G. R.Dunkley 'The ACfU 1927-1950: Politics, Organisation andEconomic Policy' PhDThesis, Monash University 1976p303. Alsosee
a reportof Clarey's argument to the Conciliation and Arbitration Court in LaborCall 10/6137 p2. During the 1937elections the ALPagain
favoured pay risesbecause "Highwagesmeanmore jobs, morespending power, morebusiness for everyone", ALPleaflet,authorised by J.
BeasleyCampaign Director, Mitchell Library Pamphlet File329.21-329.3/A
19.Hagan The History o/the ACTUop, cit, p141 impliesthat Reddaway was a union witness, but see Conciliation and Arbitration Court
Registry Transcript 0/1937 BasicWage Applications: Labor Call1n137 p8; and W.B. Reddaway "Australian WagePolicy, 1929-37" in J.
Isaac and G. W. Ford (eds) Australian Labour Economics Readings Sun Books, Melbourne 1968 p120. Moreover the ACTU's initial
economic arguments weredistinct fromReddaway's andits advocates dissented fromsomeof his recommendations.
20. Conciliation andArbitration CourtRegistry Transcript op,ciLpp849, 891.
21. ibid. p961. AlsoseeLaborCallI016137 p2 forClarey'sargument for income redistribution and thecablefromNewZealand.
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The Courtused the pretextof the War to adjourn the next BasicWagecase withoutawarding any increase. Butin
its preparations for the hearings, the ACTUBasic Wage Committee advisedaffiliatedunions in February 1940 to
prepare applications whichincludedthe point
"That the growing disparity between wages paid and the value of production diminishes the
purchasingpowerof the community, and tends to increaseunemployment."22
Union leadersextendedthe Hobsoniancase for better wages to the question of shorterworkinghours: .
"Shorter hours would result in reabsorbtion of many now unemployed, and as a consequence there
would follow a decided improvement in consumption-demand which, more than any other factor,
was essentialto the restoration of trade."23
The ACTU never launched an industrial fight for the forty hour week, but it did conduct a vigorous propaganda
campaign during the late 1930s for this very popular demand. The central case in the ACTU's very widely
distributedpamphlet Why the 40 Hour Week combineda real underconsumptionist argument for the amelioration
of capitalismwith a "socialist" conclusiontackedonto the end. Its mainpropositions were
1) "Because the masses lacked purchasing power, the depression deepened. Under the present
capitalisticsystem productionhas been developedwithout regard for the consumption possibilities.
It has been a 'grab all, when and how you can,' by those who have speededup machinery, and the
workerhas not had his proportionate shareof the benefits. More goods could be purchasedbut the
masses havenot the money to buy thosegoods."
2) "The 40 hour weekwhich Unionists demand as a step towards a real recovery means an increase
in the total amountpaid out in wages" .
3) "Profits are rising andrising, and the only satisfaction [employers] get is by investing in avenues
already overcapitalised, to produce more goods, for which there will be no market, thereby
disturbing further the ratio ofproduction and consumption."
4) "Underthe existingsystem,Plenty is the father and motherof Poverty."24
Railroad had put the relationship between socialism and shorter hours, hinted at in the conclusion to Why the
Forty Hour Week moreexplicitlyin 1934:
"Increasedwages and shorter hourswill help to nationalrecovery, but only a new economic system
will completely solve the problem."25
The crux of Hobsonian real underconsumptionism, as opposed to the radical underconsumptionism of the CPA,
was the assumption that the problemof inadequate purchasing powercouldbe solvedto the benefitof workers and
capitalism. Unfortunately for social harmonyunder capitalism, the reduction of profits to createa market through
higherwages alsoreduces employers' incentives to produce or invest at all. The reconciliation of the interests of
capital and labour envisaged in real underconsumptionist theory paralleled the class position of trade union
officials,whose functionwas to effect smallreconciliations on a day to day basis. Many laborites also took from
Hobson his preference for state action to redistribute income in the interests of greater purchasing power and
economic stability. Believing, as Money Power theorists also did, that the state could be used by either
progressive or reactionary forces, their economic arguments-were focused on the program of the next Labor
governmentor thenext application to the Arbitration Court. That is not to say alllaborite union officials argued
the same positions. Especiallyin unions where Communistinfluence was strong, a few adopteda more radical
stance.26 Moreoverreal underconsumptionism provided rankand flle workers with a rationalefor seeking better
wages,hours and conditions by· meansof direct action. A NSWLaborCouncilpamphletspeltout the implications
of real underconsumptionism for directworking class action:
22 !.Abor Call2912140.
23. O. SchreiberLabor Call 2619135 p13, reprinted from the Daily Telegraph. For similar statements see Railroad 1012134 p2; "ACfU
Propaganda Committee Report" in LaborCalll2J7/34 p13 19n134 p13: Australian Worker 30/12136 p6, 1/9/37 pi: O. Schreiber TheCase for
theFortyHour Week, National Broadcast (over13 radiostations in fiveStates), Supplement to Furnishing Worker 5/5/37. TheABU'sshorter
hourscampaign included manyarticles, mostarguinga Hobsonian case during1935in Amalgamated Engineering Union Journal. The Inter-
national Labour Organisation (ILO) and Roosevelt (where his program was understood as one of higherwagesand shorterhours)werealso
cited in supportof better pay and the forty hour week as real underconsumptionist solutions to the depression, e.g, on the ItO LaborCall
2116134 plO;413137; on Roosevelt O. SchreiberLaborCa1l28/6J34p7, reprinted fromthe Sydney Sun; Labor Call1S13134 1'6, whichincluded
references to Schreiber's arguments. Some Labor politicians also supported the demand for shorter hours, although those actually in
Govemment, as in Queensland did nothing aboutit in their ownstates,see LaborCall 20110136 ~; J. GardenCPD 145,Oetober1934p114,
154,September 1937pS79: R.Jamesibid.p603,H. C. Barnard CPD 158,November 1938p1818. The Victorian Parliament. in whichtheALP
was supporting a Country PartyGovernment, established a Select Committee on the ShorterWorking Week in 1935. J. J. Holland, a Labor
MLA chaired the Committee and campaigned outsidethe Housefor shorterhours. The DunstanGovernment was not persuaded to reduce
working hours, butofficialsfroma numberof unionswere able to demonstrate their efficacyto their members by making submissions to the
Committee, see, for example, Australian Clothing and Allied Trades Union A Shorter Working Week for the Clothing Trades Workers,
Melbourne andN. RobertsTheCasefor a Shorter Working Weekin theEngineering Trades Amalgamated Engineering Union,Melbourne.
24. Australian Council of TradeUnions Whythe 40 HourWeek1936pp12,14,23, alsopublished in AmalgamatedEngineering Union Journal
March,April andMay 1937. The publication referred to authorities suchas H. M. Vernon, FredHenderson'sTheEconomic Consequences of
PowerProduction, StuartChase, an American underconsumptionist economist, and the ILO.
25.Railroad1012134 pS.
26. See, forexampleJ. F. Chapple General Secretary of the ARURailroad editorial 1012134 pS. Chapple, muchmoresympathetic to theCPA,
stoodin aseditor whenthe NSWSecretary, responsible for theRailroadcitedin the previous footnote, died. Contrast, however, the situation
in the Queensland ARU in whichtheCPA hada stronginfluence. The Secretary T. Moroney, arguedfor shorterhoursas a meansto increase
pun:hasing power in Advocate 3016137 p3, a few pagesafter an articlemaintained that the significance of the fight for shorterhourswas its
contribution to theclass strugglefor SOCialism. "Industrialist", Le,theCommunist ARU: education officerGordon Crane,had previously made
the lattercase,Advocate 1S/6J37 ppl-2 .
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"The logical course of the workers is to fight. The most effective check againstthe evil of falling
prices is to preventthe furtherreductions of wages."27
Whether the altruistic goal of working class militancy was the real underconsumptionist one of prosperity under
capitalism or the Communist radical underconsumptionist one of a classless society the immediate, consequence
could be the same: a heightened level of class struggle.
"Mermaids of Economic Phantasy"28
The prominence offmancial institutions and international financial issues in Australia'sdepression experience led
to increased interest in monetary policy amongst laborites. Reform of the financial system had been a
longstanding policy of the ALP,29 The depression prompted some to adopt Money Power theories which
attempted to explain capitalism in general in terms of the Financial Oligarchy's conspiracies. Othersdid not go
quite as far, but came to placegreaterstress on the importance of financial reform, as a means for remedying the
defects of capitalism, than theyhad previously. In the labourmovement, monetary underconsumptionism wasthe
justification of such reforms. Like the real underconsumptionist approach to economic policy, monetary
underconsumptionism held that the main defect in capitalism was the inadequacy of purchasing power. The
solutions it offered were monetary policies implemented by means of increased government control over the
private. trading banks, or their nationalisation, and greater powers for the Commonwealth bank, rather than the
income redistribution of real underconsumptionism. There was, however, no clear dividing line between
advocates of real and monetary underconsumptionist solutions. Many laborites regarded them as complimentary,
proposing, for example, that Commonwealth Bank credit be used to finance public works as a way of
redistributing income. Adherents of Money Power ideology, moreover, often incorporated underconsumptionist
arguments into their theories to explain the mechanisms used by the financial conspiracy to effect the depression.
By the same token moderate laborites sometimes had recourse to Money Power rhetoric when they wanted to
emphasise a point in theirprogramof fmancial reform.
The most sophisticated monetary underconsumptionist proposal to come out of the labour movement during the
depression was the "Theodore Plan", proffered by Treasurer E. Theodore in 1931 as an alternative to orthodox
deflationary policies. He advocated an expansionist monetary policy: the reduction of interest rates and budget
deficits financed through central bank credit.30 Historical research into the Labor Party's economic policies has
tended to centre on the periods when Labor was in office. One could gain the impression from much of the
literature(with the exception of Love's Labourand the Money Power) that theTheodore Plan was a prescientand
distant anticipation of the Keynesian policiesof the Curtin and ChifleyGovernments.st The Theodore Plan was
not, however, a speck of Keynesian gold amidst the dross of Labor economics. Even before the General Theory
started having an influence on laborite thought(during the late 1930s rather than the War) there were significant
similarities betweenthe policies advocated by Keynes and thosefavoured by the ALP.
One of the obstacles to recognition of the continuity of thoughtbetween theTheodore Plan and the Keynesianism
of the CurtinGovernment wasmoderate laborites' resort to MoneyPowerrhetoric, for a period after the fall of the
Scullin Government, and their apparent preoccupation with the mechanics of the banking system. The
Government's collapse seemed to confirm suspicions about conspiracies. Even a number of marxists of the
SecondInternational varietyin the ALPsuccumbed. Thus"Scrutator" proclaimed in 1934that
"The responsibility for thepresenteconomic crisis can be laid on 'Big Money'."32
Scullin,defmitely a moderate, madesimilarstatements:
"Unlessthe Government asserts its authority in regard to finance, we shall continueto be governed
by the oligarchies of finance insteadof the people's representatives."33
These statements and those of MoneyPower theorists drewattention to a real weakness in Australian capitalism --
importantlevers of economic management still lay beyond the close control of the state, which could act in the
interestsof capital as a whole, because they werein the hands of the privatebanks. Interestrate, foreign reserves
and credit policies which the banks regarded as in their own best interests may not have served the national
interestof maximising capital accumulation in Australia. The division of labour undercapitalismhad constituted
27. tabor Council ofNSW Th, BasicWag, Sydney 19341 plO.
28. This phrase was used by Scrutator in LaborCall211313S pi todescribe monetary solutions to the problems ofcapitalism See footnote 13 in
the "Reaf Underconsumptionism" section ofthis chapter for the context,
29. See Love Labour and theMoney Powerop. cit, pp20-SS for pre-World War! attitudes in the Labor Party.
30. C. B. Schedvin Australia and theGreatDepression Sydney University Press, Sydney 1970 pp226-7.
31. B. Mcfarlane and D. C1ark's useful studies ofLabor policy during the depression focus on the question ofwho anticipated Keynes in
Australia. See for example B. McFarlane Professor Irvines Economics op. cit.; D. Clark "Was Lang Right?" in Radi and Spearritt JackLang
op. cit.; D. C1ark "Fools and Madmen" inJ.Mackinolty TheWasted Years AlIen and Unwin, Sydney 1981. In considering the Keynesianism of
the Curtin Government, some ofthe contributors tothe August 1981 Seminar on Postwar ReconstnJction atthe Australian National University
emphasise the influence ofKeynesian bureaucrats on the Curtin Government, to the virtual exclusion ofthe ALP's economic policies ofthe
1930s, e.g.,A. Mamchak 'Central Economic Planning and Post-WarReconstruction'; S. Cornish 'Full Employment inAustralia: the Genesis
of a White Paper'; and S. Alomes 'The 19308 Background to Post-War Reconstroetion', who draws attention to the acceptance of
Keynesianism by the new middle class, but not by sections ofthe labour movement,
32.War Call 10/4134 pi. Thetrauma ofthe depression also seems tohave converted D. Cameron, the last Secretary ofthe Victorian Socialist
Party and influential memberofthe Victorian ALP, toMoney Power ideas.
33. J. Scullin CPD 14S, 1934 p91, also see F. Forde LaborCall 13/9/34 piS. There was little difference between these statements and J.
Beasley's, Langite position, e.g, J.Beasley in D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes CrossCurrents in Australian Finance Angus and Robertson,
Sydney 1936 p329.
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the movement of money' capital as a distinct circuit of capital, whose disruption could upset the process of
accumulation through-out the economy. State intervention could preventsomeof the worst effects of economic
crisesdue to the internal structure of the financial system, for example, exacerbation of the depression by banks'
restrictive credit policies. Although the crisis of the early 1930s did see an expansion in the role of the
Commonwealth Bank, this was still limitedand the Bank remainedbeyond the ready control of governments. S.
McHugh'scomment in the Federal Parliament in 1939 was an exaggeration rather than a distortion of the
situation:
"The financial positionof this country today is that nine banking companies control the monetary
policiesof thenation."34
Withoutreform of the financial systemevents had demonstrated, the implementation of policies alongthe lines of
. the TheodorePlan and monetary underconsumptionist theorywouldnot be possible. Hence theemphasis by mod-
erate laborites,as well as advocates of MoneyPower theory, on the impo~ance of reforms of the financial system.
The Official andLang LaborParties sharedsome policiesfor reformof the financial system. These amounted to
changes to the Commonwealth 'Bankso that it would be subject to closerGovernment direction and more able to
controlfinancialdevelopments.st Cartoon 10 illustrates the relationship manylaborites saw between the financial
and productive systems. Such reforms had a different significance for the two currents, however. For Money
Power theorists theywere part of a programto smash theFinancial Oligarchy and thus free the economy from its
destructive and conspiratorial dictates. But anothermeasurewasvital to the success of any financial reform-- the
nationalisation of all banking. If the evils of capitalismwereembodied in the MoneyPower's conspiracy then the
radical measure of bank nationalisation, sometimes equated with socialism, were wholly justified.36 Moderate
laborites, while supporting bank nationalisation as a good thing in principle, usually eschewed it as a short-term
measure. They believedthat a morelimitedfinancial reform could correct the faults in the financial mechanisms
of capitalism. The reforms were means to the end of improved policies of economic management rather than
makeor breakmeasures:
"Whilst it is obvious to those who have studied the problem of monetary reform .- excepting
DouglasCredit andsuch like theorists .- that monetary reform of itself is not the remedy for all the
evils from which the nation is suffering, I am convinced that it would be the most important first
step."37
The differences between the Money Power and moderate laborite approaches to financial reform were apparent
when the Al.P'reviewed its policies, on the reunification of the Lang and Official Parties in 1936. The Plan of
Action embodied in the new financial policy amounted to a modification of the structure of the Commonwealth
Bank and an extension of its functions. The ex-Langites twice attempted to amend the policy along the lines of
"immediate" nationalisation of banking, both times unsuccessfully. F. M. J. Bakeralsosought to increase therole
of the proposed Credit Advisory Authority.38 The revised Federal Platform of the ALP .still included bank
nationalisation as a plank, like socialisation of the means of production distribution and exchange, to be
implemented at some indefinite point in the future.39 This compromise reflected the recoveryof the fortunes of
moderate laboritesas the economy pickedup again.
Following the formal resolution of the Party's differences over financial policy, the moderate view was clearly
dominantamongstlaborites. In 1937Labor Call explained that
"Nationalcontrolof banking is the first longrange remedyfor depression and unemployment."40
The implication was clearly that further remedies would follow. Similarly Curtin saw monetary reform as
preliminary to the policies of generaleconomic management:
"Nationalcontrolof banking policyand the instruments of exchange are the necessary first steps to
all effective planning for: Industrial expansion, fully employed manpower, national defence,
preparedness againstdepression, reduction of the interestburden on publicutilities."41
Laborites cited a variety of international authorities and experiences .- the British Macmillan Commission's.
34. S.McHugh CPD 161, September 1939 1)410. Also seeI. Curtin LaborCalI2216139 p6and LaborCalleditorial 18/8134 p4.
35. See the Party Platforms throughout the 1930s and, for example, the 1934 Federal Executive Election Manifesto LaborCall3/5135.
36. For the argument that the Money Power had deliberately caused the depression see, for example, Railroad 10/4134 ppl-2; J.Beasley in
Copland and Janes CrossCurre1lJS in Australian Finance op, ciL p396; H. Lazzarini CPD 147, 1935 ppS02-5; J.Garden ibid pp830, 832-3;
LaborCall2414/41 pp4,8.
37. F.M J.BakerCPD 147,1935 p1249. J.Scu1lin, in Copland and Janes CrossCurrents inAustralian Finance op. clt, pp387, 389 made the
obverse case that "an obsolete banking system" accentuated rather than "caused" the depression also see LaborCall23/8134 ppl-4. J.Dedman
Labor Call 2816134 plO took a slightly different view, but one also atodds with Money Power conspiracies, that "afaulty monetary and
banking system isthe root cause ofthe depression." .
38. P. Weller (00:) Caucus Minutes, 1901-1949: Minutes of the Meetings ofthe Federal Parliamentary Labor Party Volume 3 Melbourne
University Press, Melbourne 1975 pp139-42 and Love LabOUT and the MoneyPowe.r op. cit. pl44-6. The Credit Advisory Authority was a
proposafwhich had its roots in Social Credit theory.39. For this point see P. Love 'Labor and the Money Power, 1890-1950' M.A. Thesis, La Trobe University 1980 pp210-3 and F. M. J.Baker
CPD 147, 1935 p1249. The socialisation plank did have its uses, to distinguish the Labor position from Douglasite orother monetary IIXes, see
e.g. Labor Call 2113135 pI, 1614136 pS; LaborDaily 1614136 1)4. For a use ofsocialism by a Labor moderate, Queensland Premier Forgan
Smith, to outflank radical Money Power theory see Love 'Labor and the Money Power' op, ciL p203. Unfortunately Love takes Smith's
statement atface value when itwas essentially acynical manoeuvre.
40.LaborCall28/1137 p3 also see 319136 p9: "Monetary reform isnot acure-all for the world's economic ills."
41. 1AborCall 21110137 p6. Also see J, Curtin ThePolicyof theLaborPartyop,ciL and LaborCall519/40 p7.
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Report, the New Deal, Swedish banking policies and the ILO -- to justify their proposals for financial reform.42
But the local Banking Commission Report of 1936provided a vital reference point for the next ten years. It is
worth noting that the majority report, with its advocacy of a stronger Commonwealth Bank, generally received
more attention than Chifley's minority report. In accord withLabor's policy, Chifley adhered to mostof the main
Report's recommendations, but argued for the "ultimate" nationalisation of banking. He justified nationalisation
on the basisof the national, i.e, capitalistinterest:
"My criticisms are directedat the inability of any system which includes privatelyowned banks as
an integralpart to function in the best interests of the community."43
The Report's initialreception wasmixed. Somelaborites regardedit as a justification for the existingorder,while
others thought it revealed some of the problems of the financial system and offered some sensible solutions to
them.44 But within a short periodit had become a touchstone for sound financial reforms and policy, Le.those of
the ALP. W. F. Ahem, whileusingradicalMoneyPowerrhetoric, maintained that
"TheCommission's reportcontains somevery drasticrecommendations for the bettercontrol of the
private banking system, andfor clipping of the clawsof theMoneyMasters."45
By 1939 it had become apparent that the UAP Government would not act on the Royal Commission's Report.
Ward interpreted this as evidence of a conspiracy. Forde latergloatedthat "Thelabourparty is the onlyparty with
a reform policy" for the financial system.46 In November 1940 Curtin moved an amendment to the budget to
promote, .amongst other goals, regulation of the trading banks "on the basis of the Royal Commission on
Banking..•"47 Although Menzies modified his budgetto secureLabor support, controls over the banks like those
in the Royal Commission Report were only promulgated in November 1941, after Labor took office. When the
war timebanking regulations were translated into law, in 1945, the Banking Commission's recommendations were
still the standardagainstwhichtheywereconstructed.48
For moderate laborites, reform of the fmancial system was essentially a means to the end of more effective
policies of economic management. So their monetary underconsumptionist ideas were most obvious when the
proposals for suchpolicies, rather than the preliminaries of fmancial reform, were discussed. ThusH. C. Barnard
told the Commonwealth Parliament in 1935 \
"My belief is that the presenteconomic troubleis the lack of purchasing power among the world's
consumers.•. The solution of the difficulty lies in the creation of credits for the general mass, and
not, as at present,for a privileged few."49
Controlover the financial systemcouldensurean equilibration of production andconsumption;
"The Labor Party believes in the utilisation of the wealth of Australia. .. by national control of
creditresources, and the establishment of an efficientmediumof exchange between production and
consumption. It believes that thecontrolof thecreditresources of the nationshouldbe vestedin the
Commonwealth Bank•.• Employment and the expansion of social services should be so organised
to ensure to the community the essential purchasing power whereby our primary and secondary
industries could be developed andoperated to the fullestcapacity."50
To ~upport theircase for monetary policies to fmance public works to put people back in work and thus increase
purchasing power, laborites cited ILOpublications, Roosevelt's policies and those of the Labour Government in
New Zealand.S!
An individuallaborite union official, journalistor politician might express real or monetary underconsumptionist
beliefs, or both.52 The previous section concluded that there was a strong case for regarding real
underconsumptionism as, in part, an expression of the pressure of the working class on the labour bureaucracy.
42 E.g. 1. Garden CPD 147, 1935 pp830-3; W. J.C. Riordan CPD 158, November 1938 p1999; AU' Debaters BulletinJuly 1936 p4.
43. Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Monetary and Banking Systemsat Present in Operation in Australia
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1937 p263-4.
44. Love 'Labor and the Money Power' op. cit. pp217-9.
45.Australian Worker4/8137. Curtin's 1937 election policy speech held that the
"Report and recommendations are areinforcement ofthe Labor Party's views on this important subject. .. The Labor Party is
detennined that no groups ofbankers, no coterie ofprivate interests and certainly no instrumentality set up originally by the
people for the people, shall stand in the way of bringing full industrial opportunity to every member of Australia's
unemployed."
Also see LaborCall 14/10137 p9, 19/10139 p13, 29/8140 pl, 519/40 p7, 17n141 p3; E. J. Holloway CPD 158, November 1939 p432; G. W.
Martens CPD 161, September 1939 p512; W. P. Conelan ibid. p73, W. J.C. Riordan ibid. p521; T. Sheehan CPD 165, December 1940 p702.
46. E. Ward CPD 161 September 1939 p667, F. Forde CPD 165, December 1940 pp367-8, also Forde CPD 168, October 1941 p636. For a
Money Power theorists response tothe Govemment's proposed new banking laws In 1939 see S. F. AlIen "Hands Off the Commonwealth
Blink" AU' Debaters BulletinMay 1939 ppl, 3. _
47. J.Curtin CPD 165, November 1940 p268. Also see Curtin CPD 165, December 1940 1'483.
48. S.J.Butlin and C. B. Schedvin WarEconomy, 1942-1945 Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1977 pp618-20.
49. H. C. Barnard CPD 147, 1935 p1142. -
50. Secretary ofthe Metropolitan District Council ofthe Western Australian ALP LaborCall 21/8141 p8. Also see J. Scullin's 3KZ broadcast
in Labor Call 5/9135 p13. See also Labor Call 319136 p9, 1818138 1'4, 28/9139 p3, 16111/39 p3; Labor Daily 20/1134 pS, 27/1/34 p12,
Australian Worker 13/1137 pS; E. J.Holloway CPD145, 1934 pS34; N. Makin ibid. 669-70; W. J.C. Riordan CPD 158, 1938 p1999.
51. For comments on the Il.o see Labor Call 1413135 p4; J. Curtin election policy speech LaborCall 2319137 pp8-9; Advocate15/6137 p3,
15n137 pp2-3; A. S. Drakeford CPD 147, 1935 pp10116-7; for Comments on Roosevelt see Labor Call 1111134 p8, 25/1134 pl: and for
comments on the New Zealand Labour Government LaborCall7/1137 pl, 1/6139 p12; Australian Worker 11/8137 p7.
52. For a combination of real and monetary measures see report ofJ. Beasley's policy speech for the 1934 federal elections Labor Daily
17/8134 pp1, 10, ALPFederal Executive Manifesto "Labor's Policy for the Crisis" LaborCall3/5134 pIS. .
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Monetary underconsumptionism, on the otherhand, expressed theirrelationship withcapital, whose needformore
effective state management of the economy (especially of the financial system), labour bureaucrats recognised.
Theyjustified theneedfor state intervention to secure capitalist growth to theirconstituencies withthecontention
that a healthy economy wouldbe capable of delivering the goods to the working class, in the form of increased
purchasing power. Alternatively the labour movement was told that state control or ownership of banking was
progressive or socialist per se.53 Monetary underconsumptionist· measures could appeal to workers and also to
classes fearful of a dramatic redistribution of income, like the pettybourgeoisies. Theycouldnot be implemented
through direct working class action but only by means of legislation. So monetary underconsumptionism had a
specific attraction for Labor politicians. While the spiritual home of the real approach, therefore, was the union
office, that of the monetary view was the Labor benches in Parliament. During the 1940s it was the politicians,
aided by the Labor Party machines, who converted the mass of laborites to Keynesian economics. But even
during the late 1930s, somelaborites cameto recognise thevalue of the"new" economics.
From "Elective Affinity" to Embrace
Arguments within the labour movement, as elsewhere, were often justified by drawing on the testimony of
eminent authorities. Union advocates, labour publicists and ALP politicians cited the statements of respected
figures, whose faith in theestablished ordercouldnot be doubted. This did not necessarily mean that the author-
ity's entire position was accepted or even understood. During the early 1930s Keynes's opposition to cuts in
money wages (though he favoured cuts in real wages) and supportfor public works made him a suitable authority
for quotation.54 .
Policies of which Keynes certainly approved, creditexpansion and public works, had widespread currency in the
labourmovement during the 1930s. For thisreasonthe relative paucity of references to Keynes was symptomatic.
It indicated that, until 1937, laborites werenot especially concerned with developments in academic economics
andthe systematic justifications for "new" economic policies Keynes andothers wereelaborating well before the
publication of the General Theory. Laborites justified their positions with a loose ensemble of ideologies,
including protectionism, real and monetary underconsumptionism, ratherthan the exposition of rigorous theory.
In each case they identified the working class's with the national interest. A particular obstacle in the way of
laborites accepting the analyses of academic economists, even thosethey citedin support of theirown arguments,
wasthe suspicion of the profession engendered by its behaviour during the depression, and the participation of
some of its foremost representatives in the preparation of the Premiers' Plan.55 Given laborite agnosticism
towards academic economic theory until the late 1930s, the Il.O, Roosevelt and the New Zealand Labour
Government weremoresignificant authorities in thelabourmovement than Keynes.
The appearance of the General Theory was an important development in the relationship between laborites and
academic economists, although its immediate impact was not dramatic. The book provided a systematic
justification for a series laborite policies, which went beyond previous offerings from Keynes and the new eco-
nomics. Its publication was also an important step in the popularisation and acceptance of Keynes's theories in
respectable circles. .References to Keynes couldsoon be expected to elicit a favourable response when dealing
with the Conciliation and Arbitration Court or trying to convince swinging voters of the value of Labor's eco- .
nomicprogram. Cain gives E. R. Walker the laurels for being Australia's first academic Keynesian and for his
interpretation of thenewfaith to the academic community andtheRoyalCommission on Banking. Walker's trade
union counter-part was OscarSchreiber. Shortly afterhis1935justification of higher wages in Hobsonian terms,
Schreiber used the arguments of the General Theory, published only a few months before, to explained how
unempoyment couldbe fought:
"Mr.Keynes... says that it is essential to devise an economic order that will secureequilibrium on
the basis of 'full employment', that the failure to do so is an inherent defectof thepresenteconomic
systemand can only be remedied by the State taking control of the supply of money to secure its
adequacy, controlling the rate of interest andtaking over or controlling the amount and direction of
investment.
. "Theeffects of these 'maladjustments in theeconomic system undoubtedly are--
"(a) Inadequate standards of livelihood;
"(b)Maldistribution of thenational income;
"(c)Underconsumption; and
53. E.g. LaborCall editorial 1319/34 pS, 30/5135 p8, 1719135 p8, 217/36 1'3. By way of contrast F. EngelsSocialism, Utopian and Scientific
Foreign Languages Press,Peking 1975pp90-1 explained that although "The state is constrained to take over the direction of production" this
couldin noway be equated withsocialism".
54.For references to Keynes by Langites see Clark"FoolsandMadmen" op.cit, pp180, 189,Clark''Was Lang Right?' op. clt, p157, J. Lang
Why I Fight LaborDaily,Sydney1934pp153 (reference to "J. M. Keynes, British banker"), 290-3 (reference to "JamesMaynard Keynes" as
the authorof the Treatise on Money); /Abor Daily 27/1/34 p12 mentions Keynes's position that loanexpenditure to employ the unemployed
wouldpay for itselfby saving reliefmoney andincreasing tax returns. AlsoseeConciliation andArbitration CourtRegistry 1933 Applications
for the Restoration of 10%Reduction of Wages. Transcript of Proceedings pp218, 472 for references to Keynes by the ACfU advocates; Labor
Call 619/34 p13.
55. Thatthis suspicion affected some laborites' attitU.des to Keynes was obvious in D. Wade's comment, Amalgamated Engineering Union
JournalJune 1935pp9-10:
"Thecapitalists' economists in all countries havegotthemselves tied intoknots. Theyare tryingto savecapitalism whichhas
becomeobsolete and is so badlywornit is falling to pieces all roundthem. Oneof themMaynard Keynes, has said 'Menwill
notalwaysdiequietly' evidently he believes theyaredyingquietly now."
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"(d)Economic insecurity of thecommunity."56
Schreiber's immediate program for fullemployment included public works and "national undertakings", fInanced
by low or no interest loans, higher wages, shorter hours, later school leaving and earlier retirement ages. His
position was not, therefore, dramatically different from that in his Sun articles and pamphlet of 1935. But there
were some changes. In previous laborite analyses interest rates were generally understood in the context of
income distribution (thebondholder taking an unjustifiable cut of the nation's wealth), Schreiber now recognised
themas an important variable in economic management. He noted that the Commonwealth Bank was increasing
interest rates to slow down the recovery. In his 1936exposition Schreiber alsoreplaced theHobsonian analysis of
overinvestment with a call for greaterstate direction of investment. This demand, as opposed to those for public
works and state enterprises, seems to have been a Keynes-inspired innovation, taken up by moderate laborites
during the late 19308 and linked with the traditional demand for greater state planning. Schreiber's conclusion
wasverymuch in accord withhis earlierarticles:
"There must be established an improved and progressively rising standard of living to ensure
.adequate and well-spread purchasing power -- the absence of which is a contributory and deep-
rootedcauseof economic depression and unemployment."
Although more slowly than Schreiber, other laborites came to recognise earlier monetary and real
underconsumptionist themes and additional arguments with which to justify their favourite economic policies, in
Keynesian theory.57 Early in1937, under the delightful headline "Carefully Concocted Conference Campaign:
Figures Juggledto BlindAustralia withGladness", Keynes wasinvoked to support thecontention that
"National control of banking is thefIrstlongrangeremedy for depression and unemployment."58
After all, Keynes's "views command respect and fear", who better to testify for ALP policy. This reference,
however, was essentially in the vein of those which preceded the General Theory and did not betray a secure
understanding of its argument.
By itself the Australian impactof the General Theory was limited. But two local developments soon alerted
laborites to the value of Keynesianism and allayed their suspicion of professional economists. The Banking
Commission Report andReddaway's evidence in the 1937 BasicWagehearings both signalled in practical terms,
that there had been a revolution in academic economics. They helped cement what R. Watts has called the
"elective affinity" between theALPandtheKeynesian planners of the late 1930s.59
Reddaway recommended an increase in the levelof theBasic Wage, on thebasis of the progress of the economic
recovery and exportprice rises. Using Keynesian logic,he maintained that the economy was moving towards an
unhealthy boom (despite eight per cent. unemployment). A larger rather than a smaller increase in wages was
calledfor in order to dampen employers' expectations of profits andhence to restrictinvestment and the boom.6O
Reddaway's presentation, centering on proflt expectations and their consequences in overinvestment had some
resemblance to theHobsonian concept of overinvestment. Professors Copland andGiblin, twoof thearchitects of
the Premiers' Plan, endorsed Reddaway's analysis. His testimony was greeted with elation by largesections of
the labourmovement. Therewere detailed accounts of it in several labour newspapers.e! TheMelbourne Trades
Hall Council'sreporton theBasicWagecasenotedthat
56. O. Schi'eiber "Remedies for Unemployment: Labor's View" Lahor Call 9/4136 p14. This article was probably a reprintfrom a Sydney
newspaper, as othersby Schreiber published in LaborCall were, so it would have been writtenvery shortly after the releaseof the General
Theory.. .
57. For a general,.favourable commenton the "neweconomists" see R. Butler"MoneyFlowsfor War - Why Not for Peace?" Amalgamated
Engineering UnionJournalJanuary 1939pIS. T. RowseAustralian Liberalism and NationalCharacter KibbleBooks,Malmsbury 1975p2S
suggests,~tspeech made by John Curtin in 1936 captures the transition to a Keynesian rationale [for Labor plans for social
reconstruction]."
Butthis is not the case. The ALPhad been committed to welfarepoliciesfor manyyearsand Curtin's casefor them is basedon considerations
of equity ratherthan of economic management to maximise growth. See the speech"TheCensusand the SocialServiceState"in G. V. Portus
(00.) What the Census Reveals Preece and Sons, Adelaide 1936 and Australian Worker Snl36 pS, 15n136 pS. Curtin accepted that
unemployment was likely to "havea steadilyrising normalvolume". He saw social services as a meansof protecting the existingorder,by
minimising the extent to which the unemployed "constitute a menace to the existingorder". A commenton the speech, in Portus,made
Curtin's perspective clear:
"Mr. SJ'icer(Vie)Mr. Curtin's paperwas somewhat disappointing. It seemedto him [Spicer] to laytoo muchstressupon the
necessity of relieving unemployment whenone mighthave hopedfor somecontribution with regardto the problem: Howto
get rid ofunemploymenL"
In Britain the General Theory received an occasionally rapturous welcome amongst sections of the labour movement and its academic
supporters. ForexampleA. L. Rowse Mr.Keynes and the LabourMovement Macmillan, London1936p12maintained that .
"Whatconstitutes the politicalimportance of thebook,is thatat everypoint,withouta singleexception, it is in full agreement
with Labour policy in this country, and what is even more significant, expresses in proper economicform what has been
implicit in the Labour Movement's attitude all along. Here at last is an economist of the first rank, indeed one of the the
foremost economistin the world,undeiwriting the wholeLabourposition in thesepost-waryearsand provingus to havebeen
. substantially right,"
G. D. H. Cole, citedibid., calledthe General Theory"the mostimportanteconomicwritingsinceMarx's capital". Colealso thoughtthat "most
of the non-Marxist socialisteconomists swallowed Keyneswhole,and becamehis fervent disciples", cited ID D. WinchEconomics and Policy
WalkerandCompany, New York 19691'349.
SS.LaborCall28/1137 p3,originalemphasis. .
59. R. Watts"Revising the Revisionists: the A.L.P. andLiberalism, 1941-1945" ThesisEleven7, 19S3 p72.
60. Conciliation and Arbitration CourtRegistry1937Transcript op,ciLppS71-3, Reddaway "Australian WagePolicy,1929-37" op, cit. p126.
61. E.g. LaborCall20/5137 ppl, S,9, Advocate 31/5137 plO.
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"Secretary[of the ACfU] Crofts said he desired to pay tribute to the capablemanner in which Mr.
Reddaway had given evidence before the Court at its invitation, to show that an increase in wages
would be desirable."62
M. M. Nolan speltout the implications of Reddaway's Courtappearance:
"Evidencetenderedto the Arbitration Court by Mr. A. [sic] B. Reddaway of Melbourne University,
denotes a profound change in orthodox economic outlook since the professors so confidently
advocatedan all roundwagereductionin 1931."
If Giblin and Coplandhad been in the witnessbox
"It would have been difficult for them to reconcile their present views with those which wrought
such havocat the time of the notorioustenper cent cut in real wages."63
Nolan employedKeynes's own designation of his orthodoxpredecessors as "classical", rather than "neo-elassical"
economists. There was a note of unease in his assessment of Reddaway's evidence on the importance of
Australia's export trade and his stress on the national income. In accord with laborite protectionism, Nolan
regarded tariffs as a meansof minimising Australia's dependence on exports, by diversifying localproduction and
expanding the domestic market.
Unease over Reddaway's, and Keynes's, conception of national income was fully justified. Contrary to Nolan's
interpretation, Reddaway did not favour higher wages per se. His testimony explicitly recognised that a
deterioration in the international situationmight justify a wagecut64 Moreover, in a later articlewhichexplained
the rationale behindhis evidenceto the Court,Reddawayconcluded
"That the policy adopted by the Federal Court [of wage cuts during the early 1930s] was
substantially correct andmade a big contribution to recovery."
And that industry's capacityto pay was a sounderprinciplefor wagefixation than the needsof the workers.65
Gordon Crane, a Communist, produced an insightful critique of the academic economists' .apparent change of
heart and drew attention to theprofession's unreliability as an ally:
. "... The "brilliant" young economist", Mr. Reddaway, has been so effectively boosted (in trade
union circles among others), as a champion of wage-restoration, that he can readily be used for the
contrarypurposewheneverneeded.
"In this regard it is important to note that there is nothing incompatible in Mr. Reddawayappearing
as a supporterof wageincreases in 1937and wagereductionin 1938."66
Crane's was a lone voice. Even the Communist Party did not take up the critique of the new economics for
severalyears.
Shortly after the 1937Basic Wage case, the Banking Commission Report was published. It providedKeynesian
justifications for even more laboritepolicies. Curtin's 1937 election policy speech cited the Report, using it to
supportestablishedLaborpoliciesand drawing on it for some innovations. He noted that
"It observed that during the depression the proper policy for the Commonwealth Bank was one of
expansion, and has stated that if central bank control was to be successful in promoting recovery
Government expenditure had to be the chief factor."67
The policy tools he advocated for dealingwith unemployment and increasing economic preparedness came out of
the Keynesian kit: credit and interest rate control, and national direction of investment to promote balanced
economicdevelopment.
During late 1937H. W. Herbert explainedthe causesof andLabor's curesfor economicfluctuations in essentially
Keynesian terms, to readers of Labor Call. His acceptance that the key economic variable was the "unstable
confidence of investors", of unbalanced budgets and that inflation had to be avoided -- all indications of
Keynesianinfluence.68 Herbert quoted the Banking Commission Report on the need to expand credit during a
depression. A Labor Government wouldcontrolcredit so
"That there is productive work on good rates of pay assured for everyone, and yet credit is not
increasedto such an extentas to cause a rise in prices."69. .
Although this kind of proposal had been made by Theodore in 1931, Herbert believed, presumably under the
influenceof Keynesian self-advertisement, that
621Abor call1hm p8.
63.LaborCall '1:1/5137 p3.
64. Conciliation and Arbitration Court Registry1937Transcript op, cit. pS75.
65. Reddaway"Australian Wages Policy, 1929-37" op. cit. p126, 129.
66. Workers' Information Febroaty 1938 p3.
67.LaborCall2319137 pp8-9. After the elections COmJ7l()n Cause 30/1(1137 reported
"Mr. Curtin speaking atKalgoorlie referring towhat Mr. J. M Keynes, the noted economist, had tosay, made asuggestion to
. Mr.Lyons that, regardless ofpolitics, he had aduty toprepare Australia to meet the next depression."
Curtin explained his approach toeconomic management again inJ. Curtin TM Policyof th« LaborPartyop, cit. p40. Also see Labor Call
29/8140 ppl,10 and F.Forde CPD 165, December 1940 p364.
68.Labor Call30/9137 p8, the articles appeared until 11111/37.
69. LaborCal1 14/10137 p9. .
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"The methods of controlling depressions have been fairly well worked out during the last few
years."70
By 1938 some laborites recognised that ALPpolicies, justifiedby Keynesian economics, resembled thoseof more
conservative forces in Australian society. Thus Labor Call drew attention to a Bank of NSW circular which
advocated credit expansion insteadof increased taxation to fmance Lt,OOO,OOO of deficitexpenditure.It F. M. J.
Bakerrecognised thatNSW Premier Stevens wasadvocating creditpolicies such as thoseof the ALP. He referred
to both the Il.O and E. R. Walker, "a well-known leading orthodox economist", to justify the expansion of credit
to fmance public works and quoted from Walker to the effect that Keynes grasped "the possibility of varying
investment independently of voluntary saving".72 In 1940 a laborite expressed the convergence of the new
economic orthodoxy withLabor's policies in his comments on the Theodore Plan:
"Since the time E. G. Theodore's plan was rejected at the behest of the trading banks and little
Australians who had placed profits before country, the meritof the Theodore credit proposals has
beenrecognised, butpolitical bigotry and hatredare still being shown againstthe reformer .- E. G.
Theodore."73
During the 1940budgetdebateone of the ALP's primary concerns wasthe dangerof inflation. OldMoneyPower
theorists like Lazzarini joined moderates. such as Curtin, Scullin and Dedman in expressing fear that the
Government's methods of fmancing the War would lead to inflationary credit expansion by the banks. Curtin
calledfor the implementation of the RoyalCommission's proposals for bankregulation so that inflation could be
prevented.H The issue of inflation brought together older laborite preoccupations with monetary and banking
policy, Keynesian ideas to bolster them, and the over-riding rationale of the national interest Under the Curtin
and Chifley Governments, the Keynesian analysis of inflation provided theideological justification for the restric-
tionof working class livingstandards.
The circumstances of the interwar period had produced in Keynesianism an ideology which sanctioned the
elaboration of more comprehensive economic management of interest and foreign exchange rates, credit policy
and fiscal policyby the state in the causeof capital accumulation. As Skidelsky points out, orthodox economists
did not see the solution to depression in economic terms -- whattheyrequired was thereestablishment by political
means of the conditions, suchas the reduction of union power, social services and wages, under which economic
laws wouldguarantee growth. Keynes turned the problems of the depression into technical, economic questions.
Moreover,
"The Keynesian systemavoided having to choose between Capital and Labour. Keeping demand
buoyant would underwrite both profits and employment, thus easing the conflict over the
distribution of wealth."75
These characteristics endeared the new economics to laborites, who were also concerned to reconcile capitaland
labour, had no desire to see the short-term demise of capitalism and who welcomed the sanctification of many
cherished policies by economic "science": not only did Keynesian economists support reform of the banking
system, but Keynes himselfhad been critical of free-trade so the new faith was compatible with protectionism.76
It stressed monetary factors, but admitted that income distribution, an important concern to manylaborites, wasan
important economic variable. Moderate laborites found that the flexibility of Keynesianism facilitated the
transition to thenew theory, withoutrequiring substantial shifts in the policies they advocated. Thisflexibility and
the theory's acceptability to the capitalist class offered an important advantage for 'Labor leaders over earlier
economic theories in the labour movement For example, during the depression the ineffectiveness of Labor
Governments and theircomplicity in anti-working classpolicies couldnot bejustifiedin terms of the old theories.
Lyons and his followers reactedby going over to the conservative parties and orthodox economics. Under the
impetus of the political mobilisation of the working class Lang and others shifted to Money Power theory.
Moderates bad no real recourse besides simple embarrassment antia belated shift to MoneyPowerrhetoric.I? The
adoption of Keynesian theoryby moderate laborites meantthat theycouldimplement anti-working classeconomic
measures -- especially wagerestraint -- without suffering a crisis of ideology. Many of the left-right differences
insidethe ALPand the labourmovement couldbe foughtout within the framework of thenew economics. Unlike
the previous economic orthodoxy, its Keynesian successor was able to provide an ideology not only for the
capitalist class, but also for those seeking to mediate between capital and labour by way of state intervention.
70. LaborCall 11111137 p7. H. W. Herbert LaborCall30/9137 p8, 11111/37 p7also advocated measures suchas high transfertaxeson shares
and property, to discourage speculation (a Keynesian concern); increased taxation of higher incomes, for the same reason and to payoff
government debts incurred during depressions; and public works financed by the Commonwealth Bank. He extended the Keynesian
enthusiasm for the euthenasia of thebondholder to thehopethat private investors in general couldbe despatched.
71. LaborCall2219/38 p7.
72. F. M J. BakerCPD 158,November 1938pp2022, 2023.Seeibid.p2026andW. P. Conelan CPD161,September 1939p731 for references
to the policies advocated in the Banking Commission Report.
73.LoborCall llnl40 p7.
74.J. Curtin CPD 165,November 1940p268, alsoseeH. Lazzarini ibid.p294andM. Blackbum ibid,p300. H. V. Evattibid.p283brought an
articleby E. R. Walkerto bearon thequestion, whileJ. Dedman quotedKeynes'saphorism that"Practical men•.. are usuallyslavesto some
defuncteconomist" Dedman probably lifted the quotation from T. W. Swan"Australia's War Financial and Banking Policy" Economic
RecordJune1940,alsoreferred to by EvattCPD165,November 1940p285.
75. R. Skidelsky "Keynes and theReconstruction of Liberalism" Encounter April 1979pp29-31.
76. SeeKeynes General Theory pp333-4 fora sympathetic accountof mercantilism.
77. It is in thissensethatL. Lewis'sstatement, takenupby Watts"Revising theRevisionists" op,cit, p72is significant:
"Thedepression confirmed that the labourmovement had notbeen(intellectuaIly) equipped to dealwiththedepression."
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Only with the end of the boom and the need for theories that justifiedharshereconomic policies was Keynesian
economics superseded.
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CHAPTERFIVE
AUSTRALIAN NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA'S INTERESTS
During the 1920s the CPA had recognised that the idea of the "national interest" was class biased because the
nation and its institutionalexpression in the state were constituted in the interests of the capitalist class. Support
for the national interest therefore meant the subordination of all classes to the class holding state power) After
1934, the subordination of the Party to the interestsof the Stalinised Comintern entailed a rejectionof this insight.
The new "Popular Front line liberated the CPA from any over-riding, immediate concern with working class
action to initiate socialism. The Party's role was to advertisethe virtuesof Russia's foreignpolicyand to promote
Australian policies in accord with them, by influencing the ALP and securing its return to office on a suitable
platform. Two lines of argument were used to justify this objective. First that RUssia was socialist, a land of
milk, honey, happy workers andpeasants, and should thereforebe supported. The CPA and its front organisations
put this case, while the Friends of the Soviet Union was specifically established for the purpose. Secondly the
CPA argued that it was in Australia's national interests to ally with Russia.t E. W. Campbell told the Central
Committeein August 1938,
"Communists may understand their tasks and duties in relation to the Soviet Union, but I think we
should make much more rapid progress if we set out to show that the policy of the SovietUnionnot
only protects the Socialist fatherland, but also is the best guarantee of keeping Australia out of
war."3
The Party's acceptance of the concept of the national interest, as applied to Russia and Australia eventually led
Communists to justify collaboration between the working class and "progressive" sections of the capitalistclass.
The enemy was limited to "the Lyons administration and the most reactionary sectionsof the rulingclass".4
Where the ALP's nationalism permeated its economic theory, the CPA's affectionfor the Australian motherland
during the PopularFront did not have similareffect on its economicideas. The CPA's Australiannationalism was
counterbalanced by an even greater commitment to Russia's national interests. This inhibitedthe expression of an
unequivocal Australian nationalism. An interplay between loyalties to Russia and Australia ran through the
various areas of Communisteconomicanalysis discussedin this chapter. On questionsof Australia's place in the
world, discussed immediatelybelow, the CPA's pursuit of the national interest was temperedby the hope that it
could influence Britishforeign policy from withinthe Empire. Participants in the PopularFront milieu,whowere
not members of the CPA, might not be so constrained in their expressionof the logic of Australian nationalism.
The Party's anti-monopolism and studies of Australia's "rich families" were creationsof the Popular Front period
pervadedwith nationalismand designed to have a wide appeal across classes. But even in this case Communists
did not go to the same nationalistextremes as Money Power theorists, whoseapproachwas in manyways similar.
The process worked in reverse too. The CPA's theory of economiccrisis, radical underconsumptionism, was in
many ways an expression of loyalty to socialist revolution and the Soviet Union. The requirements of effective
and practical Popular Front politics, however, led to a growing accommodation with reformism in the Party's
underconsumptionist theory. In many of its activities the CPA was not only concernedwith Australian andSoviet
national interests, but also with those of theAustralian working class, sectionsof which constitutedits socialbase
-- the foundationof its influence in Australian society. Concern for the interests of the Australiaworking class
wereoften expressedin anti-monopolist terms and affected the Party's attitudes to industrialstruggle. Concern to
preserve its social base restricted the adoptionof a reformist underconsumptionism which focused primarily on
ameliorativeaction by the state, by Communists.
Between MQtherland and Fatherland
Communistcommitment to Australian nationalismduring the Popular Front period did not have a decisively anti-
. British flavour, even thoughBritain was the imperialistpower mostclosely involvedin Australia. Russianforeign
1.On the Marxisttheoryof the state seeV. I. LeninTII8 Slate andRevolution Foreign Languages Press,Peking1970. As lateas July 1935, the
monthof the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, L. Donald"The 'National Defence' Policy of the Labor Party" Communist Review p27
offereda Marxistcritiqueof a vital component of the conceptof the national interest- national defence - as "an openbetrayal of the class
interests of the workersand is in direct sup~rt of the class interestsof the capitalists", emphasis in the original. For an account of the CPA's
position on nationlll defence see D. Rose' The Movement Against War and Fascism, 1933-1939" Labour History 38 May 1980pp84-6 and
Oaudin TII8 Communist Movement op. cit, pp176-80 for international developments. .
2. See,for example, D. Morey"Mr.Ctirtin and the Defence of Australia" Communist Review May 1936pp31-2.
3. Workers Weekly 1118136 p4.
4. S. Mason (probably a pseudonym of J. B. Miles) "A Program of Peace for the Australian People" Communist Review January 1937
"Communists are by no meansindifferent to the fate of theircountry" andwillfightto preserve Australian democracy against"external reaction
even if the USSR was not involved in the conflict Central Committee Draft Resolutions to the 12th National Congress Unite for Peace.
Freedom and Democracy Communist Partyof Australia, Sydney 1938for the characterisation of the enemy of the progressive movement
Also see 1..L. Sharkey"The Eventsin theNew SouthWalesLaborPartyandthe Future" Communist Review July 1936p8. Mostof theCPA's
important pronouncements weremadeby a smallgroupof leading members on the Central Committee. Their nameswill recur frequently in
the following discussions. They included J. B. Miles, the PartySecretary until 1948j L.1.. Sharkey, Party President and then Secretary; R.
DixonAssistant Secretary then President; J. D.Blake; andE. W. Campbell.
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policy,and hence the the CPA's, wasconcernedto win diplomatic and military supportfrom Britain. Australia's
membership of theBritishEmpirewas to be usedrather thanopposed:
"We must insist that Australia exercise its rights in the forming of the foreign policy which means
too much to the future of the BritishEmpireandtherefore Australia."s
According to onecritic of the CPA, the Party even adopted a policyof defending the Empireagainstthe mistaken
policies of Britain's leaders.s Under the rubric of "anti-fascism", Russia's rulers and the CPA opposed those
countries, Germany andJapanin particular, whichconstituted the immediate threat to the Sovietfatherland. In the
Pacific the Australian Communists eventually identified Japan as the main threat to Australia's national interests
in terms that could beexpectedto elicit supportin a racistsociety:
"Todaythe 'yellow peril' is little mentioned. Japan has becomea profitable countryfor the rich to
have dealings with. At the very time when the threat to our national independence grows sharper
the rulingclasspursues a hushhushpolicy.
"We willnot tolerate this,"?
"Imperialism", in Britain's case, was a phenomenon associated with certain short-term policies rather than the
structure of British capitalism.8 It was in this sense that the Lyons Government was "a junior partnerof British
imperialism".9 During 1936, this new analysis of imperialism foundexpression in the CPA's attitude to national
defence. The Party had previously adopted a "revolutionary defeatist" position, summedup in the slogan "nota
man, not a penny for imperialist war". Now it was believed that national defence could be separated from
Australian and Britishimperialism:
"There is nothing wrong with defending Australia, but there is something wrong with defending
Theodore's investments in the islandsand withdefending Britishimperialism."10
This sort of sentiment was also expressed in the more strictlyeconomic area of trade policy. A major aspectof
Communist criticisms of Australia's tradelinks withBritainwas that Britainshouldabandon protectionism, which
was detrimental to Australia, andinsteadsell more to an increasingly beleaguered China.It The CPA's responses
to the trade diversion episodeillustrate the shift in the Party's approach to international events during the mid-
1930s particularly well.
The CPA did not adopt fully fledged PopularFront positions on foreign affairs and trade all at once. Just as the
Party was changing its position on national defence, the trade diversion episode forced a rapid adjustment of its
attitudeto tradequestions. The episodesaw theLyons Government attempting to juggle the keen edged interests
of capitalists concerned with the local market (largely manufacturing industry), empire markets (agricultural
producers and processors) and international markets (wheat and wool). The CPA was initiallypreoccupied with
only one of the bladesas theywhirledin the air -. manufacturing industry andespecially BHP. The front pageof
Workers Weekly was concerned with the protectionist implications of trade diversion and the consequent
strengthening of some manufacturing industries:
"It is not denied that, in some cases, the tariff may increase employment in this country; the
exclusion of iron and steel products would undoubtedly stimulate production, and hence increase
employment in thiscountrythough necessarily to a limiteddegree."
The working-class and small businesses would be compelled to foot the bill for the bounties on local automobile
production in particular. Thecruxof the argumentwasthe implications of the policiesfor the SovietUnion:
"Finally, there is one sinister aspect of the tariff which must not be overlooked. Australian
capitalism as an integral link in British world imperialism, is making its preparations for the next
war.
"The building up of its iron andsteel industrY is a very important Part of the preparations. We may
well suspect that it was with an eye to this factor. as well as the strengthening of the economic po-
sitionof Australian finance-capital. that the [newtariff) schedules werearranged."12
With its own eye on the prospectof a war with Russia, then, the CPA was straight-forwardly hostile to trade
diversion,13 After the first Workers Weekly article, theParty began to employ an additional argument againstthe
Government'spolicy: that Lyons's bellicosity in trade relations was accompanied by undemocratic practices at
home, as trade diversion was implemented without consulting Parliament. In the first instance this niggling
5. Central Committee Unite for Peace op. cit. pg. For the similar position ofthe Canadian Communist Party atthis time see N. Penner The
Canadian Left Prentice-Hall, Scarborough 1977 p99.
6. G. Ro~r "What IsHappening in the Communist Party" Militant 29/11/37 ppl-2. He quoted from a 1937 Communist election leaflet:
'British policy... endangers... the Empire... The Lyons Government supports this perilous policy... Stand by the League
ofNations."
ROJ'(lr had been CPASecretary inSouth Australia, before coming toSydney to establish the Party's "Forward Press". He left the CPAto join
the Trotskyist Communist League ofAustralia, W. and A. Scarfe "Introduction" toG. G. RoperLabor's Titan: theStory of Percy Brookfield,
1878·1921 Warmambool Institute Press, Warmambool 1983 pp2-3. Also see Workers Weekly 2214138 p3 for the contention that the British
business community, agriculturalists and manufacturers were opposed to the Government's attempts to increase agricultural imports from
outside the Empire, a reflex ofChamberlain's weakness towards the fascist countries.
7.E. W. Campbell "News Behind the News" Communist Review April 1937.
8. The inad~uacies ofthis approach and its difference from Lenin's isdiscussed in the next section.
9. S. Mason' Program ofPeace for the Australian People" Communist Review January 1937 p31.
10.Workers Weekly30/10136 pi, report ofspeeches by J.B. Miles.
11. G. Gowland "Australian Farm Program" Communist ReviewJune 1938 plO. Also see G. Gowland "Farmers Face Ruin" Communist Review
May 1938 pp49-S3.
12Workers Weekly29/5136 pi,emphasis inoriginal.
13. The Party also endorsed the outright opposition to trade diversion of the Brisbane Builders Labourers Union and the Queensland
Unemployed and Relief Workers' Movement, Workers Weekly9/6136 p4.
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objection was subordinate to the contention that masses would have to pay for trade diversion,14 It reflected a
characteristic feature of Communist assessments of international questions: Lyons's "anti-democratic" and
"profascist" domestic policies wereregarded as a simplereflexof his objectionable foreign policy.
Eventually the CPA presented the undemocratic implementation of trade diversion as the main basis for its
opposition to the policy. The previous position took Australia's national interests too little into account It had
constituted an attack on protectionism in general, which the ALP, then being requested to affiliate theCPA, would
find offensive. Further, the unqualified attacks on the empire in the Party's initial response wereout of stepnot
only with ALP policy, but also with the emerging thrust of the Comintern's Popular Front policies. Workers
Weekly soon adopted an equivocal attitude to tradediversion:
"Fromthe arbitrary imposition of discriminatory tariffs, which mayor may not have beenjustified,
the Federal Government, without consulting Parliament, has proceeded to meet reprisals by Japan
withcounter reprisals... We repeat withemphasis that, in the interests of the broadmasses whose
welfare is at stake, thewholecontroversial topicshouldbepublicly debated inParliament." 15
TheCPA usedRussia's interests to orient its policies in all its pronouncements on tradediversion. But its initial
attitude expressed an earlierstage in the transition between the ThirdPeriod and the fully fledged policies of the
PopularFront. The Party had expressed the ThirdPeriodfear of a general imperialist dismemberment of Russia
and the preparation of theAustralian economy forthis task. Hostility toprotectionism alsoreflected a balance be-
tween the interests of the Russian bureaucracy and the Australian working class in CPA policycharacteristic of
the Third Period. The later, equivocal position, was more accommodating towards Australia's national interests
andreforrnism. Where the 1935-36 seamen'sstrike helpedcrystalise outsomeof the implications of the Popular
Frontfor Communist industrial strategy, tradediversion assisted in the reorientation of CPA's attitudes to foreign
policy.
CPA nattional secretary, Miles, soon took the Party's economic nationalism a step further, when in September
1936 he conceded that the tariff policy of the ALP could be of some value for workers, with the proviso thatit
wouldfail without massaction to supportit.16 Commenting on the 1937 Marketing Referendum, he urged:
"Let the farmer join with the wage workers to oustLyons and restore wagecuts, raise the pension
level, andgive a decentlivingto theunemployed.
"Todo thisandkeepcheaplaborproducts outwouldbring an Australian levelfor the farmer and the
buyer."17
The politics of the PopularFront led to changes in Communist attitudes to Australia's own mini-imperialism as
wellas to defence and tradequestions. Whendealing with the question of New Guinea, a prominent Communist
publicistcouldevencombine racismwithan acceptance of Australia's activities in theSouthPacific:
"The White Man's Burden is a plea that hypocrisy has tarnished; but the principle behind it is
noble."18
National self-determination for New Guineawas left to the indefinite future,19 Only with the Hitler-Stalin Pact
was there a renewed expression of concern for the self-determination of the peopleof New Guinea, in the short-
terJn.20 The new internationalism, of collaboration between Nazis andRussian Communists, was also expressed
in the disappearance of maps of Australia from thecoverof Communist Review and theirreplacement by hammers
and sickles. Yet the Party still attempted to use Australian to promote Russian national interests in March 1940.
Tribuneendorsed the position of SirEarlePage,former leaderof theCountry Partythat:
nAustralia'sfirstdutywas to defend itself,andAustralian troops should not be sentwestof Suez."2l
The influence of Russian foreign policy during the 1930s limited the CPA's adoption of the kind of anti-
imperialist nationalism characteristic of sections of the ALP. Someof those attracted to, butwho did not join the
CPA,were not so constrained in theirexpression of Australian nationalism. They formed a bridge between the
left nationalism of the Stalinist CPA and that of an older anti-imperialist tradition of nationalism in the labour
movement. In doing so they anticipated the substantial congruence between thenationalisms of the CPA andleft-
laborite. Brian Fitzpatrick was prominent in the construction of this bridge, which,opened the way to the
14.Workers Weekly 5/6136 pl.
IS. Workers Weekly1417136 pl,
16. J. B.Miles"The Federal Conference of theAustralian LaborParty" Communist Review September 1936p20.
17.Workers Weekly 213137.
18.J. N. Rawling "HitlerOverNewGuinea" Australian Left NewsJanuary 1939. Rawling was a prominent Communist propagandist, leading
the Party's work in the anti-war movement. For other examples of the "pro~ssive" paternalism of CPA colonial policy see L. C. Rood
Australian Imperialism ModemPublishers, Sydney 19381 p2S and J. B. Miles' New Guinea then Australia" CommUllist Review January 1939
pSO for whom anti-imperialism was not an issue in New Guinea when Germany reasserted its claim over the north of the island: "Self
determination, the right to secede, is not a real issue in New Guinea", the real task was to win the New Guinea rnasses to an "alliance with
democratic Austra1ia against beinghandedoverto HiUerism."
19.Workers Weekly32J2138 p3: .
"Someday, thefutureSovietAustralia willapplythe greatLenin-Stalin national policy to NewGuinea.••
"Meantime, in the interests of Australian security, in the interests of the New Guinea natives themselves, defending them
againstexploitation and oppression by 'our' capitalists. we must not allow them to fall prey to the German and Japanese
fascistbarbarians."
20.Tribune 1818/40 p8:
. "The Australian Government which claims to be fighting for freedom of nations can make a beginning in New Guinea.
Doubtless amngementsof a strategic nature couldbe madewitha nativegovernment, thusdisposing of the Pacific angle."
21.Tribune 9/3/40 pI.
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Australian left nationalism of the post-war period. According to his biographer Fitzpatrick was "a convinced
Marxist and friendly with the CPA", although involved in "an even closer relationship with the reformist ALP"
duringthe 1930s.22 This may haveunder-stated theextent of Fitzpatrick's fellow-travelling with the CPA.23 He
was intimately involved in the milieu of the Popular Front, as a leading member of the Australian Council for
CivilLiberties (whichwas, however, not a Communist front) and wrotea seriesof articles for Communist Review
during 1938and 1939.24
Watsonargues that
"Fitzpatrick'snationalism was a major and distinctive aspectof his ideology. Loathing Australian
economic, cultural andpolitical subservience to Britain and, later, the United States, radicalism and
nationalism became twosidesof the samecoin. In thisFitzpatrick fits the Australian traditionof the
1890's -- a tradition handedon to him by some of its survivors in the 1920s and a little later by the
doyenof Australian literary nationalists, VancePalmer."25
Turner also stresses the nationalism evident in Fitzpatrick's economic studies and the continuity he provided
between the second and third generations of 20th century Australian left nationalism. His 1965 The Highest
Bidder, written withE. L. Wheelwright
"BroughtFitzpatrick backto a theme which had been central to his 1939-41 economic history: the
undueinfluence of overseas capitalon the Australian economy."26
As a historian of the Australian labour movement Fitzpatrick demonstrated the affinity between earlier anti-
imperialist nationalism, concerned with the defense of the national interest against monopolistic private interests,
and politics of the PopularFrontkind. His impressive economic studies gaveaddedweightto this contribution.
Like earlier radicals in the labour movement, Fitzpatrick drew attention to the role of Britishcapital in Australia
and maintained that this was still,duringthe 1930sand 1940s, a characteristic feature of theeconomy:
"Therewas still something essentially 'colonial' aboutthe Australian economy, still a very effective
measure of economic control by British capitalist interests by virtue of their investment in
Australia."
In the first, 1941 edition of The British Empire in Australia Fitzpatrick argued that the Australian state was still
subservient to Britishinterests:
"Thestate did much towards building the reservoir [of Australian labour and industry], it maintains
it, and it.allows no blockage of the streamthat flows to Imperial England."
27
This formulation was moderated in the revised 1949edition,perhaps in recognition of the role of the UnitedStates
duringandafter WorldWar IT:
"Throughout Australian history, these efforts on the part of the state have yielded a high average
dividendto capital, including muchEnglishcapital. The reservoirof Australian labourand industry
hasnever failed to providea streamtributary to the broadriverof Englishwealth."28
If Fitzpatrick's contributions to the study .of Australian capitalism had been confined to his studies of the
contemporary significance of British capital, or monopolies and his "populist" (equally accurately described as
"PopularFrontist")approach to classrelations, thenhis statureon the left wouldbe far smaller.29 His workhas an
enduring valuebecauseit provided the first thorough and scholarly-synthesis of Australia's economic development
.from a leftist perspective. He identified and documented, in particular, the crucial role of the state in the
development of Australian capitalism and the procapitalistorientation of Labor governments. So he noted
changes in the mode of collaboration between government and capital, characteristic Australian history, as a
distinctive aspect of post World War I development. The state retired from a number of directly productive
enterprises such as the Commonwealth Shipping Line, State brickworks, butchershops and quarries from the late
1920s. This was "an incident of a public policy usually subservient to private direction" still evident in state
provision of rail transport, tariffprotection and in statecontrolover wagesandconditions in industry.30
In his early academic workFitzpatrick expressed only mutedsympathy for state capitalistenterprise in socialist
22 D. Watson BrianFinpatrick: ARadicaJ LifeHale and lremonger, Sydney 1979 ppl36-7.
23. Certainly by 1944 and in the second edition ofhis Short History of theAustralian Labor MOYef7Ulnt Macmillan, South Melbourne 1.968
(rust published 1944) pp235, 249-51 Fitzpatrick was scathing inhis comments on the ALP and was very favourably disposed to theCPA. He
was expelled from the ALPin 1944, two years after joining.
24. "The Austra1ian Working Class" Communist Review January, February, March, November 1938 and January 1939. See Watson Brian
Fitzpatrick op,at. p136 for Fitzpatrick's authorship ofthese articles.
25.Wat80nBrianFilzpatrickop. cit. pxviii.
26. I.Turner "Introduction" to Fitzpatrick A Short History. . . op,cit. p30, also see p36.
27. B. Fitzpatrick TheBritish Empl1'e inAustralia,1834-1939 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1941 p504.
28. B. Fitzpatrick TheBritish Empire inAustralia, 1834-1939 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1949, second edition p348.
29. For critiques ofFitzpatrick's approach to class relations see T. Irving and B. BeIZins "History and the New Left: Beyond Radicalism" in R.
Gonion The Australian New Left Heinemann, Melbourne 1970 pp66-94 and S. Macintyre "Radical History and Bourgeois Hegemony"
Intervention 2, 1972P!'17-73.
30. Fitzpatrick TheBrulsh. Empire. . . second edition op. cit. p274.
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garbas an expression of the people's interests.s! But his 1945 'Public Enterprise DOESPay madea more explicit
casefor stateownership. The tensions in TheBritishEmpire in Australia between Fitzpatrick's analytical insights
and his nationalism was also apparent in his account of the changing importance of different sectors of the
Australian economy afterWodd War r. In his academic studies of economic history he recognised the declining
weight of primaryindustry, despite its absolute growth andstatesupport. On theotherhand, according to Watson,
"hedidnot alter the fundamental thesis", established as earlyas 1932 thatAustralia was reverting
"to a primary producing, low wage society in which particular fmancial institutions will have
indisputable paramountcy."32
Fitzpatrick also documented the decline of capital and trade links between Britain and Australia, despite the
Ottawa Agreement, and the rise of native enterprises even though he stressed continuing subordination to Britain
ratherthan the increased significance of theAustralian capitalist class,pursuing its interests through the state.
Where the earlyCPA, during the 1920s, mighthaveprovided an institutional context for a balanced assessment of
thesedevelopments. this was no longerthe case after the "bolshevisation" of the Party. The CPA of the Popular
Front was not only predisposed to Australian nationalism, but.even to the British Empire. Nor was there any
otherpossible institutional focus for the development of a comprehensive radical understanding of the Australian
economy.33
31. See,for example ibid.p273:. .
"SomeLabor governments misunderstood the accepted purpose of public undertakings, and enteredinto competition with
privateenterprise." . .
Hisuseof"usually" in theprevious quotation in theabovetext suggests that the stateneednotalwaysservethe interests of privatecapital.
32. Quoted in WatsonA RadicalLife op, ciL p43.
33. The tiny forces of the Trotskyists seem to have beendivided between adherents of the analyses of the early CPA and of a mechanical
application of the conceft of'ponnanent revolution, developed forbackward Russia and colonial countries and entailing an underestimation of
the capacity of the loca capitalist class, to Australia. See Militant9/6134 p14,Revolutionary Workers Party¥anifesto of the Revolutionary
Workers Party July 1943, Archives of Business and Labour, Australian National University for the first position and MilitantMay 1939 p2,
August 1939p4, April1940pl for the second.
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The Financial Oligarchy, Rich Families, Monopolies and Friends
TheCPA's nationalism had repercussions for its analysis of the class anatomy of Australian capitalism. Charged
with a priority of securing Australia's adherence to foreign policies acceptable to the Soviet Union, rather than
achieving a localworking class revolution, the Communist Party identified the Australian nation as progressive.
Communists explained the reluctance of the Australian Government to express the nation's real interests by
drawingattentionto the influence of a small cliqueof finance capitalists. The financial oligarchy thus became an
important component of Communist theory. This section considers the affinities between the CPA's
preoccupation with the fmancial oligarchy, anti-monopolism and the rich families Bolshevik studies before the
revolution on the one hand and Australian Money Power theory on the other. It examines reasons for the
popularity of anti-monopolism unrelatedto the CPA's overallpoliticsand thenthe implications of the briefperiod
of theHitler-Stalin pact for theParty's approach to classrelations.
BolshevikOrigins
There was some continuity between tile CPA's attacks on the fmancial oligarchy and the Bolshevik analysis
during World War I of the nature of modem capitalism. Lenin in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
and Bukharin in Imperialism and World Economy both drew on Hilferding's study Finance Capital by drawing
attention to the role of the banks and the fusion of bank andindustrial capital. They regarded the result of this
fusion,fmancecapital, as the characteristic formof contemporary capitalist organisation in the 20thcentury andas
an important factorin thedevelopment of imperialism. The contradiction between capitaland labourwas thekey
premiss of their economic analyses and the main thrust of Lenin's Imperialism was that the indissoluble link
between imperialism and war made the need for working classrevolution moreurgentandlikely.1
During the Popular Front period and subsequently, Communist Parties neglected the central argument of
Imperialism which relatedworld economic developments to the class struggle. They generally drew on the most
contingent and ephemeral aspects of Lenin's study. Lenin's epigones regarded the conceptof fmance capitaland
comments on the "fmancial oligarchy" as the cornerstones of Imperialism.c Most significantly, the Stalinist
CommunistParties liberatedthe conceptof fmance capital fromits role in explaining thedynamic of thecapitalist
systemand, in a sense, set it up in contrast to capitalism. Lenin's thesiswas set on its head: the reworked theory
allowedthe possibility of "curbing" the financial oligarchy, within the framework of capitalism. During the 1930s
the Comintern reproduced the very arguments of Kautsky, againstwhich Leninhadpolemicised in theseterms:
"... Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as
being 'preferred' by fmance capital,and opposes to it anotherbourgeois policy which, he alleges, is
possibleon the very samebasis of fmance capital. It follows, then that monopolies in the economy
are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics. It
follows, then, that the territorial division of the world, which constitutes the basis of the present
peculiar forms of rivalry between the biggestcapitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist
policy. The result is a slurring over anda blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest
stage of capitalism, insteadof an exposure of their depth; the result is bourgeois reformism instead
of marxism."3
That is, Kautsky treatedintegralparts of contemporary capitalism as contingent. In a similarway theCommunist
treatmentof the fmancial oligarchy or Britain's imperialist foreign policies, during the 19308, personified integral
components of the systemthe fmancial oligarchy, tobe confronted and defeated withoutabolishing theconditions
which generated it, Le, the capitalist mode of production. At first implicitly and, after the consolidation of the
CPA's Popular Front politics, explicitly this entailed a stagist strategy: the immediate task was to defeat the
fmancial oligarchy and implement progressive measures, especially in the area of foreign policy,only later would
a separatechallenge to capitalism as a wholebe mounted.
Stagism
The stagist implications of the Popular Front only becamefully apparent during 1937 as the CPA realised how
poor its prospects for gaining affiliation to the ALPwere. If the CPA could not formally influence a Labor
Government from the inside thenit became clear that therewere two quitedistinctstages on the road to socialism.
1. V. I. Lenin Imperialism, the Highest Stage ofCapitalism in his Selected Works Volume 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977 p700; N.
Bukharin Imperialism and World &onomy Monthly Review Press, New York 1972 p58j R. Hilferding Finance Capital_ Routledge and
Kegan Paul,London 1981. SeeR. DayThe 'Crisis' and the 'Crash' NewLeftBooks, London 1981 pp21-39 fora general discussion of these.
2. LeninImperialism op, cit. p667. SeeM. Kidron "Imperialism, theHighest StagebutOne" in hisCapitalism and Theory Pluto,London 1974
pp129-42 for the limitation's of Lenin's study.
3. LeninImperialism op, cit. p703. SeeJ. W. Roberts "Lenin's Theory oflmperialismin SovietUsage" Soviet Studies 29(3)1975"p372 forthe
fateof Lenin's theory:
"Surely what is unique and striking in Imperialism, th« Highest Stage o/Capitalism is Lenin's attempt to bringthe central
marxistschema of the economic causation of social phenomena into the scope of worldeconomics and politics. And it is
precisely thispartof the theory thatLenin'sheirshavequietly abandoned."
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The first undera progressive Labor Government, the second under a more revolutionary regime in which theCPA
had a preponderant influence. Without open Communist participation in the ALP a gradual transition between
these wasdifficult to envisage.
TheCPA wasaware that its socialbasein Australia was amongst sections of the working class. It therefore linked
working class concerns to its own majorpreoccupations with foreign policy. Hostility to the fmancial oligarchy,
or its otherincarnations as the "richfamilies" or "monopolies", werea stepin thisconcatenation. In a Communist
Review article, J. B.Milesmaintained that
"Economic problems provide a starting pointso essential to the organisation of the unitedfront for
peace."4 -
He regarded agitation around the the differences between "theexploiters, the few rich families" andworkers asan
important part of this approach. So, in line with Dmitrov's exposition of the PopularFrontat the 1935 Comintern
Congress, only a small section of the capitalist class was identified as the main object of Communist hostility.
Therest of the "nation" remained freeto engage in progressive activity. Miles wentstill further, by identifying the
"few rich families" with exploitation, rather than regarding this as an inherent feature of the capital-wage labour
relationship. Theconcepts of the financial oligarchy and monopoly, withroots bothin Leninist andMoney Power
theory, were now supplemented with that of the "richfamilies", apparently borrowed fromcontemporary French
and United States usage.S References to the rich families personified the objectof Communist antagonism even
more than those to the financial oligarchy had and removed the CPA's discussions even furtherfrom an analysis .
of the relations of production. TheCommunist understanding of the relationship between therich families andthe
iniquities of capitalism wasexpressed in Cartoon 1l.
Denunciations of the rich families provided an important complement to the Communist Party's radical
underconsumptionism, examined in moredetailin the next section. Radical underconsumptionism could be used
to explain fascism as the response of capitalists to the general crisis.. But the argument did not provide any
justification for differentiating between finance and othercapital. This was not a problem during theThirdPeriod
when Communists sought the down-fall of capitalism. But it was subsequently a distinct draw-back as the Party
tried to enter into alliances with the progressive elements of all classes. The concept of a conspiracy by the
fmancial oligarchy or the rich families offered a way out of 'this dilemma. The way the CPA's radical
underconsumptionism and sucha conspiracy theory worked were similar -- they bothpredicted the worstand did
not facilitate any concrete analyses of the economic situation: facts simply embellished predetermined
conclusions. However, the rich families conspiracy had the advantage of only encompassing a section of the
capitalist class, on whomsuch iniquities as fascism could be blamed It therefore admitted the possibility of a
stagist strategy. The shift between an explanation based on the, perhaps vulgar, materialism of radical
underconsumptionism and onefounded on the voluntarism of conspiracy theory wasevidentin a Workers Weekly
editorial in 1937: .
"The expansion of BHP is an outcome of the policy of the Australian bourgeoisie. In connection
with the last crisis, capitalist spokesmen pointed out that [the] Australian economy was the more
heavily hit because of its position as an exporter of foodstuffs, wool, wheat and other agrarian and
pastoral products.
"TheCapitalists are now calling for a policyof developing local industries... They believe that by
this policy. Which is helped as much as possible by a high tariff wall, they can offset the
disadvantages of remaining an agricultural exporter."
This constituted a reasonable summary of the objective interests of the capitalist class and of its response to the
crisis, which, perhaps because of its brevity, had conspiratorial overtones. But the editorialist then conjured the
capitalist classout of existence, because changes in theAustralian economy promoted
"Theemergence of monopolist groups and a fmancial oligarchy, as in all highly developed capitalist
states."
The fmancial oligarchy now became, in contrast to the editorialist's preceding analysis, the motive force behind
political and economic developments. This was not by virtue of objective circumstances, shared by the whole
capitalist class, suchas thepressures to reduce wages and increase profits, but because of its essential natureas a
conscious subject:
"The development of the BHP oligarchy and its kindred means that the big capitalists will strive
moreand moreto bendgovernments to their willand placeshackles uponthe people. In the Lyons
government theoligarchy finds a readytool to aid it in robbing andenslaving Australia's toilers."6
4.J. B. Miles"Fora BetterLifein Australia" Communist ReviewApril1937 ppS-9.
S.For the 200 families of France and the application of this figure to Australia see Workers Weekly editorial 23m37 p2 Alsosee Workers
Weekly 3/9/37 pi and Tribune 29m40 pl. R. Dixon France at the Cross Roads Modem Publishers, Sydney 1936 showed a considerable
awareness of French developments in the CPA. Dixon sawtheBlumGovernment as a model for Australia, p2,although he calledit a "radical
bourgeois" rather than a PopUlar Front Government. He emphasised that, in any case, the French Communist Party extended Blum's
administration "loyal, unconditional and steady support", ppl~S. The USfigure of 60, F. Lundberg America's60 Families Vanguard Press,
NewYork 1937, was only taken up for Australia after WorldWar 11. SeeJ. Playford "Myth of the Sixty Families" Arena 23, 1970for a
discussion of the CPA's use of rich families analyses. Therewere Canadian versions of these analyses too: W. H. McCallum Who Owns
Canada? Saskatchewan CCF Research Bureau, Regina 1934attacked the "FiftyBig Shots", citedin N. PennerThe Canadian Left Prentice-
Hall,Scalborough 1977 p197.
6.Workers Weekly 1419/37 p2.
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In its "make the rich pay" campaign of the second half of 1937, Workers Weekly also argued that it was a small
groupwhich haddirectcontrol over theGovernment: . .
"The Darlings, as part of Australia's financial oligarchy, rule the Lyons government, which is the
servantof the "200" richmen."?
Subsequent articles presented the sameinstrumentalist theory of the state, although there were somedifferences
overhow numerous members of the oligarchy were. "200" was theFrench figure. P. Hart apparently thought that
a smallcountry like Australia onlydeserved a tenthof thisnumber:
"As bondholders in the big pastoral and secondary industries, as directors of the banks, as inspirers
of the Lyons government, theseDarlings, Baillieus, Knoxes, Lysaghts andSmiths andtherest of the
'twenty families' control Australia itself."
He concluded that theycoordinated theireconomic, as wellas political activities:
"Therichfamilies areexploiting Port Kembla witha singlepurpose as-a monopolist group."8
The CPA thus replaced an analysis of objective circumstances with the contingent conspiracies of the fmancial
rich families as the explanation for developments to which it was hostile. Draperpointsout the flaw in this kind
of argument andthe strategies basedon it:
"Underconditions of advanced capitalism, the interests of the topstratareallyare the basicinterests
of the capitalist class as a whole, not in the sensethat the fruits ofdominance areevenhandedly and
fairlydistributed, but in thesensethatcapitalism cannotcontinue at all on anyotherbasis."9
During the mid-1930s, the CPA was generally coy about where small or non-monopoly capitalists and the not-
quite-so-rich families fittedinto thePopular Front. .It took sometimefor the ingrained hostility to capitalists, left
over from previous periods in the Party's history, to abate. Capitalists outside the financial oligarchy usually
figured as a part of the "people" by default, as no thirdcategory wasallowed to disturb thedichotomy between the
latter and the fmancial oligarchy.10 After the adoption .of a more self-consciously stagist strategy, the Central
Committee's draft resolutions for the 1938 (12th) Party Congress was moreexplicit about the placeof capitalists
outsidethe financial cliquein thePopular Front:
"The Labor Party which can provide an alternative government, should seek out that broad
programme which will rally the labor movement for united action and help line up all progressive
forces throughout Australia in a people's movement... irrespective of their party affiliation or
religion, against the Lyons administration and the most reactionary sections of the ruling
class."ll
Who Owns Australia?and MoneyPower Theory
Accounts of the rich families were the CPA's only serious attempt to offer an analysis of Australian capitalism.
As such they were deficient. But whenjudged simply as ownership studies, someof the Communist material on
the rich families was impressive. They were not usually informed by any explicit or systematic theory of the
dynamics of Australian capital accumulation in the contextof the local class struggle or international flows of
commodities and capital. Instead, employing French denunciations or Lundberg's book as models, they used
empirical accounts of one aspect of Australian capitalism -- the pattern of ownership, control andshareholdings --
to bolster the Popular Front contention that the fundamental cleavage in society was between the fmancial
oligarchy and the people. To have been too explicit about theoretical questions or details of Australia's place in
the world economy might have disturbed the equilibrium in Communist thought between the short-term
perspectives of the Popular Front and a longer term commitment to socialism, embodied in radical
underconsumptionism, However, to argue as Groenewegen does that the literature of ownership studies was
"devoid of theoretical content" is seriously mistaken,12 Indeed, Groeqewegen himselfidentifies such studies as
"populist and nationalistic". Populist and nationalist assumptions did constitute the theoretical basis of these
studies, even if, from the viewpoints of both orthodox and marxisteconomics, they were mistaken. Moreover,
bothMoneyPowerand the CPA's anti-monopolist approaches provided theoretical guides to andjustifications for
the actions of socialgroups -- notably sections of the working class.
The outstanding product of Communist anti-monopolism was J. N. Rawling's Who Owns Australia? which went
through four editions between 1937 and 1939 and was entirely recast in its fmal edition. Written in a clear, racy
style it brought a wealth of empirical material to bear on the concentration of Australian industry, interlocking
directorships, shareholdings and corporate subsidiaries. The results of Rawlings' comprehensive studies were
7. Wo~kers Weekly 3/9137 pI.
8. Workers Weekly 15/10137 p3. The "twenty families" is probably a reference toa list ofrich men on p32 ofJ. N. Rawling Who Owns
Australia? Modem Publishers, Sydney (before April) 1937, inturn taken from Smith'sWeekly during the early 19308. The list was deleted from
later editions ofRawling's pamphlet. Also see Workers Weekly 14/4139 on the rich families' quandary over who was to succeed Lyons as
Prime Minister.9. H. Draper KarlMarx~s Theory ofRevolution Volume 1: StateandBureaucracy Monthly Review Press, New York ·1977 p326.
10. See, for example, L. L. Sharkey "The Federal Elections" Communist ReviewDecember 1937 pp6-7.· .
11. Communist Party ofAustralia Unite for Peace Freedom Democracy Sydney 1938, my emphasis. Also note the sympathy expressed for
small companies disadvantaged by the South Australian Government's taxation policies, designed to benefit the wealthy monopolists, in "New
Industrial Growth inSouth Australia" Communis: Review September 1939 pS30.
12P. Groenewegen "Radical Economics" inF. Gruen (ed.) Surveys ofAustralian Economics Volume 11, Alien and Unwin, Sydney 1979 p183. .
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presented in large and complicatedcharts. Who OwnsAustralia? was unmerciful in its often ironic attackson the
rich:
"It will be seen that to some companies the Baillieu clan has generously given more than one son.
They serve their country, I said. For, as Milton said, 'they also serve who only stand and wait' --
and the Baillieus stand and wait for dividends and interest."13
The pamphlet carried an implicitmessage about the Popular Front, that the main division in society was between
the monopolies and the people. The only explicit and commenton the PopularFront was the concludingsentence
of the second edition:
"Unity of the masses .•- the Popular Front •• is more powerful than the might of the Robber
Barons1"14 .
The CPA published the pamphlet,publicisedit heavily in Communist Review and ran sectionsof the fourth edition
as a series of articles in Workers Weekly,1S No doubt it would have remained in vogue had Rawling not broken
with the CPA, going over to the Trotskyists for a brief period, before lapsing into right-wing disillusionment In
1940Len Fox filled the gap by writing Monopoly, which covered similar ground to Who Owns Australia? and
went into a second edition in 1943,16 As it was the most comprehensive accountof Communistviews on the class
structureof Australiancapitalism during the late 1930s, WhoOwnsAustralia? can be used to illustrate the content
and material basis of these perspectivesand their affinitywith MoneyPower theory.
Rawling's work carried on an aspect of the Money Power tradition of detailed study of Australian monopoly,
identified as the foe of the vast bulk of the people. Rawling acknowledged Anstey as "a writer who had delved
deep", quoting from Money Power.Yl He also endorsed Anstey's analysis of the "three rings" of monopolists,
maintaining, in the spirit of Money Power theory, that the banks controlled both economy and governments and
that the oligarchy had at its mercy
"The manufacturer and retailer, who are not big enough to be in the inner circle, the farmer, the
small business man _. many of whom are worse off than the employed worker -- the professional
man and the small trader."18
The CPA's stagist strategy for achieving socialism, reflected in Rawling's comments on the common hostility of
workers and sections of capital to the financial oligarchy, thus entailed a growing affinity between Communist
, anti-monopolism and the older tradition of labour movement Money Power theory, to which Playford draws
attention,19
During the first, peaceful stage of its strategy, designated as that leading up to and including the formation of a
Popular Front government, the CPA saw only a section of the capitalist class as opposed to it. Similarly Money
Power theories had sought to explain contemporary capitalismin terms of monopolies under the dominationof the
banks. The Popular Front minimum program, like the proposals of Money Power theory, involved campaigning
against the monopolies, or rich families, within the framework of capitalism. Under the banner of the Popular
Front or the campaign against the Money Power it would, their advocates hoped, be possible to rally the entire
people. Both ideologiesidentified the quintessenceof capitalismwith a small layer of society rather than anything
as dispassionate as the relations of production. A class analysis based on Marx's study of the relations of
production would have placed even the employers of a dozen workers on the other side of the barricades. The
.13. Rliwllng WhO OWII8 Australia? second edition Modem Publishers, Sydney 1937.pI7.
14. ibid. p64. This exhortation did not appear inthe first edition.
IS. J. N. Rawling Who OWII8 Australia? first edition op. cit. before April 1937, second edition 1937, third edition December 1938, fourth
edition October 1939, Workers Weekly April-June 1939. Note that Lundberg's America's60 Families op, cit, also appeared in1937.
16. L. Fox Monopoly fU'St edition Research Department Left Book Club ofNSW, Sydney 1940, second edition Left Book CubofVictoria,
Melbourne 1943. Fox's authorship ofMonopoly is stated on the inside front cover ofhis Australia'sGuiltyMen Consolidated Press, Sydney
1943.
17. ibidpplS-6 and first edition op. cit, pll, .
18. ibid. first edition pplS-6, second edition p26.
19. Playford "The Myth ofthe Sixty Families" op. cit. pp3S, 36. However, P1ayford underestimates the CPA'sadherence, before World War U,
tothe rich families approach. which went hand inhand with anti-monopolism. He also neglects some important elements inthe continuity
between the two theories. First that both approaches were generated by and expressed nationalist and refonnist material practices ofsections of
the ALP and trade union bureaucracies orofthe Stalinist CPA which was then evolving towards refonnism and nationalism under the impetus
ofthe Comintern's Popular Front strategy. Inthe absence ofsuch an explanation, Playford's criti~ue ofCommunist theory degenerates into
idealism: the Communist Party's intellectual shortcomings are attributed to"the centralised control' ofideas inthe Party and tothe failings of
"the so-called socialists of previous generations [of academics, who] deserve nothing but contempt for opting out of intellectual struggle
because ofcareerism and opportunism" (pp37, 38).
The second continuity Playford neglects is the preoccupation of both Money Power theorists and Communist anti-monopolists with the
ownership and control of capital. Neither attempted tointegrate the relations ofproduction, the dynamic ofthe class struggle orthe continued
anarchy ofcapitalist accumulation into their analyses ofAustralian capitalism. Following Wheelwright, P1ayford can only criticise the CPA's
failu@ to distinguish between ownership and control. He also maintains that its analysis should have been applied toforeign ownership and
control ofAustralian resources, something that both Money Powerand Communist theorists paid considerable agitational attention to.
Playford's own perspective shares some of the central assumptions of both Money Power and the rich families approaches he criticises,
particularly their nationalism and the primacy they gave toquestions ofownership and control asthe essence of"economic analysis". His own
critique of the first two generations ofleft nationalist theory served toclear the way for the third generation (or the fourth generation ifone
counts from the hostility ofthe early labour movement, under the influence ofHenry George, tothe land monopoly). His perspectives seem,
however, more subtle than those ofthe mainstream ofthat generation such asE. L. Wheelwright (e.g,with Fitzpatrick. The HighestBidderop.
cit., more recently with G. Crough Australia: A ClientStatePenguin, Ringwood 1982) and L. Cannichael (e.g. "A Transitional Programme to
Socialism" inG. Crough, E. Wheelwright and E. Wilshire (eds) Australia and WorldCapitalism Penguin, Ringwood 1980). Their foes were
not the Money Power, the monopolies orthe rich families but the multinational corporations. For this generation, like its predecessors, the task
ofopposing capitalism could bepostponed toa later stage.
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prospects for social change appearedmore cheerful (and in accord with Russianforeignpolicy)if the disagreeable
features of capitalism -- the erosion of civil liberties, war, attacks on workers' living standards, the growth of
monopoly -- were seen as contingent, the attributes of the money masters or the rich families who could be
defeated without destroying capitalism.20 The "people" could restrict the power of the monopolies through the
election of a Popular Front or ALP government -- socialism was a matterfor the indefinite future and different
tactics. Although the CPA still adhered to a radical underconsumptionist explanation of crisis, there was a
tendencyto believe that a PopularFront government couldcope with anotherdepression, to an unspecified extent:
"Side by side with the drift to war is developing economiccrisis. Already the UAP Governments
are endeavouring to force the burdenon to the backsof the people•..
"Hope in the situation rests with a Labor Party based on the trade unions and seriously concerned
with uniting the workers, winning the confidence of their allies among the middle classes and
pursuing a progressive policy againstaggressive capitalism, developing Fascismand war."21
MoneyPower theorists, of course, did not think that there were any serious restrictions on a Labor government's
ability to overcomecapitalism's problems, and even to quietlyintroduce socialism.
Conspiracy theory was also an element common to Popular Front and Money Power left nationalism. Although
Communists still explainedeconomiccrises in radical underconsumptionist terms,shortertermdevelopments, like
the actionsof governments, were understood as the consequence of manipulations by the financial oligarchy,22
Despite the similarities between Rawling's exposition of thepatternof capitalownership andcontroland the older
left nationalist tradition, there were also significant differences. Both approaches might involve a formal
adherence to socialism, understood as state ownershipof the means of production, but the CPA still distinguished
itself from the ALP on the basis of its commitment to eventual socialist revolution. Moreover it recognised in
Leninist terms that a preoccupation with the banks had been dated by the growth of other forms of monopoly and
the integration of capitalist activities. A division of capitalist allies along the lines of size (big versus small
business) was now more appropriate than one based on sector (money versus productive capital). Rawling
qualifiedhis acceptance of the conclusions of Money Power theory by using the same approach Communists had
employedduring the depressionto dismissthem altogether:
"A certain kind of propaganda that has had a good deal of influence duringrecentyearspresents the
present economic and financial systemas one of a bank's dictatorship over industry. We are living,
such propagandists tell us, withina systemof societyin which a class struggle is going on between
bankersand capitalists! The latter are exploited by the banks .- just as the rest of the population is.
Were we to nationalise the banks all our ills would end and the capitalistand worker would be able
to lie downin peace together -- the seemingcapitalist lion not being a lion at all and both capitalist
and worker beinglambs preyedon by the banker. An analysis of the facts, however, showsthat this
is a false picture... Big Business and Big Banking are the same; the controllers of industry and the
controllers of the banksare the samepersons."23
More substantive than disagreements over the physiognomy of the conspiracies they opposed, were the different
emphases Popular Front anti-monopolism and Money Power theory placed on nationalism. For the latter, the
financial oligarchy was essentially a foreign influence, even if it had local dupes. The Communist Party was
prepared to concede that there were real Australian sectional interests, allied to British imperialism it is true,
involved in the policies of the Lyons Government Moreover, during the 1930s, the CPA's adherence to the
interests of the Soviet Union still over-rode its nationalism. Expressions of concern for Australia's national
interests were generally associated with considerations which could be traced back to the foreign policy of the
Soviet fatherland. Rawling's introduction to the fourth editionof Who Owns Australia? made clear that the CPA
claimedto defend the nationalinterest:
"Governments might use the defence forces so created, not in the cause of patriotism and world
peace, but in the interestsof a small but powerfulclique."24
But even in this case world peace (= Russia's interests) was·given equal billing with patriotism. During the
Pacific war and subsequently, when the polarisation of the world into two camps promptedRussia to encourage
20. For example, Workers Weekly 26111/37 p3:
"Theownersofheavy industry in thedefeated countries had amassed huge fortunes from the fighting [during WorldWar 1],
and, as capitalism reorganised and rallied againstthe masses,the richfamilies gathered courageto begina new annaments
race."
21.Co1t/11lQn Causeeditorial 11/3/39 p4 also see CotnmQn Causeeditorial 1617/37 p4 and G. Crane"Youthand Unemployment" Communist
Review September 1939pS23:
"Unemployment is a problem whichis fundamentally insoluble underexisting conditions, but for whichsomealleviation may
be obtained by a determined campaign."
Also seethe discussion of theevolution of theCPA's underconsumptionist theory, in the nextsection.
22. Rawling expressed the idea of conspiracy, i.e, personalising the operations of the system, in his references to "the modem feudal
aristocracy" WhO OwnsAustralia? first editionOpt cit. p4, secondeditionOpt cit. pp6,26. AlsoseeWorkers Weekly 6112135 pi explained how
the "Seamenare attacked by the financial interests and banker-controlled Government" Also see Workers' Weekly 7/1'])37 p2 andCotnmQn
Cause editorial2'])4139 p4 original emphasis: .
"With the spunous plea of 'defence', a gigantic conspiracy is being hatched right here and now in Australia. Allegedly
planning to resistfascism, the rulingclassof thiscountryis planning to foistit uponus."
23. ibid.first editionppS-9, secondeditionp13. Rawling citesLenin'slmperiaJism as a tokenof his orthodoxy.
24. Rawling WhoOwnsAustralia? fourtheditionOpt cit. pl, . .
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the disruption of the US alliance, the CPA assimilated an additional dose of nationalism which made its
pronouncements no lessextreme thanthose of laborites.
The Appeal of Antl-Monopollsm
The popularity of Who Owns Australia? indicated that the CPA's anti-monopolism and analyses of the rich
families found a wideraudience than those specifically attracted to the Party's detailed conception of the Popular
Front. There were several reasons for this: the analyses expressed the convergence of the interests of some
laborite union officials, especially in NSW, and the Communist Party; theirvagueness could be used to cover a
variety of industrial manoeuvres; and theyreceived a fillip fromthe Conciliation andArbitration Court's approach
to wage determination during the late 19308.
At the sametime thatmanyLaborpoliticians weretoning down the radicalism of theirMoney Powerrhetoric, the
CPA was promoting a similar but distinctideology which union officials coulduse in theiropposition to Langand
to demonstrate their militancy. Some laborites had movedin the direction of anti-monopolism, before the CPA
startedto emphasise it. The Communist presentation anddocumentation of the case against the rich families and
their monopolist ties was, mainly thanks to Rawling, superior to anything produced by laborites. The union
bureaucrats' ability to assert theirrights against Lang in the ALPhad improved with the economic recovery. But
given Lang's entrenched position any assistance, including that from increasingly influential Communists, was
welcome. TheCPA wasonly toowilling to assist themandthus, it hoped, lay the foundations for a PopularFront
government. Outside NSW the relationship between union officials and the CPA was not so harmonious. The
officials had maintained their influence in the ALP during the depression and many regarded the growth of
Communist influence in the working class as a threat.. Nevertheless, even outside NSW, Communist Fronts like
the Movement against War andFascism, the Friends of the SovietUnionand the Left BookClub attracted some
support from laborite union leaders and even a few Laborpoliticians, the mostnotable being Maurice Blackburn.
The Australian Council for Civil Uberties, while not a front, was another arena in which Communists and
laborites worked together.2S At its 1937 Congress, the ACTU adopted a Communist supported position on foreign
policy, submitted by the NSW Labor Council.26 Even after the split which soon followed the Popular Front
triumph of covertCommunists leading the NSW ALP machine, the Communist-left Labor alliance continued in
theLaborCouncil for a while. During thisperiodit published a series of pamphlets expressing a position closeto
the CPA's, which is discussed below.
Anti-monopolism was alsouseful to union officials because its militant resonances helped sanction a switch away
from industrial action to "political struggle" when they feared defeator the expansion of rank and file autonomy
during a dispute. Theindustrial defeatof the Port Kembla Pig Iron Strike, which the CPA turnedinto a political
"victory", was an example of this mechanism at work. Moreover, thevagueness of anti-monopolism andhostility
to the richfamilies couldbeused tojustifymostdisputes as being in the people's interests.27 It couldalso be used
to blur yesterday's political allyinto today's industrial enemy or viceversa. Thusthe ownerof a "smallcompany"
mightberegarded as a potential member of thePopularFronton theone hand, but as a member of a "combine", or
simplyas a classenemy, in thecourseof an industrial campaign in his or her industry.
In its 1937 Basic Wage judgment, the Conciliation and Arbitration Court provided union officials with an
additional reason to be concerned with monopoly studies. The Courthad suggested that wages mightincrease in
line with industry'sgrowth by spelling out that the basic wage was determined by industry's capacity to pay as
well as a needs.component.28 Common Cause, the newspaper of the Communist led Miners' Federation,
published a series of articles in March 1939 linking the Popular Front rationale for monopoly studies to this
Arbitration Court inspired justification for them. The series began with a piece by J. N. Rawling, "WhoOwn's
Australia's Coai?".29 Two subsequent articles referred to chartsof coalownership patterns which weresubmitted
to the Conciliation and Arbitration Court by the union. TheCPA's stagistapproach wasapparent in theuse of the
chartsin theConciliation andArbitration Courtcombined withcallsfor revolutionary solutions to the problems of
capitalism. Theonlylink between the twowaspurelyliterary:
. "Ahandful of individuals are shown byourchartvirtually to ownAustralia. ..
"Exploitation, accumulation, investment, monopoly, exploitation. THIS IS mE PROCESS
WHICH YOU ARE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT BEFORE YOU ATTEMPT TO PRESS YOUR
CLAIMS FOR BETTER CONDITIONS FOR WAGE SLAVES. IT IS THE PREMISE OF
ARBITRATION. ANYTIIING GAINED MUST BE WITHIN THAT CIRCLE. NOT OUTSIDE
mrr .
"•.. In short mE ENEMY OF EVERY WORKER ·IS CAPITALISM, a system which cannot
function unless it pursues relentlessly the lawsso clearlydefined by the 'dreamer' Marx« the laws
25.On theAustralian Council forCivilLiberties seeWatsonBrlanFilzpatrick op,cit. chapters 3 and4.
26.J. Hagan TheHistoryoftheACTULongman Cheshire, Melbourne 1981 ppl06-7.
27.E.g.Workers Weekly 1619138 p3.
28.Hagan TheHistoryoftheACTUop, ciL, ePI41-2.
29. COl1ll1UJn Cause413139 ppl-2, chartpp4-:).
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which means an octopus like the B.H.P. becoming more octopus-like and the millionsare reduced to
penury."30
This revolutionary rhetoricprovided a cover for a less than militant approach to Arbitration, after the Communist
leaders of the Miners' Federation called off its "second round" campaign to return to the Court. The idea of
struggle as the link between immediate economic demands and working class revolution was absent. E. Ross,
editor of Common Cause, made it clear how these articles on monopoly should be interpretedin a contribution to
Australian Left News, aimed at a more middle class audience. Whatever the rhetorical trappings of class struggle
necessary when writing for the militant membership of the Miners' Federation, in strategic terms Ross and the
CPA regarded the miners' strugglesas part of the people's fight againstmonopoly:
"In its wider aspect, the miners' struggle has revealed the ineptitude of the Lyons Government, has
struck a blow at a reactionary administration which, by placing the interests of a few wealthy
monopolists before the community as a whole, paves the way for that fascist development in
Australia that its fascist foreignpolicy facilitates abroad."31
At the 1940 Basic Wage hearing, the trade union advocates presented studies of company ownership and
profitability, prepared by B. Fitzpatrick and J. Lindsay. They'demonstrated that industry was capable of paying
higher wages because of high profit rates and the extent of monopolisation. The Introduction to Fitzpatrick's
impressiveMonopoly Business: A Critical Study of 772Australian and New Zealand Industrial Institutions stated
that
"Because of the importance of this analysis of the economic structureof Australia to the workers,
the EmergencyCommitteeof the A.C.T.U.decidedit should be publishedin pamphletform,32
After the Court decided not to grant an increase in the basic wage,FitzpatrickpublishedThe Basic Wage: WhatIs
Its Basis?, which employed material from Monopoly Business as part of a critique of the whole wage-fixing
process.33 His 1944 The Rich Get Richer was a more polemical contribution to the literatureof anti-monopolist
studies.34
In their studies for the 1940 basic wage case, Fitzpatrick and Lindsay had extended the Australian tradition of
economicanalysis, startedby Anstey and continuedby Rawling,beyond a mainly qualitative and literary critique
of Australian capitalism's structure of ownership and control. Their work paved the way for later studies
conductedin anacademiccontext,even if they werenot acceptedby the academicestablishrnent3S
Finally the CPA's anti-monopolism could simply provide grist to a relatively unrecoilstructed Money Power
theorist's mill. In 1939Tribune noted with relish that Labor Senate LeaderCollings, who we have seen as partial
to Money Power theory,made" a tribute to" Who Owns Australia? in a speechon G.p.a. contracts.36
The RichFamilies at War
After dropping its Popular Front line, shortly after the outbreak of World War IT, the CPA initially maintained its
interest in the rich families and monopoly. The Party's left turn was effected in economic theory by a shift in the
emphasis in its propaganda from its minimum, Popular Front, to its maximum, revolutionary, program. As the
logic of the new position wail worked through, Communists muted the stagismof their perspectives and became
increasinglyhostile to the capitalistsystem as wholerather, than the monopolies. In this way the CPA emphasised
its differencesfrom the "reformist" ALP and the imperialistnature of theWar.
During late 1939, Communists took particular exception to the Government's connections with "profiteers" and
monopolies, although the Party's line now increasingly emphasised the bankruptcy of capitalism as a whole.37
Slow to realise the implications of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the CPA was not in a very good position to elaborate a
wholenew perspective, especially after it was declared illegal in 1940. So, as well as shiftingto a more stridently
anti-capitalistrhetoric, it also bentPopularFront analysesof Australiancapitalismto the new leftist policy.38
30.CommonCause 1113139 pl, also see 2513139. . .
31. AustralianLeftNews November 1938 pll.
32 B. FilZpatrick Monopoly Business: A CriticalAnalysisofm Australian and New Zealand Industrial Instinalons Australian Council of
Trade Unions, Melbourne 1941 p3. Also see "An Analysis ofCapital Investment inAust. (sic) and New Zealand" astatement presented by C.
Crofts, ACTU advocate, to the Arbitration Court inLaborCall SII2140 p7, 12112140 pIS, 19112140 p6. On J. Lindsay's evidence see Labor
Call 818140 p9.
33. B. FilZpatrick TheBasicWage: WhatIs Its Basis?Research Group oflhe LeftBook Cub ofVictoria, Melbourne June 1941.
34. B. FilZpatrick TheRichGet RicherRawson's Bookshop, Melbourne 1944. .
35. FilZpatrick collaborated with Sydney University economist E. L. Wheelwright on TheHighest Bidder,published in1965, B. Fitzpatrick and
E.L. Wheelwright The HighestBidderLandsdowne, Melbourne 1965, Watson BrianFiJzpatrick op. cit. p287. During the 19508 Wheelwright
had already produced work inthis genre, E. LWheelwright Ownership and ControlofAustralian Companies Law Book Company, Sydney
1957.
36.WorkersWeekly6/6/39 p3.
37. For example see Tribune 10/11139,21/11139. .
38. For the Party's confused responee to the Hitler-Stalin Pact see A. Davidson A History of the Communist Party of Australia Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford 1969 p79. As late as November 1939 the Party commended F. Forde for an attack on the Government's pro-
monopoly policies, Tribune 24/11739.
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A discussion of the Government's proposals to set up an Australian automobile industry in early 1940 concluded
that
"It is not hard to see that the ruling circles of Australia do not intend to pursue a liberal and
democratic policy when the war has ended. They look forward, not only to a continuation of
monopoly rule, but to its strengthening."39
The ambiguity of the Party's focus on monopoly, taken over from the previous period, used to justify a leftist
argument, was apparent when Tribune drew the lessons of France's experiences of the rich families for Australia:
"'The 200 families' of the French capitalist class, and their politicians and generals have betrayed
the French people to the fascists.
"The French experience is valuable for Australia. We, too have a government of big business..."40
The implication, however ridiculous, was clearly that in France exploitation was associated with extremely limited
gene pool of a few families, rather than specific relations of production. Fox's Monopoly, published in 1940,
continued Rawling's line of analysis, but added a critique of the ALP and affirmation of the desirability of
socialism.41 Trade union newspapers published instalments from "The Economic Structure of Australia" a similar
survey, though more statistical, that was issued by the Left Book Oub.42 The Labor Research Committee
produced Who Owns South Australia? in the same vein.
A series of pamphlets by J. Lindsay, Communist research officer of the NSW Labor Council, defined the
remaining common ground between the ALP, CPA and ALP (State of NSW) in anti-monopolist terms. A People's
Australia and Its Defence (8,000 sold by mid-1941) appeared around the time of the August split in the NSW
ALP.43 Labor Council Secretary, who remained in the Official ALP provided the pamphlet's introduction.
Lindsay placed the key division in society"the small business men and companies on the one hand, and the
monopolist combines on the other".44 He concluded with a "Programme for the People", which demanded that
Australian troops remain within Australia, nationalisation of the armaments industries, the basic wage and civil
rights for the armed forces, higher wages and "no speed-ups in industry".4S
Lindsay's 1941 pamphlets, Basic Wage Swindle (20,000 sold by mid-1941) and Where Your Money Goes (first
edition of 10,000) included calls for socialism.46 The "People's Programme" in Basic Wage Swindle was more
militant than that in A People's Australia. . ., calling for nationalisation of war industries, monopolies and
financial institutions, suspension of interest payments on government debts (the subject of Where Your Money
Goes) higher wages and confiscatory taxation of incomes above L1,000 a year. Where Your Money Goes was
particularly radical:
"Today, Labor's [i.e. 'labour's'] bargaining power and strength have never stood higher.
"The people must take their present golden opportunity to fight for the defeat of reactionary
Governments and to smash completely the capitalist system which these interests serve.
"... The continuance of mankind's best efforts can be achieved only by fighting now for a Socialist
Society, which will end war and capitalist exploitation."47
This radicalisation is explained by the hardening of the CPA's post-Popular Front perspectives and, perhaps, by
the the ALP's rhetorical left turn, during 1940 and 1941.
The Communist Party's greater emphasis on its maximum program during the "second imperialist war" was
apparent in a changed conception of the People's Government it continued to advocate. Where the earlier
conception of a People's Front Government was defmitively Parliamentary, the new version was more equivocal
and redolent of a soviet-type government or the dictatorship of the proletariat:
"Such a government may come through elections or Parliament it may be thrown up outside
Parliament by the joint activities of the organisations of the people."48
The German invasion of Russia ensured that this ambiguity was resolved in favour of a return to Popular Front
conceptions rather than proletarian revolution. The invasion preempted any rejection of anti-monopolism in a
thorough-going reassessment of Communist analyses on the basis of the politics of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. So this
39. Tribune 9/1/40p3
40.Tribune 29n140p1.
41.FoxMonopoly op,cit p40. Common Cause2511141 boosted the pamphlet
42. See, forexample, Common Cause 14/9/40 plO,2119/40 p12iAdvocate 15/10/40, 15/11140, 15/12140. The original roneoed version of the
"Economic Structure of Australia" is in the C. Martin Papers, held by K. Turner, Government Department, University of Sydney, to be
deposited in theMitchellLibrary.
43. J. Lindsay A People's Australia and Its Defence LaborCouncil of NSW, Sydney. Internal evidence indicates the pamphlet was written
afterJuly 1940. Circulation figurefromAdvocate 1616141 p7.
44.Lindsay A People'sAustralia. . . op, elt, pp8,13.
45. ibid.p22.
46. J. Lindsay Basic WageSwindle LaborCouncil of NSW,Sydney 1941 p11 included a passage very reminiscent of Anstey's three rings,
referring to the creation of wealth for"B.H.P., thesugarmonopoly, andthebanks". .
47.J. Lindsay Where YourMoneyGoesTrades andLaborCouncil of NSW,Sydney 1941 (oninternal evidence, afterMarch) p15.
48.MasonandMcShane (i.e,J. B. MilesandL. L. Sharkey) WhatIs thisLaborParty?Communist Partyof Australia, Sydney (late19401) p8.
Masonand McShane The Coming War in the Pacific(19417) concentrated its fireon thecapitalist classas a whole,ratherthan monopolies. E.
VargaChanges in Capitalism During the WarCommunist Partyof Australia, reprinted fromInternotional ReviewMay 1941, was particularly
expliciton this question, adopting a position in starkcontrast to that of the Popular Front period, noting that the state"represents the class
interests of theblgbourgeoisie as a whole" but that it actsfor the "bourgeoisie as a whole". ,
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aspectof the CPA's left nationalism survived the left turn of 1939-41, as it did that of the late 1940s, preserving
the continuity of the tradition until thepresent.
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An Equivocal Catastrophism
Who Owns Australia? and other studies of Australian monopolies were indigenous products, generated by the
Communist Party's belief that a Popular Front across different classes couldgive rise to a progressive national
government, before any workers' revolution. But the Party continued to rely heavily on Russian theoretical
products for its analyses of the economic dynamics of capitalism. Radical underconsumptionism became therigid
orthodoxy during 1930 as thevictory of the Stalin faction in Russia and the "bolshevisation" of the parties of the
Comintern terminated all serious debate about economic theory in official Communist circles.! It expressed
Communists' commitment to socialism as it existed in the Soviet Union, where the possibility of disproportion
between production andconsumption wasruled out by the mechanisms of the five yearplans. It alsoexpressed
faith in the inevitability of socialist revolution in the capitalist countries, in view of the further and more
devastating economic crises which would wrack them. Radical underconsumptionism, in the late 1930s, therefore
expressed in economic theory theCPA's underlying commitment to Russia's interests, while theParty's analyses
of local monopolies were part and parcel of the contingent Popular Front strategy it had accepted from the
Comintern.
The two approaches dealt withdifferent areas of economic study: radical underconsumptionism focused on the
question of economic crisis; anti-monopolism was centrally concerned with the class anatomy of Australian
capitalism. There were no serious Australian attempts to synthesise thetwo approaches. This was necessarily the
case as they were founded on assumptions which were, in some respects, contradictory. But they could not be
entirely compartmentalised. Radical underconsumptionism, after all provided Communists with their economic
explanation for the rise of fascism, which was the political rationale for the Popular Front. Fascism, the Popular
Frontorthodoxy maintained, was the response of fmance capital to the economic crisis. As their first priority,
Communists had to organise with other workers and other classes to defeat the "rich families" and monopolies
whowere the source of fascism.. The struggle against capitalism waspostponed until this primary taskhad been
accomplished. For the timebeing onlya section of the capitalist class was theenemy:
"Theeconomic ground is giving wayunder thefeetof thecapitalists.
"They will try topassthe burden on to thesmallbusiness people, farmers andtheworkers
"... Unity of the workers, a joining of all people with small incomes against the rich families, the
working out of a policyto safeguard the interests of all toiling sections in the slump, must be the
common aim of allprogressive parties andgroups."2
Theworking class had an immediate economic interest in a Popular Front -- or progressive ALP-- government,
hopefully with Communist participation. Sucha government would be,in somesense, a staging post to socialism.
Alogical conclusion, only sometimes speltout,was thatsucha government couldtake measures to overcome the
general crisis of capitalism. There was, therefore, a contradiction between the premise of the Popular Front
argument -- the inevitable general crisis of capitalism -- and its conclusion -- the surmountability of the crisis.
This contradictionin economic theory had its roots in the Party's commitment to Russia and the consequent
balancing act it attempted to perform with the interests of Soviet foreign policy, the Australian nation and
Australian working class. On the fewoccasions when a Communist discussion juxtaposed the analytical premise
andconclusion of its economic analysis, there was no signof disquiet amongst Communists.3
The simultaneous adherence of Communists to .both Popular Front anti-monopolism and radical
underconsumptionism modified both theories in some important ways. The CPA's commitment to Russian
foreign policy hampered theemergence of an unequivocal nationalism thatwasthe logical corollary of itsPopular
Front policies. Thus during the 1930s CPA did not question Australia's continued membership of the British
Empire. In fact theapplication of the Popular Front to Australia waspremissed, as far as the Comintern was con-
cerned, on its ability to influence British foreign policy. Moreover, communists, with a radical
underconsumptionist analysis at the back of their minds and a clear conscience, could not promise as much as
laborites of a progressive Labor, i.e. Popular Front, government. ThePopular Frontline andanti-monopolism had
reciprocal effects on the CPA's approach to economic crises. This section examines the CPA's radical
underconsumptionism and the impact of Popular Front politics on the Communist appreciation of cyclical
economic movements under capitalism.
In 1934E. Varga, Russia's foremost economist, justifiedradical underconsumptionism in a book laterpublished
by theBritish Communist Party. Herecognised thataccumulation was characteristic of capitalism:
"Under pain of ruin, everyindividual capitalist is compelled by competition to convert part of his
profits intocapital•.• This means that
1. R. DayTM ·Crisis' and tM 'Crash' New LeftBooks, London 1981 pp73-177 demonstrates how duringthe 19208 Russian debates about
economic events in the 'west were characterised by the continuing influence of Hilferding and Luxemburg's ideas. The final victory of the
Sta1inist bureaucracy in 1929sawthe installation of a "neo-Luxemburgist" theoryof capitalism, elaborated by E. Vargaas theonly acceptable
approach. We have preferred the descriptive term "radical underconsumptionism" to Day's "neo-Luxemburgism" which emphasises the
theory's antecedents, ofwhichCPAmembers betrayed noawareness at all.
2. Workus Weekly 1416138 pI, alsoseeforexample, Dlxon "Trade UnionPolicy" op,ciLp181; Workers Weeklyeditorial 1616139 p2;Campbell
"NewLineof Attack" Communist Review September 1939pS16.
3. E.g.seeH. Ross"Nationalisation of Banking" Communist ReviewOctober1937ppI7-20.
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"The total valueof socialcapital increases fromyear to year.
"The organic composition of capitalis enhanced...
"Thereis a relative diminution of the total profit(tendency of therateof profit to decline) as wellas
of the wagefund, as compared with the totalvalue of the annual production of goods."4
Vargamentioned the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in thecourseof his argument, but it playednorole in his
explanation of crises. Depressions were not the result of low and falling profit rates, but of a decline in
"consuming power" compared to society's expanding productive capacity. Varga defined consuming power as
wages plus capitalists' private expenditure. The fall in the rate of profit was a consequerice of the decline in
relative consuming power. Vargaattempted to complement his explanation of the "general crisis" withan account
of cyclical crises. But in doing so he simplyreproduced his analysis of the general crisis to account for cyclical
movements of the economy.S Consequently, his economic systemwas indeterminate, incapable of explaining the
movements of the real worldeconomy because it conflated short and long term movements. Nor could it allow
the possibility of a recovery from the general crisis.6 The doctrinal validation of this theorycame from a much
abusedpassage fromMarx's Capital Volume ill, takenout of context:
"The last real cause of all real crises always remains the poverty andrestriction in consumption of
the masses as compared to the impulse of capitalist production to develop the productive forces as if
only the absolute powerof consumption of society weretheir limit,"?
Duringthe secondhalf of the 19308, the CPA, following the international line, characterised the period as one of
the general crisis which meantthat
"No real or permanent prosperity for the working class can ever be achieved until the workers
themselves gaincontrolof industry andgovernment."8
Because of the restriction of the market it was not conceivable that capitalism could grow or offer workers
improved living standards for any prolonged period, although it was sometimes conceded that short, weak spurts
of growth mightpunctuate the general pictureof stagnation:
"It is because of the existence of the underlying general crisis thatcapitalism, considered on a world
scale, did not experience a 'boom' period such as was characteristic of the earlier period of
capitalism [Le. prior to WorldWar1] following the crisis period[of thedepression]."9
The causes of the general crisiswereexplained in thefollowing terms:
"The contradiction between the naturalimpulse of capitalism to extendproduction withoutlimit and
the boundaries to that impulse set.by the consuming power of society, reaches thatpitchof intensity
at whicha crisismustbreakout in a shortertime thanbefore.
"The surplus of fixed capital which is characteristic of the period of general crisis hampers the
extension of renewal of fixedcapitaland thusalso tends to shorten theperiodof the crisis."10
This position ofVarga's illustrates the CPA's acceptance of the Comintern's conflation of general and business
cyclecrises. Dixon gavean explanation of thegeneral crisis andtried to supplement it withan account of cyclical
crises. But in practicehe contrasted the general crisis with theconsequences of... thegeneral crisis:
"Whereas production exceeds 1929, the consumptive powers of the masses is more limited and
restricted and consequently the conditions of overproduction and crisis already exist. These are
complicated by the additional factors of thegeneral crisisof.capitalism."11
The contradiction between radical underconsumptionist theory, which could not account for economic recovery,
and reality wasnot especially evident in the depths of the depression.l2 But with a degreeof recovery it became
manifest. The contradiction was exacerbated by the switch from the Third Period to the Popular Front line in
1935. The politics of the PopularFront weretied up withthe notion that a progressive government couldnotonly
change foreign policies for the better but also effect improvements in their conditions for the working class.
Within the confines of underconsumptionism there were two ways of coping with the pressures on the theory:
either to reiterate dogma and disregard the facts or to shift from a radical to a reformist underconsumptionist
position.
4. E. VargaTh4 GreatCrisisand Its Political Consequent:u: Economics and Politics 1928-1934 Modem Books,London no datep18. The
following year A. Leontiev Political Economy: A Beginners Course Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR,
Moscow-Leningrad 1935,included radical underconsumptioaism, alongwithpresentations of the theoriesof value and imperialism in a more
accessible text-bookin English. The CPAwas iml.'ressed enoughbythis publicetion to reissued it (Current BookDistributors, Sydney 19437).
Chapters 8,10 and 11 contain Varga'sarguments dISCUSsed below.
5. ibid p23. See Day Th4 'Crisis' op, cit, pp9-11 for a succinct marxistaccount of cyclical crises.
6. VargaTh4 GreatCrisisop. cit, p20,DayThe 'Crisis' op. cit, p263.
7. VargaTheGreatCrisisop. ciLp20. . .
8. Workers Weekly 5/4135 p4, this article predates the official start of the Popular Front periodat the 1935 Comintern Congress, but its
sentiments continued to be expressed untilthe late 19308.
9. L. L. Sharkey "WorldEconomic Crisis to Be 'More Intense' for Fascists: StalinGaveSUIlUlllUY of CapitalistDepression" Workers Weekly
414139p2. .
10.E. Varga"A NewCrisisIs ComingI" Communist ReviewJuly 1937p36. ~
11. R. Dixon"The News Review" Communist ReviewJanuary 1938 p7. In "The Economic Scene" Communist Review February 1938 p7,
Dixonpointed to a newcyclicalcrisis. .
12.DayTh4 'Crisis' op, cit.pl72.
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The End Is Still Nigh
Pronouncements on the chimeral natureof recoveryand the imminence of a renewedandseverecrisis became the
commoncurrency of the international communist movement for thirty years after the depression. In May 1935,
with the recovery in full swing, J. B. Miles thought "the perspective in Australia is for a sharpening of the
crisis" ,13
The indeterminacy of Communist crisis theory evenprevented theParty from confidently recognising a recession
when it saw one. In August 1937, L. L. Sharkeymade anotherprediction that a crisis was imminent, which was
fortuitously borne out by events. But even in the midstof the recession theCentralCommittee draft resolution for
the 12th National Conference still regarded a new crisis as imminent rather than underway,14 In June 1938
Workers Weekly proclaimed that "The Slump Is TakingPlace", but Dixonstill "predicted" it in 1939.15 By mid-
1939 an official Party assessment maintained that the crisis was worsening, but in September 1939 E. W.
Campbell still hedged his bets as to whether the crisis was, as yet, an open one,16 He brought a little Australian
empiricalmaterial to bear on the question and revealed the source of the confusion in the indeterminacy of the
radicalunderconsumptionist theoryof crisis by his unacknowledged quotation fromVarga's The Great Crisis The
quotation was a description of a cyclicalcrisis, which in Varga's bookwas explained by the argument Campbell
used to account for the general crisis.I? The Communist Party's leadership seems to have taken its recurrent
predictions of renewedcrises with a grain of salt. An editorial comment in Communist Review, which prefaced
Varga's 1937forecastof anothercrisiscautionedthe naive that
"In some quarters a harmful tendency towards a too rigid interpretation of Varga's remarks was
noticeable.•. We warn our readers against attempting to apply it [the following article by Varga]
mechanically to Australia withoutdue consideration of the actual situation."18
No considerations "of the actual situation"that contradicted Varga's or Australian Party members' prophesies of
economic doom ever appeared in thePartypress. .
Communist confusion over the likelihood of a new economic crisis extended to the assessment of the implications
of the armsrace of the late 1930sfor economic growth. Stalin,in 1939, maintained whilerearmament meantthat
Germany, Japan andItaly werenot yet experiencing the new crisis to the full, it wouldeventually leadtheminto a
"mostintensecrisis":
"Unlesssomething unforseenoccurs, German industrymustenter the samedownward path as Japan
and Italy have already taken. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing
mean? It means givingindustry a one-sided, war direction; developing to the utmostthe production
of goods necessary for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the
production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption -- and, consequently,
reducing consumption by the population and confronting the countrywithan economic crisis."19
Onthe other hand E. W. Campbell and R. Dixon adopteda positionmore in accordwith Varga's argument of the
late 1930s that the armsrace wouldoffset the tendency to stagnation in the short term, whilepassing no comment
on the longer term implications.20
TheLure ofReformism
It was possible to remain within the bounds of underconsumptionist theory, but, in .deference to the reality of
recoveryand growth, to admitthe possibility that state action couldovercome crises, that is to shift froma radical
to a reformistunderconsumptionist position. If armsproduction couldassisteconomic growth, then whynot other
forms of state expenditure? As earlyas 1936Sovieteconomists had recognised that in the west "artificial stimuli"
were being used to overcome the crisis. Varga, who had a tenacious grip on the real movements of the western
economies, concluded in March 1937that a recoverywas underway, before the new US slumprestoredhis faith in
the generalcrisis.21 Nevertheless, by March 1939he concededthat:
13. Workers Weekly 3/5135 pI,for an amplification ofthis point see D. J.Robertson "Australia Faces Economic Decline" COfN1Iunist Review
May 1935 pp55-60.
14. L LSharkey "A Fighting Policy: Decisions ofthe C. C. Meeting" Communist Review August 1937 p35. Communist Party ofAustralia
Unite for Peaceop. cit. p3. Sharkey may well have drawn on an article by M. Dobb, a British marxist economist article on international
economic scene based on serious empirical studies, written early in 1937 which predicted a new economic downturn. The article was only
published in Australia as"England and Economic Crisis" inCommunist ReviewMarch 1938 pp37-8. G. Crane seems to have produced the
only serious indigenous Communist examination of the cyclical situation in Australia, though not in a CPA publication, G. Crane "Present
Economic Tendencies in Australia" Workers' Information 1(1), February 1938 ARU, Melbourne. Crane's unique position is considered in
greater detail below.
15. Workers Weekly 14/6138 p'1 and also E. W. Campbell "Coming Events Cast Shadows" Communist ReviewJuly 1938 p3. R. Dixon "Trade
Union Policy and the ACTU' Communist ReviewMarch 1939 p181.
16. Communist Party ofAustralia ThePresent Situation andtheTasks oftheParty7/5/39 p2.
17. E. W. Campbell "New Line ofAttack" Communist ReviewSeptember 1939 p516; compare toE. Varga TheGreat Crisisop. cit. p24.
18. Varga "ANew Crisis" op. cit. p35.
19. J. V. Stalin Report tothe 18th Congress ofthe Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union, March 1939 in his TheEssential Stalin Croom Helm,
London 1973 p338. In fact the devotion ofsuch ahigh protx>rtion ofoutput to war was liable tolead toacrisis, ifmilitary adventures did not
secure additional resources, only where itslowed the .rateofmvestment. Also see report in Workers Weekly 414139 p2.
20. Dixon ''The News Review op,cit. 116; Campbell "A New Crisis" Communist RevUlw Apri11939 pl97.
21. Day The 'Crisis'op. cit. pp275-8, 281. ,
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"Government expenditures... for armaments and public works influence and modify the cyclical
development of reproduction which is baseduponthe internal lawsof capitalist society."
Day argues that
"Logically, Varga's reasoning ran parallelto thatof JohnMaynard Keynes in The General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money published in 1936."22
During the Great Patriotic War Against FascismVargadeveloped his version of reformist underconsumptionism
further. In 1941 the CPA published Varga's Changes in Capitalism during the War. Its conclusions about the
role of state intervention prefigured Varga's post-war controversy with the rest of the Russian economics
profession:
"With the development of monopoly capitalism, the contradiction between the tendency of
capitalism to expand and the limitedconsuming capacity of society has asserted itselfmoresharpley
and permanently... the bourgeoisie in each country has tried to utilize the state as a means of
eliminating it within its own territories."23
Despitea setbackduring the late 1940s, his position becametheRussian economic orthodoxy by the 19608.
The CPA also shiftedin the direction of reformist underconsumptionism. Thiswas mostobvious in its discussion
of the role of the ALPandLaborGovernments, wherethe stresswason a progressive administration acting for the
working class on economic questions, rather thanworkers taking matters into theirown hands.24 With thebenefit
of hindsight it is possibleto see a link between this shift and the CPA's sloughing off of Stalinism and transfor-
mation into a reformist sect thirty years later. But even in the 1930s some Australian developments highlighted
this logic of Popular Front politics, to which Trotsky had drawn attention.25 For example, Lloyd Ross, covert
Communist, prominent ALPmember and Secretary of the NSW ARU, was only a little in advance of and more
. explicitthan the bodyof CPA thought, whenhe argued that
"Whatever be our departure in economic theory we must end with the conclusion that a world of
saturated markets can escapefrom its economic difficulties-by improving the standards of livingof
the masses."26
This statement could just as easily have been produced by a laborite union official, committed to trade union
underconsumptionism. Ross's premature abandonment of radical for reformist underconsumptionism had a sequel
when he left the Communist for the Labor Party in 1940, anticipating the CPA's changeof primaryloyalty from
Russia to Australia,by morethantwentyyears.
The initial formof the CPA's opening to reformism was its attempts to gain affIliation to the ALP. A great deal
wasexpected of a government formed by theLaborParty thusaugmented:
"Therefore thequestion is, whatmanner of LaborGovernment is required?
"The answer is: we want a Government that will pursue a class policy; which aims, finally, not at
theperpetuation of the capitalist system, under which the workers can never be secure in theirjobs
and their lives, but at the overthrow of capitalist role, and social ownership of the means of
production."27
This was socialism introduced by Parliamentary means. But once the ALP had rejected the Communist
application for affiliation, the idea that a Labor government could introduce socialism challenged the basis of the
CPA's existence.28 During 1937 the Party elaborated its PopularFront perspectives into a stagist strategy for
achieving socialism. Now a progressive Labor government was only expected to introduce a variety of reforms,
within the framework of capitalism but in the face of the opposition of the rich families and monopolies.
Socialism wouldbe a later task, to be completed underthe leadership of the Communists:
"Whilepointing out our conviction that only a Sovietgovernment can guarantee the masses against
the evils of capitalism, we believe that unity and a Labor government can strengthen the forces of
peace, defeat fascism and achieve the immediate economic demands of the working class and all
toiling people."29
Althoughthe modified strategy was not as explicitly reformist as its predecessor, it still contained the seeds of
reformism -- howfar, it could be asked, was a Laborgovernment capable of going. Stagismquickly flourished in
Communist theory, but bore no reformist flowers or fruit in Australia until the 196Os. Shortly before the 1937
Federal elections Edgar Ross, covertCommunist, ALP member and editor of the Miners' Federation newspaper
(andLloyd's brother) wrotein Common Cause:
"Lyons['s Government] has meant the supremacy of profits over wages. It has meant taxing the
workers to increase the wealth of the rich. In its train it has left unemployed workers. bankrupt
farmers, povertyand malnutrition.
22 ibid. p281.
23. E. Varga Changes in Capitalism duringtheWarCommunist Party ofAustralia, Sydney 1941 p6.
24. See, for example S. Mason "The Next Tasks ofthe Aust. Communists" Communist ReviewSeptember 1936 p27:
"From now on the centre ofall our campaigns relating to economic and democratic liberties must be the election offighting
Labor governments."
25. See Chapter Three for adiscussion ofTrotsky's analysis ofthe Popular Front.
26. L. Ross TheRailwayWorkers' Charter Australian Railways Union, Sydney 19361 p13.
27.Workers Weelcly editorial 24/4136 p4. - .
28. The ALP Federal Executive rejected the CPA's application in 1937, Workers Weekly 2714137 p2, confirmed its decision in 1938 and the
Federal ALP Conference of1939 endorsed the Federal Executive's action, Davidson TheCommunist PartyofAustralia op, cit. p76-7.
29. J. B. Miles in Workers Weelcly 300137 p2 Also see J. B.Miles "NSW Labor Party Conference" Communist ReviewMay 1937 plO.
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"A fighting Labor Government can reverse the situation.
"... A Labor Government will have two paths to choose. One leads to peace progress and
prosperity; the other to war, reactionandcrisis."30
Edgar's argumententailednot only a reformist, but also a governmental underconsumptionism.
TheRosses' statements were not simply camouflage for theiroperations insidethe ALP. The CPA's own journal
in June and July 1938published a two part article by John Strachey, a prominentfellow travellerof the British
Communist Party, which offered a governmental underconsumptionist solution to crises, along the lines of
Keynes's General Theory. The articlewas an early step on Strachey's road to an explicit, Keynesian reformism in
Programme/or Progress of 1940and later Contemporary Capitaltsmz) His Communist Review article started in
a seeminglyorthodox Communistfashion:
"It is not until we have builtup the main foundations, at any rate, of a socialisteconomic. systemthat
we can ever be free from the menaceof crisis, slumpand mass unemployment."32
Yet his argumentmade it clear that while the "menace" was inherent in capitalism, the actualityof crisis was not.
He.saw crises as the result of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, in underconsumptionist terms similar to
Varga's, because
"The market for consumers' goods which... capital goods can, and must, produce, if they are to
yield a profit,cannot expandat anything like the necessary speedto absorb the potentialproducts of
the ever-growing mass of capitalgoods."
Stracheyconcluded that the policy of a progressive government
"Must be to replace' the inadequate volume of investment which the private entrepreneurs are
undertaking with a great volumeof public investment."
Following Keynes he mentioned that any kind of public investment, financed through government borrowing,
even digging holes in the ground and filling themup again,would be better thannone at all. He also thought that
exchangecontrolwould be necessaryto preventa flight by capitalists fromthe currency.
"To sum up. It is perfectlypossiblefor a Labor or progressive government to overcomea slump."33
A similar case was made in the December 1938 issue of Australian Left News, a Communist front publication,
under the title "Coming Slump Can Be Avoided: Practical Plan of SocialInvestment". It added the proviso that
successrequired a Laborgovernment "backedby a united,determined, andpoliticallyawareLabor movement" ,34
Strachey's and theAustralian Left News articles may not have beenwritten by CPA members and weresomewhat
in advance of the CPA's orthodoxy, in explicitness and the obvious influence of Keynes, but their appearance
showed the direction in which Party economic analyses were moving. A controversy in the CPA over banking
reform confirmedthe directionof this trend.
Communists on BankingReform
Given the popularityof MoneyPower ideas in the labour movementand the stresson the fmancialsystemin ALP
economicpolicy, the questionof the bankswas an importantone for the CPA. During the early 1930s,the Party
argued that bank nationalisation and the "socialisation of credit" did not offer a solution to capitalist crises. By
1937 the line had changed. There was, however, confusion over just how far the change went. In March 1937
Fred Paterson, a long term CPA member and eventually the Party's only successful Parliamentary candidate,
called for agitation around bank nationalisation, the confiscation of shares and large bank deposits, in order to
"crush fmance capital".3S The proposal had a militant ring, as did much of the rhetoric of the Popular Front.
Patersonraised the issuein a way that assumedthe CPA's first versionof the PopularFront, involving Communist
affiliationto the ALP and the implementation of radical measures by a government of the combinedparty.
E. W. Campbell, editor of Communist Review, replied to Paterson in the terms of the new, stagist approach to the
PopularFront
"We fully expect a future Labor government to put into operationa programme in the interests of
the toiling people-- the 40 hourweek, increasedwages, assistance to farmers, etc. This programme
will be at the expense of the rich exploiters because of the inroads which will be made into their
profits by such legislation. However it still does not go beyond the limit of existing property
relationships.
"An ImportantPoint
"Such measures will still be reforms -- certainly reforms of a more radical character than any yet
attempted, but, nevertheless, still reforms. Such being the case, thenecessity to crush the power of
fmance capital does not arise. In fact, such a task is beyond the power of any constitutional
30. CommonCauseeditorial 16110/37 p4. .
31.J. Thomas John Strachey EyreMethuen, London 1973ppI86-7.
32 J. Strachey "SlumpandtheStruggle" Communist ReviewJune 1938 p22
33.J. Strachey "Slumpandthe Stroggle" Communist ReviewJuly 1938pp42.43,46.
34.AustralianLeft News December 1938ppl0-2.
35.F. Paterson "Banking Monopoly Exposed" Communist ReviewMarch1937.
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government. It must be regarded as a measure which can only be carried out by the dictatorship of
the proletariat, aftertheseizure of power."36
According to Campbell, banknationalisation (with compensation for the owners) and "curbs" on finance capital
werepossible anddesirable undercapitalism and could be carried out by an ALP government. Confiscation, on
theotherhandwas onlypossible afterthe revolution. His position was, therefore, less militant thanPaterson's --
in practice theCPA's later,stagist version of thePopular Frontwasmoremoderate thanthe initial approach.
Ironically, Campbell justifiedhis position that banknationalisation waspossible undercapitalism witha reference
to Lenin's raising of the demand in 1917. He thus turned Lenin's position on its head. Lenin had made his
demand after issuing his April Theses, which placed a proletarian revolution on the immediate agenda and in
explicit opposition to the stagist approach of the Mensheviks who wanted to give the "progressive" Kerensky
Government time to implement a series of reforms. In thepre-revolutionary situation of September 1917, Lenin's
call was a transitional demand highlighting the Government's inability to take a measure, quite compatible with
the survival of capitalism, in order to improve theeconomic situation, andthefact that workers' struggles wereal-
readypointing beyond theconfmes of reforms within capitalism to another revolution. He transcended the Second
International counterposition of reform and revolution, reproduced by the CPA during the Popular Front period,
by focusing on the logic of theclass struggles in progress. For more details on Lenin's position see the Appendix
to thisChapter.
Paterson, in not distinguishing between changes possible under capitalism from those possible under the
dictatorship of the proletariat, also transcended the dichotomy between reforms and, revolution, but only by
running the risk of liquidating the rationale for revolution altogether. Campbell's reaffirmation of the dichotomy,
and theParty's stagiststrategy, reproduced the strategy of the main parties of the SecondInternational and at the .
sametimelegitimised moremoderate demands thanPaterson's. But, crucially, it provided a continuing rationale
for the CPA's existence, just as the previous strategy, centering on affiliation to the ALP was collapsing, by
stating thata revolution wasstill necessary.
Campbell's article laid down guidelines for the Communist approach to banking during the later Popular Front
period.. The release of the Banking Commission's Report in July 1937 put these to a practical test. The CPA's
initial response to the Commission's recommendations was apparently conditioned by a healthy distrust of the
products of sucha respectable body, appointed by theLyons Government. Workers Weekly's general assessment
of the Report's significance wasaccurate, evenif it neglected theimmediate political contextof the Commission's
establishment: .
"Modifications of the banking superstructure of Australia during the crisis andtheneedto takestock
of these changes; to .assimilate the crisis experience and prepare for the next crisis, were the
principle motives that led to the setting up of the Royal Commission on banking by the Lyons
government."
In line withits Popular Frontpolicies, Workers Weekly regarded the Commission's recommendations as aimed at
"extending the domination of finance capitalover the whole of the.Australian people", although the banksquickly
expressed their hostility to them.37 TheCPA obviously did not see the Reportas a likelysourceof proposals for
curbing finance capital to which Campbell hadreferred three months before.
Curtinhad already calledon the Government to acton theRoyalCommission's Report in August. By the time of
hispolicyspeechfor the 1937 elections, on 20 September, he identified theReport'S recommendations with "the
Labor Party's views". The CPA took these cues. Early in September it reversed its attitude to the Report,
bringing its position into accord with that of the ALP. No publicexplanation of the change was made, nor was
thefact that it had taken placeevenacknowledged whenWorkers Weekly pronounced
"These measures, if put into practice, should give a Federal Labor government sufficient control
over the banking systemto combat anyattempted sabotage of its progressive legislation on the part
of the banks."38
Soon theCommunist newspaper announced "BankCommission: Curtin to GiveEffect: Important to the 'Small
Man'")9 The Party's first reaction to the Reportwas conditioned by its Third Periodscepticism aboutbanking
reformand suspicion of stateinitiatives far removed fromthepressures of theclassstruggle. Theresponses of the
ALPand the banks seemed to indicate that theforces identified as progressive, in termsof thePopular Front, were
favourably disposed to the Report, whilethe core of reaction, the banks, were not. The Popular Front dichotomy
between the financial oligarchy on the one hand and the people on the other could not accommodate policies
serving the interests of thecapitalist class as a whole, butin conflict with theshort-term interests of the banks. In
Australia thePopularFrontwasnot characterised byCommunists making such explicitpublicattempts to embrace
36.B.W.campbell"Nationalisation of Banking" Communist Review May1937 p4,emphasis inoriginal.
37.Workers Weekly 13/8137 p3,andfor a similar assessment seeWorkers Weekly 31/8137 p3.
38.Workers Weekly 1019137. Further favourable comments on theReport inWorkers Weekly 1419137 p3.
39.Workers Weekly 19/10137 p3.
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sections of the capitalist class, as in some European countries, but decisions such as that to supportthe ALP's
positionon the Banking RoyalCommission Reporthad the sameeffectin practice.40
In October 1937 HectorRoss (the only one of the Ross brothers to be an open Communist at this stage) summed
up the practicalimplications of theCPA's new attitude to banking reform, On the one hand
"It is necessary to recognise, then, that no amountof bank legislation could obviatecrises since the
causes are deeplyrooted in the capitalistsystemitself."
Radical underconsumptionism was vindicated. But, recognising bankers' hostility to the activities of a
progressiveLaborgovernment
"We, therefore, see the banking system as instrumental to a Labor government carrying out the
necessarybasicmeasures to alleviate theconditions of the masses."41
Only "supervision" of the banks would be necessary, this "would not be nationalisation in the full sense of the
word". Ross endorsed the policies of ALP moderates and sections of the capitalist class on banking, without
openlyaccepting the reformistunderconsumptionist theoryon which theywere premissed, although alleviation of
the conditions of the masses by means of the banking system presumably meant improving the health of the
(capitalist) economy. The CPA did not, and was probably unwilling if not unable to, develop a convincing
critique of Keynesian economics, which was an electoral asset for the ALP and held out the promise of better
times to come undera progressive government.
Gordon Crane producedthe most extensive accountof the Banking Commission Report by a Communist in the
~U's Workers' Information. He defended theReportfrom the criticisms of the trading banksand,supporting its
recommendations, pointed out that no legislation was necessary to implement the most important of them, those
relating to monetary policy. The Report
"Canbe regarded as an endorsement of Labour's criticismof the policy of the banks during the
depression; andall of its recommendations..• are in accordwithLabour's policy••• "
Crane also called for the popularisation of the Commission's fmdings. Far from criticising the Keynesian
framework of the Report, he concurred that
"The open-minded student must conclude that, if the criticisms of the Commission are justified --
and no one has attempted to prove otherwise -- then so are the Commission's recommendations.
Oppositionto such a fully-demonstrated case can only representa last desperate effort to protectand
defend vestedinterests."42
Crane did not go as far as claiming that the implementation of the Report would prevent capitalist crises, the
Report itself only claimedthat its recommendations had to be regardedas only a part of anti-depression policies,
whichwould also includedfiscalmeasures. But his acceptance of the ideaof thegeneral interestembodied in the
Commission's findings ruledout the possibility that the working class mighthave a "vestedinterest" which could
not be expressed within the framework of the Report and disputes within the capitalist class over its
recommendations.
The Limits of Communist Reformism
Several factors qualified the· Popular. Front Communist Party's openness to reformist, governmental
underconsumptionism as they did the Party's readiness to carry through the full logic of its nationalist anti-
monopolism. Radicalunderconsumptionism remained an expression of faith in socialism and the SovietUnion.43
With the adoption of a stagist strategy, radical underconsumptionism could be used as a differentia speciae to
justify the continued existence of the CPA alongside the~. The Party's need to avoid degenerating into a
Stalinistsect withouta serious base in any sectionof societywas of particular importance in restricting theCPA's
adoption of a governmental (as distinctfrom a broaderreformist) underconsumptionism. PopularFront policies
justified an accommodation with reformism and nationalism, but could only be implemented if the the CPA
sustained and expanded its influence in the working class. The Party did not drop the class struggle entirely, in
40. Note, however, that the CPA admonished the ALP to"strive for an alliance with the oppositional groups within the Country Party and the
U.A.P. to defeat Lyons", Central Committee Unite for Peace Freedom Democracy op, clL 116. The CPA was most explicit when it came to
foreign policy, see Workers Weekly 17/8138 pl, for concern to bring W. M Hughes "into agreement with the Federal LaborParty".
41. H. Ross "Nationalisation of Banking" Communist ReviewOctober 1937 pp18, 20. C.f. R. Dixon "Socialism and the Australian Labor
Movement" Communist ReviewJanuary 1935 pp19-20: .
"With the development ofthe crisis it[the Labor Party] degenerated so far that today the onlr, policy itiscapable ofisreform
ofthe banking system torestore capitalism to'prosperity', tostrengthen the capitalist system. '
42 G. Crane "Banking and the People", Workers' Informotion 1(2), May-July 1938 passim. Also Crane's comments on the Banking
Commission Report inAdvocate 15110137 pplO-l; G. Crane "Governments and Banks" Communist ReviewSeptember 1938 pp33-4, where he
concluded that banknationalisation was not possible under capitalism because ofthe fusion ofbank and industnal capital.
43. Nevertheless, the Russian leadership, which provided the CPAwith much ofits analysis ofinternational events and economic theory, did
not seem toregard Keynesianeconomics asan ideology requiring rapid refutation. The General Theory was first mentioned in the Russian
economic literature only in 1938. J.Kuczynski's NewFashions in Wage Theory (published by the British Communist pUblishers Lawrence and
Wishart in 1937) was favourably reviewed in Russia but no substantial attention was paid to the new economics until after World War 11. For
the history of Russian attitudes to Keynesian economics see C. B. Turner An Analysis of Soviet Views on John Maynard Keynes Duke
University Press, Durham 1969, pp21-S for the pre-World War 11 period.
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order to win respectable friends.44 Individual Communists wereamongst the best shop floormilitants, in building
workshop organisation and leading industrial struggles. The CPA generally supportedworkers alreadyin struggle
and regarded economic disputes as self-validating, on the basis of the labour theory of value. Workers were
exploited under capitalism; they had a right to try to minimise thisexploitation. The "get whatyou can, whileyou
can" approach was endorsed. Higher wages and betterconditions weredesirable because theyserved the interests
of the working class and not necessarily because, as in trade union' underconsumptionist theory, they were
solutions to the problems of capitalism.45
In the short term, the CPA's radicalturn in 1939put an abrupthalt to its shift to reformist underconsumptionism.
In 1940Tribune published a hostile review of Strachey's Programme for Peace, by English Communist Emile
Burns. He counterposed the Keynesian approach to the orthodoxy of radicalunderconsumptionism:
"The trouble is that, however low the rate of interest, no manufacturer will keep his works going
whenhe cannotfind a marketfor the product."46
The CPA's transition to reformism was madealong a zig zagpath,with detours between 1939and 1941 and again-
between 1947 and 1952. By the late 1960s, however, the main body of the left of the labour movement in
Australia, constituted by the CPA, the ALPleft and their supporters, accepted thatcrises couldbe eliminated from
capitalism, given sufficiently enlightened legislation.
A Glimpseof Marxist Theory
From its foundation until the 1980s the CPA believed that its economic analyses were underpinned by the labour
theory of value. During the Popular Front period the Party referred to Marx's Capital to exorcise incorrect
theories and distributedMarx's economic writings andprimers in Marxisteconomics. Its educational classesgave
members a grounding in the labour theory of value. Some trade union newspapers, notably the Queensland
ARU's Advocate, also carried material on economic theory.47 Nor was the labour theory of value the exclusive
preserve of the.CPA. Reformist socialists in the ALP. still adhered to some of the traditions of the Second
International. The Victorian Labor College, the NSW Socialisation Units and Victorian Socialist Party had
provided institutional foci for thesecurrents. A Melbourne TradesHall Council mass distribution leafletof 1937,
for example propagated the theory.48
In the ALP and the CPA during the 1930s Marxist economics was a dogma rather than a tool for analysing and
changing society. Marxists in both organisations, moreover, explained crises in underconsumptionist terms,
withoutreference to the contradictions internal to capitalistproduction. Nevertheless, for a briefperiod around
1937, there was an anomaly in this overall picture. For the only time before the 1970s, a Marxistexplanation of
economic-crises in terms of the tendency of the rate for profit to fall was presented to a wide working class
audience. It is worthexamining thisanomaly, because it demonstrates that dynamic Marxist ideas were available
to the Australian labourmovement, evenif neitherof its politicalpartiestook themup.
Unions have often used theirjournals as instruments for the education of their members. During the mid-1930s
the ARU initiatedan education scheme for its members more systematic than most. GordonCrane conducted the
program, first for the Queensland branchand then for the national union. He was a university trainedintellectual,
long-standing CPA member and had been employed for a while as a Queensland ARU organiser during the
1920s.49 The initial aim of the ARU's educational scheme was to develop union members' understanding of the
economics of capitalism. In this Crane's main text was John Strachey's The Nature ofCapitalist Crisis, written
duringthe transition from the ThirdPeriodto thePopularFront and firstpublishedby Gollancz in March 1935.
The explanation of crises in Strachey's book was based on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the
development of disproportions between the production of consumption and capital goods.50 It was capable of
differentiating betweencyclicalcrises andlonger term economic movements. Strachey's approach therefore owed
more to theHilferding tradition of analysis than that of RosaLuxemburg'sradicalunderconsumption in whichthe
44. Thus Communist Party ofAustralia Unite op,cit. pSaffinned that .
"In all cases the essential condition for unity isstruggle - the struggle for theneeds ofthe masses, for democracy and peace
and resistance to reaction."
Also see J. B. BlakeTheyMustPayCommunist Party ofAustralia, Melbourne 1937.+
45. E.g. see Afhocate 15/6137 ppl-2, 39/6137 p3. If the ALP was somehow involved in adispute, the situation was different. During the 1937
Brisbane brewery strike and lockout, for example, the CPA encouraged workers in their struggle. Yet the Party also gave credence tothe
notion that the State ALPGovernment was, orshould beexpected to be, an ally, sell Workers Weekly 2419137 pt, 2819137 pl, editorial 5/10137
p2 When an issue was further removed from industrial struggle, and the ALP more involved, as in State orFederal elections, Communist
tended tomove further inthe direction ofgovernmental underconsumptionist arguments.
46. Tribune 23/4140 p2. Also see E. Bums Mr. Keynes Answertd: An Examination Lawrence and Wishart, London 1940, a critique of
Keynes's HowtoPayfor theWar.
47. See the Advocate during 1937 in particular. Also, for example D. McLeod "Educate, Organise, Control" AmalgamatedEngiMering Union
JoUT1l4l February 1936.
48.!Abor Call2S12137 p3. Also see "ADC ofEconomics: Contributed by the Victorian Labor College" LaborCall 5/10139 to 812140 in 15
parts.
49. On Crane see T.Nolan YouPass ThisWay OnlyOnceColonial Press, Brisbane 1974, pp32, 40, 48, 82 See also T.Moroney "Forward" to
G. Crane The Workers' Struggle against Capitalist Depression and the Way Out Australia Railways Union Educational and Organising
Scheme, Brisbane, 19377 and obituary Advocate 15/2149 p4.
50. The law of the tendency ofthe rate ofprofit tofall was, aswe have seen, included in Soviet expositions ofMarxist economics, but was
superfluous to their explanations ofeconomic crises, e.g Leontiev Political Economy op, cit. pl36. .
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Soviet economic orthodoxy stood. The situation outside Russia, however, was less propitious for the brutal
suppression of heterodox ideas in the Communist movement. So long as theircommitinent to the SovietUnion
was beyond question, intellectuals in and around western Communist Parties might be given some scope for
original thought. In Britain M. Dobb and Strachey expounded Marxist explanations of crises in terms of the
tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Dobb, a Cambridge academic and Communist Party member mainly
produced academic work of limited accessibility and therefore less consequence as a threat to Communist
orthodoxy.51 On theotherhandStrachey was "themostproductive andwidely readBritish marxist theoretician of
the decade".52 But he had been advised by the leaders of the Communist Partyof GreatBritain not to join the
Party and therefore, as a fellow traveller of independent means, probably had a greaterscope than Partymembers
for innovative argument.53 The Nature ofEconomic Crisis combined an incisive critique of bourgeois economics
andpresentation of his account of criseswithan impeccably uncritical account of the SovietUnion. The Nature of
Capitalist Crisis was very wellreceived in the Australian labourmovement.54 YetCrane was the onlyprominent
labour movement publicist to recognise the significance of its explanation of the crises in terms of the rate of
profitrecognised.55
During the Third Period of sectarian hostility to most non-Communist organisations, Strachey's account was
useful as a means of starkly distinguishing Communists from all those who might use underconsumptionist
explanations of crises. Withthe advent of thepolitics of thePopularFrontthisbecame a hindrance to Communist
policy. Strachey's position soon shifted to the orthodoxy of radical underconsumptionism in his Theory and
Practice of Socialism and Why You Should Be a Socialist. His shift to radical underconsumptionism proved to be
a stepping stone to an explicitly Keynesian analysis, already emerging in 1938.56 In 1938 Dobbwrote to Strachey
that .
"I felt youhad swallowed so muchof the Keynes-Meade [analysis] as to give an almost Douglasite
twist to the whole thing Ii.e, Strachey'snotes for a bookon Keynes]... This is particularly clear in
someof yourformulations aboutcrisisbeing'a problemof purchasing power'."57
Apart from The Nature of Capitalist. Crisis, as his course's textbook, Crane alsorecommended a variety of other
books in his educational supplement to theAdvocate.58 ByMay 1937, theAdvocate repottedthatEducational and
Organisational Committees, essentiallystudy circlesaround Crane's course, existed amongst rail workers at least
in Mareeba, Townsville, Innisfail, Bowen, Mackay, Gladstone, Gympie, North Brisbane, South Brisbane and
Toowoomba.59 .
Following Strachey, Cranesaw the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as the core of the Marxist explanation of
economic crises. He presented this analysis through the Queensland ARU "E and 0 Scheme" pamphlet The
Workers Struggle Against Capitalism and the Way Out, in lectures and through the pages of the Advocate.60 In
1937 two articles by Crane, also strongly influenced by The Nature of Capitalist Crisis appeared in Communist
Review and the following year he produced the most impressive empirical accounts of Australian economic
developments by a Communist in the twoissues of the ARU's Workers' InformationJ-61 The Communist Review
pieces contrasted strikingly with the CPA and Comintern orthodoxy that crises were due to the contradiction
51. Dobb did producesomepopulararticlestoo, suchas "EnglandandEconomic Crisis" Communist Review March1938pp37-8, an essentially
empiricalaccount, and Economics of Private Enterprise CurrentBook Distributors, Sydney 1944. The latter explained crises in termsof the
rate of profit. For a critiqueof Dobb's particular derivation of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall see A. Shaikh"Political
Economy and Capitalism: Notes on Dobb's Theoryof Crisis"Cambridge Journal of Economics 2, June 1978 pp233-51. Shaikhpoints out
that, in his Political Economy of Capitalism Dobb regardedfalling profit rates as an effect of rising wages, rather than of a rising organic
composition of capital. On Dobb'scareer see E. J. Hobsbawm "MauriceDobb" in C. H. Feinstein(ed) Socialism, Capitalism and Economic
Growth: Essays Presented to Maurice Dobb Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 1967.
52. P. AddisonThe Roadto 1945 Cape, London 1975 p62. For a similar comments see C. Harman"State Capitalism, Annaments andthe
General Formof the CurrentCrisis"International Socialism 2(16)Spring1982p38 and Hobsbawm "MauriceDobb"op, cit, pl.
53. For Strachey's careersee ThomasJohn Strachey op. cit.,
54. L. Ross quoted from Strachey's bookin "CanHitler Last?' Amalgamated Engineering Union Journal May 1935pp4-9,where he called it
"one of the most importantbooks published since the depression". Ross also recommended it in Australian Highway June 1935p101 and a
reviewby "B" followedin the October1935issue. E. M H. (E. M. Higgins) reviewedTheNature of Capitalist Crisis in Communist Review
August1935 ppS5-8. Anotherreview, by E. E. Ward appeared in the Communist influenced Proletariat JUly-September 1935,published by
the Melbourne University Labor Cub. Workers Weekly serialised the chapters on Douglas credit between20/8135 and 8/10135. Even
"Scrutator" LaborCall1219135 pi wrotethat
"The author [Strachey) is to be congratulated on having logically and scientifically analysed the causes of economic
depression."
SS.J. Dewsnap, an officialof the Teachers' Industrial Union,presented the onlyother accountof crises in termsof the tendency of the rate of
. profitto fall that I have been able to find. This was in the third lectureof the Melbourne TradesHall CouncilPropaganda Committee's 1935
winterseries, shortlyafterthe appearance of Strachey's book. The lecturewas printedLabor Call2SnJ35.
56. See Strachey "The Slump and the Struggle" op. cit, for an early step in the direction of reformism and J. Strachey Contemporary
Capitalism RandomHouse,New York1956for the end result .
57. ThomasJohnStrachey op. cit. p175.
58.Advocate 15f1J37 pS. The publications recommended included A. LeontievPolitical Economy; J. KeracherEconomics for Beginners and
Why Unemployment, USpamphlets; M Marcy ShopTalks onEconomics, US pamphlet, whichwent through two Australian editions, in 1919
and 1930;Marx Value PriceandProfit and ModemPublishers'TheTwoWorld's series (theonly copyI havefoundis in the National Library
of Australia).
59.Advocate 15/5137plO.. .
60. Crane TheWorkers' Struggle op. cit.,Advocate 16111/36 p4, 15/4137 p4. For a reviewof TheNature o/Capitalist Crisis Advocate August
~r.t~~e "Bankers, Economists and the Crisis" Communist R,#view September and October 1937, "Present Economic Tendencies in
Austra1ia" Workers' Information February1938and "Bankingand the People" Workers' information op,cit,
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between production and consumption, presented, for example, by Varga only a few months earlier in the same
journal. Cranecontended thatMarx's
"Understanding of capitalism was so exhaustive and practical that he perceived that what was
required to promote recovery wasa restoration of therate of profitandhe believed that theessential
agencies for restoring the rateof profitandso creating a revival were(a) reduction in wages, and(b)
depreciation of thevalueof constant capital (i.e, money invested in plantandmachinery)."62
Crane's economic analyses seem to have been linked to the CPA's earlier commitment to working class self-
activity, ratherthan blindloyalty to Russia's interests. In hispamphlet he claimed that
"It is only through his own efforts, and not through depending upon capitalists, economists and
politicians thathe [theworker] can achieve the 'good life', andpromote his ownemancipation."63
From the beginning of the Popular Frontperiod, at the latest, working class self-emancipation had ceased to be
part of the CPA's practical politics and was seldom expressed in Communist publications. It was possible for
Crane to propagate his (and Marx's) views for a period for several reasons. First the CPA still had a verbal
commitment to the working class and Marxism and a real interest in preserving its base in that class. Secondly,
Crane's exposition of the Marxist theory of crisis remained at a fairly abstract level. His accounts of Australian
economic developments, in the 1938 Workers' Information publications did not apply his earlierexplanation of
crises, they remained essentially empirical.64 No overt contradiction thus emerged to highlight the contrast
between his Marxistand andthe Party's radical underconsumptionist theories. In the ARUCranewas left to deal
with theory and was not in a position to relate to struggles as an ordinary organiser. Thirdly, Crane was an
intellectual based in Queensland, with the support of a union not controlled by the CPA behind him. This may
have given him some independence from the Communist Party's Sydney headquarters. Whenhe stepped out of
line on a question of foreign policy, however, by dissenting from the Party's new policy of national defence, it
responded rapidly.65 Craneapparently changed his mind, as he conducted the 1938 ARUcourse on "Fascism,
War and theProblems of the Australian Workers" which presented the Communist position on these questions.66
Nevertheless, the published notes for the Course included an original examination of the tendencies to state
capitalism in Australiaduring the 1930s, inspired bycomments in Varga's The Great Crisis.67Subsequently Crane
followed Strachey's trajectory in embracing Keynesian economics.es Theobjective circumstances which dictated
Fitzpatrick's adherence to left nationalism also affected Crane. There was no insititutional focus to sustain and
advance the insights of eitherindividual in a revolutionary direction.
62. Crane"Bankers,Economists and Crisis"op. cit, p27,cf., E. Varga"A NewCrisisComingl" Communist Review July 1937p36.
63. CraneTheWorkers' Struggle op. cit, p27. .
64. Alsosee G. Crane"Youthand Unemployment" Communist ReviewSeptember 1939pp52-4.
65. See G. Crane"I Disagree" Communist ReviewFebruary 1937 ppl3-6, R. Dixon"R. DixonReplies to G. Crane"Communist Review May
1937p36. The other contributors to the "debate" all supported the Partyline.
66. Crane's 1938 "Government and the Banks" op, clt. and "Bankingand the People"op. clt, both betrayeda commitment to PopularFront
politicstoo.
67. F. G. Crane Education Course 1938 Australian Railways Union, Ruskin Press, Melbourne 1938 pp5-6 (copy in National Library of
Australia).
68. See Railroad 2617/46 p2, 23/8/46 p2,4/10146 p2. These articles were published when the CPA had already abandoned its war-time
accommodation to Keynesian economics.
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Appendix to Chapter 5: Lenin on Bank Nationalisation
E. W. Campbell's authority in stating that bank nationalisation could be accomplished under capitalism was
Lenin's The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. In the pamphlet Lenin did point out that bank
nationalisation wouldnot end privateproperty,but he also maintained that
lilt is impossible to nationalise the banks alone, without proceeding to create a state monopoly of
commercial and industrialsyndicates (sugar,coal, iron, oil, etc.). and withoutnationalising them."
Further, in the course of his discussion of the measures necessaryto prevent the collapseof the Russianeconomy,
he stated that
"In point of fact, the question of control [overthe economy] boils down to whocontrols whom,i.e.,
which class is in control and whichclass is beingcontrolled."
That is, whether theProvisionalGovernment should be replacedby the dictatorship of the proletariat
---- .. "Only the winning of power by the proletariat, headedby the Bolshevik Party, can put an end to the .
outrageous actions of Kerensky and Co. and restore the work of democratic food distribution ,
supply and other organisations, whichKerenskyand his government are frustrating."
In reply to the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who were committed to a stagist strategy,
"picture[ing]socialism as some remote, unknown and dim future", Lenin argued that "We must
either advance[towards socialism] or retreat .. But to fear advancemeans retreating",
"Becausestate-monopoly capitalismis a completematerial preparation for socialism, the threshold
of socialism, a rung on the ladder of historybetween whichand the rung calledsocialism there are
no intermediate rungs."69
Lenin's critiqueof the "PopularFrontists" of 1917appliedwith equal validityto thoseof 1937.
In 1934 a critique of J. Lang's Why I Fight in Workers Weekly had expressed the above interpretation of The
Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. In contrast to Campbell's interpretation it arguedLenin's partial
demands .
"Weremeantas the steppingstone to the confiscation of the banksby the workers' government."70
69. V. t.Lenin the Impending Catastrophe and Howto CombatIt in his SelectedWorkrVolume 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1977, ppl93,
207,209,212 .
70. Workers Weeldy 28/9134 p3.

97
CHAPTER SIX
MAKING AUSTRALIA SAFE FOR THE LONG BOOM: 1941·50
The years of Labor Government between 1941 and 1949, and particularly those after World War II, established
theparameters for Australian foreign policy through to the present and laid the basis for Australia's participation
in the long post-war boom. The military alliances of the War were ruptured soon after, giving way to a
polarisation of international politics from which the Chifley Government could not escape. But there were
important continuities between the war-time domestic policies of the Curtin Government and those of its
successor. The Curtin Government successfully mobilised the nation and contained the class struggle to save
Australian capitalists from external aggressors, in striking contrast to the failures of the Menzies and Fadden
conservative governments. The Chifley Government went on to manage the upsurge iIi industrial disputes after
the war and preside over a number of important economic reforms. While the Labor Governments' measures
werenot responsible for the boomfromthe 1950s through to the 1970s, which was an international phenomenon,
theymadea substantial contribution to its localextent
WorldWarII
The exigencies of World War IT constituted a forcible solution to the international contradictions faced by
Australian capitalism during the 1930s. As a part of theEmpire military and economic blockAustralia hadfound
itself without reliable military support, because of Britain's European preoccupations, and without prospects for
expanded primary produce export markets. The war in Europe led to an immediate expansion in demand for
Australian exports. Britain made bulk purchases of Australian wool, dairy produce, preserved fruit, sugarand
meat, although wheat, barley, wineand fresh fruit exports were curtailed.1 The outbreak of the Pacific war led to
the replacement of Britain as Australia's key ally by the morereliable and more powerful USA. Curtin's 1941
"call to America" had little to do with the establishment of this enduring alliance: sentiment, gratitude andracial
affinity were all insignificant compared with the common Japanese military threat to Australian and US
capitalism. The war led to the disintegration of the preceding military/economic blocs, first because it established
US hegemony over the western allies and ended the isolation of the USSR. The defeat of Japan, Germany and
. their allies was followed by the forcible integration of vanquished or occupied countries into Russian or western
spheres of influence.
The entry of the USA into the War was followed by increased trade and greater integration of Australian and
American production. As early as August 1941, the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter promised freer trade after
the war andhence the extension of US economic influence. A series of conferences and agreements embodied the
mainfeatures of the new world economic order that emergedafter the War: MutualAid Agreements including
those between the USA and Britain, the USA and Australia; the BrettonWoods Agreement on the international
. financial system; the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations; the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT); andconferences on the proposed International TradeOrganisation (ITO). Thedismantling of the
old military/economic blocks meant that Australian export trade would be in a much improved position in the
post-war period, withimproved access to a numberof important markets. Nevertheless, Britain was to remain the
mostimportantoutletfor Australian exports and the mainsource of overseas capitalfor almosttwenty years after
the War. At the same time, the destruction of Japan's military power and the emergence of the US alliance
ensuredAustralia greatermilitary security.
Duringthe War the Australian economy grewvery rapidly, compared to the previous periodand to that of World
War I. In 1939unemployment stood at abouteight per cent. of the workforce, but by 1943 the levelwas almost
zero. As in the 1930s, manufacturing was the leading sectorof the economy. Manufacturing employment grew
from565,000in 1938-39 to 766,000 in 1943. Employment in the metaltrades industries alonegrewfrom 177,000
to 341,000 in the sameperiod. Machine tool production rose 700 per cent. Theseincreases largely arose out of
the needs of the War, which also indirectly boosted Australian output. Australia was able to improve exports to
markets east of Suez vacated by European producers. The Warcontributed to both thegrowth anddiversification
of Australia's industrial base,2
In circumstances of rapid economic growth, other things being equal, a substantial rise in the level of working
class combativity might have beenexpected. Even during the late 1930s, the rate of industrial disputation had
increased with the decline of unemployment. Now workers werein a betterbargaining position than for overa
decade. Yet, although employers and governments were insisting on very high levels of overtime, inferior
1.SeeS.J. ButlinWarEconomy )939-1942 Australian WarMemorial, Canberra 1961 ppS5-103. ..
2. See S. J. Butlinand C. B. Schedvin WarEconomy 1942-1945 Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1977and T. Sheridan Mindful Militants:
TheAmalgamatedEngineering Union inAustralia 1930-72 Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 1975p145.
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working conditions andspeed-ups, thelevelof industrial militancy did not show a consistent rise. Afteran initial
increase in the number of days lost in strikes, in 1940, the extent of disputes, measured on this basis fell
dramatically, as shownin Table3.
Table 3. Industrial Disputes 1940 to 1960
Year Nwnber DaysLost 'Workers Involved
1940 350 1,507,252 192,597
1941 567 984,174 248,107
1942 602 378,195 169,263
1943 785 990,151 296,103
1944 941 912,752 276,358
1945 945 2,119,641 315,938
1946 869 1,947,844 348,548,
1947 982 1,338,728 327,137
1948 1,141 1,662,686 317,149
1949 849 1,333,990 264,577
1950 1,276 2,062,888 431,701
1951 1,344 872,974 408,592
1952 1,627 1,163,504 505,734
1953 1,459 1,050,830 496,046
1954 1,490 901,639 370,074
1955 1,532 1,010,884 444,647
1956 ,1,306 1,121,383 427,983
1957 1,103 630,213 337,043
1958 987 439,890 282,849
1959 869 365,039 237,471
1960 1,145 725,107 603,279
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Labour Reports.
The apparent anomaly in strike statistics is mainly explicable in terms of the actions of the Curtin Labor
Government and the trade union bureaucracy. From the start of the War it became increasingly clear that
conservative governments were incapable of effectively leading Australia's war effort. This was not primarily
because of a lack of administrative competence, although this was questioned too, but rather for want of co-
operation from the trade unions, The massive reorganisation of production and reallocation of labour power
entailedin totalwar couldnot be undertaken in the faceof tradeunion hostility, In 1939 the ACTU proclaimed a
boycott of theNational Register, a measure crucial to any planning for the redeployment of labourpow.er in case
of war. Only the intercession of ALP terminated the boycott. In 1940 even Curtin was unable to dissuade the
unions from boycotting theMenzies Government's trade union advisory panel. In 1940 and 1941 the level of
strikeactivity washigh. TheACTU endorsed theMiners' Federation 1940 campaign for theextension of the forty
hourweekandassistedotherstrikes during theflrst twoyears of theWar.3
Labor in Office
There was only one viablemeans of overcoming the hostility of the trade unions to the Government and its war
effort. Stateaction to destroy the powerof the labourmovement wouldhave been a costly and time consuming
exercise, running the risk of civil war, Norcould the Australian bourgeoisie rely on the support of a large middle
class mobilised by fascism to smash working classorganisation. In any case such an assaultwouldhave dented
.the justiflcation for the War as a fight for democracy and have rendered unreliable many of the workers in
uniform. Collaboration by theAustralian bourgeoisie with the Axis powers, against the Australian working class
was also ruled out. Australia's economic links with Britain and, increasingly the USA, were an important
consideration. Japan and Germany's threat to Australia's own modest imperial ambitions in the Pacific was
another. ' The only remaining tactic was the co-optation of the union movement, through a government which
3. J. Hagan Th4Historyofth4 ACTULongman OIeshire, Melbourne 1981 ppl08-9.
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could convincingly claim to workers that the Allies' War aims served their interests by defending civil and
democratic liberties.
The organic linksbetween the unions and the ALPmeant that a strategy of co-optation couldonly mean including
the ALP in the Government. The ALPhad quickly committed itself to supporting Australia's participation in the
War, though with little enthusiasm. Menzies understood the logic of the situation, as Churchill did in Britain,
stating in 1940that" ... a national government wouldbe worth nothing unless it had thesupport of the tradeunion
movement...".4 He invited theLaborParty into the Government. Curtin refused. Fadden soonreplaced Menzies
as Prime Minister and in October 1941 his Government fell and Curtin took office with the support of two
independent, conservative MHRs.
The advent of the Curtin Government facilitated speed-ups, over-time, pegging of wages and reduced living
standards, due to shortages of consumer goodswhich under its. predecessors wouldhave been impossible without
a dramatic increase in industrial unrest. In line with the ALP's long-standing predeliction for state-capitalist
measures, the Labor administration also dramatically increased the level of state intervention in the economy, to
the levels necessary for the conduct of total war, by means of closer control over the monetary system and the
allocation of resources, including labourpower. TheEconomic Organisation Regulations
"Tended to suspend the operations of the normal financial incentives over a greater part of the
economy, by pegging wages, profits, interest and prices, and by subjecting transfers in shares and
land to government consent.us
The Government broadened the taxation base by increasing income tax and reducing its threshold. This measure
wasjustified as necessary to finance a new "non-contributory" social security system, but in reality wasnecessary
for the fmancing of the war effort.6 The Curtin Government took over most of the administrative framework
established by the previous conservative Governments to implement its policies. The services of administrators
such as Essington Lewis, Managing Director of BHP, whom Menzies had appointed Director-General of
Munitions, were retained. Through cost-plus procurement policies, profits were also guaranteed to private
industry.
While the accession of the Labor Government was decisive for the incorporation of laborite unionofficials into .
the war effort,it wasnot the mainconsideration for the influential section of the unionbureaucracy which oriented
to the Communist rather than the LaborParty. Communist hostility to the War, a fruit of the Hitler-Stalin Pact,
lasted until the invasion of Russia by Germany in June 1941. For Communists, this transformed the "Second
Imperialist War" into the "GreatPatriotic War againstFascism". The policies of theComintern and theCPAnow
coincided with thoseof laborites, as far as theconductof the Warwasconcerned. Bothregarded the conservative
Parties as incapable of effectively directing Australia'sWar effort, which became a key issue after the end of the
"phoneywar" periodin Europein April 1940, and apparently a matterof life or death for an independent Australia
with Pearl Harbourin December 1941. By the end of 1941 Communists and many laborites concurred in their
nationalism and commitment toclass collaborationism for the sakeof thenational interest.
The newLaborGovernment was able to do whatits conservative predecessors couldnot
"The powers that the ACTUdenied, or at best ceded to the Menzies Government, it gave with far
less reserveand for a periodeven wholeheartedly to theCurtinGovernment."7
The co-operation between the Government and the labour movement was most pronounced at the most senior
levelsof the unions. Under the auspices of the FederalLabor Advisory Committee, the ACTU Executive hadco-
operated with the Parliamentary Labor Party since 1938. Now there were regular Sunday meetings between
ACTU officers and members of the Cabinet, to discuss policy and especially the prevention of strikes. In
December 1941 the Government convened a tripartite Conference on Industrial Matters. As with the Economic
Summitof 1983, the Government and unions set the pace with their proposals for collaboration between capital
and labour. The outcome was union involvement in the promotion of production, the prevention of industrial
stoppages and the imposition of Government controls on wages and prices.s Profitcontrol, though promised, was
neverdelivered. The introduction of compulsory unionism in some areas of Government employment would also
have bolstered thesupportof unionofficials for the new regime. Therewas no serious dissentwhen, in February
1942, a specialTradeUnionConference accepted National Security Act regulations which unionleaders explicitly
recognised as "Fundamentally in opposition to the policy and traditions of the labour movement."9 Unions,
especially those led by Communists, undertook to discipline their own members guilty of absenteeism or
unauthorised strikes.
4. QuotedinHaganTheHistory oftheACTa op.cit. p174. .
S. E. R. WalkerTheAustralian Economy in WarandReconstruction OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford 1947p63.
6. SeeR.Watts"Revising theRevisionists: TheALPandLiberalism 1941-1945" Thesis Eleven 7,1983 pp7S-8.
7. ibid. 178.
8. ibid.p180. ,
9. E. RossAHistoryoftheMiners' Federation ofAustralia Miners' Federation, Sydney 1970p388.
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After
"TheParty signeda formal declaration that it wouldcarryout all measures necessary for the conduct
of the People's War against Fascism" ,10
the Government restoredthe CPAto legality. Communist union secretaries of the Miners' Federation, Waterside
Workers' Federation and Seamen's Unionwereappointed to the Coal,Stevedoring andMaritime Commissions, in
the sameway as laboriteunionofficials wereappointed to boards, commissions andother administrative posts. D.
Lovegrove, a leader of the right in the Melbourne Trades Hall became the industrial officer of the AlliedWorks
Councilin Melbourne, for example.It
Communist union officials took theirParty's supportfor the War and theirnewfound respectability veryseriously.
Jim Healy, Secretary of the WWF, along with troops used as scabs, helped smash a strike by Sydney wharfies
againstthe introduction of therotary gang systemfor organising labouron the waterfront. The new scheme ended
the iniquitous "bull" system and shared the work out equally amongst union members. But it regimented the
wharfies and restrictedtheir ability to take advantage of the tight labourmarketduring the War. Under the new
systemthe gang bosswas also the uniondelegate,12 TheMiners' Federation Presidenttold his members
. "We must fight with the militancy we have shownin all our struggles, but today we must leam to
fight a new way .- we mustfight for production."13
Petersen puts the Communists' usualwartime attitude to strikesintoperspective: '
"It must be said too that it would be wrong to assume that theC.P.classcollaboration took a blatant
form. In many cases Communists were the best unionists. When strikes occurred they did not
usually break them, but they did their best to limit their effect. I find it hard to convey how
respectable arid respectedCommunists wereduringthis period."14
Cartoon 12was anotherinstance of thisrespectability.
The strength of the Communist Party's commitment to the war effort lost it some support in the unions. During
1943 the numberof strikes in defiance of union officials grew,lS Where only 378,195 working days were lost
through disputes in 1942, the figure rose to 990,151 in 1943. The strikes occurred amongstwomen,many drawn
into the workforce for the first time by the War, as well as male workers. At Duly and Hansford's in Sydney
women members of the PIA struck against the employment of non-union labour, to the union's embarrassment,l6
Strikeseven took place over the policies of the union, rather than employeraction. Balmain ironworkers struck
for six weeks in, 1945to haveNick Origlass, a Trotskyist, reinstated as the shop-steward at Mort's Dock.l7 Even
the mostjingo of unionofficials wereunableto stema rising tide of industrial unrest.
Nevertheless, war-induced nationalism ensured that the Labot Government, in whosename strikes were opposed
and living standards cut, remainedpopular. It was able to governwitha substantial majority after the 1943 federal
elections. The patriotism of Australian Communists, which extended to supporting conscription,18 and the
exploits of theRed Armyled to a massive increase in the popularity of the Australian Communist Party (ACP, the
Party changedits name at the beginning of 1944when it merged with the ALP [State of NSW]). Membership
grew from about 4,000 when it was banned in 1940 to 7,200 in September 1942.19 By the end of the War
Communist officials led the Miners' Federation, Waterside Workers Federation, Seamen's Union, PIA, Victorian
ARU and FederatedClerksUnion amongst others where they had considerable influence. The delegates of such
unions came close to constituting a majority at the 1945ACTUCongress, anddid control the BrisbaneTradesand
Labor Council. In 1944membership of the ACP reached its all time high of 23,000.20 In Melbourne alone the
Party operated20 bookstalls.21
10.1.. L Sharkey An Outlille History oftM Australian Communist PartyAustralian Communtst Party, Sydney 1944 pSI.
11. Ironworker May 1943 p3.
12. C. Johnston "The Communist Party and Labour Unity, 1939-1945" LabourHistory 40, May 1981 p83.
13. ibid. p82. .
14. G. Petersen 'The LaborMovement and World War lI' lecture delivered 7/12180 pIS, transcript held by E. Petersen.
IS. ibid. p84. .
16. D. Gollan "The Duly and Hansford's Strike 1943: Find the Strikers" inSecond Women and LabourConference Papers 1980 ,Pp341-8.
Also seeJohnston "The Communist Party and Labour Unity" op. ciL p81 for an PIA official leading members back to work across apicket line
at Austral Bronze in Sydney and Ironworker March 1943 p3 for the union leadership's account,
17. D. Gollan "The Balmain Ironworkers Strike of1945"]Jart 1LabourHistory May 1972 pp23-41 and Part 2LabourHistory November 1972
fr~~ihe ACP's support for Curtin's conscription proposals see Tribune 25/11142 pl, "Essel" "Anti-Conscription - Yesterday and Today"
Communist Review December 1942 p4.
19. R. Gollan Revolutionaries andReformists Australian National University Press, Canbena 1975 pl30.
20. A. Davidson TM Communist PartyofAustralia Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1969 p83.
21. R.Sendy Comradu. Come RallyThomas Nelson, Melbourne 1978 p28.
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From Yalta to Korea
During the War the capitalist democracies and USSR had been allies, their relationship dramatised at the Yalta
and Potsdam Conferences as they carved the world into new spheres of influence. But it was clear that the USA
emergedfrom the War as the mosteconomically powerful state in the world. The only wayRussiacouldexclude
Americafrom its sphere of influence was militarily, by establishing a state capitalistblock of regimes subsidiary
to the Kremlin. TheUS responseto this affrontto its right to dominatetheentireglobe led to the cold war.1
Egglestoncomments that
"Australia. .. is a small or middlepowerfaced with difficultstrategic problems and has to formulate
her policy accordingly. Smallnations, unable to assure their ownsecurityhave two coursesopen to
them: to seek friends and make alliances, or to seek a solution for the problems of power in an
international scheme."2
ForeignMinister Evatt made a strong effort, through the United Nations, to secure the latter solution. But it was
rendered nugatory by the polarisation of world politics around the USA and Russia. By virtue of its overseas
markets, sources of capital inflow, private capitalist organisation and previous military arrangements Australia
found itself on the side of the USA. Like other members of the alliance, the Australian capitalist class had
economic and militaryinterests in global stability, that is the status quo. As things stood after the War Australia
had some degree of access to most of the markets outside the Russian bloc. An expansion of Russian influence
would have reduced Australian export markets, an expansion of US influence would increase them. In a similar
way national liberation struggles, which challenged western imperialism, also threatened the interests of export
dependentcountries like Australia. Moreover, Australian policy makerssaw the alliancewith the UnitedStates as
the best guaranteeagainst renewedJapanese militarismand soon againstRussian aggression as well.3 In thisway
the USA was a safeguardfor Australia's imperialist interests in the southwest Pacific.
AlthoughEvatt madeefforts to build the UnitedNations into a serious means ofregulating international relations,
during the War he was alreadyclear on the value of the US alliance. He maintained that "it is essential that this
[wartime] co-operation be continued".4 A theme of Australian foreign policy under the Chifley and Menzies
Governments, until the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 was the pursuitof a writtendefenceagreement with
the USA.S R. G. Casey, a Liberal Minister for Foreign Affairs, conceded that in his negotiations over
arrangements for continuedAmerican use of the large base on ManusIsland, part of the territoryof New Guinea,
"He attempted to get a broad regionalagreementin the Pacificwith the UnitedStatesof America. ..
That... was a perfectlyjustifiable thingto attempt .. Had it comeoff, it would have been a feather
in his cap."6
Unfortunately for Evatt's milliner, the US did not want to take on a general defence responsibility for the south
west Pacific at this stage.? The USA had already shaken off illusions, which were a major consideration in
Australianforeign policyfor anotherdecade, thatJapan might again be a militarythreat in the near future.
The turn of events in Greece, where Communists contested British backed politicians for power after the
evacuation of the Germans, helped convince the Australian Labor Government that Communism was a serious
world threat and to align its foreign policy with that of the USA. In March 1946 Evatt still maintained that
Russian foreign policywas essentially defensive. Developments in Greecesoon led him to "speak of aggressive,
co-ordinatedCommunist subversion". By late 1949, the Government considered that Australiawas a part of the
western block in the UnitedNationsf So, although the Government was still worriedaboutJapan, in May of that
year the Secretaryof the Australian DefenceDepartmentcould make two arguments in Washington for a Pacific
pact:
"The first was that Russia should not be led to believe that America was uninterested in Pacific
defence; the second was on Australian fear that the Communist sweep through China might
eventuallyencompass Burma,India and otherFar Easternareas,"?
1. See P. Binns"TheNew ColdWail International Socialism 2(19),1983pp9-22. AlsoseeJ. and G. KolkoTheLimitsofPowerHarper and
Rowe,New York 1972for theevolution of US policyin particular. '
.2. F. W. Eggleston Reflections onAustralian Foreign PolicyCheshire, Melbourne 1957 p9.
3. On fear of JapanseeR. N. Rosecrance Australian Diplomacy andJapan, 1945-1951 Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1962pS7.
4. H. V. EvattForeign PolifYof AUftralia: S~eeches ~gus and~obe~n, Sydney 1915 p244. .. ..
S. See N. Harper (ed.)PacificOrbit: Australian-American Relatwnssince1942Cheshire, Melbourne 1968plS7, for the bipartisan desirefora
regional pactincluding the USA.
6. Rosecrance Australian Diplomacy andJapan, 1945-1951 op, cit. p61.
7. See ibid. pS9 and R. Bell "Australian-American Discord: Negotiations for Post-War Bases and Security Arrangements in the Pacific
1944-46" Australian Oialook April 1973pp27-8 for thecircumstances of the Manusnegotiations.
8. D. Ashenden "Evatt and the Originsof the Cold War: Australia and the U.S. with the U.N. in Greece, 1946-49" Joumol of Australian
Studies7, 1980pp73-94. provides a goodaccount of the shiftsin Australian foreign policy. J. BurtonTheAlternative: A Dynamic Approach to
OurRelations withAsiaMorgans Publications, Sydney1954 pgO also placesthe shift in Australian foreign policy, awayfrom a focus on the
UnitedNationsto closeralignment with the USA,in 1947. However, onlyby failingto identify Australia'snational interests withthoseof the
capitalist class in the integrity of the western alliance and concentrating on immediate military threatsto Australia can he argue that Australia
had "no vitalintereststhreatened by Communism", p76.
9. Rosecrance Australian Diplomacy andJapan,1945·1951 op. cit. p141. •
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With the victoryof the Chinese national liberation forces in 1949, the yellow peril became more identified with
China than Japan. The combined yellow and red peril became a major defence concern. lO The Defence
Department developed an early and acute understanding of the domino theory. There was no major change in
Australian foreign policywhen Menzies becamePrimeMinister. Soon theKoreanWar facilitated the longsought
for US-Australian treaty. The War heightened US attempts to consolidate the western block and to include Japan
in it. The ANZUS Treaty drewAustralia, withLabor supportalready anenthusiastic participant in the hostilities,
closerto the USA and was also a quid pro quo for Australian compliance in the American inspired Peace Treaty
with Japan.I! There was no regional pact, such as the Chifley Government favoured, but ANZUS and military
agreements between the USA, thePhilippines andJapan formed a web which made the USA the guarantor of the
statusquo in thePacific,including Australia's little sphereof influence.
Although the two main parties agreed that a formal alliance with the USA was desirable, they did not want, and
the ANZUS Treatydid not entail, the subordination of Australian to American national interests. This wasevident
in the way Australian Governments used their relationship with the BritishCommonwealth, the continued close
economic ties withBritain and in thedifferences between US and Australian foreign policyon someissues. Thus
Curtin's call to America
"Was a desperate and natural move in a critical military situation taken without any intention of
loosening imperial ties or pavingthe way for the dissolution of the Commonwealth."12
Once the immediate Japanese threathad beencountered, by 1943, the Government
"Turnedagain to the BritishCommonwealth as a counterweight to American controlof policy and
operations."13
Curtin called for the establishment of an Empire Council and looked forward to Australia playing the part of
representative for the Empire in the Pacific,14 This approach was necessary because it was possible that
Australia's and the USA's territorial claims in the Pacific might not be entirely compatible. Evatt made
Australia's imperialist intentions quiteclear:
"Promthe pointof viewof defence, of tradeand of transportmost of them [the Pacific islandsnear
to Australia] can be fairlydescribed as coming withinan extendedAustralian zone." IS
In response to the perceived neglect of their interests by the majorpowersAustralia andNew Zealandenteredinto
an agreement on the situation in the Pacific after the War, in 1944. It publicised their claims to spheres of
influence in the south west Pacific,16 The Pact was particularly directed against possible US claims to wartime
bases. Australia soonparticipated in the occupation of Japan as the representative of the Commonwealth. After
the War, the Chilley Government.continued to play a balancing act between theEmpireand the USA,17 The 1946
Angle-Australian arrangements for rocket testing can thus be regarded as an attempt to balance the military
significance of the USA to Australiaby re-emphasising ties with Britain:18 The BritishCommonwealth was still,
therefore, importantin Australian foreign policy. The laboritepressendorsed this approach:
"UnderLabor Australia has passed from a backwater of the Commonwealth to the mainspring of
Britishdefencepolicyin the PacificandNearEast."19
Another crucial reason for Australia's continuing attachment to Britain was economic. Britain was to remain
.Australia's principal exportmarket for some time. Hence Australia's supportfor Britain's policies to cope with
the sterling crisis after 1947. Before the War Australia had paid its balance of trade deficit to the USA by
converting part of its sterling surplus into US dollars. Between the end of the War and 1947 Australia ran a
surplus with the USA too. But from 1947to theKoreanWar this turnedintoa deficitfor mostyears, as the USA,
with its large and undamaged industrial capacity, became the supplierof manyof the manufactured andespecially
capitalgoods neededto rebuildindustry in Europe, Japan and Australia. Australia had to use its sterling holdings
to pay for US imports again, but most othersterling countries were alsorunning balance of tradedeficits with the
USA. Nevertheless,
10.1. G. StarketJUI ANtus Treaty Alliance Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1965 p66. .
11.Foraccounts of the originsof theANZUS Treatysee ibid.1'1'26,34, especially 1'36:
"[Australian foreign Minister] Spender was probably no more persistent in 19S0-1 in his advocacy of a Pacific regional
security treatythanEvatthadbeen in 1946-9, but the conditions and negotiable issueswere suchthat his proposed pactwas
withinpractical reach•.• " .
Alsosee Rosecrance Australian Diplomacy and Japan,1945-1951 01'. cit, 1'1'183,200-1, 214,243 andA. S. Watt"The ANZUS Treaty: Past
Present and Future" Australian OUllook April 19701'24. See Railroad 21141S0 for Laborsupport for Australian forcesbeingsent to Korea.
TheAustralian attitude to theJapanese PeaceTreatywas nodoubtsoftened by the rapidgrowthin tradewithJapan.
12.HarperPaclficOrbit01'. ciLI'lS0.
13.T. R. ReeseAustralia, New Zealandand th8 UnitedStates: A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968 Oxford University Press,
London 19691'29. .
14.For a favourable labourmovement attitude to this proposal seeAustralian Worker 819143 1'1.
IS. EvattForeignPolicy01'. ciL1'142. Alsosee1'132.
16.EvattForeign Policy01" cit, pp20S and 176:
"Whatwe are churning is that we must havea primary and principle responsibility in determining the future of the Pacific
region in whichwe live."
- TheAustralia-New Zealand Agreement alsosignified, according to ReeseAustralia, NewZealand andth8 United States01'. cit, 1'43, that they
intended "to assume responsibility for Commonwealth interestsin the southand southwest Pacific". Evattspeltout his beliefthat Australia
_ shouldbe the representative of theCommonwealth in the Pacific particularly clearlyin his Foreward to R.J. Gilmore andD. Warner(eds)Near
North: Australia anda Thousand Million Neighbours Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1948pv.
17.ReeseAustralia,New Zealand and th8UnitedStates 01" cit,1'31.
18.ibid.1'65. .
19.LaborCall1Snt49 1'6, alsoseeLaborCall416148 pS: .
"Australia is now spending the greatest peace-time all financial allocation in the nation's short history on a defence
programme which,for the first time,will placethis country in theforefront of Empire defence developmenL"
Australian Worker 231S14S 1'7 hadsimilarviews.
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"Australiacould not manage its dollar requirements independently of thepoolingarrangements with
Britain. Its direct earnings of dollars and other fully convertible currencies was not enough, except
in 1950-1."20
Like other countries in the sterling area, Australia wasconstrained to tie its currency to movements of the British
pound against the US dollar and to ration its use of US dollars on imports from the USA. This led to restrictions
on the consumption of some goods in Australia)l
In addition to the unsuccessful negotiations over Manus Island, Australian and US policy differed over other
issues during the 1940s. Australia objected to the proposal that the great powers have the right of veto in the
UnitedNations.22 The Commonwealth connection was also used to preventBritain's transferof Christmas Island
to the USA.23
The Milk Bar Economy
The Cortin Government started preparing for the end of the War by setting up a Department of Postwar
Reconstruction and a Secondary Industries Commission in 1943. The Commission's main achievement was the
establishment of an integratedAustralian automobile industry, wherepreviously cars had been assembled andonly
some parts had been manufactured in Australia. The Government retreated from its policy of Government
ownership of the industry, to reach an agreement with General Motors-Holden, on terms veryfavourable to theUS
ownedcompany, for production of cars after the War. The need to avoidunemployment was the rationale for this
andother compromises by the Government.24 The agreement helpedensurethat the diversification of Australia's
industrialbasewouldsurvivetheWar and that the automobile industry couldabsorb manyof the workers whohad
learnednew skills in munitions factories.
The Chifley Government helped underwrite capital accumulation in other ways. Capital equipment was
cheapenedby means of an accelerated depreciation rate, for taxation purposes, of 20 per cent. per annum onplant
and machinery bought during the five years after June 1945.25 Attacks on union militancy were designed to
contain the cost of labour power, as were the Government's encouragement of incentive payments in private
industry and the example it set by introducing Taylorisminto the Commonwealth Public Service.26 To increase
the mobilityof labour, the Commonwealth Employment Servicewas established. But the most important measure
to cheapen labour power was probably the introduction of mass, assisted immigration. Between 1947 and 1951,
an average of 116,762 migrants enteredAustralia each year.27 The migration policiesof the ChifleyandMenzies .
Governments aimed to double the growthrate of population to two per cent. a year. Migrants generally wentinto
lowerpaid workand
"Provided an easily directed, mobile reserve army to overcome bottleneck areas of building and
construction, heavyindustry andpublicutilities."28
To justify this inflow of European workers the Labor Government played on racism, invoking the threat of the
yellow peril.29 The Government's infrastructure policies helped sustain the growth of manufacturing industry,
already boosted by the War, wheremanufacturing contributed 18.5per cent. to GNP in 1938-39, by 1948-49 the
figure was26.2 per cent.
In contrast to theexpectations of conservatives, laborites andCommunists, the Australian economy didnot relapse
into depressionafter the war. Pent up demandwasreleasedas goodsunavailable or rationedduringtheWar came
backonto the market There wasno return to prewarlevels of unemployment and no difficultyin finding buyers
for Australian exports. The growth of the economy during the 1940s was, however, uneven. Capital stockhad
been run down during the War and there were problems in replacing it as Europe was producing for its own
reconstruction. while Australia soon suffered from a shortage of the US dollars necessary to buy goods from
America. Production of consumer goodsgrew at a faster rate than that of somebasicindustries suchas steel,coal,
20. J. Crawford Australian Trade Policy 1942-1966 Australian National University Press, Canberra 1968 p98. For the balance ofpayments
situation during the 19408 see W. Prest "Economic Policies" in G. Greenwood and N. Harper (eds) Australia in World Affairs, 1950-1955
Cheshire, Melbourne 1957 p137. M. Beresford and P. Kerr "A Turning Point for Australian Capitalism: 1942-52" in E. L. Wheelwright and K.
Buckley (eds) Essays in tliePolitical Economy of Australian Capitalism Volume Four Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney
1980 pp165-6 discuss Australia's relationship with the sterling area's dollar pool.
21. See statement by J. B. Chifley on 4112147 in J. G. Crawford Australian Trade Policy 1942-1966 Australian National University Press,
Canberra 1969 p109.
22. See Evatt Foreign Policy p212, H. V. Evatt Australia in World AffairsAngus and Robertson, Sydney 1946 pp18-9, 90, Reese Australia,
NewZealand and theUnited States op. cit, p45.
23. C. H. Grattan TheUnited SlatesandtheSouJhwest PaciFIC Oxford University Press, Melbourne 1961 p200.
24. Dutlin and Schedvin WarEconomy 1942-1945 op. cit, pp753-4.
25. ibid. p747.
26. For develo~ments in the Public Service see R. Kuhn "ClassStruggle in the Public Service" lnterilational Socialist 10, 1980.
27. J. Collins 'The Political Economy ofPost-War Immigration" in E. L. Wheelwright and K. Buckley Essaysin the Political Economy of
Australian Capitalism Volwne One Australia and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney 1975 p109.
28. ibid. pp118, 11O.
29. See L. F.Crisp Ben Chijley Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1977 p320. Also see Digest ofDecisions and AnnoUIICements (Digest) 141 p25,
144 p14 and 147 p26 for economic justifications for immigration and the white Australia policy.
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electricity and brickproduction. Coal shortages were chronic, largely because mine owners failed to mechanise
production.3o TheU.5 million invested in theiron andsteel industry between 1945 and 1950 was
"An amount to be dwarfed into insignificance in the next decade, and which accounted for the
slowness of post-war development [of the industry]."31
The most prominent economist of the periodD. B. Copland christened the immediate post-war years as thoseof
the "milkbar economy".32
The Post-War Strike Wave
Workers saw an opportunity to improve their wages and conditions and to gain some recompense for the
privations of the previous years in the unexpectedly tight labour market which followed the War. Uncertainty
aboutthe duration of this situation made the struggle for improvements all the morepressing. The key demands
were over wages and reduced working hours. In view of the Government's control over wage pegging and the
Conciliation and Arbitration Court Full Bench's authority to determine hours for workers under federal awards,
bothissues had the potential to unitethe whole working classin struggle.
Already in October 1944 Sydney dailynewspaper workers struckfor and wontheforty hourweek already enjoyed
by some of their colleagues interstate.33 It soon became apparent that workers were not in a mood to make
concessions. A serious dispute broke out in September 1945 over the introduction of shift work for maintenance
workers at the Bunnerong powerstation in Sydney. Eventually work wasresumed on the basis of the status quo
ante. A strikeby 20 workers startedin September 1945 in Port Kembla, overthe victimisation of anPIA delegate.
By early December 30,000 workers were out, including coal miners, wharfies, seamen and Newcastle steel
workers. An additional 600,000 workers were affected by the strike and, despite the hostility of the NSW and
FederalLabor Governments, the NSWLaborCouncil and the ACTU, a partial victory was eventuallyachieved.34
From ·1940 to 1944, 954,505 working dayswere lost on average each yearthrough industrial disputes. From 1946
to 1950thenumberof days thuslost rose to 1,744,296 a year.
TheLaborGovernment had somesuccess in restraining wageincreases until 1947, by means of its wartime wage
pegging regulations. It kept these in force in order to combat inflation, which was rapidly overtaking
unemployment as Chifley's chief economic worry. The regulations were amended in March 1946 to allow the
Courtto vary the BasicWage andstandard hours, no doubtin the hope thatindustrial militancy could be diverted
into its procedures. Pastoral workers in Queensland hadalready starteda campaign of directactionto winshorter
hours in February. Their victory was legitimised by a decision of the Queensland Arbitration Court in May.35
The regulations and the long delay in the case for shorter hours before the Conciliation and Arbitration Court
nevertheless continued to contribute to the generalisation and extension of strikeaction. In October1946rail and
tramway workers struck together in Victoria for the first time. The nine day strike against the Cain. Labor
Government won increased penalty rates and, for railway workers, three weeks annual leave. Wonthaggi coal
miners who joined the strike in sympathy, won six extra holidays a year. The Victorian WWF also came out in
solidarity,36 Large strikes over wages by metal workers and gas workers in NSW, Victoriaand South Australia
soon followed.37 The Arbitration Court made an interimincrease in the BasicWage in December 1946 to head
off further trouble. Thisdid not have thedesired effect.
The Victorian metalworkers'dispute overwagemargins lastedfromNovember 1946to May 1947. Withdisplays
of solidarity not only by members of the unions directly involved, but alsoby otherworkers, it smashedthe wage
pegging regulations. There wasearlysupportfromthe ACTUandotherunions for the keyprotagonists, theABU,
in which the CPA had influence, but byno means control, and theCommunist led PIA. As the dispute dragged on
supportfrom unions led bylaborites fell away, their leaders concerned abouttheconsequences of the strikefor the
StateLabor Government, whoseMinisterfor Labourwas ACTUPresidentP. W. Clarey. Engineering tradesmen
in Leftwing unions, notably the Victorian ARU Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association, the
Gasworkers' and Tramway Unions bore the brunt of industrial solidarity. Six months of strikes and lockouts led
to dramatic cuts in Melbourne power and transport services. In April the Chifley Government was constrained to
scrap thoseregulations which limited the size of wageincreases arbitral tribunals couldgrant. The ABU rankand
file won the dispute in May by consistently deciding in favour of extension, even when their officials were
30. That mechanisation was technically possible isindicated by BHP's program ofmechanisation during the late 1940s, see H. Hughes The
Australian Ironand SteelIndustry 1848-1962 Melboume University Press, Melbourne 1964 p145.
31. ibid p148.
32. D. B. Copland "Balance of Production in the Australian Post-War Economy" Economic RecordDecember 1949 1'4.
33. J. Hagan "Craft Power: The Sydney Newspaper Strike and Lockout of1944" inJ. lremonger etal. (OOs) Strikes: StudUs in Twentieth
Century Australian SocialHistoryAngusand Robertson, Sydney 1973 pp159-77.
34. See T. Sheridan "A Case Study in Complexity: The Origins ofthe 1945 Steel Strike in New South Wales" LabourHistory41 November
1981 pp87-109 and "The 1945 Steel Strike: Trade Unions, the New Order and Mr. Chifley" LabourHistory 42 May 1982 ppl-26, for an
excellent account ofthe dispute. Note that G. Petersen "The Labor Movement and World War 11" op,cit, p16 maintains that
"The unions won the struggle but the C. P. leadership did a deal that the victimised shop steward would resign after the
workers got back to work. Old timers who worked atthe steelworks atthe time have told me oftheir resentment atthis deal."
35.Tribune 1212146 p3, 24/5/46 p6.
36. On this dispute see J. D. Blake "The Nine-Day Transport Strike in Victoria" Communist ReviewDecember 1946 Pf355.7.
37. For the gas workers' disputes, which included asix week occupation ofan Adelaide gasworks, see N. Carothers 'Results and Experiences
ofthe Gas Strike" Communist ReviewMarch 1947 pp452-4. .
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waveringabout continuing the fight.38 The pattern of the disputewassimilarto that of the 1949miners' strike, in
that industrial supportwas eventually limited mainly to Communist led unions. But therewere majordifferences:
the intensely democratic traditions of the ABU prevented the manipulation of strategic decisions by its leaders, as
occurred in the miners' strike; the inabilityof the Governmentto label the ABU a plaything of the CPA; and, cru-
cially, the obviousness of the implications of the disputefor all other workers. .
In the aftermathof the metal trades dispute there were widespread flow-ons of increasedmargins. In September
1947 the Acru Congress brought the hours question to a head. The top leadership of the Acru had earlier
called off a 24 hour general strike on May Day over the forty hour week, despite the decision of an ACTU
Conference. Now the Congress again threatened a 24 hour stoppagefor 20 October, to be followed by workers
taking the shorter week unilaterally,39 Pressure on the NSW Government, through strikes by pastoral, metal and
transportworkers, and on the Queensland Government, especially through a shearers' strike had already led them
to promise the 40 hour week for workers under State awards. The Conciliation and Arbitration Court conceded
the reduction of hours beforethe ACTU's threatenedstrike took place and it was implemented at the beginning of
1948. So, by November 1947, the Government's old policies for controlling wages were in tatters. The Victorian
conservative Government's attemptto control the tide of industrial militancy by meansof a head on confrontation,
withits 1948EssentialServiceslegislation faileddismallyin the face of a Communist inspiredproteststrike.40
From the idyll of wartime co-operation, Communist relations with the Labor Government deteriorated in time to
the escalation of the cold war. Prepared to endorse the policies of the Curtin Government, the ACP became .
increasingly critical of the actions of the Chifley administration. At the same time the Party became more
favourably disposed to the class struggle. At its 1948Congress the ACPformally adopted a leftist position which
looked forward to the Party displacing the ALP as the main party of the working class and, on the model of
developments in EasternEurope anticipated the formation of a Communist dominated People's Frontgovernment
in the not too distant future.O The rising level of industrial struggle and the Party's important role.in it fueled
theseaspirations. Moreover FredPaterson won the Party its only seat in an Australian Parliamentin the 1944 and
the following Queensland State elections, while there were important successes in municipalelections in several
States. The decline in ACP membership since the War could be easilyrationalised as the desertionof less reliable
elements, whosedeparturewouldstrengthen rather than weakenthe Party.
The height of the Party's left turn, from 1948to 1950,however, occurredafter the greatest opportunities for mass
workingclass actionhad passed. Becauseit had still supportedthe Chilley Government as progressive at leastas
far as domesticpolicy was concerned, the CommunistParty had failed to build a co-ordinated and self-conscious
strike movement out of the struggles of the immediate post-war period. Only a preceeding period of political
spade-workcould have overcome the tendency for struggles to fragment, once the abolition of wage pegging and
the granting of the forty hour week removed the issues over which the class most readily united. Subsequent
disputes generally had a moresectionalcharacter, concerned as they werewith the diversemarginsandconditions
. in different industries. But the ACP believed thata new depression was around the corner and that the driveof
employers to preserve their profits by drastically cutting wages would serve to unify workers. In the short term .
the Party failed to recognise that the industrialclimate was changingand the extent to which divisions insidethe
workingclass were beingfostered, actingas though it could impose the correctpolicieson the workingclass.
The post-war period held the promise of better things to come for employers as it did for workers and the
CommunistParty. But the level of industrial disputation constituted an obstacle to capitalists' aspirations. A
catch-cryof the conservative federalopposition was the abolition of war-time price controls and rationing, which
were held to be restricting the pace of economic growth. Once strikes had smashed wage pegging, the Labor
Government, committed to the prosperityof Australian capitalism, had no qualms about lifting restraints on the
distribution of production, whereinternational considerations made this possible:
"Further relaxation of price control followed closely the progressive abandonment of wages
regulation."42 .
The Governmentalso took measures to deal with other matters of concern tobusiness. The rapid but uneven pace
of economic growthduring the second half of the 1940sheldout thepromise of developing Australian capitalism
as never before. For a whileChifley talkedabout the golden age to come. Someof the problemsreflectedin the
unevenness of economicdevelopment, such as thosederivingfromshortages anddisruptions causedby theWaror
demobilisation, were short-term and tractable. Others were less so. According to Copland, the level of
consumption was too high and should have been cut to boost investment. He advocated incentive payments anda
return to the 44 hour week, at least temporarily.43 Copland went as far as advocating a cut in living standards, if
38. The above account isbased on T. Sheridan "Labour v. Labor" inIremonger Strikesop,ciL.
39. T.Wright "ACTU Congress" Communist ReviewOctober 1947 p684.
40. R. Gibson MyYears intheCommunist PartyInternational Bookshop, Melbourne 1965 p135.
41. At the 1948 Congress the Party calledfor a Popular Front like that inYugoslavia dunng the War, J. D. Blake The CPA1945.63mimeo,
National Library ofAustralia p7. WhenTito fell from grace, soon after, oth~r Eastern European countries provided alternative models.
42. Butlin and Schedvin WarEconomy 1942-1945 op,ciL p782.
43. D. B.Copland Inflation and Expansion: Essays on the Australian Eco1/Qtny Cheshire, Melbourne 1951 pp8, 62. Also see A. M C.
Waterman Economic FluctUlJti01l3 in Australia 1948 to 1964 Australian National University Press, Canberra 1972 p68 who sees a major
problem inthe productivity oflabour, in "High labour turnover, excessive absenteeism and slackness on the job."
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necessary, to secure the dynamism of the economy.w The premisses of the economic policies of the Labor
Government, worried about inflation and stable growth, were essentially the same as Copland's: in the event
measures as extremeas thosehe advocated did not provenecessary.
The boost in profit rates which lay hidden at the centre of Copland's prescription, was necessary to ensure that
Australian exportsremainedcompetitive on world markets and that foreign capitalwouldbeattractedto investin
Australian industry. Similarly a change in the atmosphere of industrial conflict, with the "frontierof control" in
the workplace shifting back in favourof employers, was important to attract foreign investment. The long global
boomfrom the early 1950s affectedcountries differently. At its height the Australian economy grew morerapidly
than those of the USA, Britain, Sweden, Norway and Belgium, but more slowly than Japan, West Germany,
France, Italy and Denmark.45 Differences in rates of growth were largely determined by local developments.se
Developments in the five or six yearsafterthe War laid theconditions on whichAustralia wouldparticipate in the
boom.
Changingthe Balanceof Forces
By the time its wage pegging policy collapsed in November 1947, the Labor Government had already laid the
basisfor a differentapproach to controlling industrial militancy, raising productivity and curbing the influence of
the ACP, with which these were identified. At the tripartite Better Industrial Relations Conference of August
1947, the ACIU and rightwing unionofficials had already accepted that increasedliving standards depended on
increased production and greater understanding between employers and themselves would be a useful means of
achieving this.47 A consensus was thusestablished, excluding those such as Communists and workers pursuing a
bigger share of the wealth they had produced, who rejected the new Keynesian economic orthodoxy in theory or
practice. Once the class-wide issues of wagepegging regulations and the 40 hour week had been conceded, and
the friction betweenunion officials, under pressure from their members, andthe Government haddeclinedfor the
moment, the basisexistedfor the isolation of militantworkers and imposition of sanctions againstthem.
The new policy's first large-scale test came in a contest between the Queensland Labor Government and railway
workers, supportedby other militantunionists. From Februaryto April 1948 railwayworkers were on strikeover
penaltyrates and the flow-on of increases in margins. The strikeeventually involved 8,500 strikers and a further
8,000workers stooddown.48 The Queensland Government responded to the strikes by declaring a state of emer-
gency,allowing search and arrestwithouta warrant, banning picketing and gaolingpicketers (Communists being
subjectto disproportionate harassment) and a campaign of virulentanti-Communism. A demonstration of 15,000
in Brisbanefollowed a police attack on a peaceful demonstration. This show of support and solidarity action by
Communist-led miners, wharfies and seamen resulted in the railwayworkers winning most of theirdemands. But
the stakes in industrial struggles had been raised by the Labor Government's hard-line tactics and its greater
appreciation than its conservative counterpart in Victoriaof the use that could be made of divisions within the
working class.
The isolation of militant workers was assisted by the emergence of Australia's version of McCarthyism with the
cold war.49 Sheridan points out that the claims, by the ACP and its opponents, that Communism was the main
force behind industrial militancy was, at best, an exaggeration.50 The identification between Communism and
working class militancy helped to marginalise all those opposedto.capitalism, or willing to pursuea betterlife by
radical industrial means. From the mid-1940s, the cold war was taken into the heart of the working class by
meansof its Industrial Groups.
Four interestgroupswereconcernedaboutthe influence of Communism and the issueof industrial militancy often
associated with it. ALP politicians were worried about the ACP's encroachment on their electoral bases, its
influence inside the Party through the unions and accusations that they were sympathetic to or soft on
Communism.51 During the War the Curtin Government had gone as far as releasing some men from military
44. ibid. J!6O.
45. E. A.Boehm Twenlieth Century Economic Developmenl inAustralia Longmans, Melbourne 1972 p32.
"46. For an account ofthe origins ofthe global post-warboom in the arms race see C. Hannan "State Capitalism, Annaments and the General
Fonn of the Current Crisis" International Socialism 2(16), 1982 pp37-88. From 1949-50 to "1953-54 Australian arms expenditure only
averaged 4.1 per cent,ofGDP, less than half ofthe US proportion and certainly lower still than that ofthe USSR (W. E. Norton and N. W.
Brodie Australian Economic Statistics 1949·50to 1978·79: I Tables Reserve Bank ofAustralia Occasional Paper 8A July 1980 pp42 and 116,
E. Mandel LateCapitalism New LeftBooks, London 1975 p276). In absolute terms, therefore, the size ofAustralian arms expenditure was and
isminuscule compared with that ofRussia, the USA oreven France and Britain. While their anns spending bolstered the rate ofprofit on a
world scale, itcannot explain the precise timing and extent ofthe boom inAustralia.
47. Hagan TheHistory of theACTUop. cit, pl92. "
48. See D. Olive's report to the 1948 ACP Congress on the dispute, Communist Party Papers, National Library ofAustra1ia MS 3000, Boxl
Folded and M. Cribb "State inEmergency: the Queensland Railway Strike of1948" in Iremonger Strikes op. cit, pp225-48.
49. For achronology ofthe cold war and Labor's part in it, to 1949, see M. Burgmann "Dress Rehearsal for the Cold War" in A. Curthoys and
J.Merritt (eds) Australia'sFirstColdWar, 1945·1953 Volume 1Alien and Unwin, Sydney 1984 pp49-79.
50. T. Sheridan "Australian Trade Unions and Post-War Reconstruction" paper presented to Post-War Reconstruction Seminar, Australian
National University 31 Au~st - 4September 1981.51. Note that the non-affiliation ofCommunist led unions, whether they were expelled orthemselves disaffiliated, had unpleasant implications
for ALP electoral finances, By March 1947 the ARU, PIA,Building Workers' Industrial, Builders' Labourers, Painters, Seamen's and Clerks
unions were no longer affiliated with the Victorian ALP,Standard Weelc/y 2813/47.
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service so they could organise against the Communists in the unions.52 According to Burgmann, however,
Federal politicians were less enthusiastic in their anti-Communism than the ALP machines, with their intimate
union connections.53 The success of Communists in the unions was a particular worry for laborite union officials,
whose jobs were under threat.54 During the War right-wing Victorian union officials had started organising.
consistently against the ACP.
The Catholic Church adhered to anti-socialist dogma. About 20 per cent. of the Australian population during the
1940s were Catholics. Their social backgrounds were predominantly Irish and working class. A significant
proportion of the Church's constituency was thus made up of people to whom the ACP sought to appeal. In the
absence of a substantial Australian Catholic bourgeoisie, upwardly mobile Catholic intellectuals had a
disproportionate influence on the Church's outlook. The Church's anti-Communism, with its distinctive petit
bourgeois bent was embodied in the Catholic Social Studies Movement, headed by Bob Santamaria, set up in
1942.55 .
Employers were also keen to fight "Communist inspired" industrial militancy. The main expression of. their
hostility to Communism were the conservative political parties. The new Liberal Party, which reorganised the
forces of the disintegrating UAP under Bob Menzies from 1944, was enthusiastic in advertising its anti-
Communist credentials. But some businessmen were prepared to support other kinds of anti-Communist
organisation.
These anti-Communist currents found a meeting place in the ALP Industrial Groups, set up in NSW, Victoria,
South Australia and Queensland between 1945 and 1947 to fight the Communists in the trade unions.56 Even
sections of the left of the ALP endorsed the establishment of the Groups in NSW as a means to improve
communications between Labor politicians and the rank and file of the Party.57 The clandestine Catholic
"Movement" provided ready-made cadres for the Groups and was able to mobilise support for Group candidates
and resolutions by means ofParish lists of Catholic unionists. Nevertheless the Groups did include non-Catholics
and there were Catholics active in the fight against them and the Movement.58 The support of trade union
officials, who dominated State ALP Conferences, and sympathetic Labor politicians gave the Groups an
institutional legitimacy as organs of the Party. Some employers provided financial and other material aid directly
to the Groups, or through the Movement.59
The Groups emphasised loyalty to the Labor Government and its policies. They tended to favour the use of the
Conciliation and Arbitration Court rather than direct industrial action. The ALP publicised their activities and
promoted them by banning "unity tickets" with Communists.60 The second half of the 1940s did not see any
major Group successes in union elections, but by questioning the legitimacy of any Communist activity in the
. unions and attacking militant action on occasions, they weakened industrial solidarity. During the early 1950s
they gained control of some important unions, including the FIA and Clerks Union, and won official positions in
others.
The Chifley Government took a number of legislative steps to strengthen its hand in the fight against
Communism/industrial militancy, which it saw as constituting a threat to both its own survival and Australian
prosperity. It increased the penal powers of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court and entitled it to prohibit bans,
52. R.MurrayTM Split: Australian tAbor in tM FiftiesCheshire, Melbourne 1972p16.
53. Burgrnann "DressRehearsal.•• " op, cit. pM.
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PIA, seeAustralian Worker e.g.7111/45, 211146, 17/4/46 pg, 815/46 p9,29/5/46p7,30m47 plO.
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1973p38andJ. Warhurst "Catholics, Communism and theAustralian PartySystem" Politics 14(2) 1979pp238-9.
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wereassociated With the rightWing of the ALP. I. Wyner, formerSecretary of theNSWPainters and Dockers Union, maintained thatthiswas
the perspective of the Groupin his union which consistently took stands to the left of its Communist leadership duringthe 1940sandearly
1950s. The Group had little contact with the Groups' head office at Trades Hall and was not under the influence of the Movement
Information frominterview withI. Wynerconducted 26/9/84at 2 Colle~e St Balmain, tapeheldby R. A. Kuhn.
58. For an exampleof the prioritySantamaria gave to politics over religion see his comments on Movement support for a non-Catholic anti-
Communist against a left-wing Catholic in the election of the vice-President of the NSW Labor Council in 1953, B. Santamaria "The
Movement of Ideas in Australia" mimll? copyhe~d by ~ustl'!'lian National ~niversitr Archives of Business and~bour.. .
59. Murray The Split op, cit p19. Pamters Union, Vlctonan Branch Wmwood Fl1IQ1Ices ALP Groups Archives of Busmess and Labour P
94111482, gavethe following accountof theestablishment of theGroupin the Victorian Painters Union:
"Mr Scully [a Labor memberof the Victorian Legislalive Assembly] startedby assuring the meetingthat Mr. Winwood [a
leadingmemberof the MasterBuilders Association] wouldreward the nucleus of this Groupwith a bonusfor work done in
the bUilding of the Group." .
Also see PaintersUnion, Victorian Branch Exposure! LaborPolitician SCULLY ServestM Bossesnot the PeopleArchives of Business and
LabourP 94/1/82 .
60.Standard Weekly in particular gaveoverconsiderable spaceto theactivities of the GroupsinNSW.
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limitations or restrictions on the performance of work.61 The Industrial Registrar was giventhe right to conduct
unionballots.62 This legislation, extended by the Menzies Government, wassoon an important factor in Grouper
victories in several unions. In 1949 the Courtgaoled JackMcPhillips, a Communist PIAofficial, for contempt.63
The Government also established the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in 1949, to combat internal
subversion. In the increasingly repressive atmosphere of thatyear two Communists, including Party Secretary L.
L. Sharkey, were gaoledfor sedition and the Coal Strike Act was introduced, providing for draconian measures
against striking workers and their organisations. Cartoons 13 and 14 showed how far Labor Governments had
increased theirreliance on coercion of workers between 1944 and 1949.
The outcome of the 1949coal strikedetermined whether the aspirations of the working class, bourgeoisie or the
ACPwould be fulfilled during the subsequent twenty years. TheGovernment andcapitalist classsawthestrikeas
a challenge to their authority and a reminder thatworking classmilitancy was an obstacle to maximum economic
growth. For members of the Miners' Federation thestrike was over a 30/-wageclaim, long service leave, the 35
hour week and improved amenities.64 The Communist Party saw the dispute as an opportunity to realise its
immediate task -- winning theleadership of the working class fromthe ALP.6S It had been trying, without much
success, to mobilise an industrial campaign around the demand for a 30/- increase in the Basic Wage, like those
for the forty hour week and the abolition of wage-pegging for some months.66 The leading officials of the
Federation were Communists, so the Party was well-placed in this, one of the most militant sections of the
working class.
The miners' strike lasted from 27 June to 15 August 1949. The polarisation of the labour movement already
apparent at the time of the 1946-47 metal trades dispute was even more in evidence. The Commonwealth and
NSWLaborGovernments, the NSWLaborCouncil and ACTU as well as the majority of unions led by laborites
wereopposed to the strikers and endorsed the draconian measures taken against them. Together with the press
andconservative parties they whipped up hostility to theminers andACP. Strong supportcameonlyfrom unions
in which Communists were very influential. Having abandoned a strategy of independent rank and file
organisation fifteen years before, the ACP had no effective means of by-passing the union bureaucracy and
appealing directly for the industrial support of workers in.other unions, which could have given the miners a
chance of success when it became apparent that thedispute wasan allor nothing affair.67
Eightunionofficials, from theMP, WWFand PIAwere gaoledfor refusing to divulgethe location of union funds
to the Arbitration Court. The MP and WWFwerefinedL200eachand thePIA Ll,OOO. Fineswerealsoimposed
on individual union officials.68 The Chifley Government sent troops into open-cut coal mines. Yet despite the
gravity of the situation andcalls fromthe rank and file,MP leaders refused to call DistrictAggregate meetings to
discuss the situation for over a week.69 When the meetings were finally held union members voted
overwhelmingly to returnto work:. In the wakeof thisdefeat thecoal industry was mechanised, at theexpense of
workers' jobs and control over their work. Incentive pay and the contract systemof day wages was introduced.
Large increases in productivity allowed employers to sack miners and closepits and still increase total output.70
Thereorganisation of the production process in the coalmining was a more dramatic version of whatoccurred in
several otherindustries during the 1950s.71 '
The defeat exemplified the inadequacies of the ACP's industrial strategy and assessment of the nature of the
period. Support for Communist candidates in MP elections fell away for several years, with the Groups winning
somepositions in the union. Themembership of thepartydropped by 50percent., to 6,000, in one year.72.
A few months after the defeat of the coal miners the Labor Government suffered a severe electoral defeat.73
During the eight years and two federal elections prior to 1949 it had beenapparent that the powerof the unions
couldnot be tackled headon by a Government. The coal strike showed that this was no longer the case. The
Curtin and Chifley Governments had succeeded in controlling working class militancy when it seemed that a
conservative government couldnot. But in doing so they had used their unique ability, in association with the
61. see J.Hutson PenalColonyto PenalPowersAmalgamated Engineering Union 1966 ppI74-S.
62. Crisp Ben Chif!.ey op. cit, p'3S9.
63. Crisp BenChifleyop. cit, Ibid..
64. See P. Deary Labour in Conflict: The 1949 Coal Strike Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1948 for a very good account of the dispute and
selection ofrelevant documents.6S.Party President R. Dixon had said that "the Labor Party and refonnist betrayers must be isolated and the Communist Partybrought forward
as the altemative", atthe ACP's 1948 Congress, Deary Labourin Conflict op,cil. p33.
66. See Tribune from January 1949 for the very large numberofarticles on this issue.
67. Individual Communists were active in rank and file organisations as shop stewards and members ofshop committees. But the basis ofthe
Communist Party's strategy in industry had given priority to winning union elections rather than building such organisations for overadecade
and ahalf.68. E. Ross O/Stormand Struggle: PagesfromLabourHistoryAlternative Publishing Co-operative, Sydney 1982 pl0S.
69. Deary Labour in Conflictop. cil. ppSS, 88.
70. ibid p96.
71. For changes in the stevedoring industry see the Reportsofthe Australian Stevedoring Industry Board.
72. ibid r,p98-9. ACP Secretariat member,J. D. Blake nevertheless expressed the Party's assessment that the strike was asuccess:
The coal strike demonstrated that great working class victories can be won even though specific economic claims are not
secured in the course ofthe strike." .
73. The ACP's position in the elections was that members should call for first preferences to be given to Communist candidates but only tell
people to give second preferences to Labor candidates inthe elections only if they were asked, Blake TheCPA1945-63op. cil. p7.
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Labor Party machines and Industrial Groups, to undermine working class solidarity. They thus undermined the
basis of their support fromwithin the capitalistclass: their ability to contain a confident working class. Thestage
wasnow clear for a conservative Government underMenzies to threaten recalcitrant unionleaders withevenmore
ruthless treatment than that Chifleyhad metedout to the miners. For example, in May-June 1951the Government
used troops and scabs to break a WWF black ban on New Zealand ships, imposed in solidarity with the New
Zealandwaterfrontdispute.74
The Liberal Party had, since its establishment in 1944, cohered the forces of urban conservatism around a
revamped ideology incorporating anti-Communism, a rightist interpretation of Keynesian economics and
rhetorical hostilityto state intervention,75 Its own campaign againstthecontinuation of war-time controls together
with those of the British Medical Association against the Chifley Government's health legislation and of the
tradingbanks againstbanknationalisation createda climatemoreand morefavourable to the newParty,76
Thenumber of days lost through industrial disputes in 1950 was higher than the previous year, despite the defeat
of the miners' strike. But the defeat had accelerated the process set in motion by the scrapping of wage pegging
and the grantingof the40 hourweek,for struggles to be moreisolatedfromeachother.77 Manyof the disputes of
1950were promptedby the erosion of real wages as inflation took off with the KoreanWar boom. Blakepoints
out that there was a strike wave during the .flrst half of 1952, before the collapse of the boom (the number of
disputes and workers involved reachedthe highestpost-war leveluntil the 1960s, but the numberofdays lostwas
considerably lower than each year between 1945 and 1950) which secured increases in overaward pay.78 The
working class had thus taken advantage of the boom by means of sectional militancy rather than generalised
struggle over wages and conditions which applied to industries as a whole. No dispute during the 1950s
compared, in.its extent or significance for the conductof the wider classstruggle, to the miners' strike. Until the
late 19608, there were no attempts to effect such major breaks with the established norms of claims or industrial
procedures as the metalworkers in 1946-47, the claimfor 40 hourweekand the miners in 1949haddemanded.
With working classmilitancy alreadysectionalised, the Government andemployers tookadvantage of the decline
in unionists' bargaining positionduring the 1952-53 recession to push workers onto the defensive and to effect a
redistribution of national income. This recession was the worst between the end of the War and the mid-1970s,
with a decline in employment of 2.2 per cent and a fall in GDP -- the next year GDP actually fell was 1979.79
The Menzies Government exacerbated the recession by fiscal and monetary means, with the largest cut (in
absolute and percentage terms) in Government expenditure to 1975.80 Labour's share of national income fell
during the recession and restabilised at a level four per cent. lower than that before the KoreanWar boom.81
The Conciliation and Arbitration Court's abolition of quarterly cost of living adjustments in the Basic Wagewas
an important factor in maintaining the new pattern of incomedistribution. It only started to changesignificantly
during the late 19608. In 1953the ACTUalso mutedits opposition to incentive payments.82
Coplandhad gone too far in foreshadowing the need for livingstandards to declineif the Australian economy was
to grow at a satisfactory rate. The extent of the international boom, the availability of domestic and overseas
funds for investmentin Australia and the satisfactory localrate of profit madesuch a drop unnecessary. Ifoutput
grewfaster than wages, the rate of exploitation could increase withouta fall in real wages. The expansion of the
economythus providedscope for workers to win better wages and conditions on the basis of sectional struggles,
without seriously interfering with profit rates. The combined effects of the weakening of working class
confidence between 1949and 1953 and therelatively easygains to be madeduring the boomresultedin a decline
in the averagenumber of days lost through industrial disputes per worker from 0.66 between 1945 and 1952 to
0.27 between 1953and 1960.83 Fastergrowth wasdefinitely a feature of the period after 1952. Capital invested
per head grew at a rate of only 0.3 per cent a year between 1945-46 and 1951-52, but at 4.0 per cent a year
between1952-53 and 1959-60.84 The rate of growthof productivity showed a dramatic rise after 1952-53.85 The
74. See Australian Stevedoring Industry Board FirstReportSydney 1951 p9.
75. For the emergence ofthe Liberal Party see R. W. Connell and T. H. Irving ClassStructure in Australian History Longman Cheshire,
Melbourne 1980 pp290-1 and M. Simms A LiberalNation Hale and lremonger, Sydney 1982 Inareview ofSimms, Politics 18(2) November
1983 p121, T. Rowse points out that
"The situation which enabled a party, as economically interventionist as the Liberals to project itself asan 0eponent of
government 'intervention' was that Labor was intervening restrictively ill the market place for consumer goods. .. '
76. Connell and Irvin~ ClassStructure op. ciL p291 i R. GoUan Revolutionaries and Reformists Of: cit. pp215-22 and A. L. May TheBattle for
theBanksSydney UDlversity Press, Sydney 1968 for the British Medical Association's and banks campaigns.
77. M. Rimmerand P.Sutcliffe "The Origins ofAustralian Workshop Organisation, 1918 to 1950" Journal ofIndustrial Relations 23(2), June
1981 p237 point out that shop committee organisation declined from the late 19408 due todivisions in the working class.
78. J.D Blake TheCommunis: PartyofAustralia 1945-63mimeo held by National Library ofAustralia p18, and Table 1above.
79. W. E. Norton and N. W. Brodie Australian Economic Statistics 1949·50to 1978·79: I Tables Reserve Bank ofAustralia Occasional Paper
8A, July 1980 pp173, 92. .
80. M. J. Artis and R. H. Wallace "A Historical Survey ofAustralian Fiscal Policy 1945-66" inN. Runcie (ed.) Australian Monetary and Fiscal
PolicyUniversity ofLondon Press, London 1971 p419.
. 81. Australian De~rtment ofLabour and Immigration Labour'sShare ofNational Product: ThePost-war Australian Experience Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1975 p38.
82 Hagan TheHistory oftheACTUop,ciL p247.
83. Table 1above and Year Booksof the Commonwealth of Australia. For a survey ofindustrial struggles during the 1950s seeJ.E. Isaac
TrendsinAustralian Industrial Relations Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1962
84. Waterrnan Economic Fluctuations inAustralia op. cit. pl07. .
85. ibid. pl07..
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ratioof totalprivate fixedinvestment, excluding dwellings, to GNPalsoshowed a significant risebetween thepre-
andpost-recession periods, as Table4 indicates. .
Table 4: Private Fixed Investment, ExcludingDwellings, as a Proportion of GNP, 1945·46to 1959·60
Year 1945-46 46-47 47-48 48-49 49-50 50-51 51-52
% 5.6 6.8 6.8 7.9 9.0 9.2 11.0
Year
%
1952-53
9.2
53-54
9.3
54-55
10.0
55-56
10.5
56-57
9.9
57-58
10.4
58-59
9.9
59-60
10.4
Source: N. G. Butlin Australian Domestic Product, Investment and"Foreign Borrowing 1861 to 1938-39
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1962 p468.
A survey of US companies in Australia revealed that 66 began operations in the 15years years after 1940, while
101 startedup in the seven years after1955.86 In theimmediate post-war years, "apartfrom thesetting upof plant
to manufacture Australian cars for the first time, there waslittle to distinguish expansion from what had goneon
previously" in themanufacturing sector.87 The 1950s, on the otherhand sawnot onlygreatergrowth but alsodi-
versification in the rubber, oil refining, chemical and electrical industries.88 The periodto the mid-1970s saw the
realisation of the aspirations of the Australian capitalist class, whileworkers madematerial gains, within the pa-
rameters set by the boom. TheCommunist Partydeclined into a Stalinistand then reformist sect, while, for over
two decades, the economic theories and policies of the ALP" had no direct effects on national economic
development.
86.D.T. BraschAmerican Investmen: inAustralian Industry Australian National University Press, Canberra 1966p24.
87. W. A. Sinclair"CapitalFormation" in C. Forster (00.) Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century AlIen and Unwin,
London 1970p41.
88. ibid.pp42-3.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
LABOR AT WAR
The "elective affinity" between Keynesianism and ALP policy during the late 1930s was consummated by the
LaborGovernments of the 1940s, to establish a binding conjugalrelationship which lastedfor over thirty years.
The Curtin Government brought leaders of the Parliamentary Labor Party into close contact with professional
economists who espoused the new economics.t This chapter deals with the emergence or the Curtin
Government's Keynesian policies, thereasons for thepopularity of Keynesian ideology in Australia and theway it
waspresented to the rank andfile of thelabourmovement during the War.
Keynesian Hegemony
The outbreak of War had a decisive effect on economic policy, bringing it into line with the new Keynesian
orthodoxy, whatever the theoretical proclivities of the policy-makers, for "Orthodox economics went out of
existence with the coming of war."2 So there was no sharp break in policies of economic management between
theLaborGovernment andits immediate, conservative predecessors:
"Thechange of government on 7th October 1941 didnot affectthediagnosis thatwhatwas required
was efficient machinery for the central direction of economic policy, not did it seriously change the
nature of the solution proposed. At the level of administrative planning the same advisors were
accepted andtrustedby thenew administration."3
The new regime did tighten up on measures the disintegrating conservative coalition had implemented in an
equivocal fashion. Notably, it replaced a voluntary agreement with mandatory restraints on the activities of the
trading banks, increased the levelof taxation and established moredirectcontrols on the distribution of resources
andlabourpower.
Pearl Harbour, and soon the Japanese threat to Australian colonies and the mainland, accelerated the process of
state intervention, They made the tasks of cutting working class living standards and placing the economy on a
more secure footing for total war imperative for the Curtin Government The apparent threat of invasion also
madethe taskof convincing workers of the necessity for dramatic changes easier. The details of state control of
the economy during the Warhave beenthoroughly documented by Butlin, Schedvin andWalker.s They will not,
therefore, .be canvassed in detail here. The circumstances which dictated measures of state intervention do,
however, throw somelight on the ideological as opposed to the practical significance of Keynesian econori:lics in
Australia at the time.
Bukharin described how the interference of the state in economic life increased tremendously during the First
WorldWar.s He maintained that this was not simplydue to the war but was also a part of a wider process of
development towards state capitalism, characteristic of the contemporary capitalist system. The War had only
accelerated the process. Harman has extended Bukharin's analysis to World War Il, pointing out that the logic of
totalwar means capitalists are prepared to accept the subordination of normal economic criteria, i.e, profits, in
order to defend the surplus value they have already accumulated and their right to extract surplus value in the
future. Thisimperative applied to theAllies and Axisnations alike:
"Bothsideswereconverted intomilitary statecapitalisms in which all that mattered was thegrowth
of the national military potential, even if this did not- necessarily lead to an increase in the surplus
valueavailable to thenational capitalist class."6 .
Countries under fascist, military dictatorial, bourgeois democratic or "socialist" regimes all subordinated their
economies to closestatedirection in theinterests of the wareffort In thedemocracies,
"For the the sake of convenience, certain areas of the warring economies continued to be run as if
theywere operating undermarketcompetition in the pursuitof the average rate of profit. But they
1.The following wereamongst the professional economists in government service during thewar: L. F. Giblin, Chainnanof theFinancial and
Economic Advisory Committee; D. B. Copland, Prices Commissioner; H. C. Coombs, Treasury Economist, then Director of Rationing, then
Director-General of the Department of Post-War Reconstruction; R. Wilson, Commonwealth Statistician, then Secretary of the Department of
Labour and National Service; L. G. Melville, Commonwealth Bank Economist, Australian representative in international economic
negotiations; J. B. Brigden, Secretary of Supply and Development, then Secretary of the Department of Munitions, then Economic Counsellor
Australian Embassy Washington; R. C. Mills Chainnan Commonwealth GrantsCommission, Director Office of Education: N. G. Butlin
Department of War Organisation of Industry then Department of Postwar Reconstruction: T. W. Swan Department of War Organisation of
Industry then Department of PostwarReconstruction; S. J. Butlin Department of War Organisation of Industry; R. I. Downing Assistant
Economic Advisorto the PrimeMinister.
2.L.Rossin Standard Weekly 18111143 p3. .
3. S. J. ButlinTheWarEconomy, 1939-1941 Australian WarMemorial, Canberra 1961 p49S.
4. ibid.; S. J. Butlinand C. B. Schedvin The War Economy, 1942-1945 Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1977; and E. R. Walker The
Australian Economy in WarandReconstruction OxfordUniversity Press,Oxford 1947.
S. N. Bukharin /mperialism and WorldEconomy Monthly Review Press, NewYork1973p149.
6. C. HannanExplaining the CrisisBookmarks, London 1984pp71-2
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were marginal areas, with their activities closely circumscribed by the priority given to war
production,"
Untillate 1941 Australia stilloperated essentially on "business as usual" lines. WithPearl Harbour and total war
in the Pacific, the Curtin Government applied controls very similar to those of the other belligerents. The
. Economic Organisation Regulations "tended to suspend the operations of normal financial incentives over a
greater part of the economy•.•"8 The National Economic Plan of February 1942summarised some of the main
war-time measures of statecapitalism. It provided for limitation of profits, restrictions on property transfers and
investments, supervision of interest rates, tighter control over prices and labour power (including civilian
conscription for the Civil Construction C0fP-s), wage pegging and, in a fit of even-handedness, the prohibition of
absenteeism by employees and employers.9 Nevertheless profits were guaranteed, through the cost plus system
of procurement by the stateand subsidisation of increased costs of production for other goods, undera regime of
regulated prices.lO Within six months the promise to regulate profits was dropped "owing to insuperable
difficulties in providing a just application of the four per cent. profits tax to the various categories of income
receivers."ll Justiceis generally a moreprecious principle within thecapitalist class thanbetween classes, except
in dire circumstances.u In viewof Harman's comments, it appears manyof the war-time measures in Australia
soonattributed to Keynesian economics or theCurtin Government's peculiar heroism, prescience or patriotism are
better understood as straightforward and, in international terms, unexceptional responses to conditions of total
war.13
Keynes had elaborated his General Theory withthe depression and a presumption that capitalism had an inherent
tendency to underconsumption in mind.· War-time economic policy in Australia didnot differ in kind from
policies implemented in Britain, Russia, Germany or Japan. H. C. Coombs, one of the Keynesian economists in
the public servicenotesthe process at work:
"During the war, the presumption that the system was inherently deflationary was invalidated.
However, thepurpose for greaterGovernment intervention shiftedalmost unnoticed by its advocates
to the argument that only the Government and its agencies could be relied upon to resist the
inflationary influence of excessive potential for expenditure and should therefore have the powers
necessary to make thatresistance eff~tive."14
There were good reasons why the economic policies of the bourgeois democracies were labelled "Keynesian".
The governments' advisors wereoftenKeynesian themselves, a fact which marked thepostdepression recognition
that the survival of capitalism depended on state intervention into theeconomy. In the democracies, consequently,
stateregulation of theeconomy per se (andapartfromnationalisation) was already identified as "Keynesian", The
victory of theAllies, thelarger andmore technologically advanced of the belligerent blocks, gave added status to
the alleged ideological inspiration of war-time economic policy. The liberal alternative to Communism and
fascism seemed' to haveproven itself in the successful management of the economies of the USA and Britain, as
well as Australia. Thatmainstream politicians in the democracies could admit such management to have a great
dealin common with therunning of the German, Italian, Japanese andRussian economies wasout of thequestion.
Keynesian economics was not only used to justify the war-time economic measures of the Curtin Government.
Even before the "success" of those measures became evident, LaborMinisters and theirpublic service advisors in
Australia were advocating orthodox Keynesian policies for the post-war period too. They believed theirpolicies
could prevent high unemployment and secure sustained economic growth even if, as they expected. a new
depression startedto emerge. This held out the prospect of a domesticated capitalism, without the need for class
conflict. Cornish, in his meticulous account of the genesis of the 1945White Paper on Full Employment shows
that economists in the public service were already advocating Keynesian full employment and public works
policies before Labortookofficein 1941.15 As early asDecember 1940L, G. Melville, theEconomic Advisor to
the Commonwealth Bank had canvassed the possibilities for post-war policies to secure full employment, in a
Bank memorandum.l6 Two years later he published a cautious Keynesian assessment that concluded carefully
planned government spending could reduceunemployment He also noted that high wage rates could induce a
depression.t? D. B. Copland and R. Wilson,economists holding seniorpublic service posts,alsodeclared for high
employment policies in 1941 and 1942.18 In theirproposals and the public statements the economists helped to
7. ibid. p73.
8. Walker TheA~tralianEconomy op,cit,p63.
9.Digesto/Decisions and Announcements (Digest) 18 pp15-6.
10. Walker TheAustralian Economy op, cit, p72. Not surprisingly the Government found that capitalists did not revolt against the cost plus
- system. Cabinet considered that
"With very few exceptions manufacturers and other suppliers have co-operated whole-heartedly with the Government and
there has been little evidence ofadesire to turn the country's predicament to selfish account" (Digest 70 p6,,24111/43)
11. Digest 35 pS.
12. Such circumstances applied in Britain when, dUring the week ofDunkirk, the rate of tax on excess war profits was increased from 60 to 100
per cent, P. Addison TheRoadto1945Cape, London 1975 p116.
13. An extreme example ofthe "inspirational" approach toAustralia's war-time policies isN. E. Lee John Curtin SavioUl' of Australia
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1983. Asimilar judgment isappropriate for Crisp's comment on Chitley as a"'Keynesian-of-the-first-hour', a
fact ofeaormous significance for Australia during the years after 1941", L. F. Crisp Be" Chifley Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1977 p169.
14. H. C. Coombs TrialBalance Sun Books,Melboume 1983 pp107-8. .
15. S. Cornish 'Full Employment in Australia: The Genesis ofa White Paper' paper presented to the Post-War Reconstruction Seminar,
Australian National University 31 August-4 September 1981 ppl4-22.
16. Cornish "Full Employment in Australia" op,cit p18. .
17. L. G. Melville "The Economics ofNew Orders" Economic Record December 1942 pp150, 157.
18. Cornish "Full Employment in Australia" op. cit pp2Q-1.
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shape, Keynesian economics was evident as an ideology of revitalised capitalism, without unemployment andable
to provide a rising standard of living for the working class. The following account focuses on the public
documents which expressed this ideology, as theyhad a greaterdirect influence on labourmovement thought in
general thandid confidential communications anddrafts.
An early example of the promise Keynesian theory held out for the post-war period was the Third Report of the
Joint Parliamentary Committee on SocialSecurity, appointed in July 1941. A submission by H. D. Black, S. J.
Butlinand T. W. Swan, economists at the University of Sydney influenced theReport, published in March 1942 at
theheightof themilitary threatto Australia. Amongst its conclusions was the proposal that
"The mosteffective means of achieving this [high employment] is to havein readiness public works
projects which can be commenced as soon as unemployment increases, thus preventing the spread
of further or secondary unemployment."19
The first major public statement of the Labor Government's commitment to full employment policies (which
Cornish overlooks) came in the form of Attorney-General H. V. Evatt's case for an increase in Commonwealth
powers, put to the Constitutional Convention in November 1942. Public servants made a considerable and
acknowledged contribution to the pamphlet, while Evatt's experience as Deputy Chairman of the
Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Reconstruction from February 1941, his honorary Directorship of
Reconstruction Research in the Ministry of Labour and National Service and later his membership of the Cabinet
Sub-Committee on Post-War Reconstruction from August 1942, wouldhave placedhim in closecontact with the
professional economists later involved in the drafting of the White Paper on Full Employment.20 He used an
argument, frequently repeated by others, which conflated government intervention in theeconomy during theWar,
thepossibility of continuous full employment undercapitalism and, by implication, Keynesian economics:
"With the lessons that it took a war to teach us, we can no longer assert that the problem of
unemployment is insoluble•.• that the taskof maintaining full employment is not a responsibility of
the national Government. .• If it is possible to employ the whole of the people in organisations for
the purposes of war•.. it is equally possible to employ the whole of the people in developing
Australia in timeofpeace."21
Evattoffereda straightforwardly Keynesian prescription for full employment
"Ofcourseprivate enterprise willcontinue toplay a largepart after the war. But it will also be the
duty of the Government, if it is to honour its war-time pledges, to provide employment by setting
the people to work by producing goods and by stimulating the demand for goods. This is partlya
problemof stimulating investment and partly a problem of ensuring an effective demand for goods
and services. The history of all countries prior to the war shows that private enterprise alone does
not stimulate investment sufficiently to employ all thepeople."22
Likemost otherobservers, Evatt expected a new depression within a fewyears of theendof theWar. Thespectre
of depression was an important issue in the labourmovement throughout the 1940s.23 Within the parameters of
Keynesian economics, Evatt's caseplacedmostemphasis,on publicworks as a counter-cyclical device:
"It will be necessary, therefore, for the Government to keep close watch over the fluctuations of
privateinvestment and to adaptits expenditure on publicworks to thosefluctuations so that totalin-
vestment, public andprivate is kept at relatively stablelevels."24
So public works, favoured by the ALPlong before Keynes was popular, continued to be the mainweapon in the
arsenals of the Curtin andChifley Governments for winning full employment. In the courseof thedebates onthe
1944 "Powers" Referendum, Evattrepeated his economic case for enhancing the Commonwealth's responsibilities
and found support from prominent economists such as Giblin and Copland, as well as the Commonwealth Bank.
The availability of Commonwealth authority to control excess purchasing power, i.e. inflation, rather than to
achieve full employment wastheBank's mainconcem.15
In his speechfor the 1943 elections Curtin affmnedthat
"The Government has applied the lesson of the depression -- that the financial problem
fundamentally is oneof manpower andresources not of money,"
19. joint Parliamentary committee on Social Security ThirdReport Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1940-1-2 no. 77 (Group H) 2015/42
p7. .
20. ibid p16; A. Mamchak 'Central Planning and Postwar Reconstruction' paper presented to Post-War Reconstruction Seminar, Australian
National University 31 August-4 September 1981 p45; and H. V. Evatt Planning for Reconstruction National Talk from Station 2FC 1918141,.
mimeo held by Mitchell Library. ,21. H. V. Evatt Postwar Reconstruction: A Casefor Greater Commonwealth Power Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra November
1942 pS7. .
22.ibId' .23. Coombs TrialBalance op. cit. p26 and D. Stephens ''The Effect ofthe Great Depression on Federal Labor Governments, 1941·1949"
Australian Journal ofPolitics andHistory 22(2),August 1976.
24. Evatt Postwar Reconstruction op, cit. pS9. Evatt also offered a Keynesian critique ofthe policies followed during the depression in
Austra1ia.
15. H. V. Evatt Speech on Constitution Alteration (Postwar Reconstruction) Bill 1944 Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra 1944(from Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1112144); L. F. Giblin "Reconstruction - APisgah View" Australian Quarterly September 1943
1'116, 16; L. F. Giblln TheProblem of Maintain~g Full Employment Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1943 pp8, 19; L.I? Gi!'l!n T~e
~rowth oftheCentral BankMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1951 p306; D. B. Copland and H. C. Coombs expressed theiropmicns In
D. A. S. eatnpbell (ed) Postwar Reconstruction.inAustralia, Sydney 1944.
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He wenton to announce his Government's policy of planning a large program of public works,· with the States.26
The Chairman of the Commonwealth BankcriticisedCurtin's promises to find money to put everyone to workin
peacetime. During the budget debate, shortly after the election, many Labor MHRs advocated the use of
Commonwealth Bank credit to secure full employment. This proposal was in accord both with Keynesian
economics and the mainstream of pre-Keynesian monetary underconsumptionism in the labour movement. But
Chifley, the Treasurer, offered a thorough-bred Keynesian caution: if bankcredit was used whenresources and
labour were already fully employed then inflation would resul,t,27 Late in 1943 he reinforced the ALP's
commitment to full employment policies in a series of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald. The policies were
also presented in a pamphlet by Chifley, published and widely distributed by the Department of Postwar
Reconstruction. Like the Attorney-General, the Treasurer reaffirmed the relevance of war-time experiences for
the post-warperiod:
"In winning the war we are learning new waysof controlling our affairs by whichwe canput an end
to fear and of enforced idleness."28
He promised that taxation would be used in the post-war period to redistribute the wealth produced by full
employment,29 The ALP's FederalConference, in December 1943, also formally established full employment as
oneof theParty's most important post-warobjectives.3O
H. C. Coombs, head of the Department of PostwarReconstruction, set out the means to and problems associated
withfull employment, in greaterdetail and more candidlythan anyLabor politician had, in a 1944lecture,31 The
lectureclosely foreshadowed the contentof the White Paper on Full Employment; according to Cornishit wasthe
basisfor its early drafts. Presentedin May 1945, theWhite Paper itself was the most famous and comprehensive
of the Labor Government's Keynesian policy statement. As it has been the subject of considerable academic
attention, the following summary drawson a numberof studies.32
The WhitePaper outlinedthe main components of aggregate demandandshowedhowprivateinvestment was the
mostvolaiiIe of these, whilepublicinvestment was the most amenable to government control,
"Thebasic premisewas thatGovernments should accept the responsibility for stimulating spending
on goods and services to the extentnecessary to sustain full employment."33
In practice the policy amounted to a counter-cyclical public works program, funded out of taxation; borrowing
fromthe publicand the Commonwealth Bank, together withcommodity price stabilisation schemes for exporters.
The White Paper also identified a number of problems associated with a full employment economy, which are
considered below. The White Paper on Full Employment was not simply a statement of the Government's
intentions, but also an important instrument of propaganda, as such it was widelydistributed in the community.34
Cornish's study showsthat the differences amongst the professional economists, who had the main responsibility
for drafting the White Paper, andLaborpoliticians on questions of economic theorywere smalI.35
The reception of the White Paper on Full Employment, by conservative politicians, some business people and
economists showed the considerable scopefor disagreement over the appropriate use of differenteconomic tools,
but not over the value of the whole Keynesian kit: "Whilstmany of the Government's prescriptions came under
heavy attack", Black maintains "the principles involved were not generaIlycondernned."36 Even before the
publication of the WhitePaper,L. Ross hadmaintained that
"There is more agreement about the desirability and methods of obtaining full employment than
aboutmost economic objectives andmethods."37
If, at the start of the War therewereno "orthodox economists left", by its end mostprominentpoliticians had been
converted to Keynesian economics too. The Victorian Institute ofPublic Affairs' publication Looking Forward,
whilepossibly moreprogressive in its tone than was acceptable to all conservatives, was nevertheless a landmark
26. J. Curtin GeneralElections 1943: Statement ofPoliq Australian Labor Party, Canberra 1943 pp15, 17.
27.W. J. Waters "Australian Labor's Full Employment Objective, 1942-5" in J. Roe (ed.) SocialPoliq in Australia: SomePerspectives, 1901-
1975 Cassell, Sydney_1976 f:231 Also see Standard Weekly615/43 for acritique ofthe unrestricted use ofbank credit
28.Sydney Morning Herald 11 2/43.
29. J. B. Chifley Planning for PeaceDepartment ofPostwar Reconstnlction, Canberra 1943 p2.
30. Australian Labor Party OfficialReportofProceedings 16thCommonwealth Conference December 1943 p42
. 31. H. C. Coombs Problemsof a HighEmployment Economy Hassell Press, Adelaide 1944.
32. For example, Waters "Australian Labor's Full Employment Objective" op. ciL; W. J. Waters 'The Postwar Reconstruction Plans ofthe
Australian Labor Party during the Second World War' M. A. Thesis, Department ofGovernment, University ofSydney 1968, BuUin and
Schedvin WarEconomy1942·1945op, cit.; Cornish "Full Employment inAustralia" op. ciL; Mamchak "Central Economic Planning" op. cit;
and L. Black "Social Democracy and FuIl Employment: The Australian White Paper of1945" LabourHistory46,May 1984.
33. Waters 'The Postwar Reconstruction Plans' op. eit,p123.
34.Cornish pUS.35. See, for example, a summary ofCopland's approach to employment policy inDigest 100 p20. His position was very close to the
Govemment's at this stage. Waters "Australian Labor's Full Employment Objective" o~. cit, p241 ismistaken in seeing D. B. Copland The
Road to High Employment Angus and Robertson, Sydner 1945 as a critique ofthe White Paper on Full Employment. The lectures which
constituted Copland's book were delivered before the White Paper was issued. Despite his emphasis on "high" asopposed toBeveridge's and
soon the White Paper's "fuIl employment", Copland adopted the same theoretical frameworlc and the same policy instruments asthe Australian
Government's policy. Protagonists ofboth high and full employment accepted the possibility that the Government could engineer the level of
employment it sought In practice the difference was over the most effective way ofcontaining the class struggle - through co-optation orthe
coercion ofadose ofunemploymenL .
36. Black "Social Democracy and Full Employment" op. cit, p50. See Cornish "Full Employment in Australia" op. cit, pp187-93, for
responses to the White paper. .
37. L. Ross "A New Social Order" inCampbell PostwarReconstruction inAustralia op. cit p198.
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in the adoption of Keynesian ideas by the business community and anti-Labor politicians. The new-look
conservative organisation, theLiberalParty,drew heavilyfrom the document.38
Coombssums up the ideological situation amongst those who formulated economic policyfor Australia at theend
of the 1940s. Keynesian economics was "the means of communication" amongst the Commonwealth Bank, the
government and Treasury officials.39 He mightalso have addedthe federal opposition to the list. Thispicture had
alreadybegunto emergeduringthe War. '
Keynesian economics became the lingua franca of economic policy makers and even capitalists in their
discussions of peace-time economic management not only because it held out the possibility of achieving a long
standing goal of moderate laborites -- uninterrupted growth for capitalism, secured by the state.40 But it also
expressedcapitalism'sneed for increased state intervention, not onlyduring theWar, but in general.
The Curtin Government regardedan augmentation of the Commonwealth's legislative powers as a prerequisite
for effective programs of economic management. A number'of senior economists supported this view and the
1944 referendum to which it gave rise. So, initially, did the conservative Sydney Morning Herald, although its
positionchanged in the courseof 1944.41 The Country Partyfavoured increased Commonwealth powers, butnot
by means of a referendum. A few anti-Labor politicians even campaigned for the "Yes" vote. Business
associations, including the IPA, spearheaded the "No" campaign.42 It was understandable that there was a"
tendency to believe that the kinds of powers possessed by central governments in South Africa, Britain, New
Zealand and the Australian States were necessary to secure economic stability through action by the federal
government. The ALP was particularly predisposed to such a view, given its historical bias towards forcing the
paceof state capitalistdevelopments in Australia (relatedto the proclivities of unionofficials to regardthe state as
means of reconciling class conflict), and the apparent effectiveness of measures like those the referendum would
sanction in peace-time, under the Commonwealth's extendeddefencepowerduringtheWar.
Despitethe defeatof the referendum, elements of the expanded role of thestate as economic manager justifiedby
Keynesian economics were maintained after the War and through the long boom.43 In the absence of the widely
expectedeconomiccrisis after the War, the maintenance of the moredrastic war-time measures was unnecessary.
But the War had effecteda permanent shift in the weightof the Commonwealth budgetin the national economy
andof the right to tax incomes to the federal government. An important aspectof the program of state capitalist
economic management was implemented as a result of theWhite Paper on Full Employment and the White Paper
on National Income and Expenditure. According to Crisp they
"Markeda clearrecognition of several things. First, the Government's acknowledgement that it had
a general role of economic leadership and guidance of -- and intervention in -- the Australian
economy. This was an acknowledgement that no future Government was ever going to be able to
repudiate•.. Secondly, an acknowledgement that its own revenue and loan-raising on the one hand
becamesuch large and significant factors that its fiscaland budgetary policies... werenow amongst
the primary determinants of the condition and shape of the national economy as a whole.
Thirdly•.• that all Treasury's principal activities•.• should at all times be very deliberately
concerted and reconciled with the Government's general economic objectives. Fourthly, these
objectives henceforth shouldbe the securing and sustaining of high levels of economic activity and
employment, social welfare and national development. Finally..• the Treasurywas inevitably and
irresistibly placed at the centre of a new process of wide-ranging governmental command of the
nationaleconomy as a whole."44
In terms of the mechanics of government the White Paper on Full Employment enhancedthe role of the budget as
a tool of national economic management, furthering a process which had beengoing on since the depression had
transformed it from an unexceptional housekeeping deviceinto an important policyinstrument.45
38. On the relationship amongst Keynesian ideas, the Institute ofPublic Affairs (IPA) and the Liberal Party see M. Simms A Liberal Nation
Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1982 pp16, 18-20,46. Several IPA publications are worth examining in this context including: IPA Victoria
Looking Forward, Melbourne 1944; IPA NSW Stability and Progress, Sydney September 1945. .
39. Coombs TrialBalance op, cit. p46. H. W. Arndt "Economic Policy -Stability and Productivity" in A. Davies and G. Serle (eds) Policies
for Progress Victorian Fabian Society, Melbourne 1954 p43 maintained that
"On the desirability offull employment there isno longer any disagreement between the political Right and LeftinAustralia".
He and Coombs point out that the business community toohad been won over.
40. For a good discussion ofthis aspect ofKeynesianism's appeal inAustralia see A. M. Stevens 'The Keynesian Revolution that Never Was:
Australian Economic Management, 1945-1975' B.A. (Honours) Thesis, Politics Department, Macquarie University, November 1984 ppS2-3.
41. Waters 'The PostwarReconstruction Plans' op. cit. p49.
42. ibid. pp65, 75, 80, Simms A Liberal Nationop. ciL p34.
43. In this respect Mamchak 'Central Econcmic Planning' op. cit. p59 is mistaken in his contention that the defeat of the referendum
represented a serious set-back for Keynesian planning. The failure of the powers referendum and its successors in 1946 and 1948
circumscribed the development ofthe state's role in economic management, the underlying rationale of the Keynesian perspective, by the
Australian government alone. But the States retained the powers the Commonwealth sought and continued touse most ofthem, the means
were found, including grants under Section 96 of the AustraJian Constitution, to employ State governments as proxies for the federal
governmenL Moreover, some ofthe 14 powers atissue inthe 1944 referendum were already inthe hands ofthe Commonwealth. In the event
price control, which the Commonwealth Government could not continue after the war period, was not sustained by the States, but this did not
prove to bedetrimental toAustralia'S prosperity orinternational competitiveness.
44. L. F. Crisp "The Commonwealth Treasury's Changed Role and Its Organisational Consequences" Public Administration December 1961
p323.
45. ibid. pp324,316.
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The appeal of Keynesian economics to capitalists, politicians andeconomists, grounded in the acceleration of state
capitalist tendencies duringthe War andin accordwith a moregeneraltendency, madepossibleits acceptance asa
"science". Coombspointsout that in 1948
"It was still widely believed that there was no absolute barrier to the prevention of mass
unemployment by a technique which committed no-one to any particular political creed and was
applicable underdifferentforms of societyandeconomic organisation."46
The Promise of Things to Come
Keynesian ideology had a strong appeal to economists, the capitalist class and the Labor Government. But it is
also important to explain its appeal to the working class. The diffusion of Keynesianism inside the labour
movement can then be examined in the lightof the wayit meshedwith the interests of differentclasses.
The key factorin securing working class supportfor the war effort andacceptance of sacrifices wasnationalism.47
Moreover, nationalism and Keynesianism were both ideological props for more coerciveaspects of the war-time
"incomes policy" implemented by theGovernment and unionofficials: wagepegging, fines and the prohibition of
strikes and absenteeism.ss The promise of full employment was still an important element in obtaining
enthusiastic working classparticipation in the War. The Government realisedthat Keynesian economics' greatest
asset, in terms of attracting working class support was its promiseof full employment. So, during and after the
War Keynesianism foundits widestexpression in the beliefthatpublicinvestment programs couldpreventanother
depression. Commenting on a draftof the White Paper on Full Employment SenatorKeanecontended that
"The purpose of the statement is not to encourage undue concentration on post-war planning or
thoughts thereof but to give the fighting Services and those engaged on the home front some
assurance that the sustained efforts and further sacrifices that will be demanded before the war is
brought to a successful conclusion will not be followed by the bitterness and frustration of
widespread unemployment in the pre-warperiod."49
Coombs alsoreports thatCurtinsaw theWhitePaper
"As a politicalinstrument •• an assertion of government policy designed to rally community support
for the war and to stimulate willingness to bearcontinuing hardships."
As the Japaneseretreatedit became possible to waterdown the "promises of 'a betterworld after the war'" in the
document, before it was published.50 But, by the same token, with the improving military situation post-war
reconstruction increasedin importance as a meansof maintaining moraleand sacrifices, comparedto nationalism
intensified by the threat of invasion. Post-warhousing and socialsecurity proposals were also substantially in the
nature of bribes to elicit a greater war effort.51 Using a Keynesian framework Chifley pointed out that social
security helped to maintain purchasing power and hence full employment. He argued further, no doubt with
capitalists' worries about the cost in mind, that social security expenditure would be at a minimum with full
employment.52 Later he emphasised,
"Of course, our objective is not primarily social security, but rather the much higher aim of full
employment of manpower and resources in raising living standards. In other words, the main
function of Reconstruction will be positive, to create conditions in which palliatives will become
less and lessnecessary."53
The prospect of another depression was also used to promote the Powers referendum, as Cartoon 15 shows. In
1944, the StandardWeekly expressed a sense of the Keynesian consensus that soon emergedon the basis of the
fear of a: n~w depression:
46. COOmbs TrialBalance op, cit. p55. L. Ross "Socialism and Austra1ian Labour - Facts, Fiction and Future" Australian Quarterly March
1950 p33 illustrated the point: . .
"Ido not regard itasinconsistent here orelsewhere to state that non-Iabor could carrythrough state programmes ofnational
development, and atthe same time contend that these have an essential part to perform in modem socialistic doctrines." It
was on this basis that Amdt "Economic Policy" op. cit. p45 in 1954 wanted to separate out politics and economics in budget
policy and economic management.
47. A casual examination ofthe laborite press from late 1941 to 1943 reveals the extent towhich the ALP machine and the trade union
bureaucracy beat the patriotic drum, none inore than the AWU.
48. For adetailed examination ofthe incomes policy inwar-time Britain and under the post-war Labour Government, seeL. Panitch Social
Democracy andIndustrial Militancy Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976. .
49. Quoted in Cornish "Full Employment inAustralia" op,cit. p121. The comment was made in a memorandum and definitely not in public.
SO. Coombs TrialBalance op,Clt. pp40, 53.
SI. R. Watts "Revising the Revisionists: the ALP and Liberalism, 1941-1945" Thesis Eleven 7, 1983 p75 and Coombs TrialBalance op, cit.
pp54,69. The earlier conservative war-time governments had also recognised the need for added incentives toincrease production. In 1941 H.
Holt, Minister for Labour and National Service, said that child endowment was "aforetaste and a pledge" ofpost-war reconstruction, Walker
TheAustralian &onomy op. cit. 1'49. .
52. SydneyMorning Herald 3/1~43. F. Schafer ofWellington, New Zealand, Labor Call 114/43 drew a similar conclusion from his own
reading ofthe General Theory :
"A social security scheme, br providing fixed incomes, which are not dependent upon any job, counters the multiplier asfar
asitwill intensify any declimng tendency."
53. Watts "Revising the Revisionists" op. cit. p83, quoting from 1. B. Chitley SocialSecurity andReconstruction, Canberra 1944.
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"It is hard to imagine anyelectedgovernment everagainpermitting a spiralof depression to develop
as during the early '30's, or beingdeterredfrom substantial andeffective recovery measures through
fear of governmental spending or an unbalanced budget."54
If a week is a long time in politics, then it is only reasonable to concede the editorialist's point: 30 years of
Keynesian ideological dominance is for "ever". The editorial argued that the only differences over economic
policyconcerned thepreciseextentof publicexpenditure, whethermerely as a balancing influence to take up the
slackwhen privateinvestment laggedor as a means to finance greatwelfare projects.
Scienceor Ideology?
Keynesian economics, accepted as a scienceor at leasta legitimate orthodoxy, had beenusedas the touchstone for
assessing the significance of the Curtin Government's policies for the post-war period and the White Paper on
Full Employment, in particular. Crisp and Waters see the White Paper as a_ register of the Government's
acceptance of Keynesian theory and assume that policies along Keynesian lines were successfu1.55 Stevens,
however, convincingly demonstrates that, in the first place, there was some distance between the economic
policies of all post-war governments and Keynes's prescriptions and, in the second, that government policy had
little to do with the full employment that actually emerged.56
Black maintains that, while the Curtin Government's policy "was Keynesian in tone, it wouldbe unjustifiable to
describe the [White] Paper as an application of Keynesian economics."57 Shejudges the WhitePaper against an
idealised and necessarily unrealisable version of Keynesian doctrine, accusing it of lacking the desirable "blend of
forceand reasonedargument" because of the Government's timidity in theface of privatecapital. Thismisses an
important point: the Government's banking legislation andattempts to securethepower tocontrol pricesafter the
War showeda preparedness to incur the hostility of capitalists, whenthe Government saw itself acting in the best
long-term interests of Australian capitalism. Even if the Curtin and Chifley Governments had tried to introduce
whatBlack regards as true Keynesian policies, on the model of the Beveridge Report in Britain and including
direct controls over private investment, this still would not have constituted a threat to "the dominant position
which the interests of privatecapital occupyin capitalist society".58 Decades of French, Japanese and Swedish
. experience confirmthat substantial state interference in corporate investment decisions can be commensurate with
the continued domination of society by private capital, so long as the state itself is not in the hands of a rival
capitalist class (as occurred in Eastern Europe immediately after World War IT) or the working class. Black
identifies Keynesian theory with "a successful full employment policy", because she accepts that the War showed
state intervention could secure full employment. She continues that the White Paper on Full Employment was a
"selective and one-sided application of Keynes' teaching" because, in its production "the Australian Labor
Government evinced an awareness of its position in relation to the capitalist state". That is, the capitalist class
opposed a real Keynesian program. The White Paper "forfeits the title of a full employment policy" .59 By
comparing the Labor Government's policies with an idealised economic theory, rather than the real economic
world, Blackleavesherselfopento the chargeof idealism, as Keynesian policies were associated, in Australia and
other countries, with full employment. While Stevens shares Black's radical Keynesian prejudices, she very
successfully demonstrates that the full employment of the long boom was not associated with government
policies.6O Blackalso projects her ownpreference for the neweconomics onto the masses: "Popular radicalism"
was supposedly responsible for the "remarkably rapid and universal adoption of the precepts of Keynesian
theory".61 The acceptance of the new economics in the working class was not the result of a widespread and
spontaneous adoption of arcane. academic concepts. The process by which popularradicalism and enthusiasm for
full employment werediverted into Keynesian channels is discussed below.
UnlikeCrisp,Waters, Black and Stevens, Mamchak does not acceptKeynesian economics (in its "true" form) as
an objective analysis of capitalism. Thereal worldof economic constraint, however, is ab,sent fromhis approach.
It is liquidated into the relativism of an academic sociology where all the variables involved in economic policy
are ideologies, values or perspectives.62
To avoid the "yes, the White Paper was Keynesian; no, it wasn't" dichotomy and the relativism of some of the
above assessments of the significance of theLabor Governments' economic policies, it is necessary to understand
54.Standard Weekly 17/8144 p6.
SS.Crisp BenChif[ey op. cit. p194 and Waters "Australian Labor's Full Employment Objective" op,cit. pp239,242.
56. Stevens 'The Keynesian Revolution that Never Was' op,cit, For an admission ofthe irrelevance ofthe White Paper topost-war problems
see H. C. Coombs "Australia's Ability to Avoid Booms and Depression" Economic Papers 8,1948 p53:
"Our own experience suggests that our war-time thinking may have placed undue reliance on the possibility offlexibility in
public investment spending and in the stabilisation ofrural incomes."
57. Black "Social Democracy and Full Employment" op,cit. p34.
58. ibid. e,p48, 51. Addison TM Roadto 1945 op, cit, pU8 quotes Beatrice Webb on Beveridge's attitudes to private capitalism:
IJeveridge realizes that ifthe war isto be won, and still more ifthe industrial state ofGreat Britain istobesaved from decay,
planned production and consumption has to be undertaken. But as ofold, Beveridge is obstinately convinced that he and
his class have to do the job, and the Trade Unionists have to be ignored and the wage-earner ordered towork. .. by a civil
servant, with orwithout aprofit making employer as intermediary." (Emphasis inthe original.) .
59. ibid. pp34.36,51.
60. A. M. Stevens 'The Keynesian Revolution that Never Was' op. cit.
61. Black"Social Democracy and Full Employment" op,cit. p34.
62. Mamchak "Central Economic Planning" op.cit.
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Keynesian theory anditsexpression in those policies as anideology, whose form wasconditioned by theobjective
circumstances discussed above. First, Keynesian economics provided a label for war-time measures of state
capitalism which distinguished them from those of totalitarian regimes. It was thus a part of the heightening of
national differentiation with and aggression against the Axis Powers (and later, the Eastern Bloc).
"Keynesianism" was therefore credited with achieving full employment during the War and contributing to the
Allies'victory.
Keynesianism was also a justification for the tendency towards increased state intervention in private capitalist
economies since the depression. This tendency was not determined by the desires of politicians, workers or
capitalists for full employment. Far more important was the needfor stateintervention to secure the viability of
thecapitals of different countries in theircompetition witheach other, whether by military or economic means, in
conditions of high employment or high unemployment. Onefactor in the ability of capitalists in one country to
compete agalnst foreign rivals was the effectiveness of the state in controlling the side-effects of cyclical crises,
evenif thecrises themselves could not be avoided. Crises of themonetary andbanking systems couldsometimes
be averted, despite a crisis in production. Moreover, during any phase of the business cycle, the state could
encourage national capitals not to act at cross purposes, or, at best, to behave in a concerted way with respect to
overseas competitors. In Australia the change in the role of the statebefore and after the depression was not as
marked as that for the major powers of Western Europe and North America. The state had already played an
important interventionist roleduring thecolonial period, byinitiating economic development and,subsequently by
intervening to overcome Australia's late arrival as an independent nation on the worldmarket. Keynesian eco-
nomics, however, was a more credible justification for extensive state intervention than the previous economic
orthodoxy.63 .
Thirdly, as the basis for post-war planning in Australia, Keynesian economics was a form of "bourgeois
socialism", offering the possibility of eliminating one of the most distasteful features of capitalism,
unemployment, while leaving thesystem intact. As Black points out,
"Capitalists and theirgovernments werereceptive to an approach which offered andin wartime had
[apparently] been able to deliver, a highlevel of economic activity andfullemployment."64
Governments also heldout the prospect of a "New Jerusalem" as an incentive to working class sacrifices during
theWar. As theWardrew to a close, Keynesianism displaced nationalism as theGovernment's main rationale for
an incomes policy premissed on wage restraint. Its appeal to the working class desire for full employment was
usedby LaborGovernments andsections of the ALP machines to establish a substantial hegemony forKeynesian
economics in thelabour movement.
Keynesianism in the Machines
For the laborite union bureaucracy there were many advantages to unequivocal support for the Curtin
Government. They gained prestige as well as material benefits from associations with ministers and policy
makers and through membership of tripartite consultative or executive bodies. Communist union leaders were
also involved in suchinstitutions. So long as the rank andfile's patriotic fervour lasted, officials increased their
standing in the unions by subsuming their activities in the greater task of winning the War. When Government
. pronouncements andpolicies heldout thehopeof achieving thelongsought labourgoalof fullemployment it was
no wonder that they chorused their support. The same considerations applied to the ALP machines, whose
officials shared many of theinterests of union leaders, if theywerenot actually the sameindividuals. During the
War the Laborand trade union bureaucracies took up the cry of full employment and, to a lesser extent, the
Keynesian approach to it.
Within a fortnight of the installation of the Curtin Government Labor Call began to serialise the First Report of
theJoint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security, including its proposal for full employment afterthe War.
TheFirst Report, unlike the third, did not yet include specifics of how to achieve this state.65 The newspaper
endorsed theThird Reports conclusions andwenton to demand that
"Thewhole of the organisation that is usedfor warmustbe usedfor peace, andprivate enterprise,
thatis controlled to serve the nation at war, mustnot be uncontrolled andpermitted to create havoc
in days ofpeace."66
A brief reportin this, the organ of the Victorian ALP and theMelbourne Trades Hall Council, alsodemonstrated
how welcome economists were at laborite gatherings:
"Memories of the 'Premiers' Plan' did not prevent delegates at the last meeting of the THC from
according Professor D. Copland a most attentive hearing when he delivered an interesting and
informative address in his capacity as Commonwealth Prices Commissioner."67
Thevoteof thanks wascarried byacclamation. .
63. Some of theinterventions of theBruce-Page Government of the 19208 hadaroused theireofprofessional economists.
64. Black"Social Democracy andFullEmployment" op.cit,p3S.
65. Labar Call16, 23,30/10/41.
66. Labor CaII18/6'42 p3.
67.LabarCaII2217/43 p7.
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Articles in Labor Call by an Austrian socialdemocrat in NewZealand provided a distinctive presentation of the
Keynesian case for full employment. Hiscontributions weredistinctive because, despite a convoluted expression,
theydid not rely on ministerial, localacademic or publicservice intermediaries for their ideas.. In his first article
F. Schaferexplained, on the basis of Keynes's General Theory, that permanent underemployment was possible
because of the over-saving of therich andthat
"A socialsecurity scheme, byproviding fixed incomes which arenot dependent on anyjob, counters
the multiplier as far as it couldintensify anydeclining tendency."68
A subsequent articlenoted the War had accelerated the industrialisation of Australia and that this trend and the
transition to a peace-time economy couldlead to uncontrolled investment. Afterreferring again to the possibility
of over-saving he pointed out that the danger of a new depression, which accompanied the process of
industrialisation, could be avoided by community control of investment.69 Few similarly independent
presentations of Keynesian economics favourable or hostile, appearto havebeenmadein thelaborite press during
theWar, whenthe mainemphasis was on practical measures to secure fullemployment, ratherthan the economic
theory which established its possibility under capitalism.70 Schafer's articles were distinctive in another way,
possibly because of his awareness of developments in international social democracy: he put forward a left
Keynesian position. He maintained that government influence over private investment by indirect means alone
was inadequate, given big business's large incomes and political interests. So more direct controls were
necessary,
"Imposing the duty uponenterprises of doing thosejobs which theyhaveto do in thepublic interest.
At least big firms shouldbe treated in this way, as their abilityof forgoing maximum proflts makes
themcapable' to defy the policyof the Government. .Theexisting manpower legislation couldserve
as a pattern for appropriate measures."71
Therewasno substantial current in the Australian labourmovement which endorsed suchleft Keynesian policies,
which Black considers worthy of the title "full employment policy". During the War proposals for state
intervention, more substantial than that advocated by the Government were, in the first instance, associated with
thecall for socialist measures against capitalism.
The Standard Weekly and Australian Worker carried material like that in Labor Call, supporting the
. Government's full employment policies and their Keynesian rationale. Standard Weekly offered a Keynesian
critiqueof Paddison's proposals in Lang's Century to fmance the Warby means of bankcredit.72 Later thepaper
gavethe Government's fullemployment policies frontpagecoverage:
"Reconstruction in its widestandsimplest terms means, saidMr. Chifley, A job for every man and
woman who wants one."73
It also presented the success of thePowers referendum as a requirement for an effective full employment policy.74
Australian Worker, even more thanLabor Call and Standard Weekly, tended to rely heavily on Ministers' pro-
nouncements for its analysis of thequestion of full employment.75
Other, less .frequent union newspapers also gave prominence to the policies of the White Paper on Full
Employment. For example, Furnishing Worker featured an article by the Minister for Postwar Reconstruction,
Dedman, explaining that full employment in Australia would have to be implemented under capitalism, for
constitutional reasons. Dedman's concluding quotation from Blake was probably inspired by contemporary
.Britishusage, which L. Rosshadintroduced to Australia: .
"I shallnot ceasefrommental fight, nor shallmyswordsleepinmy hand
Til WE havebuiltJerusalem in 'Australia's' pleasantland."76
Dedman took a leading role in spreading the Keynesian message amongst the rank and file of the labour
movement. He addressed a series of NSW ALP regional conferences during 1945, on full employment and
reconstruction. His speech to the 1945 NSW ALP Conference was essentially a lecture on Keynesian
economics.?? He emphasised what the Government was doing for the people, i.e, theirpayofffor the wareffort,
rather thanwhatworkers coulddo for the economy. Given the widespread expectations of a new depression, his
message that full employment could be achieved had a great appeal. In addition, thanks to conservative
68.LaborCall 114143.
69.LaborCall 1218143 1'6.70. An exception was A. E. Sede "The Many Millions Will Decide" AmalgamatedEngineering Union JOIU'1lQI April 1942 p9. Sede criticised
A. A. Bede, US Assistant Secretary ofState, "And What Shall We DoThen?" Amalgamated Engineering UnionJolU'1lQI March 1943 pp7-lO,
which presented aKeynesian argument for full employment His pro-Soviet views leads to the suspicion that Sede was atleast influenced by
theACP. .
71. LaborCall 617/44 p6.
72. Standard Weekly 615/43. Also seeStandard Weekly 312144 for references to E. R. Walker's Economic Recordarticle of April 1939 on the
possibilities for non-inflationary financing ofthe deficit
73.Standard Weekly 2615/43 pi,emphasis in the original. .
74.Standard Weekly 18111143 p3; L Ross 912143 p3; and Evatt 15/6143 p3.
75. E.g. AUSlTalian Worker 11/8/43 p3, 1615/45 pi,13/6143 p3. .
76.Furnishing Worker818/45 pl. L. Ross, atthat time employed by Dedman's Department, used the quotation, unmodified, in "A New Social
Order" op, elt,p230. Rosshad visited Britain earlier in the War. Also see Amalgamated Engineering UnionJOUTnol May 1945 for the same
Dedman article asin FUTnishing Worker, June 1945 and July 1945 for other accounts ofits policies by the Government.
77. Walker TheAustralian Economy op. cit. p348; Standard Weekly 18/5/45 pS;and Digest104 pp24-5.
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opposition to the 1944 referendum, the Government could portray itself as conducting a crusade for full
employment againstdifficult odds:
"Vested interests, monopolies and trusts would attempt to defeatthe proposals because they did not
wantfull employment. Theywanted a reserveof unemployed."78
So opposition to the form if not the state capitalist content of the referendum and the White Paper on Full
Employment gave thema radicalveneer.
The White Paper was very well received by trade union officials and the Communist Party.79 The 1945ACTU
Congress, at whichCommunist influence washighest, affirmed that
. "Congress applauds the general principle outlined in the Federal Government's White Paper, the
IL.O. and San Francisco decisions on Full Employment as measures calculated to implement the
just demands of the workers."80
There is no evidence of serious dissent from this sentiment at the leadership or rank and file level of the labour
movement.
TheDepartment of PostwarReconstruction conducted a campaign for the Government's economic policies which
wentbeyond the issuing of pamphlets and statements to include sponsorship of a "Discussion GroupMovement" .
At least some unions helpedto organise groups and distribute the Department's material.81 .During the War the
Government had an institution at its disposal for the dissemination of the new economic orthodoxy in addition to
the press, the public service and the Labor Party: the armed forces. Thus, for example, the Australian Army
Education Servicepublished Postwar Economic Problems which propounded a clearKeynesian analysis:
"The causes and cure of recurrent depression are now sufficiently widely understood for it to be
unnecessary to permita seriousdepression to develop.
"Thecure is to balance thefall in privatespending by an increase in government expenditure... "82
Rank and File Socialism
Patriotism and the promise of full employment were not sufficient to elicit the full. response, in terms of industrial
passivity and acceptance of currentwage levels, the Government and employers wanted from the working class
duringand immediately after theWar. Whileworkers' toleration of war-time conditions, wagepegging, overtime
and speed-ups was considerable, strikes and other industrial action did not cease. As the War drew to its
conclusion industrial actionburgeoned. Tight labourmarketconditions became an important factor in giving the
rank and file of the trade unions confidence in their struggles. Moreover, the Government's talk of a new order,
reconstruction and sacrifices generated expectations of betterconditions andpay at work,on the one hand,andthe
supersession of capitalism on the other. There was widespread support for the idea of full employment in the
labourmovement, but around the end of the War this was more likely to take the form of a belief that socialism
shouldbe introduced in thenear futurethan a commitment to the verities of Keynesian economics. Anotherwar-
time phenomenon was the rapid growth of the Communist Party. The trajectories and interactions of these three
developments were crucialfor the stability of Australian capitalism. While socialist sentiments were widespread
in the labour movement for two or three years after 1942 and constituted a significant obstacle to the
establishment of a Keynesian hegemony amongst laborites,theydid not linkup with thepracticaldiscontent of the
late and post-warstrike wave. The ACP only sought to make links between the supersession of capitalism and
industrial struggle when the generalised strike movement had passed its peak and laborite socialism had already
been curbed. The Government's economic policies and Keynesian ideology playeda part both in the decline of
enthusiasm for socialism in the mid. 1940s and of the unityof the class struggle during the late 1940s. An early
step wasto conflateits post-war policies withsocialism andextendthe hegemony of Keynesian ideasin the labour
movement. Later in the decade, the now morewidelyaccepted Keynesian analysis of the trade cycle was usedas
an argument for wagerestraint andincreased productivity.
Waterspointsout that the terms"socialisation", "socialism" and"nationalisation" "werecommonplace at Stateand
FederalConferences" of the ALPduring theWar.83 In late 1943 and early 1944a numberof NSWregional ALP
conferences, much closer to the rank and file of the Party than State let aloneFederalConferences, madestrong
calls for measures of nationalisation. Each represented the local Branches in several Sydney suburbs or a non-
metroplitan centre. TheLeichhardt Conference, in a typical resolution, calledfor theearliestpossiblesocialisation
of the means of production.84 Againin late 1944someregional NSWconferences calledfor the nationalisation of
78. Evatt's address to the NSW ALP CODfererice Standard Weekly 15/6144 p3. Also see Standard Weekly 318144 p3.
79. Cornish "Full Employment in Austra1ia" op.clt, p181; !Abor CaU 7/6145 pI,2816145 p7; Australian Worker 1615/45 pI;and Standard
Weekly 116145 pl,
80. Australian Council ofTrade Unions OfficialReportof theProceedings ofA.C.T.U. Congress 1945 p2.
81. Waters 'The Postwar Reconstruction Plans' op. ciL p35; Mamchalc 'Central Economic Planning' 01" clt, pp56-7; and Railroad 2615/44 p3.
82. Australian Anny Education Service Postwar Economic Problems Melbourne, no date, p15. Given its comments OD. the desirability of
abolishing monopolies and the impossibility ofdoing so under capitalism, the pamphlet could well have been written by aCommunist, several
ofwhom worked in the Education Service, following the Party's line during late 1944 or1945. Walker notes that the Education Service had
500 education officers, TheAustralian Economy op. ciL p343.
83. Waters 'The Postwar Reconstruction Plans' op. ciL pp39-39a.
84. For the resolutions ofthe conferences see e.g. Standard Weekly 2112143 p2, 9/12143 p2, 16112143 p2, 1712144 p4•.
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certainmonopolies.st Rank andfile pressure for nationalisations was alsoexpressed in other StateLaborParties.
The 1943Victorian ALP Conference calledfor thenationalisation of essential industries andproposed that the ob-
jective of post-war reconstruction should be "the progressive abolition of the capitalist system and the
establishment of socialism".86 Unlikemany of the socialist resolutions at ALPConferences during the previous
decade, those of the lateWar periodwere carriedin theexpectation of action in the nearrather thanthe indefinite
future. Delegates from four State Conferences to the 1943 Federal Conference weremandated to support some
form of immediate nationalisation.87 The Federal Conference decided that all transport industries should be
nationalised at an early date, that the Federal Executive should immediately initiate a national campaign for
socialism andcarrieda furtherresolution, in which,
"Conference calls upon the Government to nationalise essential industries as an indispensable part '
of themobilisation of national resources for the defence of theCommonwealth."88
That such sentiments were expressed by the Federal Conference, at which full-time officers of the Party and
politicians, with theirtendency to caution, predominated indicated considerable pressure from ordinary members.
The 1945FederalConference againcalledon the Government to consider nationalisation of basic industries.89 .
Expressions of support for immediate steps towards socialism were common occurrences in the laborite press
during the War, in contrast to the late 1930s. In 1942J. A. Cranwell, Chairman of theCommonwealth Council of
theAEU calledfor Government control of industry to show workers that employers were also sharing the burden
of the war effort. The editor of the Amalgamated Engineering Union Journal also made calls for
nationalisations.90 Railroad, under the editorship of L. Ross and his successor as Secretary of the NSW ARU,
adopted a veryradical stance. Its demands outflanked theCommunist Party, which Rosshadrecently departed for
the ALP, to the left. Underthe headline "nationalisation PlusWorkers Control" an article righteously maintained
thM .
"The Communist Party is wrong when it states that it is inadvisable to raise the issue of
nationalisation now."91
In 1943 Ross's successor as NSWSecretary, J. Ferguson, who became President of the NSWALP during the late
1940s, maintained
"We want more than a 'Beveridge Plan' to provide working class needs after this war. We want,
and shall demand social ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and
exchange."92
R. Sutherland was similarly critical of Beveridge's social security proposals, counterposing them to socialism in
Labor Call.93
During .1944 Standard Weekly ran a number of articles by Gil Roper, a Trotskyist who had entered the ALP in
1941. He called for the Labor Government to nationalise industry and "provide for the participation of demo-
cratically elected workers' representatives in the controlling organs."94 It was an index of an atmosphere
favourable to socialism that the paper published Roper's material and that of other radicals who went beyond
Ross's explicitFabianism.95 In accord with the general socialist climate, the ACTU Congress of 1945 pressed
nationalisation of particular industries on the Government. E. R. Walker refers to this climate as a "war-time
utopianism", whileHaganpointsout thatin 1945 workers
"Perhaps more thanever••. were receptive to the idea that a socialist alternative was preferable to
Australian capitalism."96
Calls for socialism were strongest in sections of the union movement and at thelowest levels of the ALP, in the
face of indifference, hostility and obfuscation from the Party's senior federal Parliamentarians. The War years
were thus the first time since the depression that socialism was widely canvassed in the labour movement as a
short-term possibility. War-time radicalism in the ALP went much further than a left Keynesianism along the
linesof the 1944Beveridge Report. Standard Weekly did serialise JoanRobinson's Private Enterprise or Public
Control during 1944, reprinted by the NSW ALP's Henry Lawson Labor College soon after.97 But even her
Keynesian case for the nationalisationof theentireeconomy was not taken up by Australian writers at this stage,
because laborite radicalism found a less sophisticated expression in calls for socialism or at least measures
understood as stepstowards an entirely nationalised andplanned economy.
85. E.g. Wollongong, Standard Weekly 2111144 p4.
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"War-time utopianism" dissipated very rapidly around the end of the War. It did not give rise to an influential
socialist, or evenleft Keynesian currentin theLaborParty. Butfactors more complicated thanthe simple close of
hostilities were responsible for this change. The enthusiasm for socialism was generally inchoate. Ross and
Roper referred to workers' control, but most discussions went little beyond calls for nationalisation. Popular
.support for socialism was often accompanied by a willingness to collaborate with employers to increase
production. This could, and in the case of many union officials did, entail an explicithostility to class struggle.
So war-time socialism was, in a sensenot intended by Walker, "utopian". It was without a practical perspective
for turning immediate struggles to socialist ends. On the contrary, LaborGovernments were seenas themeans of
achieving socialism, by parliamentary means. The prestige of the CurtinGovernment and its apparent ability to
effect massive social changes contributed to this attitude, as did the absence of any significant organisation
arguing for working class action independent of the state. The socialist sentiment, therefore, remained in a
traditional-reformist mould: essentially passive and reliant on a Party and Government whose leaders explicitly
eschewed any "socialist" intentions. In these circumstances the Government achieved considerable success in
defusing socialistideasandreplacing themwitha moreacceptable ideology.
Conflation
Before the general public and in its practice the Curtin Government's position on socialism was unequivocal.
Socialism stood in contrasrto its brighthopes for the future of Australian capitalism, jeopardised Labor's electoral
prospects by scaring sections of the community such as employers and led to expectations, which coulddiminish
the Government's support in the working class when they were disappointed. The latter problemhad serious
implications for thecontinuation of wagerestraint after the War. In summary, socialist sentiment wasan obstacle
to any widespread acceptance of Keynesian economics, an ideology more suited to the achievement of the
Government's goals. A practice of conflation emerged to overcome thisobstacle.
During the 1943 federal election and the 1944 powers referendum campaigns Curtin explicitly ruled out any
measures of socialism. He, Evatt and Chifley promised ample scope for private enterprise after the War. In a
speech at theFremantle Trades HallCurtin said
"Wehavenot socialised Australia and wedo not intendto do it nowjust because we are at war."98
It was self-evident to Evatt that "private enterprise will continue to play a large part after the war". In 1943 he
pointedout that socialisation wasnotpossible underthe Constitution. "Let therebe no mistake", he said,
"There will be more room for private enterprise and business initiative after this war than ever
beforein Australia's history."99
In the Cabinetonly Ward argued consistently for nationalisations.1oo The brokers of the Labor Party machines
generally backedtheParliamentary leaders. At the 1943 Federal Conference
"Rather than 'pressing the general socialisation principle on the Government' one could argue that
the primary consideration of the 'party managers' at Conference was to insulate, or act as a buffer
for, theParliamentary LaborPartyagainst pressure fromthe StateConference level."101 .
While the Communist Party characterised proposals for immediate socialism as disruptive of the war effort,
Fitzpatrick more realistically maintained that the rank and file had been betrayed on socialism at the
Conference.l02 The Federal Executive failed to carry out the resolution in favour of a campaign for socialism,
which was itself a substitute for practical action. In 1947 Chifley againpointed out that the Constitution stoodin
the way of the nationalisation of thecoal industry, although he was prepared to attempt banknationalisation when
this seemed a necessary corollary of Keynesian economic policy.103 -
The Curtin and Chifley Governments' attitude to socialism was predictable in view of their commitment to a
Keynesian economic program. Butthey needed to retainthe confidence of theirworking classsupporters even in
the atmosphere favourable to socialist thought of the mid-1940s, in order to harness them to the national taskof
increasing production during and after the War. Theway outof thisdilemma wasobfuscation. A series of terms
was conflated so that at one end there was an appeal to the working class through "socialism" = "new order" =
"reconstruction" = "full employment" = "more room for private enterprise... It, a direct appeal to the capitalist
class. Ambiguity was thenameof thegame. Consider Curtin'smasterful characterisation of the War,evenbefore
taking office,to the 1941 AWU Convention:
"This is not a struggle to maintain B.H.P., or dividends and profits, or the banking system, or the
vestedorder; but a struggle to guarantee to ourselves the opportunity to make vested interests the
handmaiden of the welfare of all of us. We are fighting for what we have not because we are
98.Digest58 p28. Alsosee W. Waters "Labor, Socialism and World War 11" LabourHistory 16, May 1969 ppl4-5.
99. EvattPostwar Reconstruction op,ciL p57 and Australian Worker 11/8143 p3.
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satisfiedwith it, but to secure the open road to the achievement of all the possibilities inherent in
this country." 104
Early in his 1942 Constitutional Convention pamphlet Evatt hadposedthemainquestion for thepost-war world as
"Planor no plan? Plan or chaos?" Plan or No Plan? was the title of Barbara Woottons's 1934 essayon the need
for socialism, not just full employment, which was Evatt's concern. Of the White Paper on Full Employment,
Dedman said "I believe the White Paper constitutes a charterfor a new socialorder", although he noted too that
full employment policyentailed assisting business,l05 His association of the White Paper on Full Employment
with "a new Jerusalem" was designed to give flight to the imagination. But Chifley had earliersaid merely that
reconstruction meantfull employment.106 The laborite pressmadeits ownoriginalcontributions to thisprocess of
obfuscation. An editorial in Standard Weekly implied that the powers referendum was an anti-capitalist measure:
"The plain fact is that the capitalist or private enterprise system does not generate the steady and
balanced expansion of purchasing powerneeded to promote a full and steady use of its productive
powers."I07
L. Ross playedan important part, especially in NSW, in selling the Government's policies to the rank and me of
thelabour movement and in confusing theircontent. In late 1943 he was appointed to theDepartment of Postwar
Reconstruction and became its Director of Public Relations.108 He acted as a Government agent provocateur
insidethe labourmovement. During 1943-44 he spoke at NSWregional conferences on reconstruction and wrote
a seriesof articles in Standard Weekly that tookup, amongst other issues, socialism and economics.109 Although
he was a vocal advocate of socialism, Wattsaccurately characterised Ross's role: "As a socialist he preached con-
ciliation withKeynesian liberalism."110
Obfuscation helped the Government, despite its hostility to socialism, to retain working class support. The
dissociation of socialist sentiment frompractical demands for improved wages, conditions and hours assisted the
process. Substantial working classsuccesses in forcing employers and theGovernment to make concessions from
1945 werenot regarded as steps towards socialism. Sheridan notesthat
"While the machine and parliamentary leaders of the ALP had been successful in stifling rank and
me calls for a socialistic post-war programme they had been forced to acceptgrass roots demands
for short run pragmatic or 'economistic' improvements in workers' standards of living after the
war."I11 .
Whencapitalism provedable to make concessions and theexpected depression failed to emerge, theattractions of
socialism diminished. Keynesian economics seemed to provide a more practical alternative andone which was
endorsed not onlyby theGovernment butalso by veryrespectable forces, such as the LiberalParty, conservative
newspapers and professional economists. The nextChapter examines the active propagation of this alternative in
thelabourmovement during thesecondhalfof the 1940s.
During the late 1940s some individual ALP Branches might pass resolutions in favour of socialism or
nationalisations, but proposals for immediate measures were pushed to the margins of the laborite labour
movement.112 The pressure at the grass roots no longer existed to generate resolutions which seriously en-
tertained steps. towards socialism in the near future at State and still less at Federal ALP Conferences. Talk of
socialism fadedoutof Railroad during 1945. Shortly aftertheWararticles of a socialist hue alsobecame more in-
frequent in Labor Call. Where socialism was mentioned in Standard Weekly, during the late 19408, it was to
promote the merits of the ALP's maximum programme, devoidof references to immediate concerns. A series of
articles from theNSWFabianSociety illustrated this approach)13 In South Australia, where the ALP was to the
left of the NSW and Victorian organisations, the PartyPresident expressed his radicalism by looking forward to
striking
"Theknockout blow by implementing the Party's policyof collecting the full economic rent of the
land."114
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CHAPTER EIGHT
KEYNESV.CLASSSTRUGGLE
The Curtin and Chifley Governments used Keynesian economics, which had become the new orthodoxy during
the War, as a guide for peace-time economic management. The LaborGovernments' attempts to proselytise for
the new faith internationally are considered in the first section of this chapter. The second section examines the
overtly state capitalist elements in the policies of the ALP and Chifley Government and the extent to which they
wererooted in radicalsocial theory or the Party's commitment to the reconciliation of classes. The final section
deals with the propagation of Keynesian economics in the labour movement and the implications of the new
orthodoxy for economic management during a periodof militant industrial struggles.
Defenders of the Faith
Thequestionof Australia's place in the worldeconomy attracted considerable attention amongst laborites during
the 1940s. This mainly took the form of interest in the Curtin and Chifley Government's external economic
policies. Theirapproach in international economic forums was accurately seen as an extension of domestic poli-
cies and helpedincrease the Governments' credibility by highlighting theircommitment to full employment. On
the other hand the Governments' proposal that Australia adhere to the Bretton Woods Agreement was more
controversial. It counterposed thosemostfirmly committed to theperfection of capitalism byKeynesian means to
a coalition of left nationalists including adherents of Money Power theory, nationalist anti-imperialism and the
Communist Party.
Mamchak maintains that the Curtin Government's full employment policy originated as an element in its approach
to international economic problems) This, however, ignores the degree of convergence between Keynesian
economists and elements inside theLaborPartyon domesticquestions before WorldWar ITand early statements
suchas Evatt's to the Constitutional Convention. Mamchak is right in arguing that the Goveinment's concern in
international discussions on the Mutual Aid Agreement (between Britain and the USA) in 1942 was to secure
post-war demand for Australia's exports, in order to achieve full employment at home. This priority was
expressed in an ideological formas a crusade (or at least a series of missionary expeditions) to convertthe world
to Keynesian economics and to obtainproofof adherence to thefaith in votes for fullemployment at international
conferences and conventions. Thepursuit of such assurances from 1944 until 1949 represented a partial insight
into the conditions of Australian prosperity. Without full employment overseas and a concomitant high level of
demand for Australian exports, therewas littlehope that the domestic economy wouldexpandrapidly. As Arndt
put it in 1954,
"Theinstability of a dependant economy like that of Australia, which necessarily engages in a large
volumeof overseas trade, is primarily due to the instability of the majorcapitalist countries of the
rest of the world, especially the U.S.A.. So long as these major, foreign countries are liable to
slumps; no measures taken by capitalist or socialist Australian Governments could do more than
alleviate therepercussions within Australia of economic fluctuations abroad."2
Given the adoption of Keynesian policies at home, they were regarded as the solvent of international problems
too.
Australia, unlike the USA, did not give its f1I'St priority in discussions of the post-war, international economic
order to freer trade. . The USA's emphasis on free trade was a partial insight into the conditions which had
exacerbated the problems of thedepression. Its emergence fromtheWaras theworld's strongest economic power
alsogave the USAan interestin free trade. Lowlevels of protection around theworldwould givefull effectto the
competitive edge of American industry. As exporters of capital, though one was on the rise the other on the
decline, the USA and Britain were both interested in the stability of the international financial system. The
position of the Australian Labor Governments on international tradeand finance was moreequivocal. As a net
importer of capital, Australia wouldbenefit from stable capital flows, but an international system dominated by
lender powers would bias the terms of those flows in their favour. As an exporter of primary commodities,
Australia would benefit from the reduction of levels of protection around the world. But as a country whose
industrialisation was essentially basedon importsubstitution, decreased protection of the domestic market would
jeopardise substantial sectors of local manufacturing industry. So Curtin declared that Australia favoured
international free trade, but required tariffs of its own, for reasons of defence and employment.3 According to
Walker, Australia wasfaced with the dilemma of dependence on a stableinternational economic ordercombined
withattachment to protectionism;
1.Mamchak 'CentralEconomic Planning' op.cit. pp35-6.
2. Amdt"Economic Policy" op.cit. p42.
3.Digest 81p48, 4/5/44.
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"Out of this dilemma arose the Australian initiative to secure an international employment
agreement, along with the other international economic agreements that were being discussed
towards the endof the war."4
The experience of the depression in Australia had driven home to the labour movement the lesson of the
international nature of economic crises, whether this was interpreted as international conspiracy, mistakes in
international economic policies or the international laws of motion of the capitalist system. Laborites quickly
became imbued with theGovernment's crusading zeal for fullemployment during theWar. In viewof thenrecent
history, the Government's proposals wouldindeed have looked implausible without an international dimension.
TheALPSpecial Commonwealth Conference of 1942-3 recognised theneedfor international planning to maintain
employment and to raise living standards.e Soon after, Evatt said that the major industrial countries had an
international obligation to maintain high employment levels.6 Curtin proclaimed the universal validity of the
Government's Keynesian policies during the 1943 election campaign:
"This Government's policyof fulldevelopment of resources, full employment of manpower andfull
provision for social security is a basis not only for Australian reconstruction but for a stable and
peaceful Commonwealth of all nations,"?
Giblin adopted a similarposition, giving a professional sanction to theGovernment's promotion of its policies and
their theoretical basis as scientific.s Curtin contended that reconstruction entailed a "newinternational order" as
well as a new national order.9 The second of Chifley'sDecember 1943articles on reconstruction in the Sydney
Morning Herald was largely devoted to international economic questions and set out the main lines of Labor
Government policy to 1949. His starting point was firmly based in the realities of Australia's position in the
worldeconomy. The Government, he wrote,
"Suffers from no illusion that we have the full range of natural resources necessary for self-
sufficiency at modemstandards of life."
In thishe saw an affirmation of theKeynesian faiththat .
"General acceptance by all nations of domestic policies of full employment is the indispensable
basis of stableandfruitful peace:'10
As against the US approach, he maintained that tariff reductions would follow fromfull employment rather than
vice versa. Another feature of his and the Government's approach, more fanciful in the light of subsequent
developments, was the need to raise up the underdeveloped countries, who could constitute a market for
Australian manufactured exports.
The Government gained a great deal of kudos in the laborite press from its role at international economic
conferences as the prophet of full employment. At the April 1944 Philadelphia.Conference of the International
Labour Organisation, .. Beasley .preached the full-on Keynesian gospel in the form of a draft "International
Employment Agreement". He stressed that full employment was a prerequisite to lowering tariff barriers. This
point was not lost on the protectionist Australian labour movement;. as a. Standard Weekly headline,
"Unemployment Must End Before Tariffs Are Lowered Says Beasley", made clear.I! Australia's proposal was
narrowly defeated at the Conference. A much watered down. American version was then carried
overwhelmingly,12 TheAustralian suggestion of an international employment agreement suffered a similar fate at
theBretton WoodsConference on the international financial system in July 1944. But at least the Australian and
New Zealand Governments afflrmed that full employment was to be part of the international order (in the
southwest Pacific) in their 1944Pact,13
An article by F. M. Forde,theGovernment's representative at theSanFrancisco Conference of theUnitedNations
in 1945, called "our Fight for World-wide Employment" was carried by Standard Weekly, Labor Call and
Australian Worker. He proclaimed Australia's success in having a commitment to employment included in the
UnitedNations Charterandpreached redemption through international Keynesian economic policy:
"The world should know by now that there can be no such thing as economic isolation. If
employment levels fall in the UnitedStates, for instance, and there is an economic slump in that
country, the effects of that slump inevitably will be felt in Australia. Plan as we may we cannot
insulate ourselves against the economic troubles of otherpeoples.
"Neither can we insulate ourselves against the effects of having parts of the world where workers
are not paid enough to buythe things theyneed
4. Walker TheAustralian Economy op,cit,p343. .
S. Australian Labor Party Official Proceedings oftheSpecial Federal Conference November 1942 p16.
6. H. V. Bvatt Foreign PolicyofAustralia Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1945 pl18, speech originally delivered 28/4/43.
7. J. Curtin General Elections 1943: Statement ofPolicyAustralian Labor Party, Canberra 1943 p17.
8. Giblin "Reconstruction - APisgah View" Australian QU4rterly September 1943 ppl6-7.9. Australian Labor Party Official Proceedings. . •19430l" ciL pSI. The vague and utopian outlines ofthis international order were embodied
in the Atlantic Charter signed by Churchill and Roosevelt ID 1941. .
10.SydneyMorning Herald2112143, also Digest 69 1'9.11. Standard Weekly 27/4144. Also see Australian Worker3/S/44, BvattForeign Policyop. ciL pl92 speech on 1713144 for the Government's
views on increased proteetionand dispensations for developing countries, suchas Australia. . .
12. Butlin and Schedvin WarEconomy 1942-1945 op,ciLpp66()-l.13. On Bretton Woods see Bvatt Foreign Policyop, ciL p2i6 and Crisp Ben Chifley op, cit. p204. On the Australia-New Zealand Agreement
see Walker TheAustralian Economy op. cit. p370. The Bretton Woods Conference adopted the American view that international trade was the
key to prosperity and received much less pUblicity in the laborite press than the Philadelphia and San Francisco United Nations Conferences.
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"ImagineAustralia's economicposition if the millions of people who live in the islands near our
country were enjoyinga standardof livingcomparable with ours. What rich markets they wouldbe
for our primary and secondary producers."14
An advertisement for the ALP in Australian Worker, Cartoon 16, emphasised the Government's pursuit of full
employmentthroughdomestic and foreignpolicies.
The documents and statements associated with the White Paper on Full Employment explicitly related the
Keynesian crusade to the dependence of the Australian economyon the world market.l5 They also dealt with the
problemsof Australia's export industries proposing export stabilisation and insurance schemes. The WhitePaper
itself was mildly protectionist, favouring devaluation to cope with long-term balance of payment problems,but
quantitative restrictions to deal with short-termdifficulties.l6
The Labor Government returned to the international fight for countries' economic souls in the 1947 and 1948
international tradenegotiations. Dedmansummedup the aimsof Australian foreigneconomic policies:
"(a) the importance of maintaining employment and effective demand, particularly in the major
industrialcountriesof the world that will continueto represent the biggestmarkets for our exports.
"(b) the need for greater stability of prices for primaryproducts", to stabilisethe incomes of primary
producersand reduceeconomicfluctuations. '
"(c) freedomfor Australia to deal with economicproblems of particularconcernto it, for example-
(i) industrial development by tariff protection; (ii) protection of the balance of payments; and (ill)
stabilisation plans for primaryindustries.
"(d) the British Commonwealth only to reduce preferences in returnfor concessions andrecognition
of the preferences as exceptions to mostfavourednationarrangements.
"(e) limitations on controlson agricultural imports.
"(f) the need to promote the development of underdeveloped countries in order to increase their
demandforimports."17· .
The draft charter of the proposedInternational Trade Organisation (ITa) included many of these aims, notably a
commitment to international full employment policies and provisions for agreements to stabilise commodity
prices. The divergent interests of Australiaand the USA were apparentin their attitudes to the ITa. The Chifley
Government regarded the ITo.as a means to implementpet proposals, commensurate with the structure of the
Australian economy. The US Government was never keen on being formally committed to full employment
policies, while commodity agreements could raise the prices of raw material inputs into American industry.
Deprived of US support, the ITa was still born. The General'Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was ne-
gotiated in parallel with the ITa and includedsomeof theprovisions of its draft charter. GATTwas essentially an
instrumentfor freeing up world trade, as such it received the support of the USA. Australia's aim in the GATT
negotiations was to emerge with access to more markets than. it had entered with, while safeguarding local
manufacturing industry. Empire Preferences were therefore a key issue as Britain remained Australia's largest
market. Australiawas also concernedthat Britaingain marketsthrough GATT,so as to reducethe dollar shortage
in the sterling area. Shortly after the War and in the face of US attempts to undermine Empire Preference by
means of provisions in the Mutual Aid Agreement and AtlanticCharter,Evatt had announced Australia's support
for continuedpreferences.l8 But, as it became clear that the Britishmarketremainedlimitedand that international
negotiations offered a prospect of increasing access to others, the Australian position in trade negotiations
softened. In 1947Chifleypointedout that
. "It would be extremely unwise for Australia to rely upon the United Kingdom to purchase its
increasingoutputof primaryand secondary products.
"... The Government considers that whatever the fmal decisions may be [on Empire Preference in
the negotiations], if it will enable us to expandour tradeand give the maximum employment to our
people it will be to Australia's advantage."19
Coombshad earlier advised Chifley,in strongerterms,that "we shouldplan consciously to reduceour dependence
on the United Kingdom market" and should seek accessparticularly to the US market.20 GATT was signed in
November1947.
, "The new rules of tradepromised tradeexpansionwithoutrequiring prior loss of the well testedand
valuable [Empire] preferences",
apart from a small cut in Britishpreferences for Australian cannedand driedfruits. Australiaalsoconcededsome
reductionsin its own most favourednationrates of duty. The US had failedto eliminateEmpire Preferences, but
had secured agreementthat no new ones were to be introduced21 After applying the diplomatic thumb screws,
14.Australian Worker 27/6145 116; Standard Weekly 29/6145 p5; and LAbor Call 5nt4S. Also see Australian Worker editorial 13/6145 p3,
4nt45 p4,519/45 p7 for Evatt on the UNC10 Bill.
15. E.g. H. C. Coombs "The Pattem ofReconstnlction" in C. H. Grattan (ed.) Australia University of California Press, Berkeley 1947 p411 and
, Coombs Problems ofa HighEmployment Economy op,cit. p32..
16.FullEnJployment in Australia Government Printer, Canberra 1945 p13, J. Crawford Australian Trade Policy1942-1955 Australian National
University Press, Canberra 1968 p18. .
17. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 198 pp1OS2-9, 3019/48 inCrawford Australian Trade Policyop. cit. 1164.
18; Crawford Australian Trade Policyop. cit. p4 and H. V. EvattAustralia in World Affairs Angus and Robertson, Sydney 1946 p92, speech on
14111145.
19.COmmDnwealth Parliamentary Debates 191 p1029 26/3147 in.Crawford Australian Trade Policyop,cit. 1164.
20. Coornbs TrialBalance op, cit. p98-9.
21. Crawford Australian Trade Policyop. cit. pp6,35-6.
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Australian negotiators were alsoableto secure reductions in someUS duties, including thaton woo1.22 GATT did
not, as hadbeenhoped, openup vastnewmarkets for Australian produce in theUSA.23 The benefits of GATT for
Australia emerged elsewhere, notably in Japan. The Liberal opposition had placed greateremphasis on Empire
trade than the Chifley Government; once in office Menzies secured a renegotiation of Australia's GAIT
commitments but thisonlymodified previous arrangements slightly.24
The laborite press supported the Government's statements on international trade, predictably giving particular
prominence to its success in having full employment included in the various drafts of the ITO charter. "Another
Labor Triumph" overseas servedto reinforce the achievement of full employment and the Government's success
in reforming capitalism at home.2S Australian Worker carried Chifley's accurate explanation of the interests of
theAustralian capitalist class:
"Mr. Chifley said on Monday that it may be necessary for Australia to contemplate some tariff
reductions, but the Government intended to proceed with its plans for the progressive
industrialisation of Australia and would impose additional protective tariffs where necessary.
"... At the same time, it must be remembered that Australia is particularly dependent on world
markets for thesale of manyimportant primary andsecondary products, and has much to gain from
tariff reductions by other countries and the reduction of other barriers to Australia's exports, even
though the securing of thesewillrequire review of someAustralian tariffrates."26
This clarity of vision aboutAustralia's place in the worldwasnot exploited to serve working class interests. In
the tradition of laborite nationalism the insightwas used to advance the interests of the Australian capitalist class.
The long standing' protectionism associated with laborite nationalism was not an obstacle to this balanced
assessment because, afterthe War therun-down anddestruction of industry around the worldmeantthat therewas
less competition from imports for Australian manufacturers. Moreover, the Government undertook that it would
not let free trade principles stand in the way of the development of Australian industry. Coverage of the trade
negotiations in the laborite pressdrew attention to two salient aspects of the Government's tradepolicies. First
that
"A country in the process of rapid industrialisation cannotgive up its choice between protective
tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, and payment of production subsidies as a means of
fostering industrial growth."27
Secondly the papers pointed out that through small concessions Australia stood to make considerable gains
through access to new markets.28
Full employment was the indexof the Labor Governments' success most commonly used by laborites. But the
LaborGovernments of the 1940s also paid attention to the encouragement of capital investment, including that
fromoverseas, as an important responsibility. During 1944Curtinhad still thought of Britainas the main source
of overseas investment. In November Chifley notedthat
"Generally, the policy of this Government andits predecessors has beento givepreference to British
capitalfor investment in thiscountry. However, no restrictions are placed upon the introduction of
American capital whenever it can be shown that the introduction of such capital will be to the
benefit of Australia."29
In 1946, an election year,Standard Weekly reported "Mr.Chifley Delivers theGoods" on his returnfroma visitto
Britain, because "British industry is ready to transfer to Australia" and later that "ChifleyForecasts a Flood of
Overseas Capital".30 Labor Call noted favourably overseas companies investing in Australia. Standard Weekly
and Australian Worker soon did 00.31 Workers were expected to regard the confidence of international
capitalism in theGovernment as an indicator of its worth:
"Thevast expansion programme thatoverseas andlocal interests have commenced in Australia is a
hightribute to theFederal Government."32 _
The following year Chifley used several of his broadcast Reports to the Nation to explain the importance of
foreign investment.33 . The recognition of the need to attract foreign capital was an integral part of the
Government's economic analysis not only of the long term needs of Australian capitalism but also of the steps
necessary for short term economic management and counter-cyclical policy. This was particularly borne out in
theGovernment's pronouncements on thedollarcrisis.
22.CoombsTrialBalanc« op. cit. p98-9.
23. SeeDigest132 pS, 11111147 for Dedman's comments on the opportunities in the US market presented by the draft GAIT.
24. Crawford Australian Trade Policyop,cit,f12 for Menzies's position.
25.LaborCall613/47 pi. Also see !.aborCal 1313/48 p3, Standard We~kly 2411147 p3, 713/47 p6.
26. Australian Worker2211147. See Amalgamated Engineering UnionJournal April and July 1948 for reprints ofspeeches by Dedman on
GAIT and the ITO.
TT. Labor Call 613/47 pi. Also see LaborCall 22110148 p3, where Chitley said that no industry would be allowed togo to the wall and J.
Dedman Ministerial SpeechonSecondary Industries 1946.
28.Australian Worker26111147 p7 and LaborCall 11112147 p8.
29. Curtin: Digest88 p41 1219/44. Chitley: Digest92 p26 15111144.
30.Standard Weekly2'115146, 1319146 p7.
31. !.abor Call 2SnJ46 pS; Standard Weekly 2716147 pS; and Australian Worker 31nJ46 p3. Also see Dedman on foreign investment in
secondary industry in Digest122 pp34-S 29/11146.
32.LaborCall30llJ48 pi.
33.Standard Weekly1414149 pS. Foran article on the level offoreign investment in the post-war period seeStandard Weekly 7/1149 p49 p4.
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Babes in the Woods
Thewide acceptance of theneed for foreign investment by moderate laborites contrasted starklywith the hostility
of both moderates and Money Power theorists to foreign capital during the 1930s. A decade laterthere was still a
preoccupation with the threat of finance capital and international loans. Most laborite radicals regarded the
Bretton Woods Agreement as the main danger to Australia. The ACP was more in tune with the times. The
Communist Party sawa serious dangerin foreign investment and attributed many of Australia's problems toWall
Street Only from the 1950s did any significant section of laborites issue warnings about the level of foreign
investment, and then the blame was placed on the Menzies Government34 But the two versions of left
nationalism in the 19408 wereableto findcommon ground in theirhostility to theBretton Woods Agreement.
Australian membership of the new institutions of the international fmancial system provoked one of the most
notable controversies amongst laborites during the 1940s. Thecharters of the International Monetary Fund(IMF)
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (mRD) were worked out at a Conference in
Bretton Woods, in theUSA,inJuly 1944. TheBretton Woods Agreement was an attempt to stabilise international
fmancial relations to avoid a repetition of depression experiences like competitive devaluations, defaults on loans
and interest payments, disruption of trade. The CurtinGovernment sentpublic servants, but no seniorpolitical
representative to the Conference because it was concerned lest involvement with international financial
institutions restrict its freedom of action in exchange rate and other matters.35 As the most powerful country
presentand byfar the largestsubscriber to to the two new bodies, the USA was, to a considerable extent, able to
determine the shapeof thefinalAgreement. TheUSA's mainconcern was that thenew bodies should underpin an
expansion of worldtrade. The IMF was to provide a means of ironing outexchange ratefluctuations, through the
allocation of its funds (drawing rights) to countries in balance of payments difficulties. ThemRD was to provide
loanfundsfor the reconstruction of war-devastated and underdeveloped economies.36
The main effect of the Bretton Woods Agreement was to institutionalise US economic dominance over the non-
communist word. The USA provided the largest contributions to both the IMF and mRD and thus had the
greatest numberof votes on their governing bodies. The new arrangements did not alter the financial standing of
participating countries: creditors remained creditors, debtors remained debtors. But they gave a universal
character to the relations between the two categories, making it harder, for example, for debtors to play creditors
off againsteach other. Although the IMF did help smooth out exchange rate movements, it couldnot influence
longer-term economic developments, such as those which led to successive devaluations of the pound sterling
during the 19408, 1950s and 1960s. In 1971, very early in the current general crisis of capitalist, one of the
cornerstones of Bretton Woods -- thefixedexchange rate between goldandthe U'Sdollar -- collapsed.
While Chifley and Curtin favoured Australian participation in the institutions of Bretton Woods, there was still
some hesitation.s? One legacy of the depression in Australia was a wariness of international finance. No doubt
confident of a favourable publicreception, for example, Curtin in-1945 announced that L34 million of London
debt would be paid off, thanks to good foreign exchange balances.38 Later that year Evatt mentioned that
Australia did not wantto borrow US dollars because of thedepression experience withoverseas loans.39 Dedman,
soon the foremost proponent of Australian participation in the Bretton Woods arrangements, was critical of the
draftof the Agreement for the IMF.40 Chifley
"Was afraid that the new institutions wouldprevent his government fromcarrying out its plan for
the restructuring andreorientation of Australian capital."41
Even economists such as Coombs, Wilson andMelville wereconcerned aboutfeatures of the Agreement which
gave creditor. countries the dominant role in the IMF and mightcurtail Australia's freedom of action in financial
matters.42 Coombs saw it as "compatible with the 'positiveapproach" ratherthan integral to it.43 The"positive
approach" was .the Government's advocacy of multilateral commitments to full employment in international
economic forums. Senior economic advisors did supportAustralian ratification of the Agreement "on balance",
butonlyafter urging theGovernment that it reserve its decision for a period~44 This it did untillate 1946.
Whilethe Bretton Woods Agreement wasbeing negotiated, Evattsaid thatthe testof the IMFand mRD should be
"theirdirect assistance in helping to maintain high levelsof employment.45 Yet whenthe LaborCabinet decided
to endorse the Agreement, supporters of ratification in the labour movement portrayed it as already being an
34. E.g. H. W. Arndt "tabor and EConomic Policy" Chitley Memorial Lecture, University ofMelbourne, Melbourne 1956 p14 and J. Burton
TheAlternative: A Dynamic Approach to OurRelations withAsiaMorgan's Publications, Sydney 1954 p77.
35. Crisp BenChijley op,cit. p203.
36. Butlin and Schedvin WarEconomy 1942·1945 op. cit. pp661-7..
37. Coombs TrialBalance op. cit. p47
38. Digest98 pp31-2 2113/45.
39. Evatt Australia in WorldAffairsop. cit. p90.
40. Crisp BenChijley op. cit. p203.
41. M. Beresford and P. Kerr "A 'fuming Point for Australian Capitalism: 1942-52" in E. L. Wheelwright and K. BuckIey (eds) Essays in the
Political Economy 0/Australian Capitalism Volume Four Australian and New Zealand Book Company, Sydney 1980 p161.
42Coombs TrialBalance op. cit. pp46-7i Crisp BenChijley op. cit. p200i and Kerr and Beresford "A 'fuming Point" op. cit, pp161 et seq,
43. Coombs TrialBalance op,cit, jl46.
44. ibid. p47.
45.Digest8S pI719n144.
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integral part of the post-war order of full employment, a corollary of Keynesian economics. Coombs and
Melville'sreservations indicate that thiswas far from beingthe case. For, by 1946-47 when the controversy over
Bretton Woods took place, Keynesian economics was already an element in the Government's apparatus of
legitimation. Full employment wasthe touchstone of that legitimation.
Love accepts too muchat face valuewhen he argues that the supporters of Bretton Woods "saw it as an essential
component in the whole strategy mapped out in the 1945 WhitePaper" on full employment.46 Beresford andKerr
are more attuned to the realities of the situation in drawing attention to the "cynicism" of the campaign for
ratiflcation.s? Dedman argued that the Bretton WoodsAgreement should be-seen in the light of the inclusion of
full employment in the United Nations Charter. He pointed out that Australian full employment depended on
exports, which in turn could be aided by the stabilisation of exchange rates and encouragement of spending by
creditor nations. The Agreement sanctioned discriminatory action against "scarce currencies". Moreover, a
failure to join the IMF couldresult in discrimination against Australia. Dedman thus presented Bretton Woods as
a solution to problems facing Australian capitalism. The IMF proved largely incapable of solving such problems
whenthey did occur and.in anycase Australia did not sufferfromthemin an acuteform. Dedman's analysis had
a basis in the real obstacles to capital accumulation in Australia and worries that thedepression couldbe repeated,
even if heoverstated the case.48
Between 1944 and 1947, a coalition of supporters of Money Power, anti-imperialist nationalist ideas and
Communists, headed by Labor Minister EddieWard opposed the ratification of the Bretton Woods Agreement-s
They did not address the problems of a capitalist economy Bretton Woods was designed to solve, but remained
within the framework of assumptions of national capitalist development. They were most concerned about the
matters over which Coombs and Melville had expressed reservations, that the Agreement would restrict
Australia's freedom of action. The reasons Australian employers, their theoreticians and representatives on
balance supported ratification of a key instrument of the post-war imperialist order and the implications for the
international working classconcerned themmuch less. Bretton Woods wasportrayed as a threatto protectionism,
WhiteAustralia, full employment andEmpire trade.50
Opposition to BrettonWoods wasmounted on two fronts. Oneused MoneyPower traditions for its ammunition.
SenatorO'Flaherty thought
"The Scheme provides for an administrative body to implement the financial plan whichwould be
controlled by thesameold money powerin a new situation."51
Wardmaintained that theAgreement
"Offers no solution to world problems but quite blatantly sets up controls which will reduce the
smallernationsto vassalstates and willmakeeverygovernment the mouth piece and toolof interna-
tional fmance."52
From 1944 S. F. Allen attempted to theorise laborite hostility to Bretton Woods and also provided less
sophisticated arguments againstthe Agreement. Allen, who had a Douglas Credit background, maintained that
"Too much attention is given to the question of exports and foreign trade". The first aimof monetary policy, he
held, should be to increase the purchasing power of a country's own population, while tradewould takecare of
itself:
"Theend and aimof production shouldbe consumption by eachcountry'sownpeoplefirst, and then
to exportthe surpluses to thosecountries in needof suchproducts."53
This view, while it came to similar conclusions to those of Australian Keynesians, was essentially a crude
underconsumptionist one, devoid of the international perspective, beyond a conspiracy theory, of Keynesian
economics. Apartfrom a passiveisolationism, with a consequent declinein livingstandards as exportincome fell
off,Money Powercritics of Bretton Woods were unable to offera plausible solution to the international fmancial
problems Australia wasexpectedto face.
46. LOve lAbOur alidtlUl Monsy Power op. cit, p159.
47. Beresford and Kerr"ATurning Point" op, cit. ppl64-5.
48.1. Dedman "The Case for Bretton Woods" in, e.g, Standard Weekly 17/4147 pI: LaborCaU 9/1147 p7, 1611/47j Australian Worker 15/1147
pS, 1211147 p2:Amalgamated Engineering UnionJournal February 1947 pp7-9. "Having won the fight for the recognition of full employment
as an intemational policy", Dedman argued, "itwould ill become Australia to turn around and refuse membership ofthe instruments for its
achievement". Beresford .and Kerr "A Turning Point' op. cit. pl6S called this argument "deception to an almost farcical extent". Chitley in
StandmdWeekly 2113147 p8 explicitly linked Bretton Woods to other institutions ofintemational co-operation, the United Nations, Il.O, Food
and Agricultural Organisation, In which his Govemment had had more success in promoting its ideas on full employment. Also seea confusedjustification for Bretton Woods from afonnerfoe ofthe Money Power, M. M NolanLaOOr Call 2311147 p4. For Bretton Woods as a means
for preventing international trade anarchy seeLaborCall30/1147 p4.
49. Instances ofWard's prominence in the campaign are Standard Weekly 5/4146 p4, 17/1147 p4;LaborCall9/1147 pS, 1611147 pS,3111147 pS:
Australian Worker 1511/47, 2211147; and AmalgamatedEngineering UnionJournal May 1947 pp1D-4.
SO. Standard Weekly 5/10/45 p11, 2614146 p6: Australian Worker 613146 p7, 23/10/46 p7, 1113147 p11: Labor Call 30/1147, Amalgamated
Engineering Union JournalSeptember 1945 plO. Love Labourand th« Money Powerop.cit. p233-4 gives a more detailed account ofthese
arguments.
51.Australian Worker613/46 p7.
52.LaOOr eau 23/1147 pS. See Love Labourand th4MoneyPowerop. eit, pp158-64 for the use ofMoney Power arguments inthe course of
the debate on Bretton Woods.
53.StandtudWeekly 16111/44 p2. Also see Standard Weekly 23/11144 p4,2614146 p6 and Amalgamated Engineering UnionJournal May and
lune 1947. Given the content ofthe article, ItAFS" in Standard Weekly 213/44 could well have been Mr. Alien, with his initials reversed.
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On the secondfront opposedto BrettonWoods thereemergeda difficulty for laborites during the 1940s which L.
Ross accurately identified:
"The uncertainties and confusions created by the struggle against the Communist Party are
important in a period when often the policies supported by the Communist Party run parallel to
those that Labor has supported in the past. Labor has often difficulty in supporting such ideas
without beingembroiled in Communist policy."54
This problem was most acute for those on the left of the ALP, increasingly under siege from the Groups, their
ideas anathema to the Government. The Communist Party was at the heightof its strerigth during the 1940s and
proved a very significant pole of attraction for rank and me leftists inside the Labor Party. The ACP argued
convincingly that Bretton Woods entailed an extension of the influence of US imperialism. A Federal ARU
publication, by J. J. Brown,Communist Secretary of the union in Victoria, andJ. Chapple, General President, still
proponentof some Money Power ideas and close to the Communist Party for many years, exemplified the ACP
position and its proximity to that of left laborites:
"Under the BrettonWoods agreement. .. the world would be at the mercyof U.SA. creditors, and
Imperialtradewithinthe BritishEmpirewill be wellnigh impossible.
"It is evident that this wealth [from the intereston funds generated by the Agreement] will largely
go to the U.S.A.'s '60 wealthy families' and their friends, and that the wealth of the world will be
concentrated in fewerhands, principally in the U.S.A.'s financial oligarchy."55
The pamphlet employed Money Power rhetoric alongside denunciation of US imperialism.56 With the
Communists now denouncing not only local monopolists and rich families, but also identifying an international
conspiracy in the USA as the root of the world's problems,the distance between their position and MoneyPower
theory became even narrower than it was during the late 1930s. In the courseof the BrettonWoods debate this
convergence was also furthered byMoneyPower theorists' recognition of theUSA's vital role in events.57
Despitethe considerable controversy in the labourmovement, there were indicators in the mildnessof the public
debateover the Agreement that it wasnot vital to the future of Australian capitalism. Only a few members of the
opposition and a cross bencher, J. T. Lang, spoke and voted against ratification during the final debate in the
House of Representatives. Ward, renowned as a ferocious fighter to the second last trench, and some of his
supporters were absentfrom the Chamber.58 Nor did the issue have a highpenetration into public consciousness.
59 Giventhe rangeof countries that had adhered to the IMF, membership did offer Australia advantages, though
not critical ones, in improvedaccess to international reserves and loans whichmightprove useful at some stage,
while failure to ratify made Australia entirelydependent on the good will of individual countries and lenders of
suchfunds.60 .
ForeignLoans and WageRestraint
The dollar crisis from 1947 provided an important context for the Chifley Government's domestic economic
policiesuntil 1949. The PrimeMinistercontended that the international situation madenecessary importcontrols,
resulting in shortages, increased labour productivity and wage increases only in line with the growth of the
economy. Given acceptance of the existing capitalistorder this case wasquite a logicalone. Chifley tookit to the
people in his Reports to the Nation and found support in the laborite and daily press. His key themes were the
need to increaseproduction andAustralia's loyaltyto anddependence on Britain:
"What we can do, however, is to step up the quantity of our exports -- both dollarexports and other
exports. Many of the commodities we ship to Britain are the means of savingdollars for. her. But
greater exports requiregreaterproduction. .
"And so we come roundagain to the same point -- the necessity I have so often stressed to you for
greater andmore sustainedeffortsby everyone who has anypart to play in essentialproduction."61
54. L. Ross "Some Factors in the Development ofLabor's Foreign Policies AustralianOullookMarch 1949 p44.
SS. J. 1. Brown and J. F. Chapple Breuon Woods Australian Railways Union, Sydney 19461 ppS, 6. For Chapp.lets Money Power ideas see
Railroad2511146 p6,812146 lP,221U46 p2, 813/46 pS,ironically Communist Gordon Crane offered aKeynesian critique ofChapple's position,
Railroad4110/46 p2. .
56. Brown and Cliapple BrettonWoodsop. cit. pp9, 10.
57. See, for example, Ward's "The Case against Bretton Woods" LaborCall 23/1147 pS, S. F. Alien "'Dollar Imperialism' (is the right name for
the Bretton Woods Scheme)" StandardWeekly2614146 p6,LaborCall 30/1147 pS.
58. Crisp Ben Chifleyop. cit. p211.59. ibid. p212. Since the issue was widely canvassed in the labour movement this can only have meant that bourgeois public opinion was not
disturbed by the prospect ofnon-ratification, L. Overacker "Australia's Battle ofBretton Woods" Forum (philadelphia) May 1947 p403: "Mr.
Chitley's failure totrustthe people was not fatal in this instance."
60. Beresford and Kerr"A Turning Point" op,cit. pp163-4. .
61.Digest 143 p23 Report tothe Nation 30,3/4/49. Also see Digest 133 plO broadcast by Chitley 2611148; Digest 139 Pf5-8 Reports tothe
Nation 1-3, 1219148, 1919/48,2619/48; Digest 139 pll Report tothe Nation 5, 10/10148 on the Marshall Plan; Digest 14 p31 Report tothe
Nationno17, 211/49; Digest 143 p23 Report tothe Nation 30,3/4/49; Digest 147 pp23-4 Report to the Nation SS; Australian Worker10/12147, .
2811148 pl, StandardWeekly 30/1/48pS; LaborCall 3011148 ps,2919/49 p4,AmalgamatedEngineering UnionJournalFebruary 1948 pp12-3.
AustralianWorker 1U11147 p6 and StandardWeekly5/12147 p2 both ran material on the dollar crisis prepared by the Department ofPostwar
Reconstruction. LaborCall l111U47p8, 1213/48 p3 reported t>edman's argument that GATI' would benefit not only Australia but also Britain
and, 10/2/50 pl, chastised Menzies for letting Britain down by relaxing import controls and rationing.
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In his August 1948 Conference with the trade unions Chifley drew particular attention to the problem of the
sterling area and the needto increase production as a means of preventing Britain's collapse.62 The Government
made a verydirect, material contribution to Britain's economic recovery in the formof a LlO million donation in
1948, without apparently attracting criticism in thelaborite press.63
Late in 1948 the Government was still expressing Labor's traditional hostility to overseas borrowing by
lambasting P. Spender, an opposition frontbencher, for suggesting a loanfromtheUSA:
"This country can and should live within its means 'in regard to sterling dollar income and
expenditure."64
Commenting on the 1949 budget, Chifley again stated that dollar loans were a last resort, while Labor papers
claimed that the "Liberals would hand Australia to the pawnbrokers" .65 But, within a month, the Government
negotiated a US$20million withdrawal (loan) from the International Monetary Fund to cope with further falls in
dollarreserves.66 The Menzies Govemmentsoon followed up with a $100 million loan from the International
Bankfor Reconstruction andDevelopment, in August1950, and a furtherIMF drawing of $30 million in August
1952. Theseloans and their successors weresmallin comparison withprivate capital inflow. Whiletheyassisted
in the development of theAustralian economy theydid little to overcome the balance of payments problem which
wasprimarily rectifiedby means of importcontrols.67
By late 1949 the Chifley Government hadcome around to theview that it couldnot rely on international policies
for full employment to overcome the problems the world economy presented to Australian capitalism. It now
gavegreater weightto, the expansion of worldtradeand thepromotion of Australian competitiveness, productivity
andexports. Wagerestraint was a necessary basis for suchpolicies. Labor Call carried one of Chifley's Reports
to theNation underthe headline "Expansion of WorldTradeOnlySolution to DollarProblems".68 The "positive"
approach had perished. Although this corollary of the bourgeois socialist aspect of Keynesian ideology did not
survive even the cool breeze of the dollar shortage, the new economics continued to hold out the hope of a
reformed, crisis free capitalism until the 19708. Whilecapitalism happened, for otherreasons, to be crisis free, the
Keynesian argument that Governments had successfully and deliberately reformed capitalism, retained some
credibility.
By the endof the 1940s the Chifley Government, with moderate laborites in tow, had replayed the tragedy of the
Scullin Government as farce. It had movedfrom enthusiasm over foreign direct investment to acceptance of the
necessity of foreign loans and the restraint of working class living standards under the pressure of economic
circumstances and its commitment to Australian capitalist development. The laborite opponents of the Bretton
Woods Agreement hadpredicted direconsequences, in the formof economic sacrifices for the working class and
international loans, such as the Government deemed necessary soon after the debate. These were required for
reasons not directly associated with the Agreement. But those loudest in their criticisms of Bretton Woods
stepped lightly whenit cameto the international economic policies from 1947, lest theytainttheGovernment with
anyconnection to the Money Power.69 The Communist Party was, at this stage, stepping up its criticisms of the
ALP for selling out Australia and thus increased its dominance over the left nationalist current in the labour
movement. But the sequel was not, as manyfeared, another depression. It was the long boom.
62. Digest148 pp9=lO.
63. Digest138pIS, Chifley30/8/48.
64. Digest141 plOChifley7/12148. . ,
65. Standard Weekly 9/9/49pp3,9;LaborCa/lI619/49pS.
66.Digest 148ppl8-9 Report to theNation 60,30110/49. AlsoseeStandard Weekly4/11149 pl: "HowPurchase of Dollars WasMade". Note
theuseof the term"purchase", a somewhat misleading description of the transaction.
67. W. Prest "Economic Policies" in G. Greenwood and N. Harper(eds) Australia in World Affairs 1950-1955 Cheshire, Melbourne 1956
pJ)4Q-l.
~. LaborCall29n147p4. .
69. D. Cameron held fmn to his MoneyPowertheories, but didnot let these implicate the LaborGovernment, LaborCa/l2l9/47 p7, 3019/49
p7.
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Socialism (for the Good of Capitalism)
The leading figures in the Curtin Government, the Prime Minister, Chifley and Evatt, were explicit in their
hostility to measures of socialisation during theWar. TheirKeynesian economic policies were designed to usher
in a prosperity that made no classdistinctions. The Government took measures that were aimed at reconciling
classes in tripartite bodies or through Government/union consultation. In mostcases where theinterests of capital
and labour came into sharp conflict the Curtin andChifley Governments sided with the national interest, that is,
thegreater goodof capital accumulation. Mostimportantly this tooktheformof policies of wage restraint. The
Governments' approach was an important element in shaping theperspectives of laborites and in containing class
conflict. The pressure of rank and file workers on union officials and the ALP machine tended in the other
direction during the 1940s. So, although laborites applauded many of theGovernments' policies of class collabo-
ration, in the immediate post-war period there was hostility to the Chifley Government's attitude to shorter hours
andwagepegging.
The above, broad picture was, of course, complicated by the objections of individual Labor leaders and laborite
union officials to the general direction of Government policy, thechanging lineof theCommunist Partyandshifts
in the economic situation. It provides, nevertheless, a satisfactory framework for understanding developments in
the labour movement between 1941 and 1949.. But if it holds good then the NSW ALP and the Chifley
Government apparently behaved anomalously on a number of occasions, evenafterenthusiasm for socialism had
subsided in the labour movement at large. Chifley's attempt to nationalise the trading banks in 1947 is themost
dramatic example on which the Government's reputation for radicalism rests. During the mid-1940s, the NSW
ALPmachine, nototherwise notedfor its leftwing politics, mounted a campaign for thenationalisation of thecoal
.mining industry. There is no doubtthat many of those whosupported these measures regarded them as, in some
sense, anticapitalist. That is not at issue. The problem revolves around the way the prime movers in the ALP
perceived such measures and the concrete implications of their specific proposals. Was advocacy of coal
nationalisation, centering on Standard Weekly, andChifley's attempt to takeover the banks in contradiction with
our characterisation of the ALP leadership's view of the class anatomy of Australian capitalism and of the
possibilities for sustained class collaboration?
Thetwo mainparties in Australian federal politics have always beencommitted to thepursuit of economic growth
through the encouragement of capital accumulation. This was the overt form of Labor and
LiberallNationalistlUnited Australia/Liberal acceptance of the capitalist order. Both have been prepared to
continue the role of the 19th century colonial states in securing economic growth through direct intervention
where necessary. A difference has been Labor's greater readiness to judge the circumstances rightfor increased
stateintervention. Both inside the labour movement and among its opponents there was a belief that socialism
entailed stateownership and theestablishment of stateenterprise wastherefore socialist. TheChifley Government
took a number of such steps -- socialist for the good of capitalism. Curtin had already enunciated a broad
framework for them in 1944:
"Although the Government was prepared to assistprivate industry after the war, industry would
have to accept corresponding responsibility... If private enterprise cannot or will not undertake
industrial development, theGovernment willhave to consider whatit cando,"!
The significance of proposals for coal and bank nationalisation can only be understood in the context of this
framework and the other measures taken within it by the Curtin andChifley Governments. Many of the modest
state capitalist measures received scant attention in the laborite press, so that the questions of bank and coal
nationalisation seemed dramatic departures.
The Chifley Government established the Commonwealth Employment Service because no private body was in a
position to provide a comprehensive national service to enhance the supply of labour by increasing workers'
mobility in a period of labour shortage. An innovation likely to appeal to both employers and employees, the
laborite press didnot payspecial attention to it, but Chifley mentioned it in several of his Reports to theNation.2
TheService wasdwarfed by the Government's immigration program, as a contribution to the improvement of the
thesupply of labour power. A. Calwell, theMinister for Immigration, was an active propagandist forhisportfolio
inside and outside the labour movement.t The Snowy Mountains Scheme Agreement between the
1.Standard Weekly 3/8/44. . .
2.Digest 141p2S Reportto theNation 15 19/12148; Digest144p16Report to the Nation 39 5/6149; and Digest144 p17 Report to the Nation
40 1216149. .
3. The immigration program was probably the Government's mostimportant "statecapitalist" measure duringthe 19408. It usually featured in
the laborite press in the fonn of articlesby Calwell or accounts of Chitley's speeches. Racism and fear of foreign workers, longstanding
features of lliborite ideology, led to somecautionaboutthe migration program 'inthe movement. ButtheGovernment's arguments appealed to
nationalism, on the basisof Australia's defence needsand the campaign for increased production. Economics displaced defence as the main
argument after the War. SeeSydney Morning Herald IG!8143 p7for Curtin'selection statement along"populate or perish" lines; Waters 'The
PostwarReconstruction Plans' op. cit, p41for immigration proposals duringthe War;Digest66 p40Curtin2G!10 43 on the establishment of
theDepartmental Committee on Migration, mainlyfor defence reasons; Australian Worker4/12/46,29/1147 pl botharticlesby CalweU; Digest
141 p2SChifley Report to the Nation 13 5/12148; LaborCall214148 p4for Calwell at theVictorian ALPConference: "Cannot HoldAustralia
WithoutMore People- Calwell", "It couldbe held only by carrying out a huge planned immigration, build up the country so that industries
couldexpand"; LabOT Ca/I618148 p4reportof a Cabinet decision" on the contribution displaced people couldmaketo Australi~n development;
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Commonwealth, Victoria and NSW in 1949 and its preliminaries attracted a little comment in the laborite press,
but more attention was paid to the reestablishment of the Commonwealth Shipping Line and the Government's
policies for the domestic airlines.s The Government attempted to establish a state monopoly in interstate air
transport through its 1945 Australian National Airlines Act. When the Act was successfully challenged in the
High Court, the two-airlines policyemerged as a fall-back position.S The Shipping Line was reestablished in the
longstanding Labor tradition of state competition with private enterprise to keep it honest.e The purchase of
QANTAS, the establishment of the Overseas Telecommunications Commission and the Bureau of Mineral
Resources, other measures of statecapitalism, went largelyunnoticed in thelabourmovement, whoseinvolvement
in overseas travel, international communications and mineral exploration was limited. Defence as well as de-
velopmental considerations were involved in the former two initiatives. Neither the Government's efforts to
diversify the Australian economy through large subsidies to the automotive and aluminium industries nor its
shareholdings in Commonwealth Oil Refineries and Amalgamated Wireless of Australia emerged as issues in the
labourmovement7
Coal and Industrial Development
The demand for nationalisation of coal mining arose from the economic and industrial conditions in the industry
during and immediately after the War. Coal was, as it still is, one of the most basicraw material inputs for the
Australian economy. It was the main fuel for electricity generation, town gas production, rail transport and
numerous other industries. Processed into coke it was an indispensable ingredient in the iron and steel industry.
Theseindustries were, in turn, crucial to production in other sectors. It was, therefore, a matter of concern to the
entire capitalist class when, during and after the War, supply failed to meet demand. From the point of viewof
capitaltheproblemhad two aspects:
"Broadly the limits on increased production... were technical, the need to modernize mining
equipment and organisation, and human, the antagonism and suspicion prevailing between owners
and miners."8
Owners and Miners' Federation leaders had complementary, partial insights on the problem. To the owners the
shortage of coal, partly due to outdatedtechnology, was not particularly upsetting -- it guaranteed high prices.s
But the strengthof the Miners' Federation was irksomebecauseit limitedproduction within the overall situation
of shortage and cut into profits. The owners wantedgreaterdiscipline in the industryand an end to the anarchic
behaviour they attributed to the Federation and its leadership. The performance of the industry highlighted two
inadequacies in the owners' analysis and claims that disciplining the union would solve its problems. First,
despite' a dramatic fall in the level of industrial disputes to 177,565 days lost in 1942, a figure comparable with
those of the depression, production had remained inadequate.tv Under the disputes procedure enshrined in the
1942"CanberraCode", the Communist leadership of the Miners' Federation undertook to police its own members,
eliminate strike actionand increase production in the nameof the "greatpatriotic war againstfascism". Secondly,
the increasing numberof days lost through industrial disputes in the industry from 1943, despitethe unionleaders'
continued commitment to class collaboration, indicatedthat the workers' militancy couldnot simply be attributed
to the officials. It wentdeeper, to the traditions andsolidarity of the rankand file.
The Miners' Federation leadership professed a desire to increase coal production, even during the Communist
Party's left turn from 1947. Theofficials arguedthat morecoal couldonly be won if the miners' conditions were
improved through better pay, conditions and shorter hours. Further, they maintained that the industry was
inefficient due to the incompetence of the owners,so it should be nationalised and run on more scientific Iines.U
The unionhad, however, strongreservations aboutmechanisation, especially of pillar extraction.
tabOrCall22J8J48 P6 Chifley'sReport to theNation 6on immigration; Digest141 p2S Report to theNation6 j DigestReportto theNation IS
19/12148; Digest147p26Reportto theNation 56 2110/49; Standard Weekly 29/4149 p4Calwell.
4. For the Snowy Mountains Scheme see Standard Weekly 1411149 p3, 1113/49 p7, Railroad 17/10/47 p7 for a throwaway comment in the
courseof S. F. AlIen'sdiscussion of Commonwealth Bankcredit. On airline pohcy: e.g, Australian Worker 2Snt45 pl, 15/12148 p7, Labor
Call27/8/48 p4. .
5. D. M. Hocking and C. P. Haddon-Cave AirTransport inAustralia Angus and Robertson, Sydney1951 pp79-80. Alsosee Standard Weekly
ll~~9J~point of stateconcerns competing with private enterprise was probably reached in Queensland in the decadeafter its first majority
LaborGovernment was elected in 1915, see, for example, D. J. Murphy "Queensland" in D.J. Murphy(ed)Labor in Politics University of
Queensland Press,Brisbane 1975ppl90-1.
7. The adventof the Menzies Government did not significantly alter the Commonwealth's activities in industry- where private enterprise
could clearlyoperate efficiently state activity was down-graded, the Government disposed of its shares in Amalgamated Wireless and the
Commonwealth Oil Refineries and the rate of expansion of the state owned domestic airline slowed. But in less economically viable or
strategically significant areas, such as the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, QANTAS, the Employment Serviceand Migration program,
state.involvement continued. TheMcKell Government of NSWduringthe 1940s alsoengaged in somestatecapitalist exploits, seeV.G.Kelly
A Man oftM People: FromBoilermaker toGovernor-General: TM Career oftM RightHonowabte SirWilliamMcKel1 Alpha, Sydpey 1971
pp96-7.8: R. GollanTM Coalminers ofNewSouth Wales Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1963 p228.
9. At the end of March 1944Chifleyannounced that LS5,042 had been paid to mineowners in subsidies sincea coal priceceilinghad been
introduced, Digest79 p45.
10.LaboUTReports.
11. E. RossHow to Get More Coal Miners' Federation, Sydney October 1947: "Pit and town amenities - that's the answer to the coal
probleml", p3; "The wanton destruction of national resources and the chronic chaos of coal under privateownership, point sharply to the
pressing needfor a democratically controlled scheme of complete nationalisation", p32. NotethatFederation leadersand theCommunist Party
onlystartedcallingfor nationalisation of the industry late in theWar, in 1942Communists on theNSW LaborCouncil votedagainsta motion
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A rounded pictureof theproblem presented to thecapitalist classby thecoal industry has to take into account the
partialinsights of boththeowners and the miners, whilegiving moreprominence to mechanisation thaneither did.
TheFederation's leaders werecorrectin arguing that theowners wereincapable of rapidly renovating the industry
and., to a lesser extent in their contention that the miners' frequently disgusting conditions were an obstacle to
increased production. On the other hand., to take full advantage of mechanisation to obtain cheap and plentiful
coal, the powerof theMiners' Federation wouldhaveto be curbed. .
It became increasingly evident during the War that coercion of the miners was not in itself a solution to the
problems of the industry. Fines and otherpenalties were imposed with the approval of the union, but theyfailed
evento reducethe number of dayslost after 1943.12 By theend of the War the Communist Party had once more
begun to accommodate itself to working classmilitancy. The Partyendorsed the widespread view, in andoutside
the labourmovement, that nationalisation couldremedy the problems of the coal industry. In the context of rank:
and file enthusiasm for socialism Standard Weekly, in 1944, campaigned for nationalisation, better amenities,
housing and new industries in the mining areas to employ miners displaced by mechanisation.13 The aim was
completely in accord with the advancement of Australian capital accumulation. In a nationalised industry it would
be possible to increase production and productivity through mechanisation, without lightening workloads, while
also ameliorating the workers' conditions. An editorial in the paper argued that nationalising the mines would
make it easier to encourage miners to scab during strikes, because in doing so they would not be siding with a
boss.14 This was clearly a procapitalist justification for "socialisation". Standard Weekly used the increased
production in mines takenover by the Coal Commissioner as an additional argument for nationalisation.15 Atthe
1945 ALP FederalConference the NSW branch moved for the nationalisation of the coal industry,16 Thepost-
warcoal crisisdeepened during 1946, due to the reluctance of the owners to modernise, equipment shortages and
difficulties in reorganising the industry. Standard Weekly again took up the issue of nationalisation, although
prosocialist sentiment in the labourmovement had abated.t? Thepaper's position thus had a radical appearance.
Theeditor, J. Ormonde, devoted a signedpage one article to the call for nationalisation under the headline "More
Mines - More Miners 00 MoreCoal". A month lateranother frontpagearticle indicted theowners for theirfailure
to develop the industry. Later A. Calwe11 added his voice to those of the NSW Party leaders in support of
nationalisation.18
Thatnationalisation of the coal industry was not necessarily a socialist proposal was apparent in a detailed study
by two professional and far from radicaleconomists. They attributed the economic problems of the coal industry
to excess capacitybetween theWorldWars:
"Excess capacity creates the majorproblem of the industry... It has been createdby the extremely
inelastic supply of coal, owing to the high cost of closing a mineeven temporarily. Hence in the
face of declining demand., adjustment by competitive means is slow, uncertain and inefficient It
does not necessarily drive out the least efficient firms, but those that have the least financial
resources at a given time. It may prevent new and efficient mines developing through lack of
capital. It may maintain old and possibly high cost pits working long past theirproper time, at the
ultimate expense of thenation as a whole."19
They concluded that nationalisation and workerparticipation were the most effective means of overcoming the
coal shortage andrationalising the industry.20 No doubtShaw andBruns wereencouraged., as others in Australia
were, by the British Coal Industry Nationalisation Act. In accord with the Labour Government's intentions the
Act .
"Imposed constraints on the N. C. B. [National CoalBoard] which ensured it behaved likea private
employer."21
In other words, it attempted to solve the problems of the British industry, in many ways similar to those in
Australia, within welldefined capitalist parameters, butby means of stateintervention.
Most "respectable" and academic commentators in Australia favoured solutions to the problem of coal production
otherthan nationalisation. The 1946 Report of the Commissioner Appointed to Inquire into and Report upon the
Coalmining Industry, in particular, wasessentially a manifesto for the owners. The NSWowners simplyreprinted
extracts from the Report as a pamphlet, no additional comment was apparently thought necessary. The
.Commissioner, Mr. JusticeDavidson, was appointed by the LaborGovemment. He attributed theproblems of the
industry to its workers who not only disrupted production, but also hindered rationalisation. He believed that
mechanisation was discouraged by talk of nationalisation, restrictive legislation and the cost of new equipment,
12StandardWeekly 1712144 pl urged "Miners' Leaders Must Face Facts: One More Task Before Them: Expel the Irresponsibles". For the
ineffectiveness ofprecisely suchmethods see e.g,Australian Worker 1913/44 pl. .
13. StandardWeekly2216144 ppl, 3.
14.StandardWeekly24/8144 p6.
15.StandardWeeklyeditorial 3118/44 p6. For the war-time regulation ofthe industry see Walker TheAustralian EcoMmy op,cit. p77, Butlin
and Schedvin WarEconomy 1942-1945 op,clt,pp444-53.
16.StandardWeekly12110/45 piI.
17. GoIlan TheCoal Minersop,cit.p228.
18.StandardWeekly3115/46 pl, 28/6146 pl and C. Kieman Calwell: A PersonalandPoliticalB.iography Nelson, Melboume 1978 p151.
19. A. G. L. Shaw and G. R. Bruns TheAustralian CoalIndustry Melboume University Press, Melbourne 1947 p170.
20. ibid. p190. .
21. V. AlIen TheMUitancy a/the BritishMinersMoor Press, Shipley 1982 pp32, 103.
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ratherthan the vestedinterests of the owners.22 His explanation of the miners' militancy bordered on the bizarre,
theproduct of a fevered, reactionary and Victorian legalmind:
"There must be an underlying pathological reason for the attitude exhibited by large numbers of
mineworkers in NewSouthWales."
Onlythe influence of the communist Partycouldexplain why "moststoppages havenot beenbasedon a genuine"
grievance.23 His solution to the problems of the industry was a reactionary pipe dream: better living and social
conditions for the miners; "enforcing the law and maintaining the sanctity of agreements"; "insisting on the right
to impose discipline, if necessary by dismissal from the Industry of recalcitrant employees", i.e. a blacklist;
mechanisation; appeal rights for miners to the Arbitration Court; and "by procuring the co-operation" of the
Miners' Federation in all this.24 He also favoured Government advances to the owners to help pay for
modernisation.
The Chifley Government accepted neither proposals for the nationalisation of the industry nor for smashing the
Miners'Federation. As earlyas 1943 Curtin said that
"TheGovernment hasno intention of nationalizing thecoal-mining industry."
Chifley made the same point in 1947, in the wake of the ACTU Congress's call for nationalisation.2s By
legislating to establish the JointCoal Board(JCB) in 1946, the NSW and Commonwealth Governments hoped to
win the supportof the miners and their unions, who weregenerally proponents of nationalisation, for increased
production. The Boardwasgiven widepowers anda charterto modernise the industry, againstthe wishes of the
owners if necessary, and to improve mine and community amenities. While continuing its criticisms of the
owners, Standard Weekly quickly left its talk of nationalisation behind when the Board offered an alternative
means of solving the problems of the industry.26 The paper favourably reported a statement of the Board's
Chairman on its aims and later produced a number of enthusiastic and uncritical articles on the JCB.27 With the
Communist Party still adopting a veryconciliatory attitude to theChifleyGovernment, Miners' Federation leaders
initially accepted the Board as "the best effort yet to bring the industry undercontrol", although they still called
for nationalisation.28 In the event, the moderate statecapitalist expedient of close supervision of the industry by
the Boardproved sufficient to tackle its problems, except that of the miners' militancy, for which nationalisation
on terms similarto Britain wouldhavebeenno solution either.
In its firstannualreport, theJointCoalBoardproduced a realistic assessment of the difficulties facing it:
"Theproductive capital of theindustry is inadequate in relation to Australia's coalrequirements and
thisconclusion stands apartaltogether fromthequestion of industrial disputes."
"Theindustry is fundamentally inefficient andout-of-date."29
It also referred to the hostility between owners and miners, lack of trained workers and the dependence -of
Australian industry on coal. Because of the reluctance of mostowners "to adoptthe Board's planswith theenergy
and aggressiveness which would be required if they were to be completed in time", and delays in obtaining new
equipment, the JCB instituted its own program of ordering machinery. It evencommissioned the manufacture of
some machinery in Australia, to overcome difficulties securing supplies from overseas.3O During 1947-48 the
JCB introduced an industry widesystem of workers' compensation insurance, established Medical Bureaus on the
coal fields to examine theminers, handed out funds for community amenities andmadedirectives on the standards
of pit amenities.31
. Although the JCB's firstlineof attackwas to improve working conditions in orderto winover the miners, it failed
in its efforts to improve industrial relations in the industry.32 The militant miners, under an increasingly leftist
Communist leadership, werequickerthanthe bulkof the Australian working class to regardconcessions, such as
thoseon pit head amenities and.the Board's charitable undertakings in the coal towns, as an invitation to make
greaterdemands for increased wages and shorter working hours. TheBoardmadesomeprogress on the technical
side of the industry, despite the limitations imposed by. shortages of equipment, but strike levelsremained high,
culminating in the 1949 coal strike. Regarding the strike as a Communist attempt to discredit it and the JCB
having failed to improve the industrial situation by conciliatory means, the Government deemed it necessary to
confront the miners head on. Only two days after the strike had begun the Government froze. union funds. In
speaking on legislation introduced to copewiththedispute, Evattsaid
"There is no other industry in which a stoppage of this character can have such a serious effect on
thecommunity.
22.ReportoftM Commissioner Appointed to Inquire intoand ReportupontheCoalmining Industry Commonwealth Government Printer 1946
pp88,101.
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"... Whenone looks back uponthe history of thecoal industry one realises that for many years the
employees of the industry haveworked underunsatisfactory andoften degrading conditions. Those
times have gone. In the legislation that was passed by this Parliament and the Parliament of New
SouthWales, stepswere taken to provide amenities for the miners because it was realized we had a
duty to them. This bill deals with the converse situation. The employees of the coal-mining
industry, having beengiven a special tribunal and a board to provide amenities for themcannotact
in this way."33 '
In the Macquarie DistrictAssembly of the ALP, which included the western mining district, Chifley said it was a
caseof "bootsandall".34 .
Thedefeatof the miners was not only a turning point in the fortunes of the union movement and the Communist
Partybut alsoof thecoal industry. In its wake the level of control miners exercised over their work, through the
contract systemand theirclose-knit organisation, declined. Withthis shiftin the frontier of control andtheeasing
of equipment shortages, the pace of mechanisation accelerated. By the beginning of 1951 the coal shortage had
beenovercome and, with therecession thefollowing year, therewas a glutof coal. During the 1950s thousands of
miners were made redundant, neverto workin the industry again.35The Government had accurately judged that
nationalisation was not necessary to facilitate the growth of the national economy. The acceptance of this
judgment by influential erstwhile- supporters of nationalisation in the ALP helped ensure that the the
Government's rejection of the proposal did not tarnish its image. The acceptance of Keynesian ideas by laborites,
discussed in more detail below helped pave the way for acceptance of the Government's onslaught against the
miners.
It cannot be doubted that laborite proponents of nationalisation of coalmining favoured betterconditions for the
miners. But their vehement denunciation of the Miners' Federation during 1949 strike would appear to be in
contradiction with their earlier behaviour if their calls for nationalisation are regarded as primarily socialist in
inspiration and motivated by a desire to seejusticedone for the mineworkers. The alternative position allows for
a greater consistency on the part of the NSW ALP leadership: in supporting nationalisation and attacking the
striking miners they were attempting to ensure that (capitalist) economic development in Australia proceeded as
rapidly as possible and that the ALPretained its working classbase, unhindered by Communist inspired industrial
militancy.
Finance and the Trade Cycle
The Labor Government managed to negotiate the problems of the coal industry without raising widespread
objections that it had flouted the ALP's socialisation objective. Thisnegative achievement wascomplemented by
its later attempt to nationalise the banks, which forms the basis of the myth that the Chifley Government had
progressive or evenradicalintentions..Thus a recentanniversary edition of theRecorder holds that the attempt to
nationalise the banks was
"Arguably the most progressive and far reaching piece of legislation ever to come out of an
Australian Parliament"36 .
This myth served the Chifley Government ( and subsequently the ALP in general) well; by helping to hold the
loyaltyof moremilitant supporters. TheGovernment's motivation in thebanknationalisation controversy, which
raged from 1947 after socialist sentiment amongst laborites had ebbed, was, however, far from socialist. The
decision to nationalise the banks was taken more in the light of the requirements' Australian capitalist
development, defmed in Keynesian terms, than a commitment to socialism or determination to resist theMoney
Power.
The most important step in the modernisation. of the Australian banking system since the early 1930s was
implemented by the Curtin Government's war-time banking regulations,37 Money Power analyses and rhetoric
continued to be used in the labourmovement during the War,particularly when financial issues were discussed.
Calwell, still outsidethe Cabinetin 1941 andpushing to get in, usedleftish rhetoric andquotedAnstey'sKingdom
of Shylock. H. E. Boote argued in Australian Worker that the War could be entirely financed through
Commonwealth Bank credit and that Government loans only put an unnecessary burden on the real wealth
producers. He took hisMoneyPowerviews withhim when he retiredas editorof Australian Worker and started
writing regularly forLabor Call. He raisedcitrus fruit to a newliterary status in one headline:
"The World Is His Orange: The Money Monger Consumes the Fruit -- the People Get Only the
Pips".38
33. H. V.Evatt29/6149 inP. DeeryLabourin Conflict: The1949CoalStrike Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1978 p47.
34. Chifley 3nt85 in ibid. pSO.
35. Ross A Historyop, cit. p~2-8.
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37. Butlin WarEconomy 1939-1941 op. clt, p394.
38. CalweU: LaborCall20/11141 p3. Boote Australian Worker 5/8142 pi,2618/42 p3; LaborCall 1011/45 pt.
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In October 1943 D. Lovegrove, a prominent figure in the Victorian ALP and Melbourne Trades Hall Council,
urged the Government to nationalise the banks once it had a majority in the Senate,39 The Brisbane ALP
Debaters' Bulletin, under the direction of Senators Gordon Brown and Ben Taylor, published Money Power
material during the War, some sympathetic to Douglas Creditism. In 1944 H. Lazzarini, MHR, published The
'How' in Post-War Reconstruction, with a sketchy Money Power analysis. But Chifley and Curtinjustified the
banking regulations by referring to the Reportof theRoyalCommission on the BankingandFinancialSystemand
the need to prevent a dangerous expansion of credit.40 Leading figures in the Government and large sections of
the labour movementcontinued to use a Keynesian framework in theirdiscussions of financial questions. Chifley,
in a rebuttalof MoneyPowerideas, warnedthat therewerelimits to the safe useof bankcredit to finance the War.
His argument was taken up in the laboritepress.41
The Government did not act in accord with the ALP platform or the wishes of Money Power theorists by
nationalising the banking system when it rendered the war-time regulations into more enduring legislation in
1945. The new laws consolidated the banking system in line with the regulations and the Royal Commission
Report. The Commonwealth Bank and BankingActs firmly establishedthe Commonwealth Bank's powers as a
centralbank and instrumentof Government monetary policyand expandedthe scope of its commercial operations.
TheirKeynesian flavourwas evidentin provisions setting out that it was the duty of the Commonwealth Bank to
pursue policies to secure currency stability, full employment and economic prosperity.42 Cartoon 17, from
Tribune, summarised not only the Communistbut also the laboriteattitudeto the banking legislation.
Love draws attentionto the elements of Money Power analysis in the receptionof the 1945 banking legislation.43
His approach, however, underestimates the considerable currencyof Keynesian ideas in the labour movement by
1945. Chilley's Keynesian justificationof the Government's approach was widely reported in the laboritepress
and from January 1945 Standard Weekly gave extensivecoverage to the Bills, most of it not inspired by Money
Power ideas.44 The favourable receptionof the very mild legislation cannot, therefore, be regardedas an indexof
the currencyof Money Power ideas. Even proposals for banknationalisation on the ACTUCongress agendalater
in 1945 can be interpretedas stemming as much from the socialist sentimentof the time as from Money Power
theory.45 MoneyPower ideasmay have been near the heart of a populist phenomenon during the depression, but
they certainly were not a decade later. By the 1940s Money Power analyses were seldom used in the laborite
press except when strictly financial matter was being discussed.ss In laborite circles, the major treatments of the
likelihood of a new depression after the War used a Keynesian framework, if any underlying theory was dis-
cernibleat all. Dedmansummedup the argument:
"Withoutadequatebankingcontrols little effect can be given to such a policy [for full employment]
due to the extremeinstability of privatecapitalexpenditure."47
The Chilley Government decided to nationalise the banks in 1947 because the High Court had sustained a
challengeto a section of the 1945 banking legislation. The section was not critical to the general thrust of the
legislation. It required all government instrumentalities, Commonwealth, State and local, to hold their accounts
with the Commonwealth Bank. But Chifley anticipated, incorrectly as it turned out, challenges to more vital
provisions and sought to pre-empt these by nationalising the banks. His concern at the banks' intentions was
certainlyconditionedby the experience of the early 1930s,but this does not constitutea MoneyPower analysis of
the nature of Australian capitalism. Rather than being a "progressive and far reaching" piece of legislation, or
even one inspiredby a residual anti-Money Power radicalism, the attempt to take over the banks was a defensive
manoeuvre designed to bolster earlier legislation inspired by Keynesian economics. The moderate intent of the
legislation was expressedin Cartoon18. Chifley's speechon the 1947BankingBill, also publishedas a pamphlet,
made this rationaleclear:
"To deal with the economic and financial problems both of the transition period [to a peace-time
economy] and of the following years, the Government must have the necessary powersover banking
and monetary policy. Fluctuations in business activity are not solely due to monetary causes, but
39. Lovegrove: LaborCall2111W43 p,7, 28110/43 pI;AlP DebaJers' Bulletin November 1940, March 1942, October 1942, November 1942,
December 1942, November 1944, Apn11945.
40. Chifley: LaborCall6111141 pI;Curtin: Digest8p19 26111141.
41. Waters"Australian Labor's Full Employment Objective" op, cit. p231, Standard Weekly 615143.
42. Coombs TrialBalance op, cit. p1l2; Butlin and Schedvin WarEconomy 1942-1945 op. cit. pp612-8; and Love Labourand tM Money
Powerop. cit. pl66.
43. Love Labourand tM MoneyPowerop.cit. pI67-8.
44. Chifley on the legislation, Australian Worker 1413/45 pl, Labor Call 15/3145 pI; Standard Weekly e.g, 1111145 p3, 26110/45 p3, note,
however, the quotes from W. M Hughes's Money Power-influenced Bondor Free?inStandard Weekly 2313/45 p3. Australian Labor Party,
Victorian Branch The Commonwealth Bankand Labor'sBanking Proposals Melbourne 1945 p7 argued that the banks had accentuated the
depression, rather than the Money Power view that financial institutions were responsible for the crisis.
45. Love LabourandtM Money Powerop,cit. p167.
46. For Money Poweranalyses ofissues other than Bretton Woods orbanking legislation seeChapple's treatment ofthe railway interest burden
Railroad 25/1146 p6, 8/2/46 pS, 2212146 p2, 813146 pS. Afew adherents toDouglas Credit and Henry Georgism kept up an abstract debate in
Amalgamated Engineering Union Journal during the 19408, e.g. H. E. Langford "This Money Complex" November 1943 plO, D. Mclnnes
"ThlsMoney Complex" January 1944. .
47. J.Dedman Ministerial Speech onSecondary Industries 1946. Alsosee J.B. Chifley Digest103 p47 616145:
"We cannot. by monetary policy rectify all the evils inthe community. Nevertheless, monetary policy isthe most powerful
instnunent inthe community for rectifying economic ills."
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they are certainlygreatly influenced by financial policy. The Government would not be justified in
gamblingon the outcomeof possible threats to the 19451egislation."48
May's detailed study of The Battle for the Banks confirms that this statement accurately represented the
Government's overall position. For Money Power adherents the crux of the depression was that the banks had
been responsible; for Chifley the banks had only accentuated the problems of that period.49· The Keynesian
justification was carried to the labour movement rank and file and to the public. The Henry Lawson Labor
Collegepointed out, in answer to the question"Is Bank Nationalisation a step towards socialism?", that
"Nationalisation of the banks is necessary if full employment is to be maintained and depression to
be prevented. Upholders of private enterprise should be the first to support bank nationalisation,
since privateenterprisecannot surviveanotherdepression."50
Another very widelydistributed publication, Man Is Worth More . . Than a £1 Note, issued by the NSW Labor
Council, did not develop an explicitly Keynesiananalysis, nor did it adopt a Money Power perspective.51 The
NSWFabian Society, on the other hand,put a sustainedKeynesian case in its The Case for Bank Nationalisation.
The authors, Butlin and Arndt, were professional economists. With an eye to the possibility of a depression
starting in the USA, which also gave a sense of urgency to other labour proponents of nationalisation, they
proclaimed
"N0 measures that the Labour Government has taken in terms of office so far could not have been
taken by any LiberalGovernment with a sociallyprogressive policyfor a capitalistsystem. Thatap-
plies equally to bank nationalisation. In fact it could well be arguedthat bank nationalisation in the
conditionsof Australiain 1947 is a precondition of the survivalof a privateenterpriseeconomy."52
The Fabian pamphletwent throughtwo impressions in November1947and the ALPpurchased5,000copies.53 A
cruder, though similarargumentwas put in a NSW ALP circular.54 While some ALP leaflets and some material
in the laborite press propagatedMoney Power analyses, Labor Call, Railroad and especially Standard Weekly
gave prominence to Keynesian arguments.55 Despite the references to Money Power to which Love draws
attention, and others could be added, the evidence does not suggest that the ALP oriented labour movement
generallyand the Government in particularregarded bank nationalisation as an onslaughton the Money Poweror
supporthis contention that
"After the private banks successfully challenged the 1945 Banking Act, the Chifley Government
responded to its populistheritageby attempting to nationalizeAustralian MoneyPower."56
Love's study.is extremely useful in drawing attention to the undoubted existence of a current of Money Power
thought in the labour movement, but he inflates its importance when he attributes the Government's failure to
cope with the mobilisation against nationalisation to its "preoccupation with ideas about the Money Power".57
The use of Money Power rhetoric by Chifley and many, though by no means all, others represented an
employment of the strongest language available to justify whatthey saw as a crucial measure, rather than the
resurgenceof a genuineMoneyPower analysis of the ills of capitalism. The decisionto nationalise the banks was
basedon Keynesianassumptions coupledwith the mistakenassessment that the 1947High Court
"Decisionshowed that full publiccontrol of banking as sought under the 1945 legislation could not
be secured withoutpublicownership of banking."58
Coombs maintains that even during the 1940s the banks were not hostile to the main provision of the 1945
legislation,which survived, unmodified in essentials through the yearsof the MenziesGovernment.59
In the light of the Keynesian motivation behindthe attemptat nationalisation, the Government'slack of crusading
zeal is less in need of explanationthan Love or May60 think: why mobilise support, with the risk of heightening
48. J. B. Chifley Banking Bill1947: SecondReading Speech Delivered on15thOctober 1947 Government Printer, Canbena 1947 p7.
49. ibid. p2.
50. Henry Lawson Labor College Questions onBankNationalisation and theAnswer6 Sydney 1947 p3.
51.25,000 copies went tothe NSW ARU alone. .
52 NSW Fabian Society The Case for Bank Nationalisation Sydney 1947 plO. See also p8 for the short-term prospects for economic
difficulties and L. Ross "Socialism and Australian Labor' Australian Quarterly March 1950 pp27-8; IAbor Call 4/9/47 pS; and Standard
Weekly 519/47 p2 for an article by W. C. Taylorwarning ofthe danger ofadepression due to the dollar crisis.
53. A. L. May The Battlefor theBanksSydney University Press, Sydney 1968 p52
54. Australian Labor Party, NSW BranchNationalising theBanksCircular47/191 mimeo ppl-2, Mitchell Library emphasis inthe original:
"One of the chiefest threats to full employment is the instability of private capital expenditure and ofexpenditure from
. overseas, the fonner because itdepends on personal judgments ofbusiness prospects, the latter because of the fluctuations in
the world economy.
"i ,; The fmancial history of this country, and overseas, makes it plain that the policy of private banks fostered the boom
conditions which have preceded the slumps, and has then shown conspicuous ignorance infinding the way out ofthe morass.
"... Labor says thatFull Employment Is already obtaining In Australia, and can becontinued providing the flow or
credit Isstabilised according tonational needs and not juggled according tothe whims orself·lnterested speculators."
55.B.g. LaborCall 1819147 p3;Railroad 31110/47 ppl, 6; and Standard Weekly 519147, 1919117. On the other hand for Money Power positions
LaborCall 11/9/47 p4; StantJard Weekly 1219/47, 1In/47 p2519147 p3; Australian Labor Party, NSW Branch Yes: Nationalisation Concerns
You! Sydney n.d. Love lAbour and the Money Power 01'. cit. pI69.72 gives an extensive account of labour movement res{lOnses to bank
natioaalisation,many ofthem neutral asbetween Money Power and Keynesian theory. "Editor's Notes" Amalgamated Engl1U!ering Union
JournalNovember 1947 p7 maintained
"Nationalisation will not prevent depressions affecting Australia; itwill, however cushion the depression, and, so soften its
effect on the wage and salaryearner particularly."
56. Love Labourand theMoneyPowerop. clt, p185.
57. ibid. 1'185-6.
58.Digest 131 p14 15/10/47.
59. Coombs TrialBalance op. cit, p116.
60. May TheBattlefor theBanksop,cit,p177.
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class conflict, in supportof the logical extension of an already well established and quite popular policydesigned
to eliminate the need for class antagonism by increasing economic growth? MoneyPowertheory also promoted
nationalism and class collaborationism. In its heyday it had done so in a climate of working class mobilisation
and radicalism. But Keynesian economics, which shared a view of the possibility of reconciling classes and
perfecting capitalism withMoney Powertheory, was the primary rationale behind the attempt to nationalise the
banks. The Government mayhave recognised that themeasure wasa daring one, butdidnot intend it as a radical
assault on theexisting order. It was the vehement response of opponents of the legislation thatcast it in a radical
lightanddid the Government the service of helping it maintain credibility in the eyesof somemilitant supporters
as it continued on its non,or evenanti-socialist course.
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The Frowning Face of J. M. Keynes
Soon after the War as one of the Chifley Government's headaches, in the form of rank and file enthusiasm for
socialism abated, another complaint increased in intensity. In the language of economics it was called "inflation".
In practice it meant persuading the working class to shoulder the burden of Australia's economic development.
Concern about inflation was the obverse of Keynesian economics' promise of full employment. The Curtin
Government hadregarded inflation as a major economic danger during theWarbut, byraising loans andimposing
controls on the distribution of resources, prices and especially working class incomes, had successfully contained
the problem) Cartoon 19shows howWar loans were promoted and inflation was identified as a danger in the
laborite anddailypress. In 1946 Evattthought that
"Possibly the most important achievement of the Labor Government was the effective control of
inflation... Australia hasescaped oneof thegreatest dangers thatcan threaten a nation at war."2
Chifley and professional economists anticipated greater inflationary pressure and its adverse consequences for
Australia's position on the world market when the War ended.3 They were right: even before the close of
hostilities, with the decline of the "nation in danger" justification for wage restraint, workers had begun to take
industrial action to secure improved wages and conditions. Soon the dollar shortage exacerbated the related
problems of maintaining international competitiveness, holding down inflation and increasing production.
Inflation became Chifley's main economic worry during the second halfof the 1940s.4 Sheridan draws attention
to a contradiction between labourmovement support for theGovernment's reconstruction policies in general, and
hostility to Government restraint of wages, whichwas a part of reconstruction policy.5 The contradiction didnot
particularly arise fromserious flaws in the economic analysis of the Government or the working class. Its roots
lay in the divergent interests they pursued. For the Government there was a continuity between the incomes
policy of the War and that it sought after the War: they were both necessary to advance the interests of the
Australian nation in sustained economic growth, safeguarded by an independent state. The hegemony of
nationalist thought in the rank and file of the labour movement during theWar meant that it accepted economic
sacrifices as a means to military victory. But even before the extreme circumstances of the War had passed,
workers began to pursue their class interests in conflict with the interests of thenation/ruling class. Untutored in
thefiner pointsof theGeneral Theory, theydidnot accept that there wasa connection between continued wage re-
straintand full employment, which was regarded as thecoreof reconstruction policyin the labour movement.nor
thatwage restraint would improve theirliving standards in thelongrun,e Theunion andALPbureaucracies found
themselves pulled in twodirections by thissituation. As brokers between capital and labour, seeking to maintain
credibility on both sides, a situation of heightened class conflict couldbe threatening. They were also caught
between their interest in maintaining Labor in office and the need to maintain their working class base by
delivering improvements in wages andconditions opposed by theGovernment.
The Chifley Government attempted the difficult task of preventing inflation by ending industrial unrest on
capital's terms while maintaining its ownpopularity. Nodoubt in an ad hocandsomewhat haphazard fashion the
Government responded withtwo different, but not mutually exclusive tactics. Thefirstwas anattempt to gain the
consent of theunion movement, or at leasta significant partof it thusisolating themilitants, to a moderation of its
demands and pursuit of them along the proper channels. The labour movement was to be persuaded of the
correctness of theGovernment's policies which were theconclusions of Keynesian economics. Secondly coercive
measures, such asdelaying thelifting of war-time regulations and stateinterference in union affairs through fines,
,- gaolings and scabbing by troops, wereused. The Government successfully began to contain the militancy of the
working class which lay at the rootof its fear of inflation. An effective balance of the above approaches andthe
climate of the emerging cold war were both important facts in this success. So, particularly after 1947, was the
support of laborite union officials fearful of rank andfile revolt and Communist aspirants to theirjobs. Chifley's
relative success in restraining wages and thestrike wave rendered theLabor Government redundant andpaved the
wayfor a moreovertly conservative government.
1.For worries abOut iriflatlon dunng theWar amongst professional economists see,forexample, E.R.Walker Wartime Economics Melbourne
University Press, Melbourne 1939 p123.
2. H. V.EvattSpeechat the Opening of theBartonElectorate Campaign mimeo 1946 p3Mitchell Library. .
3. Chifley referred to inflation in hisDecember 1943 Sydney Morning Heraldarticles. Crisp Ben Chif/ey op. cit. pp195-6, 165,225,300gives
an indication of Chifley's andthe economists' position on inflation during and shortly after the War. Thefirst problem dealtwithin H.C.
Coombs Problems ofa HighEmploYm4nt Economy Hassell Press, Adelaide 1944 p30wasinflation, andthe contribution of wage claims to it.
Inflation was alsoat thetopof Cunin's listof reason forsupporting thePowers referendum, Standard Weekly 'J:1m44 p3. Hemade thelogic of
hisposition clearto a conference of representatives in February 1945:
"Competitively withtheworld, Australia mustkeepcoststo theabsolute minimum.
"Thismeant thatallelements in costs, including wages, mustbestable." (Australian Worker 712145 p2)
Commonwealth of Australia Full EmploYm4nt in Australia Government Printer, Canberra 1945 pp9-12 also dealt with the the danger of
inflation, wagesandtheimportance of increasing production.
4. CrispBenChifleyop.cit. p303.
5. Sheridan 'Australian Trade Unions' op.cit. pp14, 22-3.
6. References to economic authorities coUld neverhavethe impact of Curtin' s tirade in 1943:
"I regard everycoal minerwho stops worknotonlyasbreaker of the law,for which heshould andwillbe punished. butalso
as a factorgiving aidto theenemies of thiscountry." (quoted in Walker TheAustralian Economy op,cit.313)
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SellingKeynes
In 1943 Coombs raised thepossibility of using the organisations of the labourmovement to obtain working class
consentfor post-wareconomic policies:
"Perhaps now we will be able to solve the problems of labour turnover and labour discipline by
usingexisting institutions [for consultation with the trade unions], insteadof using the threatof un-
employment whichhas beenin thepast oneof the most significant factors."7
By 1944 he had expanded thisinto a strategy:
"In the past labour discipline was based primarily upon the threatof dismissal, with its consequent
fear of unemployment. If that fear is removed there may be reduced output, increased labour
turnover, absenteeism, andso on."
So therewas a need for new incentives:
"Wecan interestworkers in figures of production, costsand efficiency for individual plants,and for
production as a whole. We can educate them in the relationship between wages and profits on the
one hand and national incomeon the other.
"In a moredetailedsensewe can build up a consciousness in the worker thathis work is significant
to production as a whole, and a senseof participation in the totalachievements of the economy. We
. canprovide a progressively improving physicalenvironment on thejob and at home, better housing
andcommunity facilities, effective safetymeasures and industrialwelfare services, adequate oppor-
tunities for training and transfer to other jobs, and an understanding and acceptance of the
principles on whichhis wages are based.
"Furthermore, we can developthose measures used during the war which bring the workerand his
representatives increasingly into the tasks of production planning, wage determination, and labour
control. Briefly we must build up the worker as a partner in the tasks of production and
management, and this established, the co-operation which can only come from a sense of common
responsibility."8
While this statementwas not a blueprint for the Government's approach to the problems of industrial unrest, it
was a manifestoof confident bourgeois socialism, in the guise of Keynesian economic "science" and indicated the
direction of Government policy. Ifonly workers accepted this sciencetoo, therewouldbe no needfor classstrife.
The White Paperon Full Employment also expressed Coombs's strategy and stressed, in code, the importance of
the union bureaucracy in securing its success:
"The trade union movement includes the great majority of consumers, and should protect their
interests by ensuring that a minority does not obtain benefits which will involve higher prices for
consumers in general."9 .
During the. War Curtin and others had also expressed hopes that "employee participation" would be a means to
improve production and industrial relations. Although the proposal cropped up both in laborite publications
during the 1940sand found supportfrom the JPA and someof its business backers, workerparticipation did not
take of00 "A sense of common responsibility" was necessarily propagated by other means, for the lesson of
workerparticipation in a period of industrial conflict would have been quite to the contrary, demonstrating the
distance betweenemployers andemployees rather than theircommon interests.
Labor Party bodies, Ministers, unions and economists laboured a number of arguments and theories to secure
working class consent for the Government's postwar labour/economic policies. The main elements in this
ideological campaign were:
1) the idea that capitalism was perfectible, in the sense that full employment could be secured through the
Government's (Keynesian) policiesandespecially its plansfor counter-cyclical public works projects.
2) the idea that inflation was a threatto the working class. .
3) somebasicpropositions of Keynesian theory.
4) the conclusion that increasing the size of the national cake, through increased production and control of
inflation, was a more effective means of improving working class living standards than income redistribution
through class struggle.
None of the elements of the Keynesian offensive was universally accepted inside the working class. The
Communist Party and those who looked to it for leadership explicitly rejected many of them. Their verbal
acceptance by others belied a practical continuation of industrial struggle. The conclusion that increasing
production was a priorityover redistribution was not widely accepted until 1947. Before 1947considerable rank
and file pressureon trade union officials meant that even laboriteofficials were criticalof the Government on a
numberof importantquestions, despitetheirloyaltyto it The acceptance of Keynesian ideas was accompanied by .
and reinforced changes in the nature of the class struggleduring the second half of the 1940s: the contradictory
7.StantJt;rd Weekly23i9/43 p4.
8. Coombs Problems a High Employmelll Economy op, cit, p33. Also see H. C. Coombs The SpecialProblemsofPlanning Melbourne
University Press, Melbourne 1944 p17.
9.FullEmployment in Australia op. cit, pl2. .
10.Labor Call D. Cameron 21/1/43 pi; Digest 95 p17 J. Curtin and the same Australian Worker712145 pi; on the IPA's position H. Gepp
"Secondary IndUStry in Post-War Australia in Australian Institute ofPolitical Science Australia's PostwarEconomy 1945 p204; Labor Call
214148 pS, 25/6148 p2; Standard Weelcly 1812149 one ofChifley's Reports tothe Nation; NSW Fabian Society Towards a Socialist Australia
Sydney 1949 p16. The Catholic Social Studies Movement also favoured joint consultation, see Appendix tothis Chapter.
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position of unionofficials was increasingly displaced into the ranks of the working class itself in the form of a
polarisation workers who accepted andopposed theGovernment's industrial policy.
During and after the War Labor Ministers, and following them the laborite press, advertised the Government's
anti-depression policies. Fear of another depression remained a potentmeans of attracting working support tothe
ALP. Especially during the campaigns before the 1946 and" 1949 federal elections, the ALP emphasised the
measures the Government had in hand to counter any downturn in the economy, notably its national works
program. Opening thecampaign in his electorate in 1946Evattsaid that
"Adequate steps shall be taken to ensure economic prosperity andfull employment throughout the
wholeof Australia, not onlynow,butcontinuously."ll
In his 1949 election policy speech Chifley gave prominence to the question of full employment,12 The popular
appeal of theLaborParty's stress on full employment is understandable in the context of the dollarcrisis andthe
apparent emergence of a recession in the USA. The Party's message was that the Government could at least
ameliorate and at best eliminate capitalism's economic problems. A NSW Fabian Society lecture in 1949
conceded "unemployment is an inevitable consequence of the capitalist system" butreassured that
"It is now accepted that the worst onslaught of depression maybe mitigated by expanding capital
works until the 'confidence of privateinvestment is restored' ."13
Standard Weekly proclaimed "FullEmployment Not Accident", Labor Call "LaborPlans Counter Depressions"
and Australian Worker "Australia Rides Out the Economic Blizzard: Employment Rising Despite Adversity
Abroad",14 The NSW Industrial Groups and Labor College made the same point,IS A statement of Professor
Hytten, economic advisor to theBankof NSWon the possibility that effective labourdiscipline would require an
increase in the level of unemployment was seizedupon to demonstrate that Labor's opponents also opposed full
employment.16 (See cartoon on this subject.) Labor Call, which for a period ran a column on the statistics of
business prosperity, and the NSWLabor College revelledin the boonthe Government was to private enterprise.I"
As we haveseen,Australia's international economic policies werealsoused during the second halfof the 1940s to
associate theGovernment with the effective pursuitof full employment.tf
The Government connected popular fears of another depression with its argurnents about inflation: the
inflationary consequences of a boomhad to be controlled or they Would inevitably give way to the deflationary
phase of the trade cycle,19 In the context of the forthcoming prices andrents referendum, SenatorCortice put it
this way: "Booms must bust if prices are uncontrolled."20 During the 1948 referendum the laborite press
followed the Government in arguing that inflation wasa threatto full employment and wages.21
The activities of theIndustrial Groups and theNSWHenryLawson LaborCollege, established in 1944, assisted in
the propagation of Keynesian ideas and conclusions in the labour movement. Although the Groups played an
important role in fighting Communists for powerin the unions, in NSWat least they were initially seen "as mere
propaganda bases in the union" by laborite unionists.22 Less stress seems to have been placedon the Groups as
simplypropagandist bodies in Victoria where covert, preexisting anti-Communist organisations of union officials
andCatholics quickly became influential in thenew industrial institutions ofthe ALP.23 In 1947 Standard Weekly
still attributed a primarily ideological role to theGroups, as wellas theLaborCollege:
"The Capitalist Press sets up its daily barrage. The Communist Press sends out its destructive
criticism.
"For that reasonLabor has to embark upon a more vigorous campaign of favourable publicity. The
Labor College and the ALPIndustrial Group organisation, both functioning from Party headquar-
ters, are partof thatdrive."24
H. Amdt and K. Laffer, both Sydney University economists, lectured for the LaborCollege. The College helped
equipleaders of the Groups with Keynesian arguments: one of its regular addresses to the GroupExecutive was
on "the Economics of Full Employment".25 During 1946and 1947 the College published a monthly journal. The
first seven issues ran a series called "Economics for Australian Workers", by R. Mendelsohn, a Master of
11. Evatt Speechat the Opening of the BartonElectorate Campaign op, cit. p6. Also see F. Forde Addressto the Capricornia Divisional
Executive 16.'2146 ppS-6, Mitchell Library.
12Labor Call 18111149 pp4-S and Digest146 pSO 21/8149. For other 1949 election material see, e.g,Standard Weekly 22/4149 p3, 2618/49 pl,
919/49 pI.
13.StandardWeekly 21/1/49 pS.
14.StandardWeekly21/1/49 pi;LaborCall2618/49 pi;and Australian Worker1419/49 pS, areport ofChifley's broadcast on the budget.
IS. The NSW Grouf:s: Standard Weekly 9/12149 »2; the Henry Lawson Labor College 1016149 p7. Also see Standard Weekly 1112149 pS;
LaborCall9/9/49 p ;and E. Holloway tothe Victorian Labor Conference Standard Weekly 9/12149 p2
16. E.g. Standard Weekly 21/1/49 p7, 413/49 pi, 21/10/49. Also see material in Communist influenced publications "Editor's Notes"
AmalgamatedEngineering Union JournalFebruary 1949 p7 and Wor News 21/12149 p3.
17.LaborCaU July-August 1946 and Standard Weekly 219/49 p7.
18.E.g.lAborCalll213/48 p3 forDedman on world agreements; Australian Worker 31/8149 pi on Australia's full employment proposals to
the United Nations.19. J. B. Chifley. cited in D. Stephens "The Effects ofthe Great Depression on Federal Labor Governments. 1941-9" Australian Journal of
Politicsand History22(2), August 1976 p2S9.
20. LaborCal12712148 p6.Also see E. Holloway Digest132 p22 19/11/47.
21. E.g.AustralianWorker 21/1/48 p. and LaborCall2613/48 p6.
22T. Sheridan "The 1945 Steel Strike: Trade Unions, the New Order and Mr. Chifley" lAbourHistory 42, May 1982 p26.
23. R. Munay TheSplitCheshire 1972 ppl6-8.
24.StandardWeekly 2812148 p7. Also see Standard Weekly 21/6146 pi,2218147p6.
25.Standard Weekly 27/6147 p7, 8/8/47 p7, 31/10/47 P7.
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Economics graduate of Sydney University.26 Thesearticles probably constituted themostcomprehensive attempt
to carry out Coombs's program of educating workers in their place in the economy. They conveyed the main
points of the Government's ideological campaign and much more. The first installment, "Supply Demand and
DirectAction", Mendelsohn defined economics in orthodox terms as "the science of scarcemeans and alternative
uses". He thenwenton to thecruxof theGovernment's policies:
"The socialist case, while pointing to the injustice of inequality, is concerned principally with so
organising the relations of production thatmorecan beproduced with thesameor lesseffort.
"Youand I, as workers, havea deepinterest in the efficiency of industry, no matterwhatthe formof
society."27
So the mainissuewas to increase the sizeof thecake,not howit wassliced. He wenton to explain howeconomic
policies, of thekind theLaborGovernment was thenespousing, could secure efficiency through full employment
andindustrial peace. Mendelsohn usedsomesocialist rhetoric buthis socialism wasof thenever-never variety:
"We believe on the grounds of efficiency and justice capitalism should be put aside, but that is no
reasonwhyweshouldnot make the bestof things whileit is here."
The punch line followed fromhis preceding exposition of Keynesian economics:
"In recenttimes manystrikes havebeenmisguided, andhavefailedin theirobjectfor that reason.
"A better understanding of the workings of the economic system will often change the type of
demand, the timeat which itis madeand the weapon used.
"Thestrikemaysometimes be a confession of weakness ratherthana signof strength."28
Mendelsohn's second article dealt with wage determination and restated the initial reason for laborites being
attracted to Keynesian economics during the 1930s:
"Keynes pointed out, what the leaders of the working class movement have always known
instinctively, that a reduction in wages doesnotnecessarily resultin an increase in employment, and
that it is almost always right to resistpressure to reduce moneywages."29
He concluded that theAustralian systemof wagedetermination was basedon technical considerations, ratherthan
struggle. As a consequence,
"Would it not benefit theAustralian Council of Trade Unions to maintain a skilled staffof economic
andstatistical interpreters?"
(Hewouldhavebeen ecstatic over recentdevelopments.) In the face of longstanding demands for a higher wages
andshorter hours,hisonlysuggestion wasthat
"Some adjustment is due, andit mightwellcomeas a resultof the long-needed general investigation
intolivingcostsandstandards."
Subsequent articles useda Keynesian perspective to explain howthe banking system, socialsecurity, taxation, the
profit motive and price control fitted into the economy. Mendelsohn's outlook was summed up in a rhetorical
question and, in viewof Laborleaders' explicit statements andtheGovernment's policies, a spurious answer:
"What, in general terms, is thepresentobjective of theAustralian LaborGovernment?
"Is it to run the capitalist system as efficiently as possible, mitigating its worst effects so as to
beneflt the workers?
"Or is it to arrange.what a recent writer in the London 'New Statesman' called the 'calm,
constitutional transfer of authority to theworkers?
"Probably theanswer is that wehaven't yet decided."30
In addition to Mendelsohn's essay, the flrst issue of Labor Digest carried a piece by Dedman. He argued the
origins of unemployment lay in "the chronic instability and regular insufficiency of private investment".
Government spending wasto offsetdeficiencies in privateinvestment, so that,
"Far from weakening private investment in its legitimate spheres its maximum turnover will be
virtually underwritten by Government action."31
Like the laborite press, during 1949 the Labor College and Industrial Groups particularly stressed that the
Government's economic policies had createdfull employment and prevented a depression.32 See Cartoon 20 for
anillustration of this argument.
The NSW Fabian Society, established in 1947 by Sydney University economists and some others, was also
involved in the propagation of Keynesian ideas. In January 1949, for example, a weekly Fabianlectureexplained
"No Need for Depression",thanks to the Government's economic policies.33 The Society's series of pamphlets
alsoprovided Keynesian analyses of current issues.34
26. Mendelsohn explained his political position in1954, in terms 9uite commensurate with the thrust ofhis LaborDigestarticles:
"I would be happy tothink that I could cany on that tradition ofsocial refonn by reason - by the patient, persistent analysis
offacts backed, but never warped, by adeep feeling for social justice - which he [professo.rRobson ofthe London School of
Economics] in his turn inherited from Sidney and Beatrice Webb," (R. Mendelsohn Social Security. in the British
CommonweQlth Athlone Press, London 1954 pviii)
27.LaborDigestJanuary 1946 pS1.
28. ibid. p54.
29. LaborDigestFebruary 1946 p50.
30. LaborDigestAugust 1946 pp52-3. .
31. LaborDigestJanuary 1946 pp17-8.
32.Standard Weekly 10/6149 p7, 219/49 p7, 28/1149 p6.
33. Sydney University economists associated with the Fabian Society were K. Laffer, R. S. G. Rutherford, N. G. Butlin, Standard Weekly
2111149p:l.
34. The Case for Bank Nationalisation has already been mentioned. Fighting Inflation Sydney 1949 especially p26 explained that an
uncontrolled boom could lead toadepression and regretted the relaxation ofcontrols over prices and labour.
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Caught in the Middle
Whilethe Government was consistent in its policies on inflation during andaftertheWar,union officials behaved
in a contradictory way particularly during the two immediate post-war years. Manycalledfor shorter hours and
higherwages, but supported the Government's insistence on theneed to fight inflation. Labor Call's summary of
theWhite Paper on Full Employment echoed it by asserting that
"Trade unionists, as consumers, should protect their interests by ensuring that a minority does not
obtain temporary benefits which will mean higherprices to all. Claims for sectional increases can
be dealt with by existing arbitration machinery, although this should be overhauled so that it works
more quickly."35
Despitetheir support for theGovernment, laborite union officials, underverystrong rank andfilepressure around
theend of the War,were verycritical of the continuation of wagepegging and demanded legislation for the forty
hourweek,36 EvenP. W. ClareyACTU President and a LaborMember of theVictorian Legislative Council
"Urged workers to save rather than boost inflation by 'competitive spending' and called for price
and rent control withprogressive abolition of wages pegging."37
The pragmatic arguments of trade. union underconsumptionism were used to justify improvements in wages and
hours: they werenecessary to boostpurchasing powerandhence to expand production andemployment.38 Labor
Call proclaimed that .
"Labormust fight with all the ferocity of BillyHughes' Bengal tiger... against acceptance by the
people of this country of any suggestion that increased efficiency in Australian production is the
paramount post-war need. Thefirst andmost important task is to promote efficiency in distribution
and consumption of the goods that bountiful nature, science and machinery have already made it
possibleto provide. .
"... Labor must counter all publicity in favour of improved productivity to enable Australia
to sell in competitionwith the United States of America or any other country... "39
This Hobsonian argument could not be.as effectively bolstered, as during the late 1930s, by reference to
Keynesian economics because the latter had now been appropriated by the Government, Opposition and even
employers to demonstrate that wages should be restrained.w Wishful thinking was also a feature of ALP and
laborite union official thought during this period. The argument that the Chifley Government wanted to getridof
wage pegging regulations, when in fact it was working hard to limit wageincreases, was not uncommon.O The
extra-Parliamentary wing of the LaborParty, in a statement by theFederal Executive, recognised the threatto the
Party's electoral supportconstituted by the contradiction between Government policyand the aspirations of rank
andfile workers. But all it could do was to endorse the Government's outlook as well as workers' demands and
urgepatienceon unionists:
. "Thefullest possible utilisation of the productive resources of theCommonwealth, together withthe
achievement of full employment through Australia wide planning, should make further additional
increases in livingstandards possible andattainable."
"Factors in Australia causing discontent are such matters as continued pegging of wages, high
taxation, and the lowered standard of living arising from such taxation, the continuance of the 44
hourweek, together with the inability to secure a higher standard of livingby means of an increased
basicwage."
"Thesedesires arenatural. Theyshould be granted.
"Needless upsettals of industries to attain theseobjectives slow down the field of production and in
the longrun delayand make harderthe attainments of theworkers' aims."
"TheExecutive urges workers to recognise the grossly improper methods which have been and will
be used by Labor's opponents and refuse to be provoked into direct action, however just and
reasonable theirgrievances may00."42
The cross-purposes between workers and employers over the question of production, illustrated in Cartoon 21,
were apparent inside the ALP. The Communist Party recognised the contradlction' inside the ALP and laborite
union bureaucracies in 1947. But the Party overstated and predicted the continuation of the divisions inside the
ALP shortly before they declined intensity. L. L. Sharkey argued that "Chifley and Co," regarded theACTU,
LaborCouncils and big unions as tooresponsive to therankand me,
"Both the ACTU andtheNSWLaborCouncil haverepudiated economic Chifleyism, That is to say,.
thereis a growing divergence of policywithin theLaborPartyitself, between the mostimportant re-
35. JAborCall 28/6i45 pP6=7.
36. E.g. LaborCall 26110/44 p2, 1811/45. 15/1145 p4, 10/10/46 pp1, 8,31/5/47; Standard Weekly 20/4144 pl, 27/4/44 p3, 18/5/45, 2819/45 pl,
2111145 pi;and Australian Council ofTrade Unions OffICial Reportof theProceedings ofACJUCongress 1945.
37. G. R. Dunkley 'The ACTU 1927-1950: Politics, Organisation and Economic Policy" PhDThesis Monash University 1976 pS06.
38. O. Schreiber Furnishing Worker 815/45 pi; P. Qarey"Industrial Relations after the War' in Australian Institute ofPolitical Science
Australia'sPost-WarEconomy op, ciL pp2S~; Labor Council ofNSW Whythe 40 HourWeek? Sydney 1945 p2; and LaborCall 812145 p2
1319/45 pi.
39.LaborCall 813145 pi emphasis in the original.
40. O. Schreiber Laborcat:5/11145 p4 explicitly referred to Hobson.
41.LaborCall24110/46 p2.
42. Austra1ian Labor Party Federal Executive Strikesand TheirProvocation Australian Labor Party, Victorian Branch, Melbourne 8/6146 p3
and Standard Weekly 2415/46 p3. Also see Railroad3115/46 pi for a restatement ofthe Federal Executive's ~sition and the realistic
conclusion that the "Communist Party is no more responsible for the prevalence ofdisputes than is the Citizens Rights Committee"; the
increasing level ofdisputes was "a social complaint".
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forrnists in the trade union movementand the 'liberal' Keynesian group that dominates the Federal
Cabinet."43
"Unswerving Loyalty"
Wavering by union officials and even by the ALP machine, for a period after the War, helps explain changes in
the targetfor Chifley's speeches againstinflation. Sheridan draws attention to a
"Notable feature of the economic speechesof the Prime Minister and other leading ministers in the
flrst two post-war years that they spent most of their time endeavouring to educate their own
supporters. It is not until approximately 1948 that the emphasis swings more to the uncommitted
and opposinglisteners."44
In the first instance Chifleyrecognisedthe need to strengthen the resolve of the Government's closest supporters.
But during 1947 the relationships amongst laborite union officials, the ALP and the Government changed.
Friction decreased and some of the intimacy of war-time relations was restored as a modest consensus on the
priorities of Australian capitalism and for the working class was established. Success in the long fought wages
and hours struggles of the immediate post-warperiod was the main factor responsiblefor this shift, aided by the
refurbishing of the Arbitration Court with amendments to its Act and the appointment of additional Conciliation
Commissioners to speedup the processing of disputes.45 The hope of a responsive Arbitration systemcontributed
to the increasedsectionalism of industrial struggles by helpingto divert themalongofficial channels. At the same
time as the contradiction betweenrank and me pressure and loyalty to the Government eased, laborite officials
were being pushed closer to the Chifley regime as a sourceof legitimacy and assistance in their struggleagainst
Communists aspirants to theirjobs.46 They thus becamemoreeffectiveinstruments of the Government'sdesireto
increaseproduction and contain working class militancy. The continuation of considerable rank and me pressure
in some areas and the influence of the ACP, then turning leftwards, made a full blown incomes policy impossi-
ble.47 But a more modest"accord" on theneed for greaterproductionand directedagainstmilitants was achieved.
It facilitated the labour movement's toleration of a high enough level of coercion,culminating in the defeat of the
1949coal strike, to achievean importantshift in the balanceof class forcesbetween 1949and 1952.
The tripartiteBetter IndustrialRelations Conference of Augustand the September1947Acru Congress provided
.evidenceof the changes takingplace in the labour movement. The need to increasethe size of the cake had previ-
ously been a conclusion from Keynesian economics mainly preached to the union movement The Joint
Declaration of the Industrial relations Conference, endorsed by the ACTU Congress, represented the explicit
acceptance of thisprincipleby a substantial sectionof the unionbureaucracy. Hagan points out that
"Thus were laid down as basic premisesfor the A.C.T.U.'s industrial relations: the importance of
private enterpriseas the foundation of full employment in the post-wareconomy, the maxirnization
of production as the way forward to securing benefits to the worker and a public commitment to
tripartiteco-operation."48
Chifley recognised, even more explicitly than Coombs had, the importance of the trade union officials in
successfully implementing his ideologically Keynesian programfor the development of Australian capitalism:
"I appeal then to every individual Australian to give of his best in whatever occupation he may
follow. To do less is a denial of the needsof his fellow Australians•.• I appeal to the leadersof the
trade union movementto exercise firm discipline over the units they lead, to prevent unauthorised
disputes over small matters, and to concentrate their efforts and thoughts on the production this
countryso sorelyneeds.
"I call on each unionist to give unswerving loyalty to such leaders."49
This speech to the tripartite Conference was widely reported in the laborite press.50 The issue of incentive
schemes was raised at the Conference, although the ACTU had a longstanding policy of opposition to them.51
Subsequently both Chifley and HolIoway, the Minister for Labour, advocated the introduction of incentive
payments as a means to raise productivity.52
.43. L. L. Sharkey "The Labor Movement atthe Crossroads" CO"""unist ReviewMarch 1947 p451.
44. Sheridan 'Austra1ian Trade Unions' op, cit. p16.
45. On refonns of the AIbitration system see B. Healy Federal Arbitration in Australia Georgian House, Melboume 1972 pp79-80 and B.
Dabschek and J.Niland Industrial Relations inAustralia Alien and Unwin, Sydney 1981 p22S.
46. Hagan TheHistory a/the ACTUop. cit. p195.
47. Compare the situation in Britain at this time, L. Panitch Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1976 pp26,28:
"The policy's success with regard towages was the direct result ofthe unions acting not asrepresentatives but as agents of
control over their members' demands. It was moreover, a task which only the unions themselves could have undertaken;
direct application by the Government ofsuch a policy, inconditions ofrising prices and profits,would certainly have led to
massive IDdustrial unrest."
48. Hagan TheHistory a/the ACTUop,cit,p193. See Standard Weekly 8/8/47 pp3, 5for the Joint Declaration.
49. J.B. Chitley Things Worth Fighting ForMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1952 p277.
50. Australian Worker 618147 pl declared "The Australian Workers' Union will co-operate with the Government in its efforts to increase
production". .
51. Standard Weekly 8/8/47 p5. . '
52. E.g. Digest 140 p22 22/10148; Digest 142 pp17-8 20/4/49 a Report to the Nation; and Standard Weekly 1812149 p5 another Report tothe
Nation. Crisp BenChifley op. cit. p349 reports that Chitley favoured incentives schemes provided "that employers do not use incentives ortask
systems for the purpose ofunduly exploiting the workers". . .
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In March 1946the BritishLabour Government had launcheda productivity drive at a Conference with tradeunion
officials.53 No doubt combining this British model with the experience of class collaboration during the War
Chifley embarked on his own "production drive". In his 1947 budget speech he used the identification of the
Government's (Keynesian) policiesfor full employment to justify a call for greater output and for a fight against
inflation. Full employmentrequired
"Unremitting efforts to achievegreater production... It also required a continuance of measures to
prevent unwarrantable increases in costs and prices."54
At the 1948 VictorianALP Conference Chifley
"Said that workerswhodo not do a fair day's work werecheatingtheirown people,not the boss, the
Government, or the Treasury."55
A Standard Weekly editorial endorsed the call for increased production. Chifley made a similar appeal to the
NSW ALP Conference in June 1948.56 The SeptemberFederal Conference endorsed the call too, with provisos
designed to maintain rank and file support The conditions provided for consultation between unions and
Governmenton increasing production, legislation to protectworkers from"exploitation and speed-up", to prevent
greaterproductivity from leading to profiteering or more inequalityand to ensure that living standards rose in line
withproductivity.57 Shortly afterwards a conferencewas convenedbetween federal unions and the Government
The laborite press noted that in his pitchfor increasedproduction at the conference Chifley
"Illustrated how Labor had provided insuranceagainst unemployment through over-production and
overseas trade slumpsby planninga huge worksprogramme."58
He explainedthat
"Representatives of Trade Unions are better able to make such an appeal [for greater production]
than I am. I thereforewould ask every delegate to make a simpleappeal not only on behalfof the
Labor Government, but also on behalf of the nationof which they are members to pull their weight
and do their best"59
He also linked the need for greaterproduction to the dollarcrisis.
The Federal Labor Advisory Committee(FLAC) was revived in October1948 to facilitate consultation between
the ACTU and the ALP. The Committee discussed changes to the Arbitration Act which the Industrial Groups
had been advocating for severalyears. The ACTUExecutiveand then the 1949Congress supportedamendments,
enacted in August 1949, which provided for Court controlled ballots in union elections. These provisions for
interference by the state in union affairs were extended by the MenziesGovernment in 1951. Discussions in the
FLAC also led to an ACTU Executive recommendation that the 1949 Congress reconsider the question of
incentivepayments. The Congress rejected the proposal by only three votes, but the 1951 Congress reversed the
decisionand in 1953 the ACTUestablished guidelines for inceritive schemes.60
Chifleyused his Reports to the Nation,often reprinted in the laboritepress, to take his drive for more production
directlyto the rank and file of the labour movement61 In February 1949 he opened an"anti-inflation appeal" for
more production and saving.62 Railroad probably wins the prize for the most zealous trade union opposition to
inflation during 1949-50. The paper ran a series of articleson economic topics, but especiallyon the dangers of
inflationand the need to increaseproduction, by economics professors from around Australia.63 An article in the
'issue before this seriesstartedwas headlined"ThePrimeMinisterOpensDrive AgainstInflation" andproclaimed
11All must work as efficientlyas possible.
"The greater the production, the quickershortageswill be reduced."64
The complicity of laborite union officials in the Government's economic policies and their determination to stop
the ACP culminatedin 'their endorsement of the measures taken against the coal minersduring their 1949strike.
Some officials went further and actively campaigned against the miners themselves. In a leaflet droppedon the
coal fields during the strike the NSWLabor CouncilusedKeynesian ideas to justify opposition to the strikeandits
leaders:
"OnlyLabor can maintainfull employment
"The CommunistParty: Promisesa depression, wants a depression, works to create a depression.
53. Panitch SocialDemJJcracy andIndustrial MilitaN:y op. cit, pl2.
54.LaborCall 2519/47 pS.
SS.StandardWeekly214/48 pl and editorial pl.
56.AustralianWorker1616148 pl and similar inLaborCall 18/6148 pI.
57.StandardWeekly8110/48 p6 and Australian Labor Party Official ReportoftM Proceedings oftM Commonwealth Conference September
1948 p50.
58.StandardWeekly22110/48 p3.
59. ibid., AustralianWorker20/10148 pl, For the full text ofthe speech Chifley Things op,clt, p39-42 and Digest140 p9 16110148.
60. Hagan TM History of th« ACTU op. cit, pp195, 247-8 and Department ofLabour and National Service Wage Incemives in Australian
Industry Government Printer, Canberra 1959 pp112-3. Labor Call 413/49 p7 optimistically suggested that "Employers Would Oppose
Incentive payments" if their introduction meant consultation with trade unions asChitley suggested Digest 142 pIS Report to the Nation
1312149.
61.Digest 141 1'31 Report to the Nation SnJ49and Digest 142 pl15 Report tothe Nation 1312149.
62.StandardWeekly 412149 pS.
63.Railroad 1812149 p4,24/6I49 p7, 8nJ49pS,5/8149 p5)J9/49 pll, 3019/49 pS, 1712150 p2, 28/4/50 pS.
64.Railroad412149p6., . .
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"TheLabor Party: Fearsthe results of a depression, rejects a depression, knows thatLabor's policy
offull employment canpreventa depression."65
D. B. Copland, however, offered a more realistic assessment of the origins of full employment during the late
1940s:
"Fullemployment during andsincethe warhas beeninevitable andhas not beendue to anyovert act
on thepart of economists or governments."66
By the end of the 1940s significant sections of the labour movement and especially laborite union officials
accepted the logic of Keynesian economics. They agreed that improved wages and conditions depended on the
expansion of the economy and that unions shouldtake an interestin expanding production. This stoodin contrast
with the position in 1945, when, despite support for Government statements about inflation, the emphasis in the
labour movement was on improving workers' living standards through struggles to redistribute income from
capital to labour:
"Thefirst essential -- beforeincreasing the percapitaoutputof the primary or secondary worker-- is
to improve the standard of living, so that the existing productive capacity willnot produceglutswith
miseryfor millions of workers of theworld."67
Despite this changein perspective it was not possible for unionofficials to retain rank and flle supportsimply on
the basis of exhortations to greateroutputin thenational interest. They still arguedfor some wage increases that
could not be justified simplyon the grounds thatproductivity had risen and they even supported strikes on some
occasions. When dealing with the national economy they now accepted Keynesian assumptions, but the broad
church of Keynes could accommodate a wide spectrum of views, so laborites generally argued for more
expansionist economic policythan theLiberalParty.
The emerging hegemony of Keynesian ideas helped prevent the. emergence of an effective analysis or the
sustained generalisation of the strike wave during the immediate post-war period, so that it could be turned to
socialist ends, as the Communist Party attempted (too late) after 1947. Keynesian ideas helped polarise the
working class between supporters of the Government and a militant minority. This took place when the
contradiction between supportfor the Chifley Government and opposition to its wages and economic policies was
displaced from being a problem for the laborite unionbureaucracy into a conflictinside the working class itself.
The willingness of the bulk of laborite union officials to condone the Chifley Government's harsh measures
againstmilitants helped secure working class compliance with Government policy underMenzies, There was no
longer the need nor the possibility of consensus or "accord" between the unions and the new conservative
Government. Although the conservative LiberalGovernment like its socialdemocratic predecessor promised eco-
nomicprosperity on the basisof industrial restraint, unionofficials did not publicly offer their support Paniteh's
account of the behaviour of unionofficials in Britainhelpsexplainthis difference:
"The real reason for their support [for the Attlee Government] was political, and based on the
loyaltytheseleaders felt for theGovernment andits ideological position."68
During the early 1950s a tendency quickly emerged for trade unionofficials to make ad hoc arguments, with a
tenuous theoretical basis, for wage increases and to play down the link between wages and inflation while
accepting the general priorities of the Keynesian economics. "H. P." in Railroad thought that orthodox
economists, and by implication the Menzies Government, over-eniphasised increased production and thrift as the
cure for inflation: better working class living standards and a greatershare for wages in nationalincome would
play animportantpart in reducing inflation too.69 A frontpage article inAustralian Worker argued
"Workers are urged to work harder and over longerhours with the ostensible purposeof doubling
the wealthpool from which all pay envelopes are filled.
"TradeUnion leaders, however, arenot convinced that moreproduction alonewouldbe an effective
check to the sky-rocketing pricesengineered by theprofiteers, racketeers andmiddlemen... "70
Suchprotestations weregrounded in the material conditions of the union bureaucracy caught between capitaland
labour who protested that the pursuit of working class interests was compatible with the logic of Keynesian
economics, itself an expression of the dominant interests in society. In this sense they were similar to pre-war
trade union underconsumptionists. Hobson had at least provided the semblance of a theoretical justification for
the latter position. Now laborites madedo with pragmatic arguments or scraps from the Keynesian high table of
professional economists, conservative parties and business, at which they also aspired to sup. The fact that
laborite union officials and ALP politicians still offered such arguments was a tribute to the pressure of the
continuing, if lower level, of the class struggle. That struggle embodied the logic of an alternative interpretation
of Australian capitalism. Despite his mistaken suggestion that class collaboration necessarily led to material
benefits for workers, Amdt identified thislogic: .
65. NSWLaborCouncil leafletp4, Mitchell Library.
66. D. B. Copland Inflation and Expansion Cheshire, Melbourne 1951 p2S.
67.LaborCall 812145 p2. AlsoseeFurnishing Worker 815145.
68. Paniteh SocialDemocracy and Industrial Militancy op. ciL p30.
69.Railroad418150 pS.
70. Australian Worker2511150 pl, Contrast thiswithAustralian Worker 20/10148 pI headline: "BenChifley'sPersonal Drive: 'The Bigger the
Wealth PooI- the Biggerthe Dividend"'.
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"There is a far from universal, but still widespread, attitude among Australian workers which
regards working harderthan one must to keep one's job not merely as an act of pitiable stupidity, a
view which mightbe endorsed by Australians in all walks of life -- but also as a betrayal of one's
mate in theclass war against the capitalist employer... thecoderestson the assumption which few
Australian workers would want to take to its logical conclusions, the assumptions that the capitalist
system must be destroyed if the workers are to enter upon their inheritance, and it is better for
workers to forgo immediate benefits in terms of higherstandards of living than to aid and abet the
survivalof an iniquitous socialandeconomic system."7l
71. Arndt"ECOnomic Policy- Stability and Productivity" in A. Davies and G. Serle (OOs) Policies for Progress Victorian Fabian Society,
Melbourne 1954pp5~7.
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Appendix to Chapter Eight: The Ideas of the "Movement"
The distinctive ideology of the Catholic Social Studies Movement, carried into the ALP and unions by the
IndustrialGroups, assistedthe widening of divisions in the Australian working class during the secondhalf of the
1940s. Its ideas constituted a current of economic thought in the labour movement distinct from Keynesian,
MoneyPower or Communisttheories.
A distinctive aspectof the Movement's ideologywas its claim to providea meansfor workers to builda betterlife
away from industry and their current employment. This approach, at variance with traditional labourism and
Communist theory alike, did not have a great impact on the established institutions of the labour movement.
Movementideas did not evenfeature on the IndustrialGroups' page in Standard Weekly, whileMurraypoints out
that they were infrequently raisedand then usuallydefeatedat FederalALP-and ACTUConferences.1 Theseideas
were, however, an importantcomponent of the ideological ensembleof an organisation which had a substantial
impact on working class politics during the 1940s and especially the 1950s. The economic thought of the
Movement is primarily worthy of examination because it provided a motivation for the activities of the cadre of
the Movement.
The core of Movement belief was anti-Communism.2 This made the organisation acceptable to employers and
other social groups threatened by the CommunistParty and the working class militancy (sometimes mistakenly)
identified with it. But this was not sufficient to build up a base of active support inside or outside the labour
movement. A simple conservative defense of the status quo did not lie behindthe Movement's anti-Communism;
it embodied, rather, a vision of a different society that had an appeal to specific social groups. Moreover the
Movement's ideas and activities had the imprimaturof the Churchto recommend it especiallyto Catholics.
Catholic Social Theory
One of the foundations of Movement ideology was Catholic social doctrine, which grew out of the Papal
encyclicals Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno and On Atheistic Communism. Pope Leo Xlll's 1891 Rerum
Novarum was an attempt to provide a Catholic alternative to the increasingly popular socialist solution to the
"social problem". Its premises were "the natural right" to private property, sanctioned by divine law; the
inevitability of inequality; that "to suffer is the lot of man"; and the wrongfulness of class war.3 The encyclical
maintained that the remedy for the "miseryand wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majorityof the working
class" lay in moral behaviourby employers and labourers. The former should take care of the physicaland moral
well-being of their employees, while the latter should refrain from injuring propertyor people. The state should
take action in the interests of the workingclasses. On the one hand "wages ought not to be insufficient to support
a frugal and well behavedwage-earner" but on the other shouldallow him, "by cutting down expenses, to put by
some little savings and thus secure a modest source of income".4 The law should encourage people to become
propertyowners.
Pope Pius Xl's Quadragesimo Anno was a further attemptto maintain the credibilityof the Church in the face of
the crisis of the depression and leftistcritiques of capitalism. Again the distribution ofJVealth that led to poverty
was criticised The solution offered was alms giving and just behaviour by employers and the state. Pius
recommended class collaboration through corporatistinstitutions and affirmed the desirability of workers attaining
property, without reference to savings as a source of income.S In 1937 he made an additional statement On
AtheisticCommunism in the contextof the popular front governments in Spain andFrance. It alertedCatholics to
Communism as "a doctrine destructive of the foundations of civil society and subservience to social order".6
"Thisperil of our times"needed to be containedby urgentaction, both through the solutionof the social problem
by employers adopting the correct attitude and throughorganisations of Catholic Action amongstworkers to win
themback to Christ,"
These encyclicals acknowledged the injusticeof the conditions of some workers but did not constitute a serious
critique of or challenge to capitalism. They were founded on the assumption of the inviolability of private
property, a term which ambiguously referred to both the means of production and property for personal use. The
assertionsthat it was desirablefor workers to own privatepropertydid not, therefore, threaten the capitalistclass's
monopolyownership of the means of production. The Church's perspective was commensurate with its position
in the main Catholic countries, not only as a large scale propertyowner and employerin its own right but also in
1.Murray the Splitop,cit.pp37,54, 56.
2. Seeespecially B. A Santamaria TheMovement of Ideas in Australia mimeo 1953 ppl-2.
3. Pope LeoXIIIRerumNovarwnin S.Z. ElderandJ. B. Morall(eds)ChurchandStateThrough theCenturies BumsandOates, London 1954
pp326, 328-9,332-3.
4. ibid.p346.
5. PopePiusXI Quadragesimo Anno in EhlerandMorall Churchand Stateop.cit. p443.
6. PopePius XI OnAtheisticCommunism (Divini Redemptoris) in ElderandMoralfChurch and Stateop, cit. pS51.
7. ibid.pp562,571.
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terms of its relationship with its multi-class constituency, of which capitalists were the most influential part, and
withcapitalist states. The doctrine of the encyclicals was a much cruderand more explicit version of bourgeois
socialism than Keynesian economics. It was without the apparatus of sophisticated social scientific analysis to
explain the possibility of capitalism functioning harmoniously in the future, once some technical problems had
been sorted out. .Instead it reliedon moral assertions. In commenting on another bourgeois socialist argument
Engels argued that
"... Our bourgeois Socialist takes us... from the economic sphere into the moral sphere. And
nothing is more natural. Whoever declares that thecapitalist modeof production, the 'iron laws' of
present-day bourgeois society, are inviolable, and yet at the same time would like to abolish their
unpleasant but necessary consequences, has no other recourse but to deliver moral sermons to the
capitalists, moral sermons whose emotional effects immediately evaporate under the influence of
private interests and,ifnecessary of competition."8
The Catholic Church's undeniable sensitivity to the development of the class struggle, as capitalism expanded,
meantthatonly twenty yearsafterEngels's articles suchsermons weredelivered fromrealpulpits.
Distributism
Where a moreradical critique of capitalism could be legallypropounded, Catholic socialtheory couldhaveonlya
limited impact on working class Catholics, especially where Catholicism was not the established religion. From
early in the 20th century, however, two Catholic literary intellectuals in England had drawn on elements of
Catholic social doctrine to construct a more aggressive ideology, distributism, which was both anti-socialist and
anti-capitalist Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton maintained that social injustice was inherent in capitalism.
They believed that the desire of the mass of the peoplefor security undercapitalism was driving them to accept
the reintroduction of slavery. Unlike the papal encyclicals, Belloc drew a distinction between property and the
means of production, indicting capitalism for its restriction of the latter to a smallminority. He sawin legislation,
such as that for employers' liability for injuries to their employees at work, evidence for the development of a
"Servile State" .in which workers voluntarily gave up their freedom in exchange for the security offered by
employers.s In a literally reactionary utopia, Belloc and Chesterton lookedto the supposedly wide dispersal of
property in the means of production amongst the craftsmen and peasants of the middle ages for a model of an
alternative to capitalism and socialism.tv The solution to thesocialproblem therefore lay in thewiderdistribution
of the means of production and especially land. In Chesterton's case, a corollary of this view was a certain
hostility to modem machinery because of the large scale industry it necessitated.U Belloc also foresaw the
possibility of increasing the number of shareholders and their ability to control large enterprises which couldnot
be broken up for technical reasons. Other large units were to be redistributed by the state, through the use of the
taxation systemandothermeasures to encourage "independent production".12
Belloc and Chesterton's ideas very much fitted the bill as a petty bourgeois ideology, commensurate with the
social position of small owners of the means of production, dependent on their own labour. They raised the
conditions of this class to a transcendental plane, as the solution to society's problems and proposed state and
otherinitiatives to assistthem. Belloc andChesterton's thought matched thatof Proudhon bothin theirindictment
of the evils of capitalism and their reactionary utopianism. The main difference between Proudhon, "the
philosopher and economist of the lower middle class" against whom Man: and Engels had polemicised in the
middle of the 19th century, and his literary English successors was the former's fervent anti-clericalism and the
latter's fervent Catholicism.13 Despite their anti-capitalism, Chesterton and Belloc used the bourgeois socialist
ideasof the socialencyclicals as theirmeans of expression. But,as Draperpoints out,
"Normally the petty bourgeois thinks like a bourgeois even in order to formulate resentments
againstthe bourgeoisie."14
In the writings of Chesterton and Belloc the founders of theMovement, and especially B. A. Santamaria had an
ideology which motivated its supporters by providing not only a critique of communism but alsoof the iniquities
of capitalism and offered a positive alternative. Like Douglas Credit theory, distributism denounced the class
8. F. Engels The Housing Questioll Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975 p44. The articles that make up the book were originally published in
18729. H. Belloc TheServileStateT. N. Foulis, London 1912 pp14, 156. Apparently the workers actually fought to force employers and the stateto
make them servile. .
10. H. BellocEssay 011the Distributioll 0/Property The Distributist League, London 1936 pp41-2 Alsosee G. K. Chesterton What'sWrong
withtheWorldCasseU, London 1913 and his Outline o/ReasollMethuen, London 1926.
11.Chesterton Outline ofReasoll op,cit. pp179, 224.
12. Belloc Essay011theDistribution 0/Property op. cit. pp42, 52.
13. See K. Marx and F. Engels Manifesto o/the COI1IITIUIIist Party Progress Publishers, Moscow 1971 ppS8-9 for a critique ofpetty bourgeois
socialism that could have been explicitly written ofBelloc and Chesterton. Alsosee J. Strachey and V.McNabb Communism or Dis.tributism:
A Debate Distributist League, London 1937 p27 for Strachey's comment,
"Now if you believe it ispossible to to go back tothe means ofproduction current in the Indian village, then you can end
exploitation by distributing the means ofproduction. But not otherwise,"
Note that the characterisation ofProudhon as a petty bourgeois socialist isfrom Marx's letter to Annenkov 28/12146, appendix to K. Marx The
Poverty o/PhilosophyProgress Publishers, Moscow 1975 p178. In the Manifesto he isreferred toas abourgeois socialist. For an explanation
ofthis shift see H. DraperKarlMan's Theory 0/Revolution Volume 11: ThePolitics 0/SocialClasses Monthly Review Press, New York 1978
~~ ,
14. Draper ThePolitics0/SocialClasses op,cit. p29S, emphasis in the original.
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struggleas a means for workers to collectively improve their conditions and transform society. Insteadindividual
virtue and/or pressure for statemeasures wouldestablish independent production, supplemented by profit sharing
or similar schemes in theremaining large-scale industry, as the basisof the new socialorder. The maindifference
between the two approaches, as Belloc pointed out, was that Douglas Crediters sought to redistribute income,
distributists property,1S To that extent distributism had a greater appeal to aspirant, Douglas Credit theory to
established petty bourgeois. In 1953 Santamaria said that Catholic workers, tradesmen and unionists, rather than
the educated had borne the brunt of the Movement's battles,16 This must, of necessity have been true of the
Movement's work inside the trade unions. But Charlesworth locates the social standing of the bulk of the
Movement's supporters in generalamongst
"Peoplewho had moved up the socialladder and no longerfelt sentimentally bound to the ALP the
way theirfathers had."
The Movement satisfied "the social, psychological and quasi-religious needs of the new lower middle-class
Catholics",17
The fact that distributist ideas wereendorsedby the Catholichierarchy wasan important factor in theMovement's
success. According to Chesterton's biographer, distributism probably had its greatest impact anywhere in the
world in Australia, the only country whose hierarchy adopted it,18 In Australia the Church's constituency was
moreproletarianin its class composition thanin mostother countries. Oneconsequence of the relativesmallness
of the Australian Catholic bourgeoisie was to increase the influence of middle class Catholic intellectuals, with
theirown idiosyncratic perspectives, in the development of the Church's thinking. The first aggressively Catholic
and sustained intellectual grouping in Australia was that of Santamaria's generation, in the form of the Campion
Societyin Melbourne. It was the productof recently established Catholic upper secondary and tertiary education
institutions,19 In Australia there were proportionately fewer Catholic capitalists to be outragedby Santamaria's
anti-capitalism of the 1930s and, toned down considerably, the 19408, than in other countries. With the formal
establishment of Australian Catholic Actionin 1937the ideasof thenew generation of university trainedCatholic
intellectuals provided the Church with a new and effective means of relating to its working class constituency,
independently of theLabor Party. During the post-warboom, as the differentiation of the Catholic flock led to a
classpattern morereflective of society at large, the Church's position on socialproblems became more orthodox.
This process in part proceeded by way of severeconflicts inside the hierarchy and the Catholic community over
the Church's role in politics. During the period 1957-62 the Church rejected the petty bourgeois socialism of
distributism and adopteda "prudentconservatism" or bourgeois socialistoutlook.20
Independent Production in Australia
The Movement's central focus in fighting Communism was apparent in the balance of material in its organ
Freedom (renamed News Weekly in 1946). Other aspects of the ideology that drew people to the organisation
were covered in the newspaper but they often found fuller expression in publications of other Catholic Action
organisations dominated by Santamaria •• the Australian National Secretariat of Catholic Action (ANSCA), the
NationalCatholic Rural Movementand someof the Bishops' socialjustice statements of the 19408 and 1950s --
and in materialby C. Clark, the Queensland Government's economic advisor, who inspiredsome of Santamaria's
policies.21
The annual CatholicSocial Justice Statements by the Australian bishops were drafted by Santamaria. The 1942
StatementForFreedom, startedwith an explanation of the socialencyclicals and wenton to arguethat
"The Catholic is opposed to that modern brand of capitalism which deprives the masses of
ownership andconcentrates it in the handsof a few monopolists,"
"... THE GREATER FIGHTTO BE CARRIED ON IN THEFUTURE IF AUSTRALIA IS TO BE
FOUNDED ON JUSTICE ANDONFREEDOM, IS THEFIGHTTO RESTORE OWNERSHIP TO
TIlE PEOPLE - OWNERSHIP OF HOMES, OF LAND, OF WORKSHOPS, AND OF MEANS
OF PRODUCTION."22
This theme was inspired by distributism, rather than directlyby the socialencyclicals, andran through subsequent
Social Justice Statements and Freedom/News Weekly.23 The newspaper offered the occasional critique of
monopoly capitalism as unstable and prone to depressions. Manpowerbudgets and social services did not go to
the heart of the problembecause.
IS. Bellae Essayon theDistrlbuuo« ofProperty op. cit. p4•.
16. Santamaria TheMove1tU1n1 of Ideasop. cit. p9.
17. M. Charlesworth Church, StateandConscience University ofQueensland Press, Brisbane 1973 p38.
18. M. Ward GilbertKeithChesterton Sheed and Ward, London 1944 pp44S, 447. '
19. G. Henderson Mr.SantaTMria and theBishops Hale and Iremonger, Sydney 1983 pp7-8, 11.
20. ibid. p97-9.
21. On Clark's contribution see Henderson Mr.SantaTMria and theBishops op,cit. pS7.
22 ANSCAFor Freedom Advocate Press, Melbourne 1942 ppS, 6.
23. E.g. ANSCA Pattern for PeaceMelbourne 1943 pSj C. t"lark's review ofHayek's TheRoadto Serfdom inFreedom 4110/44 p2j Freedom
27/8145 p3, 2211/44 p2, 28/6144 p4.
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"Thereal solution is the unfashionable one of Distributism -- of the widespread diffusion of capital
ownership among a majority of the population."24
In 1945 Freedom took up the cudgels againstmonopoly as an obstacle to Keynesian full employment policies, to
back up its case against monopoly on distributist grounds.25 This indicated the considerable popularity of the
Government's commitment to full employment. In Clark's Property and Progress, distributed by ANSCA, anti-
monopolism vergedon conspiracy theory. Employers mightwelcome the elimination of the tradecycle but
"Eventhis desirable objective may be thwarted by the sinister but extremely powerfulinterests that
make their fortunes out of the upsand downs of thestock market, large-scale moneylendingand the
buyingup of embarrassed businesses at distressed prices."26
In some cases the Movement portrayed Communism as the collusive twin of monopoly. Clark raised the
possibility that the twomightcombine againstthe ideaof independent production.27
Santarnaria and the Movement's greatest hope for small property lay on the land. Hence their support for
"independent fanning" (self-sufficient agriculture) regionalism and opposition to tariffs, which benefitted large-
scale manufacturing to the detriment of primaryproduction.28 Australia's need for an increased population was
used to justify rural settlement, because the birthrate was supposedly higher in country.areas.29 The Movement
was somewhat morecautious in its attitudeto technology than Chesterton and Belloc were. Even so it tended to
deny that economies of scaleexistedin manyindustries and maintained that, in anycase, the costsofsmallerunits
of production wouldbe worthpayingif sucheconomies did exist.3O .
"The social problem will be solved", News Weekly maintained, in establishing the link between distributism and
the working class,
"When the worker is given command over goods and services sufficient to enable him to live a
decentand full life, and this canonly be done by making available to him an increased share arising
from economic and technical development, so that he can fend for himself..• and so that he may
have the opportunity of establishing himself (if he so desires) as an independent working
proprietor."31
This perspective, therefore. justified increased wages as a means to changesociety. The demandfor better pay
would have appealed to workers, even if few relished the prospect of transforming themselves into peasants.
Othermeans to a distributist society. besides increased working class incomes in the form of the "family wage",
included tripartite industrial councils to run large enterprises, creditfacilities for craftsmen and smallbusinessmen
(for the Movementthey werealways "-men") and taxation of monopolies.32 Someof theseofferedsuccourto the
established petty bourgeoisie.
The practical significance of the Movement's support for increased wages was much diluted by its rejection of
class struggle and its consistent advocacy of class collaboration. Peace in Industry, the 1946 Social Justice
Statement, was an attack on Communist inspired industrial militancy and provided a rationale for Catholic and
especially Movement anti-Communist activity in the unions to fight "the imminent danger facing this country".33
Freedom/News Weekly might assert that wages should have priority over profits, but its frequent articles on
industrial councils. profit sharing and similar schemes emphasised that "If Australia is to survive in a hostile
world. Capital andLabor mustpull together."34 Workerparticipation andprofit sharingwereonly steps towards a
holygoal,because
"TheNatural Law cannot be denied. God created the material resources of the earth for man's use
and benefit-- for the benefitof all men.
"••• The naturalright to ownproductive propertyis perfectlyclear."35
The Movement's approach to industrial relations had important elements in common with the Government'sstress
24.News Weekly2313149 p4. Freedom2110/43 p4 quotes Qark on the superiority ofdistributist measures over social security legislation. C.
OarkNews Weekly 1018149 p5 drew attention to the emergence ofthe servile state, as"foreseen in an extraordinary book published by Mr.
Hilaire Belloc asearly as1912".
25.Freedom14/11145 p4. Also seeNewsWeekly 1213/52 p4, 19/10/49 pl on the monopolisation ofMelboume's milk supply.
26. C. Clark PropertyandEconomicProgressCatholic Social Guild, Melboume 1945 pp9-10.
ZT. Freedom14/11/45 p4,3/6144 p2; News Weekl113/10/48 pl;and Qark Propertyand Progressop, cit,]'6. '
28.For example, ANSCA TheLand Is Your BusUless Melbourne 1945, ANSCA Pattern/or Peaceop, Clt. p4Setseq.;Freedom 13/11/43 pl,
20/11143 pl, 2513/44 P'J, 814144 p4, 1618144 p4, 23/8/44 pl,219/44 p2, .19/12145; News Weekly9n147 p4,3otT/47 p4, 913/49 p4, 29/6149 p4.
29. See, for example, B. A. Santamaria The Earth Our Mother Araluen Publishing Co., Melbourne 1945 pplO-I; ANSCA The Land Is Your
Businessop. cit, pp2-4; Freedom18110/44 pt: and NewsWeekly913/49 p4.
30. Freedom30110143 p3 and News Weekly30nl47 p4,318149.
31.News Weekly3Onl471'4.32. See, for example, ANSCAFor Freedomop. ~it. pp7-9; ANSCA Patternfor Peace op. cit. ppS, 11, 20, 29; Freedom2211144 p2, 1212144
p2' and News Weekly 29/6149 p4. The Movement approved the attem~ tonationalise the banks, because this would facilitate the provision of~it facilities toindependent producers, although italso lifted the Idea of credit union straight out ofBeUoc's Essay on the Restoration 0/
Propertyop, cit. pp87-8; Freedom13/11143 p3,30/10143 pl, 19n144p3; and News Weekly 13/8147 p4, 1110/47 p4, 22110147 pi. .onthe other
hand it opposed the nationalisation ofindustries more amenable to organisation along independent lines, for example the health industry, e.~.
Freedom30/10143 p4. The 1948 Social Justice Statement Socialisation summed upthe organisation's position, seeHenderson Mr. Saniamaria
andthe Bishopsop. cit,pp7o-5. .
33. Quoted In Henderson Mr. Santamaria and the Bishopsop, cit. pp70, 68.
34.Freedom 16110/43 pl. Also see Freedom13/11143 pl;News Weekly18/6147 p3, 9n147 pl, 3/12147 p4, 18/8148 p4,2819/49 pS, 4110/49 p4.
Freedom29/1144 p2 for how worker owned businesses could put an end to the need for strikes and lockouts.
35.News Weekly 1612149 p4.
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on the need to increase the size of the economic cake and to end industrial disruption. So the Movement endorsed
incentive payments and Chifley's production drive. A News Weeklypamphlet, Production or Poverty? exhorted
"AUSTRALIANS
"Support the Labor Government and the Peace in Industry Conference in the fight for greater
production."36
In accord with this logic and despite rhetoric about needs based wages, News Weekly in April 1949 explicitly
opposed the LlO basic wage claim as inflationary, as it had earlier supported temporary continuation of wage
pegging.J? Eventually Movement support for productivity rather than quarterly wage adjustment tipped the
balance in its policies overwhelmingly against demands for across the board wage increases.38 Class harmony
was a greater good for the Movement than increased wages.
36. News Weekly Production or Poverty? 10 Reasons Why You Should Increase Production Melbourne 19471 p4. Also see News Weekly
23nJ47 p3, 30nJ47 pi, 618/47 pi, 511149 p3, 1911149 p4,13/4/49 p4, 1815149 pS.
37.News Weekly 614149 p3. .
38. Munay TheSplitop, ciLpS6. .
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CHAPTER NINE
LEFT NATIONALISM, CONSERVATIVE AND RADICAL
The development of laborite thought can be relatedon the one hand to the requirements of Australian capitalism
andits contradictions, reflecting differences in the capitalist classas overBrettonWoods. On theotherhand class
contradictions inside theALP,concerning questions likepost-war nationalisations, abolition of wagepegging and
the introduction of the forty hour week, were involved. Communist strategic and economic ideas were also
shaped by the exigencies of the class struggle. But they were shaped by developments on the plane of the
international capitalist system more directly than ALP thought was. Communists had a primary interest in the
interplay of the great powers during the war and then the emergence of superpower blocs around Russiaandthe
USA after it, because of their identification of Russia as the socialist motherland. Where the ideas of the ALP
werein part determined byAustralia's placein worldcapitalism, theCommunists were explicitly concerned with
andgavepriorityto events of international significance.
During the decade after the start of the "GreatPatriotic War Against Fascism" in June 1941, Communist policy
underwent two profound reorientations. The Party's attitude to the war and its economic analyses of the period
changed very rapidly when Germany invaded Russia. Clearly Communists' international preoccupations, rather
than the Australian class struggle, were virtually the sole consideration here. The CPA's economic thought
quickly came to include an appreciation of the progressive role of the Labor Party, as the representative of
.Australian capitalism, andan optimistic assessment of the socialist potential of the Government's anti-depression
policies, prefiguring the Communist Party's own reformist underconsumptionism from the mid-1960s. Thenthe
Australian Communist Party (thePartychanged its namein 1944 on its merger with the StateLaborParty) entered
a transition period, during which it became more and more critical of the Government's foreign and domestic
policies, as the war was drawing to a close. It began to revise its attitude to the role of the ALP and the
progressive sections of the Australian capitalist classLabor washeld to represent This criticism was encouraged
by a quickening in the pace of thedomestic classstruggle, the self-evident emergence of a cold-war foreign policy
in Australia and then byevents in the international communist movement -- theConference of Empire Communist
Parties in February 1947, the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Corninform) in September
1947 and developments in the "NewDemocracies" of eastern Europe. During this transition periodtheParty gave
greater emphasis to the role of the monopolies in Australian capitalism and reasserted the inevitability of
economic crises. The Party's nationalism developed an increasingly anti-American flavour, which still
characterises much of theAustralian left today. TheMay 1948 ACPCongress confirmed thenewradical position
andsupplemented it with anextremely polarised pictureof the structure of Australian capitalism. On theoneside
stoodthe Collins House monopolists, on the other the ACP, the only genuine political expression of Australia's
national independence. Militant class struggle replaced measures by a Laborgovernment as the most important
means of obtaining a measure of economic security for the working class. Theradicallineremained in placeuntil
1951-2, ·when changed international circumstances and a severe decline in the Party's fortunes dictated more
moderate policies.
Despitethe diversity ofCommunist policybetween 1941 and 1950theperiodpossesses a unity. It was theperiod
of theParty's highest membership and greatest influence, particularly in the tradeunion movement. TheParty's
three hundred union officials acted as a bridge carrying Communist ideas into the wider labour movement and
rankand file workersentiment into theParty. Communist theory wasconsistently nationalist during the period: it
justifiedits policies as being in the interests of the Australian nationor people (for analytical purposes it is often
betterto read suchjustifications as "in the interests of Russia's rulers'"), To highlight the doctrinal continuity as
well as the changes in the ACP's ideas it is useful to divide the period between 1941 and 1951 into three sub-
periods -- the war, 1941-45; transition 1945-7; and theradical phase, 1947-51. These areexamined in thecontext
of the Party's interpretation of a statement on Australia's place in worldcapitalism and the structure of Australian
politics: Lenin's 1913 article "In Australia". This article provided an important theoretical reference pointfor the
Communist Party between 1941 and the early 1950s. Official interpretations "reoriented" the article to
accommodate theParty's current position.
Lenin's article was known in Australia before the 1940s. In order to make the Communist Party's use of the
article during and after the war clear, earlier references to the article and the context of its production are
examined. The primary importance of real social forces in defining the content of an "idea" is also nicely
illustrated in the careerof Lenin's littlearticle of 600or so words before 1941.
"InAustralia" wasfirstpublished in the legalPravda of 13June 1913.2 Leninbasedhis account on the analysis of
1.c.f.L.L. Sharkey''Weopposecurrentforeign policy, not so muchbecause it is or is not in the interests of SovietRussiato do so,butbecause
thispolicyis a menace to Australia" Australian Communists andSovie: Russia CurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1947plO.
2. V. I. LeninCollected Works Volume 19 Progress Publishers Moscow 1913 pp216-7.
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the Australian elections published in the pressof the seniorpartyof the Second International, the German Social-
Democratic Party.3 Cliff has pointedout that
"Leninknew how to /write very popular, short articles for Pravda. They were always factual, and
everyarticlecentredon just one idea,whichwas arguedout".4
The message in this articlewas that class struggle couldnot be avoidedundercapitalism, including in Russia. The
Australian situation, with its class-collaborationist Labor Party, was exceptional. It could last only a short time
because Australia was a' colonial country which had not yet achieved full independence or a proper central
government. By implication Australia was more backward politically than Russia. Underlying the article werea
number of assumptions which derived from Lenin's conception of the socialist revolution at that time. He
believedthat socialiststrategy would have to go through two stages. The frrst was appropriate to the period of
struggle for the achievement of the bourgeois revolution, as set out in the minimum program of the Russian
Social-Democratic LabourParty •• a democratic republic, land reforms, certainlabourreforms. The secondstage
couldonlystart after the flrst had been completed. It was the struggle for the socialistrevolution.
Lenin's article was designed to depriveliberals in Russia of an exampleof the advantages of class peace. But it
also illustrated some of Lenin's assumptions about revolutionary strategy. In particular, Lenin's account of
Australia lent weightto his argument that a labourparty couldplay a leading role in the achievement of the tasks
of the bourgeois revolution and could even participate in a revolutionary government committed to carrying out
thosetasks ifit conducted"1) a revolutionary struggle againstcounter-revolutionary attempts, and 2) the defence
of the independent interests of the working class".5 He counterposed this position to that of the Mensheviks who
thoughtthe working classshouldonlyplay a passivepoliticalrole, supporting the bourgeoisie's politicalactions in
attaining its revolution. In the course of 1917 Lenin changed his attitude to the stages socialist strategy would
have to pass through. In hisApril Theses he affirmed that thesocialistrevolution was on the immediate agenda.e
adopting a position indistinguishable from Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution. The 1913 article is also
notablebecause it prefigures one aspectof Lenin's analysis of the majorityof social-democratic parties,by at least
a year. As a result of the collapse of the Second International at the beginning of World War I Lenin's
characterisation of the ALP as a bourgeois labour party was extended to most of the parties of the International)
The article bore some of the marks of a second or third hand account Lenin attributed uniform national
education, factory (stillnot a feature of Australian society) and tariff legislation to the ALP, as well as the land tax
the secondFisherGovernment did introduce. Nevertheless his conclusion that the ALP was a "liberal" party was
a real insightand constituted a pointof interestfor Australian socialists. '
Lenin's sole attempt to specifically analyse the conditions of Australian capitalism and the ALP apparently hadno
direct influence on Australian Communists until 1933 when it was published in Australia for the first time and
with great fanfare in the CPA's Labor Review.8 Neither this edition, nor those that followed made any serious
attemptto place the little article into historical context Presumably such a step would have reducedthe abilityof
CPA leaders to interpret it flexibly. "Lenin 1913" did not immediately become a touchstone for Communist
analyses of the Labor Party or of Australia's place in worldcapitalism. Within a month of its publication, Jack
Masons made a reference to the article: What Lenin wroteproved that Jack Lang's proposal to unify Australia
was simply a capitalistpolicy.
"In Australia" did not fully accord with the extreme leftist spirit of the Communist Party as it went through its
Third Period stage. Where the StalinistComintern called social-democratic parties "social fascist", Lenin had
more accurately described the ALP as a "LiberalLabor Party". The article was revived in January 1935, on the
occasion of the eleventh anniversary of Lenin's death, as the CPA was in a transitional phase between Third
Period and Popular Front politics. For a while the Party's orientation roughly accorded with Lenin's. The
Communist Party had cast off the worstof its sectarian excesses and was advocating a UnitedFront with the ALP,
though not yet a PopularFront. An articlein Communist Review and a Workers Weekly editorial announced that
Lenin's prediction was coming true as the bourgeois Labor Party'made way for the socialistLabor Party, ,in the
formof theCPA.10
The logic of the CPA's Popular Front politics led it to reinterpretLenin's 1913 essay in 1938. J. B. Miles had
already foreshadowed that affiliation of theCommunist Party to the ALPwouldprepare
3. For a discussion of the German Social'Democratic press's treatment of the ALPbeforeWorldWar I see J. Tampke "PaceSetteror Quiet
Backwater?: German Literature on Australia's LabourMovement andSocial Policies, 1890-1914" LabourHistory 36, pp3-17
4. T. OiffLeninVolume 1: Building thePartyPlutoPress, London 1975p343.
5. V. I. LeninTwo Tactics ofSocial-Democracy in theDemocratic Revolution in his Selected Work!Volume 1 Progress Publishers, Moscow
1977pp434-7, 494 (firstpublished 1905).
6. V. I. LeninTheTask!oftheProletariat in thePresent Revolution in his Selected Work! Volume 2 op,cit. pp29-33 (firstpublished) 1917.
7. SeeV.I. LeninImperialism andtheSplitin Socialism Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975p19(firstpublished October1916):
"Thefact is that 'bourgeois labourparties', as a politicalphenomenon, havealready beenformed in all theforemost capitalist
countries."
AlsoseeTM Co//apstf oftheSecondInternational Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975,firstpublished 1915.
8.Worktfrs Wtfek/y 2413133 p4: "••• ' In Australia' , in whichthegeniusof Lenin unerringly estimates themake-up of this Party. Everystudent
musthavethisarticle".
9. probably a pseudonym forJ. B. Miles,theCPA'sleader. .
10. Worktfrs Wetfk/y 1811135 p2. This issue of the paper also carried a reprint of Lenin's article on p3, R. D[ixon]. "Socialism and the
Australian LabourMovement" Communist Revkw January1935 p6-16.
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"the wayfor a fundamentally class outlookon essentials in theALPranks, andfor a unitedworking-
class party for the struggle to end the powerof capital, establish a class government of workers to
suppress all counter-revolutionary opposition andgo forward to the building of socialism'l.tt
L. L. Sharkey trimmed Lenin's article to fit the new perspective. He indicated that the struggle to reform the
NSW ALP was part of the process Lenin predicted whereby a Socialist Labor Party would emerge. The
implication clearlywas that theALPcouldbe transformed into a Socialist LaborParty.l2
Within a year of Sharkey's article the Party's interpretation of Lenin 1913 changed again. Just as Stalin's
increasing exasperation with the western democracies which he was attempting to woo into an anti-fascist pact,
led him to turn to Germany, Australian Communists were becoming increasingly exasperated withtheLaborParty
by rnid-1939. Despite repeated overtures for a PopularFront, the ALP had shown no willingness to collaborate-
with the Communist Party or with "progressive" sections of the conservative parties. For this latter crime ALP
leaders were labelled "sectarian" in the Communist Press.l3 In June 1939 Dixon anticipated the leftism of the
Party's line during the "Second Imperialist War". He said that "the Labor Party is by no means a socialist
workers' party. It is, to quote Lenin, a 'bourgeois Labor Party''',14 But Dixon did not refer to Lenin's wider
analysis, in the article, of the role of the ALP in developing Australian capitalism nor to the need for a Socialist
LaborParty. OnceCommunist leaders had sortedout the correctresponse to the outbreak of war and the Hitler-
Stalin Pact the Party embarked on a more thorough-going leftist course, eschewing nationalism and for the first
timeraising Lenin 1913 to the status of a key doctrine. It retainedthat status throughout the 1940s, despite two
further changes in theParty's orientation.
In What Is This Labor Party? Mason (Miles) andMcShane (Sharkey) set out to discredit the ALP and its support
for Australia's efforts in the "Second Imperialist wat'. "Our starting point," they announced "is Marxism-
Leninism, more especially Lenin's well-known analysis of the Australian Labor Party, made in 1913".15 They
emphasised the non-socialist nature of the ALP , its nationalism and protection of Australian capital. These
undesirable features were explained in terms of the Party's base in the petty bourgeoisie and the aristocracy of
labour. That is, they employed the Leninist critique of social-democracy in general which attributed the
corruption of the aristocracy of labourto bribes madeout of the proceeds of colonial exploitation, and identified
theconservative influence of tradeunion officials in the parties of labour. MasonandMcShane conceded thatthe
LaborParty had achieved "liberal" reforms before WorldWarI, but, as in Lenin's article, theycounterposed these
advances to the need for a Socialist Labor Party, quickly identified as the CPA. This, the main conclusion,
indicated why Lenin's article wassummoned up to play an important role during 1940: where the Popular Front
strategy had been premised on a relatively uncritical attitude towards the ALP, a merit of Lenin's analysis was
precisely that it highlighted the obsolescence of Labor's class-collaborationism as far as the pursuitof working
classinterests wasconcerned•
.1941-45: A National Front for Victory16
AfterJune 1941 Communists weresecure in the beliefthat theirpatriotism, nowpermanently exchanged again for
internationalism, served the interests of the socialist motherland.t? So it did, because the rulingclasses'of Russia
and its allies had a common interestin the defeatof the Axis powers. TheCommunist Party of Australia's most
substantial explanation of its war-time orientation wasL. L. Sharkey's 1942pamphlet Australia Marches On,18
Thepamphletincluded Marx's "News from Australia, 1855" andLenin's "TheLaborGovernment in Australia",
Le, Lenin 1913. Where What Is This Labor Party? wasprimarily concerned to document theALP's anti-working-
class features, including its nationalism, Sharkey's contribution, to Australia Marches On stressed a different
aspectof Lenin's argument He gave priority to an issue that in Lenin's article was subordinate and transitory:
theprogressive role of theALP in developing Australian capitalism. Lenin regarded the influence of andworking
class support for the ALP as a preliminary to the emergence of a Socialist Labor Party. Earlier CPA
interpretations of the article accorded with this expectation, either maintaining that the .ALP was on the verge of
transforming itself into, or that the CPA was about to supersede the ALP as the Socialist Labor Party. In both
casesthe old role of the ALP was already redundant Thirtyyears afterLenin had innocently produced the topic
for extensive antipodean biblical exegesis, Sharkey turnedearlier interpretations on theirheads: the ALPwas still
playing a progressive role by taking theprocess of thedevelopment of anindependent andcentralised Australia to
fulfilment. Sharkey gave the ALP credit for legislation that helped to consolidate and develop an independent
11. J.B. Miles "The Federal Conference ofthe Australian Labor Party" Communist Review September 1936 p23.
12L. L. Sharkey ''Working-Class Unity" Communist ReviewOctober 1938 pp55, 57.
13. R. Dixon "TowardsAPeople's Front" Communist Review September 1938 p55.
14. R. Dixon "Labor Reforrnism and the Popular Front" Communist Review July 1939 p397.
15. Mason and McShane What Is This IAbor Party? Forward Press, Sydney (as the covers says 11 Published. .. For The CommunistParty Of
Australia" the pamphlet probably appeared before May 1940 when the Party was banned) p2
16. Communist Party of Australia A United Working Class and a National Frontfor Victory: Resolution of the 13thCongress March 1943,
Sydney 1943.
17. The "Australian Working Cass March" (1\me:"Men ofHadech") in Australian Communist Party A BookofC017ll1lWlity Songs Sydney
1945 pS began "Sing Australia's greatest glory, Battles in her epic story... 11
18. L. L. Sharkey Australia Marches On NSW Legal Rights Committee, Sydney 1942. Also see the third impression Communist Party of
Australia, Sydney 1943. L. H. Gould's review ofAustralia Marches On indicatedthe exalted status ofLenin 1913 at this stage. "The author's
starting point", according to Gould, "is Lenin's analysis in 1913, ofthe Australian political scene, and his forecast offuture developments -
amazingly fulfilled in all details" Communist Review February 1943 p13.
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Australia, including that for the Commonwealth Bank, land taxation, the Scullin tariffs and, following Lenin's
mistakes, the uniformCustoms tariff, Federation Acts and Factory-Acts. The Curtin Government's ratification of
the Statute of Westminster and proposed constitutional alteration were evidence that this process was still going
on andthat the CPA shouldsupportit.
"Independence, unification, democratic institutions, industrialisation and numerical and political
growth of the working class, these are the basic conditions which capitalism itself has been
compelled to create, but which are, historically, also the basic preconditions for the transition to a
socialistsociety... it is for us to help alongthe historical development."19
The Communist Party, in other words, should promote capitalist development so long as it proceeded along
prescribed lines, as it was doing during the war. The argument was the same as that used by Labor Party
supporters for decades and wasextended to the Communist analysis of Australian imperialism.
On the basis of its current interpretation of Lenin 1913 the Party achieved greater insight into the dynamics of
Australian imperialism than it had since embracing nationalism in the mid-1930s or it ever did subsequently.
Ironically this was because of Communist endorsement of, or" at least indifference to, Australia's imperial
ambitions. During the War Lenin's insight that the ALP pursued the interests of Australian capital was
wholeheartedly accepted by the Party,unencumbered by contradictions between bourgeois foreign policy and the
interests of the Russian ruling class. The Party not only identified with Australian nationalism but also regarded
the Government's war policy as essentially in accord with the nation's interests. After the war, as during the
PopularFrontperiod, therewas a divergence between theParty's conception of the nationalinterestand that of the
the Government, because the latter was increasingly anti-Soviet This distorted Communist perceptions of the
capitalist class's pursuitof its own (in the final analysis, theonlyoperative"national") interest Dixon foundlittle
to object to in the Curtin Government's ambitions in the south Pacific and accurately assessed the motivation
behindGovernment policyin the last yearsof the war:
"If left to itself Australian imperialism has little chanceof asserting itself againstAmerica. Hence,
whereas in 1942 Mr. Curtin appealed to America for aid, now, at the end of 1943, he is for a
strengthening of the ties of the British Empire, so as to strengthen Australian capitalism for the
struggleagainstU.S. imperialism. It mustnot be assumed from this that he wants to strengthen the
Empireon the old basis."20
A contribution to the development of a unified, robust and independent Australian capitalismwas not the only
condition for Communist support for Government measures. Sharkey specified another: that such measures
represented the influence of thepeople on national andforeign policy".21 Thusthe Party had, previously opposed
referenda introduced by conservative governments even though they would have served to unify the Australian
politicalsystem (Bruce's first referendum on arbitration is the most notableexample). But in practice the Party's
identification of the CurtinGovernment as the bearerof progressive liberalpolicymade this condition redundant
Sharkeysupplemented Lenin's analysis by explaining that the ALP's liberalcapitalistbehaviour was a resultof its
greaterindependence from any sectional capitalistinterests than the conservative parties could attain. The Labor
Party was therefore better able to "legislate for Australian capitalism as a single entity".22 Although Sharkey
maintained that the Curtin Government was still worthyof support, because of this progressive capitalistrole, he
defmeda spacefor the CPA by arguing the ALP's old role wasnearlyexhausted and that the CPA was leading the
working class in independent actionand stoodready to lead the way to socialism, as the promisedSocialistLabor
Party. The CPA's Handbook/or Tutorsalso stressed this argument23 E. J. Rowe, an AEU Commonwealth
Councillor, explained the connection between the development of Australian capitalism and the inevitable
ascendancy of the Communist Party in the labour movement He linked the rise of an independent Australian
capitalism and its large factories to wartime dilution of skilledtrades and hencethe erosionof reformism's basein
the labour aristocracy. This development occurredbecauseover the past forty years "the Australian bourgeoisie
refused the role of 'hewers of wood, ete,' to the British imperialists and commenced a sturdy development that
19. ibid.~. In Tribune 5/4/45 pS Sharkey paraphrased this statement: "
The Communists support this trend towards an independent Australian national sovereignty, not because we are narrow
nationalists, 'superior racists', chauvinists and flag waving 'patriots' of the imperialist type, but because we are we
Australian patriots who place the welfare ofthis land firsL
"... It is a necessary stage of our nation's growth, for the establishment of an industrialised and self-~oveming nation
increases the strength and importance oftheworking-class and creates the conditions for eventual socialism.'
Also see L. L. Sharkey An Outline History o/the Australian Communist PartyAustralian Communist Party, Sydney December 1944 p30 for a
reference toLenin 1913.
20. R. Dixon "The Federal Labor Conference" Communist Review January 1944 pplSQ-2. The CPA's position on New Guinea was tooppose
"Australian imperialism", and call for an eventual exercise ofnational self-determination by the local people, R. Gibson C01Tl11lU1list Review
April 1943 p37; S. Purdy "Post-War for the Fuzzy-Wuzzy's" Communist Review October 1943 ppI3S-9; E. Laurie "A Democratic Policy for
New Guinea" C01TI11IU1IlSt Review December 1943 ppI65·6; E. A. H. Laurie Australia in New Guinea Current Book Distributors, Sydney
August 1944. L. H. Gould ''New Zealand and Australia" Communist Review February 1944 pp201-2 greeted the Australia-New Zealand
Agreement asafulfllment ofLenin 1913's predictions. He said its provisions concerning defence in the south-west Pacific had "the earmark of
unwarranted grab - not large, perhaps, just commensurate with Australia's position asa 'second-rate imperialist power''' but he nevertheless
endorsed Australia's claim toretain bases on the Pacific islands.
21. L. L. Sharkey Australia Marches Onop. ciL p22
~: ~~7:rrlst Party ofAustralia Handbook/or Tutors 1943 (no date isgiven but ;ntemal evidence indicates itwas published after 1942 and
the Party changed its name to Australian Communist Party atthe beginning of1944) plO; Tribune 2618/43 ppl, 3,7/10/43 p3; J. R. Hughes
"Amalgamation -A Historical Step" Communist Review January 1944 ppI78-9; R. Dixon WeMustGo Forward Australian Communist Party,
Sydney March 1945 pS.
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resulted in Australia becoming a second-class imperialist power".24 Australian capital accumulation now de-
servedthe same attribute that Britishimperialists reservedfor the "sturdy" Englishyeoman.
The Communist Party propagated the "Leninist" perspective on the role of the Labor Party and Australian
capitalism in Australia Marches On extensively during the War. It was invoked to refute the renegade Lloyd
Ross's defence of the ALP,25 to justify support for ratification of the Statute of Westminster26 and the Curtin
Government'sproposedconstitutional changes,27 on the sending of an Australian ambassador to Moscow,28 and
to explaina varietyof the Government'sother actions.29
The Party's line was imbued with the Australia Marches On perspective even where it and Lenin 1913 werenot
mentioned. In November 1942"Dublin" maintained that the mannerof Menzies' declaration of war in 1939 "was
just one of the last splutters of the old system of complete subordination" to Britain. Australia was reaching its
independence and "success will be ensured to the degree that the working-class can effectively influence and
supportprogressive actions by the Curtin Government in foreignaffairs".30 The Party praised the "liberalrefonn
tradition established by the Andrew Fisher Labor Government" and "never failed to recognise the Labor Party's
services in building an economically strong, a more unified and more independent Commonwealth".31 On the
third anniversary of the CurtinGovernment Tribune maintained that "Theperiod witnessed Australia'S quickened
pace towards nationhood".32 During theWar full independence for Australia seemedas perpetually imminent to
the Communist Party (thus prolonging support for the Curtin Government) as the threat to Australia's
independence has seemedfrom the late 1940s to the present The actual point at whichindependence wasreached
was only retrospectively identified, after the Party's line had changed, as the ratification of the Statute of
Westminster. ..
The perspective incorporated in "Lenin's" analysis of the ALP and Australian capitalismprovidedthe framework
for the CPA's other economic ideas. During the War these can be roughly grouped into three categories. 1)The
importance of Australiadeveloping as an independent capitalist state. Such an assessment fitted in well with the
class collaboration the Party encouraged during the War. Unlike the Popular Front, the cross class unity of the
Warperiod went well beyond agreement on international issues to include questions of production and budgetary
policy. 2) A much less polarisedview of the anatomy of Australian capitalism. Againin contrast to the earlier
Popular Front interpretation, the Communist Party's war-time line militated against an economic analysis of
Australian capitalismbasedon anti-monopolism, and againstthe demandfor nationalisation of key industries. 3)
A drift into Ieft-Keynesian economic policy prescriptions. In emphasising the progressiveness of the Curtin
Government's policies, Communists tended to suggest that a Labor Government could overcome some of the
constraints placed on economic policy by the capitalist system, including the inevitability of economic crises.
This aspectof Communist thoughtbecameparticularly pronounced in 1944 and 1945.
"Some Profits Must Be Left To The Capitalists"33
The CPA's policy on the class struggle stood in notable contrast to its earlier attitudes. An editorial in the
Ironworker (laterLaborNews), the newspaper of the Communist dominated FIA, summedup theParty's attitude,
onlya few monthsafter theGermaninvasion of Russia:
"Apparently one of the diseases to which a militanttrade union is subject is the periodical outbreak
of strikes andstoppages whichserveno real purposeand whichonlyweakentheorganisation.
If ••• We have had many examples of an irresponsible attitude towards the union and the belief by
smallsections of the workers that they can take action in spite of, and in defiance of the union, and
thenexpectthe unionto handle thedisputeand finance it"34
At other timesCommunists wouldhave calledsuch an attitude"industrial solidarity". IndeedErnie Thornton, the
union's Communist secretary, had boastedof the extent of the FIA's involvement in industrial actionin the June
1941 Ironworker. But the Party had moved from encouraging virtually any industrial action to hostility to any
24. E. J.Rowe "New Processes Demand New Union Policies" Communist ReviewJanuary 1944 pI88-9.
25.Communist Review July 1942 ~p,1l-12
26.Tribune 2319/42 p3; J.Mason Changing the Constitution" Communist Review October 1942 pp2-3; "S.P." "The Constitution and the Post-
War World" Communist Review December 1942 p4. . .
27. J. Mason "Changing the Constitution" op, cit.; J.Mason "More Power for National Parliament" Communist Review November 1942 p8,
"S.P," "The Constitution and the Post-WarWorld" op. cil;E. F. Hill"The Need for Greater Federal Powers" Communist Review February 1944
. p206; Tribune Hi/9143 pl editorial, 13/1144 p4. ,
28. "Dublin" "Envoy to Moscow: Australia Grows Up" Communist ReviewNovember 1942 pl.
29. e.g. Evatt and Curtin's renunciation of nationafisations during the War "Lenin, Curtin and Evatt Agree on ALP" Communist Review
September 1943 pI18; the signing ofthe Australia-New Zealand Agreement Tribune 27/1/44 pI;and the 1945 bank legislation Tribune 5/4145
pS,29/3/45 pIeditorial.
~O. "Dublin' op,clt,
31. Tribune 2913/45 pl editorial.
32 Tribune 5/10/44 pl editorial. .
33. "Bconomist" "War Finance and the Chitley Budget" Communist Review October 1942 pplO-l2.
34. Ironworker September 1941 p4 editorial See also R. Dixon "The United Front" draft resolution for the CPA's 1943 Congress Communist
Review March 1943 ppI9-20. DIXon advocated "A firm stand for disciplined adjustments ofgrievances, for an end tounauthorised strikes and
stoppages and avoidable absenteeism". Later the Central Committee congratulated the Party for the way this task had been carried out:
"The fight for production and transport ofthe necessary war materials was no easy task, the Party being forced tostruggle not
only against irresponsibility shown by some sections ofworkers, and against Langite and Trotskyite disruption and sabotage,
but also against pm-pricking and provocation by some employers and against Govemment weakness and mistakes,"
Australian Communist Party Report o/the Work0/theCentral Committee fromthe13thto14thNational Congress Sydney June 1945.
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disruption of work whenRussia became one of the gallant allies. By opposing fascism, capitalists and capitalist
governments· were playing a progressive role, which neatly meshed with that of the "liberal" ALP's mission to
establish an independent capitaliststatein Australia.
The Ironworker asserted that the union's (and the Party's) attitude to industrial action did not entail an
abandonment of the class struggle because it defendedtheright to strikeafterconciliation and arbitration had been
exhausted. But when workers advanced the struggle, for exampleby ignoring the Government's abolition of the
1943New Year's Day holiday, the unionchastised them.35 Nevertheless, the thrust of Communist policy during
the War should not lead to an overstatement of the distance between the attitudes of Party members and the
working class in general. In theirsupport for the War Communists weregoing with the mainstream of Australian
opinion, including that inside the working class. This was the case even if that current served the interests of
capital labour and a growing minority of workers went against it in their shop-floor practice by engaging in
industrial action. Moreover Communists still raised criticisms of war-time. working conditions and wage
movements, recognising that employers were taking advantage of the hostility of ALP and Communist union
officials to strikes.36 The Party also raised the demand for equal pay, even if only for "equal work" (but again
opposedindustrialactionto achieveit).37
If Communists were not usually blatantly class collaborationist on the crucial question of struggles actually in
progress, they could have hardly been moreso whenit cameto the maximisation of production. Because winning
the war was the immediate and absolute priority, workers were urgedto increase production as far as possible and
to accept somedeterioration in working conditions if this was necessary. While the Party was still illegal in 1941
or early 1942, its front organisation the Legal Rights Committee issued a leaflet matching the most extreme
jingoismof WorldWar I:
"Communist call to action! MadDogs of JapanMoveCloserto Australia!
"WORKERS! SPEEDUP PRODUCTION -- be readyfor all sacrlflces."38
Dixonexpressedthe samesentiment in a less overtlyracistway:
"The policy of the Communist Party calls for maximum war effort and for unity in support of the
Curtin Government which is so effectively mobilising Australian manpower and resources for the
people's war."39
JackLindsay, the Communist Research Officerof theNSWLabor Council contributed to the war effort by writing
a number of pamphlets on the importance of raising production and advocating an extension of the shop
committee movement to helpincrease output.40
By emphasising the role of the workers in the war the CPAmaintained its orientation to the working class,evenif
its content had changed from supporting at least some level of industrial militancy to advocating that workers
acceptthe goals of capitalistproduction:
"Forproduction, as indeed in every phaseof the war effort the centralpointof our propaganda is the
decisiverole the working classcan andmust play."41
The point was made on all possibleoccasions, including May Day with the slogan"ProduceMore for thePeople's
War".42 The Communist argument for reducing working hours (to above the pre-war level) and for improved
conditions was an unintentional parodyof the laboritecasefor the40 hourweekbeforethe war: such stepswould
increase production.43 Thus theParty welcomed the Government's limitation of working hours to 56 per weekas
a real break-though.44 Stakhanov, the "man.of marble" who gave his name to the super-exploitation of Russian
workers, becamea popular figure in the Communist press during 1942. In August 1942Stakhanov conveniently
died at the front making him totally reliable as a politicalherofrom the viewpoint of the Russianbureaucracy.45
The Communist Party's attitude to the wargenerally led it to tail theLaborGovernment on questions of budgetary
policyas on those of production. The Communist attitude to the CurtinGovernment's first budgetset the tonefor
therest of the War: it was progressive but the Government couldhave done better.46 "Economist" endorsedand
35. Ironworker January 1943 p3. The CPA had welcomed the Govemment's December 1941 decision to cut public holidays to aminimum but
TribUllt: nevertheless went into recess over Christmas-New Year1941-2, Tribune 19/12141.
36. e.g. TribUllt: 25/2142 p4, 14110/43 pl, 16112143 pl editorial; R. Dixon "The United Front" op. cit. ppl9-20.
37. L. Finch "CPA Women and the Waf' Hecate 10(1) 1984 p23; TribUllt: 2111142 pI,1112142 p4.
38. in'Australian Communist Party Uterature 1927-40' Mitchell Library.
39. R. Dixon "The United Front and Labor Reactionaries" Communist Review June 1943.
40. J. Lindsay Th8Battlefor Production Labor Council ofNSW p2, also see his Factory Frontand Women in the Workplace, on the role of
shop committees inincreasing production see TribUllt: 1113142 pl,2512142 p2.
41.Communist ReviewMay 1942 p7.
42.TribUllt: 27/4144 p3, also see aseries ofarticles"Struggle for Production" starting inTribune 2618/42 p4. As late asApril 1945 the Party
boasted "Mines Output High Where ACP Strongest" Tribune 10/4/45 p4.
43. Undsay TheBattle op. cit. ppS-7, TribUllt: 413/42 pI, 1411l1411pl, "Hours ofLabor and Production" Communist Review November 1942
pp4-5. .
<Wo TribUllt: 4111/42 p4
45. "Stakhanov - Organiser ofSocialist Labor" Communist ReviewJune 1942 pp8-10, "Staknanovism - On the CoIlective Fann Fields"
Communist ReviewAugust 1942 pp8-9, Tribune 1619/42 p3, 27/1143 p4.
46. Tribune 7/11/41 pI. The Party accepted the Government's income tax measures, but argued that the rich should make a greater
contribution, Tribune 7/1142 p3, 412142 p2, 17/2144 pl;J.B. Miles "A Programme for the People" Communist Review October 1943 p132.
For criticism ofthe level ofwar-time profits and the cost-fluS system ofwar contracting see e.g, J. Undsay Tribune 2112143 p4•• Reporting a
Conference ofFederal union in February 1942, Tribune 812142 pl said "The general features ofthe [Government's] economic plan will no
doubt be accepted" and emphasised the importance ofGovernment consultation with the unions. The plan and its most important feature, wage
pegging, was accepted by the unions and the CPA.
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accurately assessed Chilley's approach to war finance as attempting to reduce civilian consumption in order to
redirect resources to the war effort "Economist" was particularly solicitous of the interests of capitalists, using
arguments employed todayby conservative opponents of high taxation:
"Some further taxation and compulsory loans may be neededlater, but they mustnot be so heavyas
to reduce the incentive to workto the utmost."47
Since war effort required the supportof capitalists they had to be left someprofits. He also favoured betterwages
for the lower paid and improved working conditions in general.
Thelogic of the CPA's supportof the Government'seconomic policies while theoutcome of the war remained in
doubt was apparentin an anonymous contribution to Communist Review. The authorargued against "Junius" that
workers should not be compensated with pay rises for higher prices due to more expensive imports, higher
taxation and increased costs of production. If the basic wagewas to rise then the totalwagebill shouldbe keptin
check by increasing taxation on workers withoutdependents, in order to avoid a drain on resources going to the
war.48 "Junius" had argued that inflation was due to "the general crisis of capitalism expressing itself in the
currentcapitalist State finance" rather than to higher wages. This was one of the few times during the war, after
1941, that the general crisis was mentioned, although "Junius" did not explain the mechanics of its relationship
withinflation. He argued that price control, greater taxation of the wealthy and increased public subscriptions to
war loans were the solution to current fmancial problems. In reply to his anonymous critic "Junius" said that,
whereverprice rises came from, workers should be compensated for them, commenting that "Starvation willnot
be sweeter becauseit is not causedby profiteering".49 The anonymous critic was allowed to restate his case in a
furtherarticle in July 1943,an indication that whilehis positionwas not that of the Party the editors believed that
it deserved a sympathetic hearing amongst Communists .- Communist Review was far from being an open
forum.50 An article by S. Purdy attempted to defuse the issue by stressing that war fmance through "The method
of loans is by far the best method for the working class and middle class", compared with the alternatives of
taxation and bank credit.51 From October 1943 the Party ambiguously called for increasedwages "as far as the
.war allows" and arguedfor a relaxation of wage-pegging to permitan increase in the level of the lowestwages.52
This was a response to the improved military situation and the rising level of industrial struggle. Communists
argued for the "relaxation", "modification", "liberalisation", and "easing" of the wage pegging regulations. The
trade unions, the Party held, were behaving correctly because "Despite the drastic effect of the wage-pegging
regulations, the unions haveneverdemanded that theyshouldbe abandoned".53 Only whentheWar endeddidthe
Party and its senior tradeunionofficials call for the abolition of wagepegging, but this was also a consequence of
the change in line inaugurated at theParty's August 1945Congress.54
Apart from contributing to the Cortin Government's economic policies by trying to restrain working class
militancy, Communists assistedthe war effort by campaigning actively and extensively for the various war loan
programs. Appeals for the "Austerity", "Liberty" and "Victory" loans were made on public occasions, such as
"Russia Day" in November 1942 (a date formerly celebrated as the anniversary of a revolution), and by the
Communistpress.55 Cartoon 22 was suchan appeal. We have already seen that S. Purdy regardedthe voluntary
reductionof workers' wages through loans as the mostdesirable means of war fmance;56 The Partynow usedthe
experience of factory gate meetings, gained through the organisation of workers in struggle before the War, to
solicit for war bonds.57 Norman Jeffrey, a foundermemberof the Party, became the Secretary-Organiser of the
Industrial Loan PaneL58
The Anatomy of Australian Capitalism During the War
National unity was the keynoteof Communist analysis and propaganda during the "Great Patriotic War Against
Fascism". For the CPA the CurtinGovernment expressed that unity by representing the interests of Australian
capitalismand, for the time being, thoseof the working class. UnlikeWorldWar I, thepresentconflictwas
"a war in which rich and poor alike, capitalist and worker, farmer and small business man, are
fightingfor a common aimin thedefeatof fascism."59
Thus the Communist Party was prepared to supportwhat it acknowledged to be a capitalistgovernment. In fact
whileLenin was in vogueduring the 1940s the ALP in its efforts to reformAustralian capitalism was regarded as
a political proxy for the enlightened bourgeoisie, although the UAP and Country Parties were the parties of the
47. "ECOnomist" "War Finance and the ~ifley BUdget" op.cit.pplQ.l2.
48. "Inflation - Some Criticisms" Communist Review April 1943 p~3-6.
49. "Junius" "Inflation" Communist Review February 1943 pplQ.l, 'Junius" "Inflation - AReply" Communist ReviewMay 19431'63.
50. "A Further Reply to'Junius'" Communist Review July 1943 p92.
51. S.Purdy "War Finance" Communist ReviewMay 1943 ppSl-2
52. TribllM 1411lY43 pi; Communist Party ofAustralia Federal Election Policy of the Communist Partyof Au.rtralia Melboume 1943; J.B.
Miles "A Programme for the People" Communist Review October 1943 p131.
53. T. Wright "Wage Pegging Problems" Communist Review February 1945 p425. Wright was an official ofthe Sheetmetal Workers Union
and a member of the Party's Central Committee. forcalls for relaxation ofthe regulations see Tribune 512145 p7. 19/6145 p3; J.McPhillips
"Economic Demands ofthe ACTU" Communist Review August 1945 pS73.
54.TribllM 3lYS/45 p7.
55. See, for example. TribllM 18/11142 p3, 7/10/43 p3.1411lY43 pi,2119/44 pS.
56. S.Purdy "War Finance op, cit.
57. Finch "Women and the Wa-l' op. cit, p16.
58.Tribune 1613/44 p4.
59. R. Dixon "What Kind ofNational Government" Communist Review June 1942.
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capitalist class60• To avoid frightening off the capitalist class or overstepping thelimits of the current stage of its
strategy for achieving socialism, the Communist Party opposed calls for nationalisations until 1944.61 In 1942
and early 1943 Communists alluded to the capitalist class as essentially homogeneous and stressed the capitalist
nature of the Government. Beforethe publication of Australia Marches On Dixon had said that the existence of
theLaborGovernment was of serious concern to the ruling classes "eventhough Labor has not done anything to
endanger the capitalist system". He did not distinguish amongst sections of the "ruling classes" .62 In Australia
Marches On Sharkey maintained that the ALP was a moreeffective partyof capitalist government because of its
greater independence of sectional bourgeois interests. While he referred to "big capital", Sharkey did not deal
withdifferences insidethe capitalist class. Moreover the terms "bigcapital" and"big business" are ambiguous as
they can embrace the capitalist class as a whole (as opposed to the petty bourgeoisie) or just a section of the
bourgeoisie. At this stage thosehostile to the CurtinGovernment were characterised by their fascist sympathies,
conspiracies and insignificance compared with the "people" rather than as "monopolists". Thus Menzies and
Fadden represented "the most reactionary leaders of big business -- those who are most closely aligned to
fascism". LenFox's Australia's Guilty Men and Their Conspiracy Against the Labor Government wasan expose
of prominent conservative politicians. It mademuchof theirsupposed fascist sympathies and associations, butnot
theirconnections withvarious monopollsts.es Thepamphlet thuscontrasted withFox's earlierMonopoly andlater
Wealthy Men which both focused on the relationships amongst leading monopolists as well as their connections
withparticular politicians.64
In the same way as Communist policy on wages became a little more aggressive, when the military situation
eased, the Partyagainraiseddemands for nationalisation. It alsocameto placemore stresson divisions inside the
capitalist class. Where previously the Party had wanted an alliance with almost the entirecapitalist class, now it
looked to progressive sections of it.
A revival of a more polarised view of Australian societyand the ruling classwas apparent as early as December
1943, when thepolicies of the rightwing of the Victorian ALP wereidentified with"theinterests of the Victorian
Monopolists".65 Later, E. F. Hill contrasted the "reactionary capitalistic groupings" with the "national
bourgeoisie", represented by the Government.66 For a while Sharkey straddled the old and new positions. At
beginning of an article in June 1944he attributed opposition to national unityand the referendum proposals to the
capitalist class as a whole. At end he said that Menzies and company actedin the interests of monopolists and
black-marketeers.e? At this timethe ACPalso began to call for thenationalisation of the big monopolies afterthe
war. It denounced them for opposing the referendum and emphasised their links with overseas capital.68
Moreover, according to the June 1944 Party Programme nationalisations were in the interests of a "substantial
section of thecapitalist class".69 Dixon justifiedtheParty's new demands in thefollowing terms:
"Atan earlierstagein thewar, theraising of postwarissues was dangerous to the wareffort, as they
are highly controversial and could have had the effect of dividing the nation when unity was vi-
tal".70
Now that killing the conscripted workers of other countries was no longer vital to Australia's and Russia's
interests, unitycouldbe moderated and thePartycouldaffordto see andpresshomedivisions in society andin the
capitalist class. Reactionary policies couldagainbe attributed to the interests of the big monopolies, ratherthanto
shortsighteddelusions, purelyideological sympathy for fascism or an ambiguous "big business" which hadfewer
implications of divisions in thecapitalist class. Nevertheless E. W. Campbell in a review of The Rich Get Richer
still criticised BrianFitzpatrick for arguing that monopoly led to fascism. This position had been the orthodoxy
for mostof the 1930s and was again orthodox later in the 1940s. In adisplay of uncharacteristic disinterestedrress
Campbell maintained that
"Monopoly is not, therefore, an absolute evil; it has its progressive as wellas its retrograde side."71
During the secondhalf of 1944 the Communist led Miners Federation took an increasingly aggressive stance on
the organisation of the coal industry. Not only the change in the Party's attitude to post-war questions, but also
mounting rank andfile militancy must havebeenconsiderations in thisand later developments in the union. The
Federation's President H. Wells, called for Government. control'of the mines, though not nationalisation, in
60. see e.g, Sharkey Australia Marches On op, clt, p26; Tribune 7/10/43 p3 referred to Lenin 1913 in its explanation that the conservative
parties were those ofthe capitalist class, while the ALP tried to reform capitalism inthe interests ofprivileged workers and the middles class.
The CPArepresented the real interests ofthe working and middle classes.
61.Tribune 13/5/42 pIwhere Uoyd Ross's calls for nationalisation were diversions from the campaign for a'second front, 23112143 pI.
62. R. Dixon "The LaborGovernment" Communist ReviewMay 1942 J?5. .
63. The model for Fox's pamphlet was "Cato" (Michael Foot) GUIlty Men Gollancz, London 1940. Written with th encoura§ement of
Beaverbrook, Foot's employer, the British pamphlet attacked Tory appeasers and Labour pacifists, C. Bambery "The People's War' Socialist
Worker ReviewMay 1985 pp2Q-I.
64. R. Dixon "The Labor Government" op,cit, Sharkey Australia Marches On op. elt, pp22-3,quotingJ. B. Miles. Later L. Fox continued the
conspiracy theory tradition ofthe Money Power in his Australia's Guilty Men and Their Conspiracy Against the Labor Government State
LaborPa~, Sydney Apri11943. 50,000 copies ofthe pamphlet were sold toFebruary 1945, Tribune 1512145 p2.
65. "M. C. I "RightWing Domination ofVictorian Labor Party" Communist Review December 1943 p173.
66.Eo F. Hill"The Labor Party inVictoria and the 1944 Conference" Communist Review May 1944 p245.
67. L. L. Sharkey "Which Class Champions Democracy" Communist ReviewJune 1944 pp257-9. .
68. e.g.Tribune 15/6'44 p7, 2216'44 pl, 29/6'44 1'3, 617/44pi., .
69. Australian Communist Party PrograftIIM oft'h4 Australian Communist PartySydney 1944.
70. R. Dixon "Labor's Policy for Private Enterprise" Communist Review September 1944 p315.
71. E. R.Campbell Communist Review September 1944 pp329-30.
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October 1944 but by early 1945 the union's leadershipwas demanding nationalisation of the industry.72 Sharkey
and Campbell's pamphlet The Story of Government Enterprise in Australia provided an extensive Communist
Party case for widespread nationalisations, while the Party unequivocally, if late in the piece, began to endorse
rank and file workers' demands for nationalisations and socialism,whichhad found greater expressionin theALP
than the ACP during 1943 and 1944.73
Despite this somewhatmore aggressive stand (withDixon expressingconcern that the Governmentwouldnot take
the steps necessary to control the monopolies) the Party continued to affirm the validity of concessions to the
"national bourgeoisie". The CPA rejected the view "that socialism must be the immediate post-war aim of the
CommunistParty",74 Communists critically supported the Government's bankinglegislation becauseit would go
some way towards curbing the power of the monopolists, even if it did not go far enough,75 In the lead up to the
Party's August 1945 Congress, then, it was already moving back to a view of the class anatomy of Australian
capitalism more appropriate to its Popular Front strategy of late 1930s than to that of 1941-44. The Communist
conceptionof the nature of capitalist crisis was much more moderate and closer to its reformist position from the
mid-1960s, than it was even to its relatively uncritical attitude to Keynesianideas of the late PopularFront period,
until the Congress when J. B. Miles, in unconscious homage to Gertrude Stein, proclaimed that "Capitalism
remains capitalism, monopoly remains monopoly"•
Full Employment
Up until the start of the "GreatPatriotic War' the Communist Party remained wedded to the view that capitalism
was either in the midst or on the.verge of an economic crisis,76 Subsequently discussion of the inevitability of
capitalist crises was largely confined to abstract expositionsof marxist economics,77 From 1943 the Communist
Partyjustified support for the Government's referendum and some other proposalson the grounds that they werea
means for avoiding a post-war economic crisis. This position was part of the Party's accommodation to the
politics of the CurtinGovernment as a result of its desire for national unity and the lure of respectability.78
The Australian Party never moderated its policies to the extent that the Communist Party of the United States
(CPUSA),under Earl Browder, did. The American Communistsmoved to liquidate their Party and renouncedthe
class struggle in anticipation of the class peace of the war continuing into a postwar period of economic
development The forces at work on the AmericanParty were more extreme than those operating in Australia.
The Roosevelt Government,which the CPUSA was constrained to supportbecauseit was an ally of Russia, wasto
the right of the Curtin Government. The effects of the sudden rush of respectability to the brains of American
Communists must have been more dramatic than in Australia,given the more anti-Communist prewar atmosphere.
Russia and the world's CommunistParties must also have been very much more anxious about US involvement in
the War, to take pressure off the Russian front, than they were about Australian or even British commitments.
Australia's preoccupation with the Pacific theatre and Britain's with the European were established policies over
which Communists could hope to have very little influence. Despite these differences, the Australian Party
72. H. Wens "Program for Mining Industry" C011ll1lU1list ReviewOctober and November 1944 pp339, 358; Tribune 2913/45 p3.
73. L. L. Sharkey and E. W. Campbell Th8 StorycfGovemmentEnterprise in Australia Australian Communist Party, Sydney January 1945.
For reviews ofthe pamphlet see e.g. LaborNewsMarch 1945 pS, Tribune 7/8/45 p4. According toTribune lOnt45 p6 40 400 copies had been
sold to date. In June 1944 J. R. Hughes had acknowledged the existence of rank and tile support for socialism, without endorsing any
immediate steps in that direction, such as nationalisations, "Amalgamation A Historic Step" op. cit, p179. For Communist attitudes to
nationalisations in 1945, before the end of the war, see e.g. Tribune 2212145 pl, 29/3/45 p3, 5/4145 pS, 31ni45 p3; E. J. Hansen ''TheQueensland Trade Union Congress" Communis: RllYiew February 1945; E. W. Campbell "The Australian People v. the Bank Tsars" Communist
Review May 1945 p495; N. Bonney a favourable review of B. Fitzpatrick's Public Enterprise Does Pay C011ll1lU1list ReviewMay 1945
pp51Q.l.:
74. R. Dixon Report tothe Central Committee meeting ofFebruary 1945 Communist Party ofAustralia Papers National Library ofA.ustralia
MS3000 Box2 Folderl, atitsMay meeting the Central Committee included the efforts ofprogressive employers amongst the forces available to
support national planning Tribune 31/5/45 p3. Contrast Dixon's ~sition in"Post War Policr and the National Congress" Communis: Review
July 1945 p541 where he outlined the main division inthe capitalist class C'not just one reacuonary bloc") between the reactionary element,led
byMenzies, and the progressive section which had supported the referendum toL. L. Sharkey's position a year before. Sharkey had argued
that the whole capitalist class had o~posed the referendum "Which Class Champions Democracy?' op. clt, Dixon reported on the traitorous
role of France's "200 rich families" ID Tribune 7/8/45, the last mention ofthat particular gene pool I have located inCommunist discussions
unti11948. '
75. Tribune R. Dixon 2013/4~. Also see Sharkey's less critical response Tribune 15/3145 pl. Australian Communist Party FactsAbout
Banking Re/ormSydney 1945 argued that abanking dictatorship, like that durin~ the deJ.ll'ession, would bebroken bythe new legislation.
76. For example, the Party pu Iished anedition ofE. Varga CJuinges in CapiJallSm Durl1lg the War in 1941 Communist Party ofAustralia,
Sydney 1941, while itwas stillunderground.,
77. "Junius" in"Inflation" op, cit, plO argued that inflation was due tothe general crisis incontrast toS. Purdy in"'Private Enterp,rise' and
'Incentives'" C011ll1lU1list ReviewAugust 1943 pl07, who maintained that the war had enabled capitalism toavoid economic crisis or 'astate of
chronic economic depression". Three of the discussions of marxist economics were reprints of overseas publications: E. Burns 'What Is
Marxism? Intemational Bookshop, Melbourne 1945, first published Britain 1939; M. Dobb Economics 0/Private Enterprise: An Introductory
Outline Current Book Distributors, Sydney 1944, first published Britain 1943; A Leontiev Political Economy: A BegiMers Course Current
Book Distributors, Sydney 19451, first published inEnglish Moscow 1935. Australian publications were the Communist Party ofAustralia's
Handbook/or Tutors op. cit, 1943, which also referred toVarga's "Changes in Capitalist Policy During the War' (sic.); Communist Party of
Australia An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy: Ten Lectures International Bookshop, Melbourne 4th edition 19401; Communist
Party of Australia The Capitalist Social SystemIntemational Bookshop, Melboume 1942 (300 in first,1941, printing, 5,000 in the second).
None ofthese publications discussed economic crisis inthe context ofcurrent circumstances, but only asan inevitable result ofthe mechanisms
ofcapitalist accumulation: for Dobb the tendency ofthe rate ofprofit tofall, for Burns and the Handbook radical underconsumptionism, for
Leontiev both, with the emphasis on the latter.
78. see Petersen 'The LaborMovement and World War 11" text ofalecture delivered on 7/12180 inSydney, pS,copy held by E.Petersen and E.
Upward's novel TheRottenElements Quartet, London 1979 for a fictionalised account ofsimilar respectability amongst the leadership ofthe
British Communist Party.
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followed a few steps along the path taken by the CPUSA,79 As the end of the war approached the ACP not only
contemplateda post-war alliance with sections of the capitalist class, but its attitude to the ALP also softened and,
according to Davidson,Communists came to believe in a peaceful transition to socialism.80 The ACP's responses
to Curtin's death and Chifley's accessionepitomised the Party's willingness, for the time-being, to acknowledge
not only the ALP's leadershipof progressiveforces in Australia but also the effectivenessof Labor's strategy:
"Victory, Progress Are Curtin's Memorials."81
".•• in his firstpublic address as Prime Minister, Mr. Joseph BenedictChifley set for the Australian
workers and their middle-class and farmer allies the only possible course for victory in war and
peace."82
Initially the ACP's new attitude to the ALP involved another request to be allowed to afftliate to the Labor Party.
Communists argued that such a move would consummate the advance towards working class unity already
expressed in the amalgamation of the CPA and the State Labor Party at the beginningof 1944. After the failureof
the afflliation move the ACP sometimes talked uncritically about "Labor's Socialist objective". This was a step
back from the analysis in Australia Marches On, with its recognition that Labor's objective did not make the ALP
socialist, and conflated the re-election of the Curtin Government, even alongside ACP Members of Parliament,
with the transition to socialism.83 The ACPalso adopted an uncritical attitude to the Government's post-war
economicpolicies, outlinedin most detail in the White Paper on Full Employment.
The "powers" referendum was the first major issue in relation to which the Communist Party demonstrated its
reformist attitude to economic policy after the war. H. B. Chandler, a former leader of the State Labor Party said
of the powers sought in the 1944referendum:
"If they are not granted it would mean retrogression, and a return to the doles and depressions,
unemploymentand unrest that characterisedthe prewar days."84
Other Communist writers were even more explicit, reproducing the arguments of ALP leaders that the powers
were needed to prevent anotherdepression: •
"Themain issue at stake, as stated by Acting Prime Minister Forde, is whether the Commonwealth
is to have the power to prevent post-war unemploymentand depression."8S
Later Tom Wright suggested that the "laws of capitalism"would only be manifestedin a depression after the War
under a Menzies-FaddenGovernment A Labor governmentaided by international agreements might be able to
avoid such an outeome.86
Labor News went further than the official Communistpress. Before the 1943 elections it predicted
"From then we can go forward to win the war and plan the New Order that will win the peace, if the
Australianelectors sweep the Curtin Governmentback to office."87
The PIA's paper wished success to the referendum "To ensure jobs for all" and "To ensure decent wages".88 FIA
secretary Thornton, it should be noted, became Browder's most prominent admirer in Australia.89 When in
August 1945 the ACP started its turn back to support for militant class struggle and greater criticism of the
79. for reports on developments in the CPUSA in Tribune see 2011/43 p3, 2412143 p3, 1/6143 p2 and especially L. L. Sharkey "How US;
Australian Commuilist Tasks Differ" 913/43 p3. .
80. A. Davidson TM Communist PartyofAustralia: A ShortHistory Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1969 pp98-9.
81.Tribune lOnJ4S pi.
82.Tribune 17nJ4S pi my emphasis. .
83.Tribune 30111/44 p3: ' .
"The Australian people's rising prospects of a rapid advance towards socialism in the post-war, and the Australian
. Communist Party's determination tohelp lead the people toLabor's Socialist objective were stressed by Party leaders at last
weekend's plenary session ofthe Party's Central Committee." ,
Also see L. L. Sharkey and E.W. Campbell The Storyof Government Enterprise in Australia op. cit. p76 and T. Wright "Arbitration and the
Living Standard" op, cit. p399, which called for the development ofthe Labor Government in the direction ofa People's Government. In
Tribune S/4/4S pSL. L. Sharkey propounded a position more inthe spirit ofAustralia Marches On: "The Labor Party builds anindependent
and democratic Australia, the role of the Communist Party istocarry this work further and establish a democratic Socialist Australia." The
ACP distinguished between the progressive forces inside the Labor Party and the reactionaries especially inthe Victorian ALP, see e.g, "L. J.
S." "Victorian Labor Party Conference" Communist ReviewOctober 1942 pp9-10; R. Dixon "The United Front and Labor Reactionaries"
Communist Review June 1943; "M C." "Right Wing Domination of Victorian Labor Party" Communist Review December 1943 p173; and
especially E. F.Hill "The LaborParty inVictoria and the 1944 Conference" Communist ReviewMay 1944 pp242-S:
'Upon men like Pollard, Dedman, Monk, Crofts, Cain, Slater and many others, who express the real tradition ofthe Labor
Party, rests a great responsibility to take the initiative inending the position in Victoria. They are people who occupy in
Victoria the position occupied inthe Federal sphere by the Curtin Government - a Government, itistrue serving the interests
ofthe national bourgeoisie, but, inpresent circumstances also the interests ofthe working class."
84. H. B. Chandler "Extend Federal Powers - And the United Front" Communist Review May 1944 p2S3. Also see, e.g, E. J. Rowe
"Engineers Must Vote 'Yes'" AmalgamatedEngineering Union Journal June 1944 p7.
8S.Tribune lS/6144 p7. As early asTribune 2011144 p4 J. Lindsay had said that the referendum could prevent "great and needless hardship"
after the War. Also see Tribune 1/6144 p8 (Lindsayagain); L. Fox Vot, Yes For Homes and JOM 1944; R. Dixon "The Case for the
Referendum" Communist R,view August 1944 pp297-9; and R. Dixon "Labor's Policy 'for Private Enterprise" Communist ReviewSeptember
1944 p31S: "Full employment and higher standards are possible and, therefore, should be the aim ofnational policy."
86. T. Wright "Arbitration and the Living Standard" Communist ReviewJanuary 1945 p399.
rI. LaborNewsJuly 1943 pl.
88.LaborNewsAugust 1944 pi.
89. for Thornton athis most Browderist see LaborNewsJune 1945 p2:
"Ibelieve that the Labor movement should aim in the post-war years at the preservation and extension of the maximum
.amount of national unity, a minimum of friction within our country, and the widest co-operation of all sections of the
Australian people to make Australia a free, democratic, prosperous nation, with growing mdustrialisation, an increasing
population, full employment and a rising standard ofliving."
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Government's domestic policies, Thornton bore the sins of the Party. In the meantime he reproduced the
arguments of reformistunderconsumptionism:
"The real message Mr. Thornton is putting again and again to the people in his forceful manner, is
that only by our united efforts can we achieve prosperity, and that only by giving workers a fair
share of increasing productivity can employers build up a home market that will win them real
prosperity."90
The Communist Party's program of June 1944, revised in January 1945, reaffirmed that the final solution to the
problems of capitalism was socialism. It went beyond the Curtin Government's proposals to some extent,
advocating nationalisations for example, but still expressed a reformistlogic: the problems of capitalism could be
overcomeon the road to socialism.91 The measures proposed in the Programme are very much in line with the
left-Keynesian strategy advocated by, amongst others. Joan Robinson and inside the BritishLabourParty during
the later 1940s. That current was much weaker inside the ALP and was probably best represented between late
1944 and August 1945in Australia by the ACP,even if the Party did not acknowledge it. ThusL. L. Sharkey and
E. W. Campbellarguedthat
"State capitalism or Nationalisation is a transitional form preparing the way for a socialised
economy." .
They believed that "a progressive labor government" (sic) acting in the spirit of the Teheran Conference could
secure a prosperous Australia by undertaking nationalisations and other essential economic and financial
measures.92
Concern over the well-being of the Australian economy and acceptance of arguments usually associated with the
ALP and even its right wing extended to Communist assessments of immigration and international monetary
policy. Dixon argued that immigration policywas a part of planning for full employment and therefore calledfor
the imposition of a quota system to ensure that the number of migrants accorded with economic conditions in
Australia moreover, "Mass immigration from low-wage countries in particular must be avoided."93 The Bretton
Woods Agreement was acceptable to the Communist Party, until early 1946. For E. F. Hill the Bretton Woods
MonetaryConference was "an integralpart of the post-warsettlement and stabilityvisualised at Teheran and the
Crimea".94 ' .
Tribune held that the 1945banking legislation "clips the talons of overseas fmancial dictators" and couldprevent
inflation. It was in the praiseworthy "liberal reformtradition established by Andrew Fisher".95 Communist criti-
cisms of the Beveridge Plan and the Government's post-war economic policies were made in essentially left-
Keynesian terms. The ACP's main criticism was that the state should have a much expanded role, through
additional nationalisations so that the Government's plans could be really effective in preventing a new
depression.96 The Party endorsedthe 1945banking legislation on the basis of theGovernment's Keynesian logic.
as necessary so that full employment, prosperity and currency stability could be achieved.97 E. W. Campbell
welcomed the Government'sWhite Paper on Full Employment in the following terms:
"TheCommunist Party will certainlygive full supportto theproposals outlinedin the WhitePaper.
These are substantially in accordwith its own policy."9S
He thought that full employment, better living standards and shorter working hours could be achieved, in classic
Keynesian terms, "by Government accepting responsibility for stimulating spending on goods and services to the
extent necessary". Government direction of the activities of the monopolies was a necessary (left-Keynesian)
supplement to such a policy.99 On the eve of the ACP's Congress and its changeof line, Dixon rejectedthe idea
that "the post-war world will be marked by unemployment, the struggle of workers and soldiers for jobs. and
economic crisis••• ".100 Cartoon 23 shows the ACP promising that its policies could achieve full employment
after the War, beforethe introduction of socialism.
90.tAbor NewsDeCember 1944 pl, for similar concern about the expansion ofthe Australian market see Dixon Tribune 27nJ44p6•.
91. Australian Communist Party Programme of theAustralian Communist PartySydney 1945 pp4-5. Also see Tribune 3115/45 p3.
92. L. L. Sharkey and E. W. Campbell Government Enterprise in Australia Australian Communist Party, January 1945 pp72,77-8, the
lengthiest Australian left-Keynesian publication atleast until the 1950s, and Australian Communist Party Victorian State Executive Communist
Plan/or Victory and Peace Melbourne 1945. At the Teheran Conference Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin demonstrated aspirit ofco-operation.
which the Communist movement hoped had inaugurated a new period ofinternational peace and economic prosperity, by starting tocarve the
world up into spheres their own states' influence, see F. ClaudinTheCommunist Movement Penguin, Harmondsworth 1975 pp376, 4Q6.7.
93. R. Dixon Immigration and the 'White"Australia PolicyCurrent Book Distributors, Sydney 1945 pp3-4. Despite Dixon's opposition to the
White Australia {'CHcy his key argument about "low-wage wage countries" was the same as that oftraditional labour movement racism - most
low-wage countries happened tobe non-white. For a discussion ofthis justification for racism see V. Burgmann ''Writing Racism Out of
History" Arena 67, 1944 pp 78-92. Dixon's opposition to racism condemned the treatment ofthe Chinese on the goldfields, but condones
opposition to "Kanaka" labour, which resulted in the forced expulsion ofMelanesians, rather than their organisation into the mainstream ofthe
labourmovemenL On the ACP's immigration policy also see Tribune 7/6145 p6, 1217/45 p3, 1418145 p3.
94. B.F. Hill "Victorian Labor Party Easter Conference, 1945" Cbmmullist Review May 1945 p493.
95.Tribune 2913/45 pl, .
96. e.g. Tribune 16111/44 p2 on the Beveridge Plan, Communist Party ofAustralia Papers op. cit, Box2 Folder! for pertinent comments atthe
February 1945 Central Committee plenum, R. Dixon We Must Go Forward Australian Communist Party, Sydney March 1945 p7. Dixon
maintained that "By a combination ofefforts by Government, progressive employers, workers, farmers and middle classes - there can be
national planning for full employment," Tribune 31/5/45 p3. .
97. Australian Communist Party FactsAboutBanking Reform op. ciL
98. E.W.CampbeU "Government White Paper on Fun Employment" Communist Review JUly 1945 p549.
99.Tribune 7/6145 p3.
100. R.Dixon "Post WarPolicy and the National Congress" Communist Review July 1945 ppS4Q..l.
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The rising pressure of industrialstruggleon the Party, doubtsabout the thrustof Evatt's foreign policy,Browder's
excommunication from the international Communist movement and the imminence of the War's end led to the
change of line at the August 1945 Congress.101 It cut short the CommunistParty's flirtation with reformist and
especially Keynesian underconsumptionist analysis which had started shortly before the War, cooled for a few
years and then reignited during the first half of 1945. The relationship was rekindled during the 1960s when the
Party began to break with Stalinism. The early period of CommunistKeynesianisrn, althoughprompted by factors
that becamerelevant again later, only left an ephemeral trace after the line changed, in some Railroad articles of
late 1946by Gordon Crane,102
101. For increasing Communist criticism ofthe Government's foreign policy see Tribune 31/5/45 p3, 5/6145 pI, 1416145 p2 and R. Dixon "San
Francisco Conference" Communist Review June 1945 pS16. For Browder's fall see Tribune 14/8/45 pl and L. L. Sharkey "The American
Communists and Our Congress" Communist ReviewAugust 1945 pp567-70.
102.Railroad2617/46 p2, 23/8/.46 p2, 4/10146 p2. Crane's obituary inAdvocate 15/2149 p4 did not mention his Party membership, so he may
not have been an ACP member atthis stage. Inany case "Since his discharge from the Anny, ill-health prevented him from taking an active
part inthe Labour and.Trade Union Movement."
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1945-47: "The Leaders of the ALP are Today Vacillating" 1
In some ways the 1945Congress of the ACP was an expressionof the Party's later war-time policies, including
the affirmation of an "Australian way to socialism". The Congress took place a few days before the War ended
and itheld to the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism.2 Moreover the Party continued to support an
alliance with sectionsof capital until its left turn of 1947-8. But even beforethe Congress the Party had started to
move awayfrom its most conciliatory war-timeposition. Not only had the ACPreturnedto a more forthright anti-
monopolism, with concomitant demands for nationalisations, and called for the relaxation of wage-pegging;
Communists had also become increasingly critical of the Government's foreign policies, notably Evatt's
oppositionto the veto at the UnitedNations.
It is most useful to see the Congress as the end of the CommunistParty's period of war-time class collaboration
and the opening of a new period. By rejecting "Browderism" the Party explicitly rejected the post-war
implications of its own war-time policies and implicitlycriticisedthe thrustof its economic thinking during 1945.
The Congress thus saw the Party reverse its position on the Government's Keynesian proposals and return to its
earlier belief in the inevitabilityof an economiccrisis.3 Neglected for several years, the idea of economic crisis
again became a matter for immediate concern, even if Communists still believed, for the time being, that
Governmentpolicies could be effectivein alleviating its worsteffects. Finally, as far as the Party was concerned,
the Congress marked the end of the class truce of the war period. The most tangible short-term consequence was
the demand that wage-pegging be abandoned.s Miles spelt out the widerimplications:
"Government, Executive and Court delays will not be overcome only by resolutions and
deputations. No other pressurecan equal job meetings, including stop-work meetings, trade union
rallies and demonstrations and, ifnecessary, well-organised strikes."5
Henceforth the Party's conception of the class-struggle underwent a growing radicalisation. Moving from a
defensive conception, which lagged behind the tempo of rank and file militancy during the second half of 1945
and 1946, through a more aggressive view that workers were on the offensive and should win improvements in
wages and conditions through industrialaction while economic conditions were favourable, to the positionof the
Comintern-encouraged left turn which saw the ACP displacing the ALP as the mainparty of the working classby
meansof industrialstruggles. If a "wrong decision" was made to drop the class collaboration or "moderation" of
the war period it was made around the time of the 1945 Congress rather than in 1946 as Davidson indlcates.e
Early in 1946,however, the Party became much morecriticalof the Government's foreignpolicy.
The transitional natureof theperiod 1945to 1947is reflectedin contemporary interpretations of Lenin 1913. As
in Australia Marches On "Lenin's" analysis was still trotted out to demonstrate that the ALP was a progressive
"LiberalLabor" rather than a "SocialistLabor Party".7 The most interesting use of the article was in references to
divisions inside the Labor Party over its historicalrole as proponentof Australian independence. During the War
the ACP had had no doubts of the progressiveness of the ALP's FederalParliamentary leadershipand thePartyas
a whole. The Chifley Government's foreign and industrialpolicies, however, led to increasing concernthat the
right wing of the Labor Party, opposed to the old progressiverole, was gaining in influence. In December 1945
Sharkeynoted that
"The AustralianLabor Party is still fulfilling its Liberal tasks, whilewithin it there is also a vicious
right wing... "8
The situationdeteriorated duringthe ensuingsix months:
"The leaders of the ALP today are vacillating between the traditional liberal progressivepolicy of
the ALP and the imperialismand anti-Sovietism of Bevin. Their current policy is a weird mixture
ofboth."9
Whileholding on to the interpretation of Lenin 1913expoundedin Australia Marches On, Sharkeyalso compared
thepositions of the now "right wing" leadership of the ALP with the "disastrous" policiesof the GermanSocialist
1.L. L. Sharkey "TheRoleof the British Labour Government" Communist Review May 1946 p,132. .
2. Davidson op, cit. p98-9 assesses the Congress in this light. For an aftinnation of the 'peaceful approach to socialism" see Australian
Commup,ist PartyVictorian StateExecutive Communist Planfor Victory and Peace Melbourne 1945.
3. compare R. Dixon "Post War Policy and the National Congress" op, cit, pS40 with his "Full Employment and Capitalism" Communist
ReviewAugust1945p570and the Congress Resolution in Communists In Congre99: The 14thCongress of the Australian Communist Party
Current BookDistributors, Sydney 1945 p12. .
4. R. Dixon in Communists In Congres« op. cit. p13.Compare J. McPhillips "Economic Demands of the ACTU" Communist Review August
1945 p573,with its callfor the easingof wage-pegging, toTribune 30/8/45 p7where thedemand is abolition.
5.1. B. Miles "TheFight on the Industrial Front" Communist Review October 1945 pS16. Tribune 28/9/45 p3 reported ACPpolicy in the
following tenns:
"Whileour general attitude of support for the LaborGovernment continues we mustengage in moreconstructive criticism,
especially on suchissuesas the disposal of war facilities, refusal to modify wage-pegging, failure to life [sic] the burden of
taxation fromlowerincome groups etc."
6. Davidson op,cit, p99.
7. see, for example, Congress Resolution in Communist91n Congre99 op. cit. p16: "Thepolicy of the Government is liberal and.progressive
and will help promote the further development of Australia", Tribune 2018146 p6; E. W. Campbell and L. L. Sharkey "After the Federal
Elections" Communist Review November 1946 p323. .
8. L.L. Sharkey "TheRoleof Reformism in thePostWarWorld" Communist Review December 1945p680.
9. L.L. Sharkey "TheRoleof the British LaborGovernment" op.cit.p132alsoseeTribune 24/5/46 p3..
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Party)0 Despite this growing criticism of the ALP leadership and a belief that the ACP had an increased
responsibility for continuing the traditions of the labourmovement, the Partystill had a realistic assessment of its
ownlimitedinfluence.11
Sharkey's reluctance to abandon the war-time interpretation of Lenin 1913 found expression in his view that the
Government's encouragement of foreign investment could be in accordwith that analysis:
"Although development by native Australian capital is preferable, the labor movement raises no
barriers to the transfer of industries that would provide employment, consumer goods and capital
goodsfor Australian development [fromthe USA]."12
At anytime after 1948such a viewwouldhavebeenderidedinside the Communist Party.
The transition evident in the ACP's use of Lenin 1913 to interpret the behaviour of the Labor Party is also
apparent in three areas of Communist economic thought: the Party's conception of Australia's place in world
capitalism and the foreign policy appropriate to that place; the Party's analysis of the class anatomy of Australian
capitalism; and the imminence of an economic crisis and the means to combatit.
Australia and the World
Communist disquiet aboutDr. Evatt's foreign policy had begunat the timeof the SanFranciscoConference of the
new United Nations Organisation in April 1945. His opposition to the "Big Five's" veto powers then and later
was seen, however, more as the resultof Evatt's personalshortcomings than as beingpart of a generalreactionary
tendency in Australian foreign policy,13 The ACP generally supported the thrust of the Chifley Government's
approach to international relations until the end of March 1946. Communists approved of the Government's
emphasis on the United Nations system including even the BrettonWoods Agreement.14 The March editorial in
Communist Review noted that at the UnitedNations Australia had supported imperialism in Greece. The Party
took a while to assess the significance of the Government's response to this, the first major and quite warm .
episode in the cold war. Dixon referred to the "Peculiar twists and turns" of Australian foreign policy, but
consoled the Party with the conclusion that Chifley's administration wasmoreprogressive than the BritishLabour
Government.15 Sharkeystill supported Australian claimsfor controlover several Pacific islands in May, with an
argument straight out of the social-democratic parties' rationalisations for national chauvinism during the First
WorldWar:
"Thepoint is that if the working-class parties which have the task of establishing socialismin their
owncountry, were to neglectthe struggle for the national interestsof thecountries of which they are
part of the government then they wouldnever succeedin winning the majority and so there would
beno chanceof a futureinternational socialistsolution of theseproblems."16 .
ButDixon took a differentpositionat the May-June CentralCommittee Plenum:
"The reactionary trends in foreign policy must cause us to reconsider the Labor Government's
defenceplans for the so-called defenceof Australia becauseto build up armies••• means to buildup
in every way, the imperialist strengthof this country, in order to give effect to a reactionary foreign
policydirectedat the colonies andSovietRussia."17
After the Plenum the Party press consistently opposed the Government's foreign policy, accusing it of
"Converting AustraliaTo Imperial Arsenal",18 Bevinand Evattwere turning Australia and the rest of the British
peoplesinto "juniorpartners" of the USA.l9 Suchmoves were linked with the interests of British and Australian
monopolists and "Anglo-American imperialists". And, particularly damning, the Government was lining up
againstRussiaat a timewhenStalin's policies had "givennew hope to the world".20
The ACP now counterposed Australia'snational interests (its versionrather than the Government'sor capital's) to
United States policy. The dispute over the future of the military base on Manus Island encouraged Communist
hopes that significant sections of the Labor Party would realise that pro-American policies were against the
10. L. L. Sharkey LaborBetrayed Current Book Distributors, Sydney 1946 p7.
11. "The Communist Party isaware ofits increasing responsibility in the struggle against alien forces within the forces of labor... " L. L.
Sharkey "The Role ofthe British Labor Government" op, cit. p132; Dixon pointed out tothe Central Committee inMay that disillusionment
with the ALP Government had not led toasubstantial increase inthe ACP's support, "The Federal Elections and the United Front" Communist
ReviewJuly 1946 p195.
12.Tribune 2415/46 p3, L.L. Sharkey "The Role ofthe British Labor Government" loc,cit. Also see L. L. Sharkey "The Labor Movement at
the Crossroads" Communist ReviewMarch 1947 pp451-2.
13. see e.g,Tribune 3115/45 f3, 5/6145 p1, 14/6145 p2, 18/1146 pSi R.Dixon "San Francisco Conference" op, cit, p516j and E. J.Docker"The
United Nations and Dr. Evatt sViews" Communist Review November 1945 pp664-7.
14. e.g, Tribune 2213/46 pi,29/3/46 p5 and R. Lockwood "Foreign Policies Stress Our Nationhood". Forafavourable view ofBretton Woods
see E. W. Campbell "What Isthe Bretton Woods Agreement?' Tribune 19/2146 p4.
15.Tribune 1614146 p3.
16. Tribune 1015/46 rJ' the immediate issue that promJ;'ted this argument was the need toexplain the conflicting territorial claims ofthe French
and Gennan, and Itahan and Yugoslav Conununist Parties. .
17. Cornmunist Party ofAustralia Papers National Library ofAustralia op,cit. Box2, also see Blake's conunents. At this meeting J.R.Hughes
raised the pro~ct of"arevolutionary situation inAustralia in the course of2, 3,or4 years" probably for the first time since the close ofthe
"Second Impenalist War (i.e, June 1941)." .
18.Tribune 2116146 pl. See also R. Dixon "Refonnism and the Fight for the United Front" Communist ReviewJune 1946 p163 on the ACP's
hostility to Chifley's proposal that Australia play aleading role for the Empire in the Pacific.
19. Tribune 25/6146 pp4' 5.
20. R. Dixon "Refonnism and the Fight for the United Front" op. cit. pp163-4j R. Dixon "Peacemaker orWannonger" Communist Review
October 1946 pp291-2j and Tribune 13/8/46 pi, 1719/46 pS,2719/46 pl.
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nationalinterest.21 Communistobservations of the pro-imperialist policiesof Evatt and Chifleycould therefore be
sustained while the Party retained its Australia Marches On assessment of the ALP. Yet the only question over
which any serious division inside the Labor Party emerged was the BrettonWoods Agreement. In opposing the
Agreement, the ALP left, a Tribune editorialaccurately concluded, was fighting the shadowand not the substance
of imperialism. The ACPon the other handopposedBrettonWoodsand US imperialism in general, and by doing
so it executed a 180degree turn fromits positionin February 1946. ThenE. W. Campbell had arguedthat
"Australiahas more to gain thanshe has to lose from adopting a positiveapproach to BrettonWoods
and by assuming that the terms of the Agreement may be suitably modified to meet future circum-
stances as they arise."22
In November Bretton Woods was "only one of the shadows cast by the imperialist policies of the Byrnes-
Vandenburg-Dulles clique" of US policy makers.23 The Party believedthat the new positionwas a response to a
new situation
"Since the Bretton Woods Agreement was first drawn up and particularly since the end of the war,
big changes have taken place... The USA, far from seeking an orderly expansion of world trade to
benefit all nations,as called for in the BrettonWOods Agreement, is preparing to launchthe biggest
trade war in history."24
The CommunistParty interpretedChifley's initial defeatover BrettonWoodsin Caucus as foreshadowing hisfall,
seeing the conflict as one'
"in the Federal Labor Party between, those who want to collaborate with Angle-American
imperialismand thosewho want the Labor Party to maintain its traditional nationalistpolicy".25
Cartoon24 expressedthis optimism. The disappointment of these hopesroughlyco-incidedwith the beginning of
the intemationalleft turn in the Communist movement-- conveyedto Australia through the Conference of Empire
CommunistParties in London in February and,more definitively, through the pronouncements of the Communist
Information Bureaus,set up in October 1947.
Who Are the Monopolists?
At a Central Committee meetingshortly after the ACP's 1945Congress Dixonexplainedsomeof the implications
of the Party's new orientation. In particularhe pointed out that
"The slogan of national unitynow gives way to the sloganof unityof all progressiveforces against
monopolyand reaction." .
The Congress resolution had alreadyspecified that such forces includedsections of the employers.26 So theParty
tookup its PopularFront anti-monopolism againin earnest.
During1945 and 1946 Tribune published a number of articles by J. F. Chapple, the FederalSecretary of the ARU.
While not apparently a Communist, Chapple was at this stage close to the ACP. His articlespropounded Money
Power ideas, focusingparticularly on the significance of the debts of the state railways. He pointedout that the
Commonwealth Bank couldresume the railways's debts at lower interest rates, blamed the banks "more than any
other factor" for the depression and, while favouring bank nationalisation, praised the Government's bank
legislation.27 The publication of Chapple's views indicated not only the ACP's acceptance of the thrust of the
Government's economicpolicybut also the links between the Party's revivedhostility to the monopolies and the
older Money Power tradition. This was also apparent in other articles attacking the holders of government and
railway bonds, the objects of long-standing Money Power criticisms, and in an enthusiastic review of Eddie
Ward's Shall the Banks or the People Rule?28
Len Fox's Wealthy Men gave the most detailed account of Australia's monopoly capitalists during this period.
Using material similar to that in his Monopoly and Guilty Men he demonstrated the links amongst Australia's
leading individuals, families and companies. Fox had a conspiratorial view of how the "MoneyTsars" exercised
their influence. There were
"Twentymen who can meet in a secret room and dominatethe wholepopulation of.Australia,"
He maintainedthat while the Labor Party wasnot as close to the main monopolies as its conservative opponents, it
was a capitalistparty influenced by some manufacturers in competition with those tied to Britain,American as op-
21.Tribune 22110/46 1'6,15/11146 pS, 19/11146 p3,22111/46 pi.
22. Tribune 1912146 p4.
23.Tribune editorial22111146 pl,
24.Tribune 26/11146 p5,also 5/11147 p,p4-5 and G. P. O'Day's reviewofB. FitzpatrickTheAustralian PeopleCommunist ReviewMarch1947
p467and R. Dixon"The Way FOIWard' Communist ReviewApril 1947p483.
25.Tribune 21/1147 p3. Also see Tribuns 6/12146 pi, 24/12146 p3, 28/1/47p3.
26. Tribune 2819/45 p3 and Congress Resolution p16 in Australian Communist Party Communists in Congress op,clt, p16. At the Congress
Dixonhad demonstrated, by referringto Lenin's analysis, that the ALP opposedpromotion of "the stn1ggle against monopoly and carryingit
throughto the end. •• " Dixonin ibid. p14.
27. Tribune 21/12145 p2, 1912146 p5, 2213/46 p4, 1415/46 p7, 1116146 es,
28. Tribune 513/46 p5 2018146 p3, 3/9/46p3, 18/10/46p4and E. W. Campbell "Bondholders Cause tax Burden"Communist ReviewSeptember
1946pp260-1. .
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posed to British monopoly, brewery monopolists and independent monopolists like Wren and Theodore.29 This
viewof the ALP, as a party influenced by monopoly, waselaboratedby theACPduring its radical turn.
Anti-monopolism, still with obvious remnants of its Money Powerpredecessor, was compounded with the Party's
increasingly virulent anti-American nationalism to form a particularlydurable intellectual material. It found one
of its earliest expressions in Bretton Woods, an ARU pamphlet by Chapple and J. J. Brown, the Communist
Victorian Secretary of the Union. They fulminated against the Money Power, "Dollar Imperialism" and the
USA's "60 wealthyfamilies". BrettonWoods, was designedto extend American bank control of Americato the
rest of the world,30
When the ACP returned to an anti-monopolist understanding of the anatomy of Australian capitalism it did so
withoutproviding any theoretical justificationfor its analysis. The Party relied on the empirical accounts which
had been the mainstay of its PopularFront anti-monopolism to explain the role of monopoly, without attempting
to explain the mechanisms at work. So long as the main featureof Australian capitalismwas its evolution into an
independent state, as outlined by Lenin in 1913, Communists did could not use those passages in Lenin's
Imperialism on the nature of finance capital to throwlight on the influence of monopoly in contemporary society,
in anything but a liturgical fashion. Lenin's position in the latter was too categorical about the domination of
finance capital to be easily reconciled with the Australia Marches On version of 1913, in which the Labor
Government was progressive.
A concomitant of the empiricalnature of Communistanalyses of the class structureof Australian capitalismwas
an imprecise use of terminology. There was a lack of clarity over the distinctions between the
bourgeoisie/capitalist class and the monopolies and later "Collins House" as well. For example, at the 1945 ACP
Congress Miles said .
"Capitalismremains capitalism, monopoly remains monopoly, and the class of monopolists, with
support from the majority of the capitalist class will strive relentlessly and ruthlessly for its own
policies,nationaland international."31
Miles, no stranger to marxist terminology, thus presented the monopolists as a distinct class from the capitalists.
But he did not explain what separatedand united the interests of the two. At the same Congress Dixon implied
that the differentiaspeciaewas simplysize, althoughwithoutexplaining why this shouldbe the case.
"... The interests then, of a great section of smaller and middle capitalists are bound up, not with
grantinga free hand to monopoly, but with the destruction of the powerof monopoly... "32
Now it seemed that "the majority of the capitalist class" did not support the monopolists. On the other hand,
Sharkey had equated Lenin's reference to the "counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie" (in his On Slogans) with
"monopoly capitalists" .33 Here the difference between monopoly and non-monopoly capital seemed to be a
politicalrather than an economicquestion.
Part of the ACP's theoretical difficulties can be attributedto the application of the inappropriate model of Eastern
Europe to the Australian situation. The Party wanted the development of Australian capitalism without
monopolies, as it believedwas takingplace in the "New Democracies".34 In EasternEurope the largest capitalist
enterprises had in fact been turned into components of an even larger capitalistmonopoly, controlleddirectly by
the state. In Australia privately owned "monopolies" were and are the characteristic form taken by capitalist
accumulation, providing the dynamic for economic growth. The existing structure of the state was oriented
towards the promotion of private capitalist accumulation. Only a drastic reorientation of the state towards an
equallycapitalist accumulation, but directedby the state, as occurredon the bayonets of the Red Army in Eastern
Europe, or the revolutionary replacement of the capitalist state form could alter the situation. The Communist
Party conflated these two approaches and, partly as a consequence, was in a position to effect neither.35 The
confusionof Communistterminology continuedafter the Party enteredits radicalphase in 1947-8 and discovered
that the People's Democracies were actuallydictatorships of theproletariat.
Inevitable Crisis (Again)
At the ACP's 1945 Congress the Party endorsed the Government's economic programme, but rejected the
economictheoriesthat informedit. Blakepointedout that:
29.L. FoxWealthy MenCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1946,28,000copiesweresold to early 1948, Australian Communist PartyReport
of tIM Workof tIM Central Committee from tIM 14th to tIM 15thNational Congress 1'30 Communist Party of Australia Papers01'. cit, box2
folder!
30. J. J. Brown and J. F. ChappleBrettonWoodr Australian Railways Union, Sydney 1947. For the suggestion that Evatt's foreign policy
mightbe linkedto his friendshll' withW. S. Robinson (a CollinsHousedirector) see Tribune 618146 p4.
31.J. B.Miles"Jobs,Freedom, Progress" in Col1ll1UU1ists in Congress 01'. clt, 1'9. .
32.R. Dixonin ibid.1'10.
33. L. L. Sharkey "Must the Communists Win a MajorityT' in R. Dixon and L. L. Sharkey A Free World Without Violence Australian
Communist Party, SydneyJuly 19451'18. Also see L. L. Sharkey "The Roleof Reformism in the Post War World" 01'. cit, 1'686, wherehe
seemsto use the terms''bourgeoisie'' and"monopoly-capitalist menace" interchangably. .
34. seee.g,Tribune 25/1146 1'5andEditorial Communist ReviewOctober1945pSIS
35. for an examination of the transformation of private capitalism into state capitalism in Eastern Europesee C. HarmanClassStruggles in
Eastern Europe Plato, London 19831'1'27-41.
173
"throughout the White Paper [on Full Employment] the theory is advanced that capitalism can be
stabilised; that crises and depressions can be eliminated, that production can be planned
continuously under the system of capitalism; and, finally therefore that socialism is a quite
unnecessary evil."36
The White Paper was not explicitly anti-socialist but Blake was right about the logic of its argument. That
argument had been espoused by leading Communists less than a month previously. Now the Party held that
economiccrises couldnot be prevented and, therefore, nor could the class struggle. For, if capitalismcan deliver
the goods to the working class withoutperiodic convulsions then thereis littlepoint to struggle and especially the
risky struggle for a new social order. In the face of another depression Blake urged struggles for jobs, better
wages and social security:
"Followingthis path the workingclass will fmd itself in an infmitely betterpositionto deal with the
problems of a new economiccrisis in the interestsof the working people than was the case during
the last depression of 1930-33."37
Although the Party had now rejected Keynesian theory it did not immediately arrive at the radical conclusion of
the period after 1947 -- that Chifley's economic policies were at best ineffective and at worst deliberately reac-
tionary -- by rejecting the Government's policy proposals. Blake still conceded that the Government's program
couldprolong the periodof economicexpansion after the war and delaythe onsetof the crisis.
"If, on the other hand, the great capitalist :monopolies are given a free hand to plunder and rob the
people to buildup hugeprofits our country will fmd itself all the sooner in the throws of economic
crisis."38
This was a weaker echo of Wright's contentionin January that the laws of capitalismwere mutable, according to
which group was in government. Measuressuch as the Government's banking legislation and full employment
policies had to be defended because they would blunt the severity of a crisis. But, according to the Party's
rediscovered radical underconsumptionist theory, capitalism could not raise wages sufficiently to cope with
increasedproduction.39 The Communists' immediate programin practiceremainedthe same as the Government's
formal position, supplemented by measures such as the nationalisation of certain industries, direction of
monopolies and control over investment which, while inspired by developments in Eastern Europe, were quite
consistent with a left-Keynesian outlook.40 The Party's campaign for jobs, for example,stressed the importance
of a new referendum on Commonwealth powers over employment.41 While the Party supported industrial
struggles, therefore, it saw these as a supplement to the policiesof a Laborgovemment, The Party did oppose the
continuation of wage-pegging, but until late 1946. seemed to believe that the logic of the Government's program
and ALP policy would lead to its abandonment in the near future. Until 1947, this emphasis meant the Party's
assessments of and attempts to lead the class strugglelagged behindrank and file workers' actions.42
The ACP's rejection of the theory behind the Government's policies led to the first serious Australian attempt to
refute Keynes' General Theory, recognisedas the Government's economic bible. Dr. G. P. O'Day undertook the
task, mainly relying on Jurgen Kuczynski's 1937 critique of Keynes.43 He asked, with a hint of Third Period
rhetoric, "Does it [the General Theory] not contain all the essentials for Fascist propaganda?" After Kuczynski,
O'Day maintainedthat Keynes's proposals were designed to cut real wages through inflation. Certainlythis was
an element in the book and O'Day drew attention to its relationship to the Government's wage-pegging
regulations, but his exposure of this anti-working class proposal hardly constituteda refutationof Keynes's sys-
tem. Kuczynski's account remained the standardSoviet reference whenRussian economists started to pay more
36. J. D. Blake "Unite for Post-War Progress" in Austra1ian Communist Party Communists in Congress Sydney October 1945.
37. ibid. plO.. .
38'. ibid. irP9, 10, R. Dixon "Full Employment and Capitalism" August 1945 op, ciL p571 retreated from his position ofJuly toconcluded that:
the economic theories ofthe Labor Government as set out inthe Wliite Paper represent a marked advance over the prewar
views, but they do not iron out the contradictions of capitalism, nor are they a lasting solution to the problems of
unemploymenL" (my emphasis)
Also see Tribune 3018145 p4 .
39. Sharkey argued that radical underconsumptionism operated inpeacetime, but not during the warTribune 2118/45 p3. Dixon argued tothe
Central Committee that the general crisis ofcapitalism was now deeper than before the War Tribune 2819/45 p3.
40. e.g, E. W. Campbell "A Congress ofVictory" Communist Review September 1945 p593 and G. P. O'Day "The Australian Labor Party and
J. M. Keynes" Communist ReviewNovember 1945 pp667-8. 10the Communist Revkw Editorial ofOctober 1945 p515 the editor, Sharkey,
noted that such measures had been promised by the British LabourGovernment.
41.Tribune 1119/45 ~1, 25/1146 p3.42. see T.Sheridan 'The 1945 Steel Strike: Trade Unions, the New Order and Mr. Chifley" Labaw: History 42 May 1982 ppl8-19 for the
ACP's attitude tothe Government during the 1945 steel strike. Also see Tribune 12110145 pi for a Communist call on Labor Governments to
solve the Bunnerong power dispute infavour of the workers and Tribune 16111/45 pi, 4112145 pi for Communist hostility to the idea ofa
general strike over either ofthese disputes. E. J. Rowe of the AEU "Higher Wages Shorter Hours" Communist Revkw December 1945
pp681-2 was more forthright incalling fo~ strike action over wages ~~d hours, bU~ still expressed reservations: . .,
"We do not want workers todISSIpate their strength and nuhtancyon: nunor matters, but we do approve oftheir expressing In
the sharpest fashion that they will stand no 'dilly dallying' around these demands." .
Also see E. J. Rowe "Developments. on the Industrial Front" Communist Revkw April 1946 pp105.{i, where he called for aggressive strike
tactics but wamed that the bourgeoisie was on the offensive. LaborNewsMarch 1946 pi advocated a strategy ofpetitions to Chifley and MPs
and demonstrations towin the 40 hour week. Tribune 2815/46 p8 published a statement from the ALP Federal Executive without criticising it
and with the headline"Employers Provoke Strikes, ALP Says". Dixon in TribUM 4/6/46 pi warned workers tofight on their own and not the
bosses' terms,43. G. P.O'Day "The Australian Labor Party and J. M. Keynes" op, cit.; J. Kuczynski NewFashions in Wage Theory: Keynes, Rabinson,
Hicks, RueffLawrence and Wishart, London 1937, note the Communist publishing house. ,
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attention to refutingKeynes with the escalation of the cold war.44 Not until April 1947 did the ACP publishan-
other extended analysis of Keynesian economics. 1. Trachtenberg, of the Institute for World Economics and
World Politics in Moscow, criticised the General Theory, Beveridge's Full Employment in a Free Society, the
BritishGovernment's 1944Employment Policy and an American articlebyArnliefor reproducing
"in a somewhat modernised form, adapted to present conditions, the familiar 'theory of
underconsumption,' of 'insufficientcapital,' and so forth. The difference is that the old theories of
undereonsumption started from the premise that the development of production ran up against an
absolute insufficiency of capital,while the new theories start from the premisethat capitalfunds are
on hand, but are not spentor not spentin a suitable way."45
His objections were 1) that the pursuitof profit is incompatible with increasing consumption, as Stalinpointedout
in Questions ofLeninism. 2) it is not possible to redistribute national income under capitalism. 3) the state can
only influence the national economy under capitalism to a very limited degree. Finally, the experience of the
USSR in abolishing unemployment demonstrated the superiority of Marx over Keynes. Trachtenberg's critique
thus consisted of a series of assertions without any serious attemptto demonstrate their validityfrom a studyof
Keynes' thoughtor by empirical means.
The ACP mademore efforts,including Cartoon 25, to explain the comingeconomic crisis than it did to showwhy
Keynesian measures couldnot preventit. E; W. Campbell gave the first extended post-war accountin a report to
the September 1945Plenumof the CentralCornmittee.46 He said that the war had deepened the generalcrisis and
thatcapitalism couldemergefrom its presentcrisis (presumably that associated withdemobilisation) only to enter
"a depression of a peculiarkind", like that whichfollowed the 1929crash. Two paths were open. Alongone the
monopolists jettisonedthe achievements of Teheran, San Francisco andBrettonWoods Conferences, to embarkon
a trade war. It ended in economic crisis and eventually WorldWar m. On the other path mass struggleagainst
such policies could lead to socialism. Campbell seemed to imply that crises could be averted along the second
path, an atavismfrombeforethe AugustCongress.
Campbell's article reproduced, in a somewhat garbled form, arguments from E. Varga's "The Course of the
Industrial Cycle after the War".47 Varga's prognosis was less temporising thanCampbell's. The Russian
economist predicted that a newcrisis, deeperthan that following WorldWar I, wouldoccur in two to four years.48
L. L. Sharkey endorsed Varga's analysis and affirmed that the class struggles in the coming period would be
essentially defensive ones. He candidly admitted that the new emphasis. on economic crisis contradicted the
Party's earlierviews:
"Some comrades might think that if the perspective is economic crisis, the various documents we
havebeen issuingare Browderite myths that shouldbe scrapped. AndI am afraid that in dailyprac-
tice not a few haveactedon thiskind of idea."
Howeverthe crux of ACPpolicywas still
"to compel the Labor Government to get the proposals it has made, fairlygood in themselves out of
the blueprintstage and transferred to the sphereofreallty."49
During 1946 the ACP became more critical of the Government's economic policies. It emphasised that
nationalisations were necessaryto offset the effects of a new depression on the working class.50 But thePartywas
still seriously urging these measures onto a Government quite hostile to them. Despite O'Day's exposure of
Keynesian theory, Thornton still had a naive approach to the Government's Keynesian practice. An approach
whichkept the contradiction between the Chifley Government's activities and the current interpretation of Lenin
1913 in the background. Thornton seemedto regard"Chifley's Wage-Pegging Fetish" as a personalidiosyncrasy.
He called on the Government to end wage-pegging and to tighten price controls, in the spirit of ALP policy.51
Later he argued that Chifley's ideas on inflation were "unreal" withoutsuggesting that they might have a reality
and function in the eyes of the capitalistclass.52
44.See C. B. Turner An Analysis ofSoviet Views ofJohnMaynard Keynes Duke University Press, Durham 1969 pp34, 42-4, 53. The General
Theory was translated into Russian in 1948.
45. I.Trachtenberg "Comments on Keynesian Theories ofFull Employment" Communist ReviewApril 1947 pp506-8, for his affiliation see F.
G. Barghoorn "The Varga Discussion and Its Significance" American S/avicand EastEuropean Reviewv7 October 1948 p229.
46. E. W. Campbell Report to the Central Committee Plenum "Some View on the Current Economic Crisis" Communist ReviewNovember
1945 pp660-2. On the imminence ofeconomic crisis also seeTribUM 513/46 pl, 1319/46 pl and L. L. Sharlcey Report to the Central
Committee Communist ReviewAugust 1946 p238.
47. originally published in the Moscow journal WorldEconomics and WorldEco~mics in May 1945, republished Communist ReviewJanuary
~~~~~~uence of"respected Marxist economists" on the ACP's belief in an imminent crisis, see E. Bacon Outline of tll« Post-war
History oftll«Communist PartyofAustralia D. B. Young, Sydney 1965 pIS. .
49. L. L. Sharkey "The Tasks of the Party in the Present Situation" report tothe Central Committee meeting of1811146 Communist Review
FeblUary 1946 pp36-7. Such myths occasionally slipped out even after Sharkey's warning, see, for example,lAborNews September 1946 p3
for a justification ofthe 1946 referendum asameans ofachieving full employment. TribUM 9/8146 supported the referendum only on the basis
that itwould help "Safeguard Gains By Workers'" -
50. e.g. Tribune 1319/46 gl, 24/9/44 p3. ,51. E. Thornton "Chitley s Wage-Pegging Fetish" Communist ReviewSeptember 1946 pp264-5. The fact that some employers were breaching
the regulations was aduced toshow how illogical Chifley's policy was see also TribUM 29/1G'46 p3.
52. TribUM 22110/46 p3. For T. Wright's similar attitude on the hours question see "The Fight for a Forty-Hour Week" Communist Review
October 1946 pp293-4. He praised the Queensland shearers who had taken the 40 hour week through industrial action, but explained that unity
required unions asa whole tosupport the ACTU Executive's Court application and that the Chifley Government could use the Federal external
affairs power in the Constitution to legislate for shorter hours.
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Although the Party had earlier endorsed industrial action to win better wages and conditions, the Victorian
transportstrike in October 1946,shortly followed by the prolonged Victorian metal trades dispute, convinced the
Party that the working class was on the offensive and militant action was the key to overcoming the
Government's policy on wages and hours.53 The Party increasingly saw the shadowof the boss behindChifley's
wages policy, as Cartoon 26 illustrates. In the November 1946 Communist Review, L. L. Sharkey and E. W.
Campbell counterposed the working class theory that wages can rise at the expense of profits, without raising
prices to Chifley's bourgeois economics.54ForCommunists, the course of events during 1947confirmedthat the
ALP right wing was consolidating its hold on the Party. Another factor which would have encouraged the
CommunistParty in a more militant attitude was Varga's predictionthat a "NewDepressionWill BreakNotLater
than 1948".55 Such a prognosis made Chifley's prediction of a "golden age" even less plausible.56 The ACP
fmally started to recognise that Chifley's position on wages and hours might be integral part of his overall
economicprogram.f? For a time Communists continued to supportspecific policies of the Government as being
progressive, but with increasing criticismof its overall approach to economic management Nevertheless the ACP
apparently hoped for a resurgenceof theLabor left until early 1948. Sharkey describedChifley's approach in the
following accurate terms:
The essence of the matter is that the Chifleypolicy aims to preventthe raisingof the livingstandard
of the working people, to stave off the shorter working week, and to make it possible for the
capitalists to enrich themselves during the periodof post-warshortages."
In contrastwith the Party's earlier assessments he concludedthat
"It is against this whole economic policy of the Chifley Government that workers have been
strugglingover the post-warperiod."58
Labor News's front page in February 1947 summed up the ACP's attitude to the Government and its economic
and foreignpolicies,on the eve of the Party's radical turn: "Wanted-- ALabor PrimeMinister" .59
53.Tribune 19/11146 p7 saidthat Chifley'spolicies weres~ng theonsetof a newdepression alsosee 6/12146 p6; E. Hill and C. Sharpley
"TheRightWingin the Victorian TradeUmons" CommunISt Review November 1946p331 still expressed illusions in the ALPtradeunion left
represented by A. E. Monkand C. Croftsand calledon them to fight the trade unionright; J. D. Blake "TheNine-Day Transport Strike in
Victoria" Communist Review December 1946 pp355-7 concluded that while the previous period had been one of defensive struggles, the
working class wasnowon theoffensive. T. RoweandT. Wright United ActionWins Current BookDistributors, Sydney 1947 drewthelessons
of the Victorian metaltradesdispute in termssimilarto Blake's. E. F. Hill"SomeAspects of Refonnism" Communist Review December 1946
p369accused Chifley of carrying capitalist beliefs into the labourmovement. R. Dixon"Abolish Wage-Pegging, Control Prices" Communist
ReviewDecember 1946pp558-60 calledon workers to takethe 40hourweekthemselves andfor thePartyto paymoreattention to wages and
hoursquestions in thefuture. AlsoseeE. J. Rowe inAmalgamatedEngineering UnionJournalDecember 1946pl l. .
54. E.W.Campbell andL. L. Sharkey "Afterthe Federal Elections" Communist Review November 1946p32S.
55.Tribune 10112146 p5.
56. E. F.Hill"SomeAspects of Refonnism" Opt cit. .
57.R. Dixon "StrikesandLabor'sEconomic Policy" Communist Review February 1947 pp419-20.
58.L. L. Sharkey "TheLaborMovement at the Crossroads" Communist Review March1947 pp451-2.
59. E. W. Campbell and L. L. Sharkey "Afterthe Federal Elections" Opt CiL had still expressed the hope that the ALP's working classbase
wouldprevent it fromactually attacking theworking class. OnlywiththeParty's radical turnwasthisillusion finally dispelled.
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1947-51: "The Need To Take The Offensive"!
In September 1947 the Communist Party of the SovietUnionreasserted its authority over theworld's Communist
Parties, by setting up theCommunist Information Bureauor Corninforrn. Although the Bureau only included the
Communist Parties which heldpowerin Eastern Europe andthe two largestwestern European Parties, during the
coldwar it was the undisputed voiceof the international movement. A challenge to Moscow's authority, such as
Tito's in Yugoslavia, meantexclusion from the movement. For the Communist Parties of the British Empire the
Corninform's reassertion of the international character of the movement had been foreshadowed in April 1947
withthe Conference of EmpireCommunist Parties heldin London. These twoevents initiated a radicalisation of
the policies of the ACP, encouraging it to draw unrealistically extreme conclusions from the "strike movement",
which it had finally recognised during 1947.
Theradicalisation of the ACP's policies wasnot an evenprocess. TheParty's attitude to international events and
the Chifley Government's foreign policy became radicalised more quickly than its local strategies for social
change did.2 Radical nationalism represented no serious break with theParty's policies since 1941, but rather an
intensified identification with the interests of the Australian "people" as a whole. Moreover, the leading
Australian Communists had already identified the anti-soviet thrust of Australian foreign policy and needed no
outside prompting to criticise the Chifley Government on that count. The effect of the Empire Communist
Conference was to heighten theAustralian Party's nationalist andanti-American rhetoric still further. Theirhopes
for progressive foreign and sooneven for progressive domestic. policies fromthe ALP dashed by the "reactionary
right-wing of theLabor Party,Australian Communists increasingly cameto see theirownPartyas the only real
representative of Australia's national interests.s Probably because the ACP was slow to recognise the post-war
strike wave the Party counterposed it to the Chifley Government's "reactionary" domestic policies later than it
rejected Evatt's foreign policy.4 The ACP's domestic and international policies were brought back into line
around the timeof itsMay 1948 Congress, which also saw the emergence of a new interpretation of Lenin's 1913
article on Australia.
Two theoretical developments from overseas helped to crystalise the ACP's new radical position. First the
Corninform's pronouncement that the worldwas divided into two camps: Russia, its allies and the progressive
movement in capitalist countries wereopposed to the reactionary forces in the world, centred on US imperialism.5
This led to the immediate identification of the progressive workers' and national liberation movements with
Russia's international interests. In Australia the ACP's hostility to the Government's foreign and domestic
policies coalesced in the assertion that bothwerein the interests of ColIinsHouse, itselfclosely tied to WallStreet
imperialism. Thecapitalist classand, in practice, theALPleadership hadgoneoverto the sideof the monopolies.
Australia was polarised between those who looked to theACPfor leadership and those whofurthered theinterests
of monopoly capital.
Thepathof independent capitalist development for Australia had beenclosed off. However a newpathof national
.development had opened up from the second, international development which shaped the ACP's new policies:
thediscovery that the statesof eastern Europe wereon the road to soclallsm.e They were taking a different route
from Russia and one that Australia could emulate in the near future. Just as the ACP was recognising the
reactionary role of the ALP and Australian bourgeoisie, the honey-moon period in which capitalist and
Communist Ministers formed Governments in eastern Europe wasending. Thefunctions of thedictatorship of the
proletariat werebeingcarriedout "without theSovietform" (or any working classcontent).'
. The Communist Party did not immediately change its assessment of the ALP and the progressiveness of the
Australian capitalist class when it embarked on its more radical course during 1947. But it had increasing
difficulties in reconciling the old interpretation of Lenin's 1913 text with the reactionary role it became convinced
1. Australian Communist Party Speakers' Notes February 1950held that "The emphasis must be on the need to take the offensive" in
speeches by Partymembers. .
2. The emphasis in J. C. Henry's speech to the London Conference of Empire Communist Partieswas ultra-nationalist, but not particularly
radical with respectto industrial strategies. Hestressed theneedto keepthe partiesof monopoly capitalism outof officeandfor policies which
were in the interests of "sections of capital not tiedto the greatmonopolies", Communist Review May1947pp515-7. Gollanpointsoutthatthe
Australian Communist Party's position at the September 1947ACfU Congress wasopposition to theGovernment's foreign policies combined
with "a more militantexposition of the aimsof the federal Laborgovernment", that is, the ACPhad heightened its criticisms of the ALP on
domestic issues,but only onthe basisof Labor'sown formal policies R. GollanRevolutionaries andReformists Australian National University
Press,Canbena 1975pp202-3.
3. see,for example, Tribune 12111149 pI.
4. J. B. Miles Communist Review July 1947 pS93 expressed the radicalisation of the Party's nationalism, though not yet of its strategy for
achieving socialism whichremained stagist. Milesexpected a "longperiod of stnJggle fordemocracy", beforethe advance to socialism.
5. GollanRevolutionaries and Reformists op. cit. p211. For Australian references to this approach see Tribune 2512148 p3 and the documents
of theAustralian Communist Party'sCongress in May 1948National Library of Australia Communist Partyof Australia PapersMS3000.
6. see J. p. BlakeTheCommunist PartyofAustralia: 1945-63 mimeo National Library of Australia p7; E. Varga"Democracy of a NewType"
Communist ReviewNovember and December 1947 pp721-4,757-9 and J. D. Blake "Some Questions on People's Democracy" Communist
Review December 1948 pp367-70. These Communist Review articles denied that the dictatorship of the proletariat existed in the "new
democracies", but thisposition wassoonreversed, seeGollan Revolutionaries andReformists op.cit. p212 '
7. seee.g.Mo Rakosi "ThePeople'sDemocratic State" CommunistReview May1949pp138-42
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the ALP was playing on the domestic and the international plane. In contrast with the Party's earlier position, its
radicalcourse now dictatedthat foreign investmentin Australiahad to be opposed:
"the economic policy pursued by the Labor Government here in Australia, is to attract British and
UnitedStates capital. This to our minds meansthat Australiawouldbecomea semi-colony't.s
Hardlya progressivedevelopment. Moreover the ALP had abandoned its old electionprogramof nationalisations
for the benefit of "big overseas trusts and monopollstst.s Dixon and Sharkey both sought a way out of this
problemby contrastingthe ALP's progressive intentions with its effectively reactionary policies. They attempted
to salvagethe current interpretation of Leninon the ALPby arguingthat:
"This policy of attracting overseas capital, which is so basic in the policy of the Labour
Government, does not mean any conscious departure from the aims of the Labour Party, as set out
byLenin, of buildingandstrengthening Australian capitalism, even thoughit must lead ultimately to
the subordination of Australiato US imperialism..."(myemphasis)10
The Australian bourgeoisie "hoped" to exercise the same independence with respect to the USA as it had with
Britain.
During the May 1948Party Congress E. W. Campbell solved the problem in a different way, by reverting to the
interpretation of Lenin's article currentduring the "SecondImperialistWar", Le. before GermanyinvadedRussia
in 1941, and before that during the Third Period of the early 1930s. He said that the Party "had to stop thinking
about the role of the LaborParty in the old terms" because
"The Australian bourgeoisie has long since become an independent bourgeoisie... Politically the
bourgeoisie has also come of age and the old role of the Labor Party has just about been exhausted.
Ratificationof the Statuteof Westminster put the seal on Australiaas a sovereign power.
"... The Labor Party, being a bourgeois labor party reflects the tendency of the Australian
bourgeoisie in the new world situation to turn to America" .
Campbell argued that now an independent Australian capitalismhad been establishedthe ALP had exhaustedits
old role, asLenin predicted. So the Communist Party should lead the defenceof Australian independence and the
fight for nationalisations to combatthe approaching economic crisis and to open the way to a People's Democracy
in Australia.11
In his reply to the discussion at the Congress Sharkeytook up the "confusion" amongstsomecomradeson the role
of the LaborParty and attempted to dispel it in the termsDixon had used earlier. He identified the contradiction
betweenthe Party's analysis of the LaborParty as the party of independent Australian capitalism, basedon Lenin,
and the ALP's encouragement of foreign capital. According to Sharkey the contradiction was only apparent.
Taking up Dixon's approach he said that Chilley was attempting to make Australia the centre of the British
Empire, in accord with Lenin's analysis (or at least that interpretation of it current in the ACP between 1943 and
1948). But the Labor Party did not have the advantage of marxism-Ieninist theory and so could not understand
that this attempt was in vain. In a conclusion that owed more to moral idealism than historical materialism
Sharkeysaid that
"Wedo not have to change the estimation thatLenin made, that we have always [sic]put forwardas
the essential historical role of the Labor Party to establishhere in Australiaan independentcapital-
ism. .• In the conditions of the present day world theyare going to get oppositeresults to what they
anticipated")2
This line of argument, which did not appear in the draft resolution, was included in the Congress Resolutions,
publishedas The Way Forward.l3
Sharkey's reply to the discussion at the Congress and the Congress Resolution proved nevertheless to be the
dissonantswan song of theAustraliaMarchesOn interpretation of Lenin on Australia. Campbe11's speech to the
Congress was published in the July Communist Review.14 By SeptemberSharkey was writing of the "failureof
the bourgeois-reformist policyof the ALP", in less subjectivist terms than his Congress reply,15and by Apri11949
~tainedthm '
"The Labour Party which, in the past stood for an independent capitalism, today, because of the
desperatesituation of world imperialism, pursues a policy that obviously lessens the possibilityof
Australia standing as an independent. State, but draws our country to the level of a province of
American imperialism. On all the major questions the Labour Party is in the camp of the
bourgeoisie".16
8. L. L. Sharkey Replyto discussion at the 1948ACPCongress Communist Partyof Australia Papersop, cit. box1 folder1. Also see1..1..
Sharkey ForAustraIlJl ••Prosperous andIndependent: Report to Fifteenth Congress, ACPCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney May 1948p17.
9. R. Dixon"Importof Capital and Labour's Policy" Communist Review May 1948pp134-S Also see DrajtResolUlion for 15th Congress
National Library of Australia Communist Partyof Australia PapersMS3000 box2folder3.
10.Dixon"Import of CapitalandLabour'sPolicy" op,cit. ..
11.CampbeU wasa memberof theCentral Committee, his speech is inNational Library of Australia Communist Partyof Australia Papers op,
cit. box2folder4. .
12.ibid.box1 folded.
13.Australian Communist PartyTheWay Forward Current BookDistributors, Sydney May 1948p14.
14.E. W.CampbeIl "TheRoleof the LaborParty" Communist Review July 1948pp19S-6.
15.1..1..Sharkey "TheCollapse of the Labour Government's Economic Policy" Communist Review September 1948pp267-70.
16.1...1. Sharkey "The Reformists ServeReaction" Communist Review April1949p112.
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This remained the Party's analysis until it dropped its radicalpoliciesduring 1951-2,17 In August 1952Sharkey
affirmed the correctness of Lenin's assessment of the ALP, although the leaders of the Labor Party had now
forsaken the courseon an independent Australia,18 The interpretation of Lenin's text was still that of the Party's
radicalphase but the Party had in practice returnedto a strategysimilarto that of 1943-8. In a 1953report to the
Central Committee, Sharkeyclosed the theoretical gap by affirming that the ALP's new preamble demonstrated
the correctness of Lenin's interpretation whichappliedto the wholehistory of theLaborParty.19 The ACPshould
encouragethe left wing of the ALP to pursue a progressive policy whichcould be implemented by a progressive
Labor Government
Lenin's text was not a reference point for the Australian Communist Party during the remainder of the 1950s.
There are two, probable and compatible, explanations. First, the interpretation of a text could only be changed a
limited number of times before its use became confusing to the Communist Party's rank and file, apparently
alreadya problemat the 1948Party Congress, or, more dangerously, stirred up doubts about the cogencyofParty
theory. A little articlewhen frequently manipulated and stretched tends to lose its elasticity. Second, the growth
of the Communist Party of Australia duringWorld War ITmeantthat theParty could use Lenin to justify an opti-
mistic perspective of the Communist Party superseding the influence of the ALP in the working class in the not
too distant future, even thoughthe Communists temporarily supported Labor's leadership of the nation. During
the 1950s the Communist Party was much weaker than it had been during the war and placeda commensurately
greater emphasis on the progressive role of "a real and genuine [ALP] left-wing with whom we can work" in
extending the influence of socialist ideas.20 The distance between the situation of the 1950s and Lenin's
prediction that a SocialistLaborPartywoulddisplacethe ALP was a depressing prospectbest left unviewed.
This section examines the the main areasof Communist economic thoughtfrom 1947to 1951 in the contextof the
Party's strategic conceptions, summedup in the currentinterpretation of Leninon theLaborParty. As in previous
periods the main issues were Australian capitalism's place in the world, the likelihood of a new economic crisis
and the structureof economic powerin Australia.
Trading with the Devil
.. By the end of 1946the ACPhad come to regard any Australian tieswith the USA,especially economic ones, with
great suspicion. The Communist press denounced contacts ranging from the Bretton Woods Agreement to the
import of American comic books. Not only would the latter's "sexual suggestiveness" corrupt the young, they
also drainedAustralia's dollar reserves andput Australian artists out of work.21
Communists believed that US foreign and trade policies were a threat to world peace, i.e. Russia, and were
harmfulto Australia. Tribune, Communist Review andother Communist or ACPassociated publications analysed
the detrimental effects of US investment on Australia22; the implications of US defence and foreign policies,
including its policies in Japan, and Australia's endorsement of some of these23; the significance of Australia's
involvement in the sterling area's "dollar crisis"24; and the consequences of Australia's involvement in
international trade negotiations dominated by the USA. The consequences of such relations with the USA would
be the transformation of Australia25 or the whole BritishEmpire26 into a "juniorpartner" of US imperialism, "an
arsenal for the Yankee 'world conquerors'''27, "a colony of Wall Street" like Cuba or the Philippines28, a
"province of American imperialism"29, a "watchdog" of US andBritishimperialism in thePacific30,or a "satellite
to America"31 and the devastation of the national economy in terms still usedby left nationalists today.32 Cartoon
17. For an account ofthe transition tothe new, more moderate policies see D. C. Lockwood'To the FllndersStation: The Communist Party of
Australia and the PopularFront' History Honours Thesis Australian National University 1976 1'1'39-43.
18. L. L. Sharkey "The Labor Party Crisis" Communist Review August 1952 pp227-32
19. L. L. Sharkey "Report tothe Central Committee" Communist ReviewApril 1953 1'1'105-13.
20. ibid. 1'112. .
21.e.g, TribUM 1411/47 p3.
22 e.g, Tribun« 616147 1'3, 1/8/47 1'3, 1719/49 pi; R. Dixon Coml1lUnist Review July 1947 ~92, R. Dixon Report to the Central Committee
"The Present Situation And The Tasks OfThe Party" Communist ReviewApril 1948 pl01; R. Lockwood"Dollar Invasion Brings Thought
Control" Communist ReviewApril 1948 1'117; L. L. Sharkey ForAustralia ••Prosperous andIndependent 1'17; R. Dixon "Import Of Capital
And Labour's Policy" 01'. cit. 1'134; and his Report tothe Central Committee Communist Review September 1950 1'653.
23. e.g,LaborNewsJanuary 1947 1'5; TribUlle 1615/471'5, 30/5/47 pS,3/6147 1'2, 1/10147 pi, 1/11/471'3, 1913/49 1'3, 2613/49 r,3, 25/6149 1'2,
26111/49 Po1; L. L. Sharkey"The Meaning ofDr.Evatt's Policy" Communist ReviewDecember 1947 1'1'752-7; L. L. Sharkey Pacific Pact Is
War Pact' Communist ReviewJuly 1949 pp195-9; and J. D. Blm War, WhatFor? Victorian State Committee Australian Communist Party,
Melbourne [late] 1949.
24.e.g. TribUM 29/11/47 1'1,3/1/48 1'1'1, 8, 412148 ppl, 8,24/4148 pi, 319/49 1'2, 1019/49 pl, 2119/49 pl. Also seeJ. D. Blake "Devaluation
And Its Consequences" Coml1lUnist ReviewNovember 19491'331; LaborNews February 1948 1'8,2819/49 1'4; Australian Communist Party
Reportof tM WorkoftM Central Committee from tM Fourteenth to tM Fifteenth Natiofllll Congresses Sydney April 1948 1'4; and B. Millis
Dollars Devaluation andYouCurrent Book DIstributors, Sydney October 1948...
25. e.g,TribUM 1615/47 pS,DraftResolution for the 15th Congress National LibraI)' ofAustralia MS 3000 1'14.
26. A. Leontiev American Expansionism Past and Present Australian Commumst Party Sydney October 1947 1'27 and Draft Resolution
Communist Party ofAustralia Papers 01'. cit. 1'7. .
27.TribUM 3015/47 1'5.
28. ibid.
29. L. L. Sharkey "TheReformists Serve Reaction" Communist Review Apri11949.
30. DraftResolution 01'. cit. 1'23.
31.R. Dixon Report to the central Committee Plenum Coml1lUnist Review September 1950 1'654.
32 e.g, TribUM 1615/47 pS,2512148 1'8,319/49 1'2; L. L. Sharkey Australian Communists andSovietRussia Current Book Distributors, Sydney
1947; and "DraftProgramme Of The Australian Communist Party" Coml1lUnist Revie",:, July 1951 p839.
180
27 portrays Evatt as the mouthpiece of dollar imperialism. This analysis did not prevent the ACP from
recognising Australia's own imperial ambitions in the Pacific)3 It is not necessary to consider all of the above
issues in detail in order to establish what the ACP thought Australia's place in the worldor relationship with the
USA was..This is well illustrated in the Party's comments on one of the most important areas of international
relations during the late 1940s: themultilateral tradenegotiations aimedat establishing international agreements,
similar to Bretton Woods, to coverinternational trade.
As. the spirit of Teheran waned, so the CPA became more and more sceptical about the international trade
negotiations of the second half of the 1940s, as it did of the BrettonWoods Agreement. The Party believed that
Australia's share of the British market was at stake particularly at the Geneva World Trade Conference which
started in April 1947. The UnitedStates, Communists believed, was trying to use tradenegotiations to force open
themarkets of the British Empire in order to improve access for its own goods.34 The CPA took this insight and
its prediction of a new economic crisis and turned them into a nationalist stick with which to beat U.S. policy:
"Thesmashing of Australian exportindustries" was a logical consequence of US hostility to Empire preference
andtheLaborGovernment's subservience to WallStreetimperialism.35
Thecourse of tradenegotiations during 1947 led theACP to believe that the Australian fruit and sugar industries
would suffer from any agreement reached.36 Farmers were prime candidates for the Party's People's Front
strategy, partly modelled on the experience of the Eastern European People's Democracies. The Front was to be
led by the working class, with the ACP at its head and was to explicitly include farmers, the middle classes and,
until the line changed in 1948, sections of thecapitalist class.In orderto enlistthe supportof farmers, against US
imperialism, the Party mounted a campaign which included a tour of the fruit growing areas by Partyjournalist
RupertLockwood. The campaign focused on the dire consequences any reduction of Empirepreferences would
haveon the fruit-growing industry.37 Lockwood wrote Wall Street Attacks Australia as a part of this campaign.
Its front cover, Cartoon 28 indicated the Party's view of the relationship between Australia and the USA. He
argued that
"BothBritain andAustralia need the tariffsystem known as Empire tariffpreference, so thatBritain
can buy our food and wool and Australia can buy British machines and other goods... which
Australia doesnot manufacture herself'.38
Identifying with the interests of Australian manufacturing capital and the intentions of the Ottawa Agreement,
Lockwood further maintained that preference and tariff protection was necessary so that economically weaker
countries like Britain and Australia could compete with the USA for markets. He thus reproduced traditional
laborite arguments in favour of protectionism. To these Lockwood addedan argument that had beenusedbypre-
war left nationalists against Britain: the Commonwealth countries had suffered proportionately highercasualties
duringthelastwar thantheUSA and therefore shouldnot haveto sufferfrom dollarimperialism.
During May the US Congress's threat to increase US wool- tariffs led the ACP to express concern for the
Australian wool industry.39 But, some time after this danger had passed, Tribune discovered that big overseas
wool interests, "recognised on the Murrumbidgee as the economic fifth column", were trying to sacrifice fruit
exports to Britainin order to earnUS dollars by selling wool to the USA. Onlyunitedactionby workers, farmers
and business peoplecouldpreventsugarandfruit settlements frombeing turned intoghosttowns.40
The ACP's focus on access to the British market also justified the Party's support for aid to Britain's flagging
economy. This support was motivated by the beliefthat assistance to Britain could helpher resistpressure to fall
in line with theUS's anti-Russian foreign policy:
"Australia and New Zealand have been glad to receive their formal freedom under the Statuteof
Westminster but find that Britain is still the biggest, indispensable purchaser of their exports.
"All the Dominion people are therefore interested in helping the British people ward off the Wall
Streeteconomic raiders as theywarded off theNazimilitary raiders in the 1940."41
HencetheParty's encouragement of the food parcels for Britain movement.42
The ACP's new attitude to Empire preference and protectionism in general fitted in well with its and Russia's
currentattitudes to international affairs, but werehardly congruent with the Party's earlierdenunciations. Dixon
sought to clearup the theoretical position in a report to the Central Committee in July 1947. He recognised that
33. e.g. G. P. O'Day's review of B. Fitzpatrick The Australian People, 1788-1945 C011l11UUlist Review March 1947 p476j Australian
Communist Party The Way Forward op.ciL p17; L. L. Sharkey "Pacific Pact" op. ciLJune 1949 p195; and Austra1ian Communist Party "Draft
Programme" Opt ciLJuly 1951p840. . .
34.IAbor NewsMarch 1947 p6 and R. Dixon "The Way Forward", Communist ReviewApril 1947 p483.
35. e.g. Tribune 8/4/47 pl, 1114147 pl, 2512148 p8.
36. e.g. Tribune 615147 p8, 915147 p7, In147 pSand R. Dixon Report tothe Central Committee Communist ReviewJuly 1947 pp590-I. For the
Party's assessment ofthe drafttreaty seeTribune 22111147 p3: "Fruit Growers Take It On Chin from USA".
37. e.g. Tribune 615147 p8, 23/5/47 pl, .
38. R. Lockwood Wall Street Attacks Australia Cumnt Book Distributors Sydney 1947 p3. Also see IAbor News August 1947 p7.
Lockwood's pamphlet apparently proved to be quite popular, by the time ofthe 1948 ACP Congress 15 000 col!ies had been sold, Australian
Communist Party Report01theWork01the Central CommiJtee from the14thto 15thNationalCongress op. cit. p7.
39.Tribune 13/5147 p6 "Australia As Shom Lamb In Wool Deal with USA".
40. The Murrombidgee Irrigation Area was alarge fruit growing region. Tribune 3/6147 pl,
41.Tribune 23/5147 p4
42. e.g. ibid, Tribune 2217/47 pl,
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protectionism was an aspect of inter-imperialist rivalry and that it cut working class living standards by raising
prices. But in practicehe reversedthe conclusions to be drawn from sucha Marxistanalysis:
"Empire preference has a vastly different significance for Australia today to what it had in the
1930's. Todayit means the difference between the destruction and the maintenance of a numberof
industries vital to this country."43
There had been far more justification. for this argument, already a very familiar one to laborites, during the
depression than during the late 1940s. Dixon made the crux of his argument clear by looking forward to sugar,
fruit and meat producers and manufacturers, including "sections of the capitalist class", joining the ACP and
sections of the labour movement in opposition to US foreign policy, which aimed to link up with the Australian
big bourgeoisie.
TheACP treatedthe laterHavannatradenegotiations in the samewayas the Genevadiscussions:
"Postwarreconstruction Minister1. J. Dedman appears to haveaccepted at the Havana trade talks
the American sponsored plan to allow American capitaland goods freer entry to 'underdeveloped'
countries".44
Dixon put the question of the international trade negotiations into the context of the Party's perspectives:
communists should use the danger to Empire Preference as an example of the way the United States was
accentuating the Britisheconomic crisis so it could imposedetrimental policies on Australia. The Party should
fight the policies of the ALP and the Australian bourgeoisie which were leading to economic disasterand the loss
of "our independence". Finally, '
"Wemust rally the farmers, middleclasses and otherpeople whose livelihood is endangered by the
abolitions of Emf'irepreference and the scaling downof tariffs".4S
Thedevastating consequences of the GeneralAgreement on TradeandTariffs ("GATT", which cameinto effect at
the beginning of 1948), the International Wheat Agreement and the proposed International Trade Organisation,
predicted by theParty, never eventuated.46 Not only did Australia's export markets in general expand, thanks to
the long boom, but GAIT only marginally affected Australia's preferential position on the British market. The
Wheat Agreement did not prove to be an obstacle to increased Australian production and the United States
eventually rejectedthe International TradeOrganisation as detrimental to its owninterests.
The ACP was on safe ground in criticising the international trade negotiations, as Russian authorities, including
Varga who had not yet, gone into temporary eclipse, were doing the same.s? The enthusiasm of the Party for
Empirepreference ledL. L. Sharkey to worrythat .
"Sometimes our propaganda.could be taken to mean that we are fighting to restore the old
imperialist economy in the fight to preserve independence from American imperialism... But it
must be made'crystal clear that this fight is directed also at the British and Australian monopolists,
whosepolicy is one of subservience to Wall Street imperialism, whilestriving to save as much as
theycan of theirprofitsat the expenseof the masses".48
Indeed the Party had been calling for increased Empire self-sufficiency49, but it also called for increased trade
with Russia and Eastern Europe as an alternative to subservience to the U.S.A.SO This readily distinguished
Communists from Empire 10yalists,Sl although the capacity of Eastern Block countries to absorb substantial
amounts of Australian exports and therefore their value as outlets to supplement the limited British market was
doubtful.
It is just as important to distinguish the ACP's post-war, anti-imperialist nationalism from its nationalism before
the War, as it is to distinguish its position on EmpirePreference from that of theEmpireloyalists. TheParty's at-
titudeto the imperial powermostimportant for Australia after theWar, i.e, theUSA,was different fromits prewar
attitude to Britain. Duringthe late 1930s theParty's nationalism had beentempered by its desire to influence the
externalpolicy of the whole Empire in a direction favourable to Russia through Australian pressure on theBritish
Government It mightbe said that therewerethreecamps: thatof Russiaandits supporters around the world; that
of Germany, perceived as the ~ediate threat until mid-1939; and in between them the wavering western
43. R. Dixon Report tothe Central Committee Communist Review July 1947 pS9G-92.
44.Tribune 2512148 p8.
45.R. Dixon "The Present Situation and the Tasks ofthe Party", op. ciL pl07 also Tribune 1313/48 p8.
46. For more on Communist concerns about the international negotiations see, e.g, J. W. BaUes's address to the 1948 ACP Congress
Communist Party ofAustralia Papers op, ciL Box1 Folderl Tribune 3013149 p7.
47. Eo Varga "The Geneva Trade Talks" Communist Review October 1947 pp686-91, reprinted from New Times (Moscow) and E. Varga
"Britain Could Get Free From WaU Street" Tribune 1011148 p4. .
48. L. L. Sharkey ForAustralia Prosperous and Independent: Report to theFifteenth Congress, Australian Communist PartyCurrent Books,
Sydney May 1948 p12.
49. e.g. Dixon "The Present Situation" o~. ciL and Varga "Britain Could" op. ciL
SO e g. LaborNewsMarch 1947 p6j Tribune 8/8/47 pi, 4/10147 p3, 22111147 p3j Varga "Britain Could" op, clt.; Tribune 2812147 pS, 27/6147
pp4.Sj R. Dixon "The Way Forward" op.cit. p484j E. W. Campbell'''Golden Age' isNow a Fading Mirage" Communist Review September
1947 p6S3j R. Dixon ''The Present Situa~on" 0l'~ clt, p107j and Tribune 3/9/4~f2, 2119/49 pi,2~/10/49 pl, . ..
51. For an account ofthe Empire loyalist ~sltion see R. S. Russell/mper/Q Preference published for the Empire Econonuc Umon by the
Falcon Press, second edition London 1949. RusseU'8 conclusion warns that freer trade wiUlead to the Empire falling "under the domination of
American capitalism" and hence toaclash with Russia pl30.
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democracies, which Russian foreign policy was trying to win over. So Communists did not oppose Australian
membership of the Empire, although they did identify and oppose the interests of Australian and British
monopolists andcondemned certainactsof Britishimperialism. Duringthe late 1940s the Party's nationalism was
morevirulent, involving a rejection of any links at all withthe mainimperialist power,now the USA. The ACP's
nationalism was also moreclosely integrated withits critique of localmonopoly capitalism. Moreover, because of
the betrayals of the ALP, the Communist Partynow had" a specialresponsibility to take into its hands the banner
of thenational independence of Australia" .52
ColIins House
The Communist Party linked activities of the Australian bourgeoisie to the interests of US imperialism before
1948, but the identification of monopoly and American foreign policy was given great emphasis from the May
1948 Congress, which marked the formal adoption of the international radical turn by the Australian Party.53 At
the 1948 Congress this link wasstressedin itemafteritem. Sharkey identified British andAustralian monopolists,
"whosepolicy is one of subservience to Wall Street imperialism", together with American imperialism as the
Party's opponents in his main report to the Congress.54 Similarsentiments were expressed in the draft and final
resolutions of theCongress:
"Australian reaction, theclique of monopoly-capitalists and its political servants, is today becoming
utterlysubservient to American imperialism."55
Miles made the basis for the link in the Russian theory of the "two camps" explicit in his comments at the
Congress, by linking together the struggle against reactionary foreign and domestic policies.56 The Party's
comments on Australian foreign policy for the remainder of its radical turn continued to stress the relationship
between monopoly capital, Collins Housein particular, and US imperialism.57 Thenatureof this identification of
Australian monopoly capitalism with imperialism was somewhat different from that of the PopularFront period,
because theParty's nationalism wasless inhibited during the late 1940s.
The theorisation of the link between anti-monopolism and Australian nationalism was perfectedduring the early
1970s with the advent of the concept that Australia was dominated by "multinational corporations". The
multinational corporation embodied the object of anti-monopolismand anti-American nationalism in the same
institution. The development of the concept also followed an undisputed increase in the proportion of foreign
ownership of manufacturing capitalin Australia during thepost-warperiod.58
In its role as the preeminent representative of Australia'snational interests, theCommunist Party at first continued
to expect some sections of the capitalist class to take a progressive stand against monopoly capital, at least on
questions of international relations. During 1947 and early 1948 the Party thus held to the cross-class strategy
which had emerged from the 1945 Congress. The signs of the radicalisation of Communist policy had been
accompanied by statement's such as J. C. Henry's to the Empire Conference of Communist Parties in
February/March 1947. He maintained that thepolicyhe had advocated
"is suitable to the national interests of Australia because it is in the interests of the workers, farmers,
townmiddleclassand of sections of capitalnot tied to thegreatmonopolies" .59
Backin Australia he told the CentralCommittee Plenumin May 1947 that the broadfront againstUS imperialism
should include "patriotic progressive elements in the capitalist class".60 The Party's campaigns over the
international tradenegotiations during 1947 andearly 1948 shouldbe seen in this light•
. In the courseof the campaigns against the international trade negotiations Communists did consider the divergent
interests of capitalists engaged in different industries e.g. manufacturing, which included both the BHP steel
monopoly and manyvery smallbusinesses, versus woolproduction, involving hugepastoral companies as wellas
smallfarmers. But as during theprevious periodtherewasa lackof clarityon the distinction between capitaland-
monopoly capital, as classes. The resolutions of the 1948 Party Congress again identified monopoly capital as
having its own "selfish class interests" and Sharkey said that it was in the interests of strengthening monopoly
capital that the ALP had dropped its commitment to nationalising key industries.61 But he made no attempt to
distinguish between the content of monopoly as opposed to other capitalists' interests. After a reference to the
52. J. D. Blake Communist Review May 1948 p137. For the ACP's softness on the Empire during the War see R. Dixon "Federal Labor
Conference" Communist Review January 1944 p180 and Tribune 14/8/45 p3.
53. R. Dixon Report to the Central Committee meeting of 16-1915/1947, Communist Review July 1947 p592, suggested that US capital was
fonning joint companies with Australian capital in order to build up a "Fifth Column", and in fact,"Important sections ofthe Australian
bourgeoisie are being drawn into the camp ofAmerican Imperialism".54. L. L. Sharkey For Australia .0 Prosperous and Independent, op. cit. Current Books Sydney May 1948 p12.
SS.DraftResolution ForFifteenth Congress p14 in National Ubrary ofAustralia MS 3000, Australian Communist Party TheWay Forward op,
cit.pg.
56. J.B. Miles's comments are recorded in Communist Party ofAustralia Papers op,cit, Boxl Folded.
57. see, for example, Tribune 2612149 p5,2515149 p4, 12111149 pi; J.R. Hughes KeepThe Unions FreeCurrent Book Distributors, Sydney
September 1948 p3; and R. Dixon "The WayTo Victory" Communist ReviewFebruary 1950 pp421-2.58. see especially the writings ofE. L. Wheelwright e.g, Radical Political Economy: Collected Essays ANZ Sydney 1974 and B. Fitzpatrick
and E.L. Wheelwright TheHighest Bidder Landsdowne,Melboume 1965.
59. J.C. Henry. Speech to the London Conference ofEmpire Communist Parties Communist Review May 1947 pS17.
60. J.C. Henry Report tothe Central Committee Communist Review July 1947 pS85 "... undoubtedly as the reality ofthe position becomes
clearer elements inthe Country Party and also the LiberalParty will be found for Australian independence as against American domination".
61. Australian Communist Party TheWayForward op. cit, and L. L. Sharkey ForAustralia .0 Prosperous and Independent op. cit. p17.
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class interests of "monopoly capital" he went on to deal with the increasing ferocity of the "bourgeoisie" in its
attackson the working class and the need for a People's Front againstthe "capitalists". The relationship between
monopolyand other capital was also unclearin the ACP's critiqueof the "Browderism" of the BritishCommunist
Party. The Australian Party emphasisedthat "monopoly capital is in complete control and the bourgeois statehas
not been undermined. .."62 This statementwas designed to deny, in orthodox Leninist terms, the possibility of a
transition to socialismunder a Labour Government but it drew moreon CommunistPopularFront analyses during
the 1930s than on Lenin and raised the question of the distinction between monopoly capitalist"control" and the
bourgeois nature of the state.
Jessop has pointed out that the Popular Front conception of fascism as the dictatorship of the most reactionary
elements of fmance capital presaged the 19508 theory of state monopoly capitalism in which monopoly capital
appropriatedstate power to the exclusionof other fractions of the capitalistclass.63 Since the War, the ACPhad
been moving towards this latter conception in an atheoretical way. In his critique of E. Varga's The Changes in
the Economics ofCapitalism as a Result 0/ the Second World War I. Gladkov expounded an early,Stalinisttheory
of state monopoly capitalism. This was an instrumentalist version which emphasised "the limited nature of the
regularising measures of the bourgeois State in the economicsphere". Gladkovjustified his analysis in terms of
the "fusion of fmancecapital with the State", a formulation fromLenin's Imperialism. While more explicit in its
analyses than anything an ACP member wrote during this period, Gladkov's article still did not explain, and
stamocap theory subsequently has not satisfactorily specified, the distinction between the interests of the
bourgeoisie and monopoly.64
In the 1948 pre-Congress discussion Dixon emphasisedthat the Australian bourgeoisie was "not movinginto the
arms of Americanimperialism like a lover into the arms of his mistress". Rather the bourgeoisie was vacillating
and divided on the question.65 On foreign policy, the most vital area of Communist concern, theParty had to
"Take advantageof the differences amongstthe bourgeoisie." He thuscalledfor manoeuvres amongst sections of
the bourgeoisie, which he labelled traitorous to Australia. Soon after, in his Report to the 1948 Party Congress,
Dixon called for the construction of a People's Front of workers, farmers and the middleclass, withno mention of
the progressivesectionsof the capitalist class.66 This proved to be a transitional position. The radicalisation of
the Party's domestic policies and the modification of its interpretation of Lenin 1913 from the Congress, made it
untenable. After the Congress there was little talk of including capitalists in the People's Front or of taking
advantageof the divisions amongstthem, until the Party moved back to the right in 1951-2.67
Henceforth the Party's analysis made no serious distinction between the bourgeoisie and the monopolies. Their
identity and, also from the 1948Congress, that of Collins House were increasingly blurred.68 In the tradition of
Money Power analyses, the monopolies were accused of conspiring against the people.69 The evolution of the
Party's conception of the class structure of Australian capitalismtowards a state monopoly capitalist (stamocap)
view was thus confused during this radical period of Communist policy, and its apparently contradictory
consequences in the realm of economic and class analysis: on the one hand an increased focus on opposition to
Collins House, a tiny section of the capitalist class, as the main enemy; on the other hand a blurring of the
distinctions amongst Collins House and monopoly capital and the bourgeoisie as a whole. This view was
expressedin Cartoon29.
The point of stamocap theory was that it justified attempts by Communist Parties to form alliances with non-
monopolistsections of the capitalistclass. Once the fully blown radical position had been adopted at the 1948
ACP Congress, however, the Party'ceased to talk about winning over progressive sections of the capitalistclass
until it moved back to the right during the early 1950s. The belief that the whole of the bourgeoisie was
62 Political Committee ofthe Australian Communist Party "Letter tothe CPGB" Communist Review September 1948 p27l.
63. B. Jessop The Capitalist State Martin Robertson Oxford 1983 p39. The theory ofstate monopoly capitalist "subjugation ofthe state
machine tothe monopolies" was sanctified inStalin'S 1952 Economic Problems Of Socialism in theU.S.S.R. (Foreign Languages Press Peking
1972 p43). The affinity ofthe postwar evolution ofthe ACP's theory ofthe state toPopular Front conceptions was ap~nt in its use ofthe
term fascist todescribe the agents ofmonopoly capital, e.g, J. R. Hughescalled the actions ofthe right-wing Labor 'agents ofthe bosses;
agents ofCollins House" "Hitlerite" in his KeepTheUnions Freeop. cit, and inFebruary 1950 Dixon argued that the Menzies Government was
promoting fascism, understood as the dictatorship ofthe powerful banking and industrial monopolies, "The Way To Victory" op,cit. p420. For
an early explanation, inan Australian publication ofthe dominant role of the monopolies vis a vis the rest ofthe capitalist class see M. Dobb
Economics ofPrivate Enterprise op, cit, p5. .
64. I. Gladkov "Second World War and Changes in the Economics of Capitalism" Communist ReviewMay 1948 ppI49-154. For a brief
statement ofthe Communist Party's later stamocap position see Communist Party ofAustralia ThePeople Against Monopoly Current Book
DistributoIS, Sydney June 1961 and also E. Aarons Economics For Workers Current Book Dlstributors, Sydney 1961 pp53-54, Aarons's
treatment ofstamocap ispreceded by adiscussion ofthe "Sixty Families".
65.Tribune 15/5/48 p3 and R. Dixon "Import ofCapital and Labour's Policy" op,clt, pl34.
66.R. Dixon "BUilding the People's Mass Movement"Communist Review June 1948 pl,'l64-6. For an earlier and weaker version ofDixon's
transitional position see his report tothe Central Committee inFebruary 1948, COmmunISt Review April 1948 ppl06-7 where heargues that the
policies ofthe Australian bourgeoisie and the ALP are hastening the onset .ofeconomic crisis and Australian subordination toUS imperialism,
although he ambiguously calls for the ACP to "rally the farmers, middle classes and other people whose livelihood is endangered by the
abolition ofEmpire preference and the scaling down oftariffs". These other people presumably included some manufacturing capitalists. On
the priorityofforeign policy seeJ. C.Henry Speech tothe London Conference. .. op, cit, p517.
67. W. Gollan, Central Committee member though not a prominent one, endorsed an alliance with progressive capitalists at the 1948 Party
Congress, but no other leading members did, Communist Party ofAustralia Papers 01" cit. boxl foldert, Australian Communist Party Report
ofthe Workof theCentral Committee from the 14thto 15thNational Congress op. Clt. noted Henry's speech to the Central Committee on the
need for alliance with progressive capitalists. .. .,68. e.g. J. D. Blake "Murdoch, Sharpley and Holloway" COmmufUSt ReVieW June 1949 pl63; J.R. Hughes Keep TheUnions Freeop, Clt.; and
Communist Party ofAustralia Spealiers' NotesFebruary 1950 pp3, 22. .
69.Tribune 1913/49 p3, Communist Party ofAustralia Spealurs'Notesop,cit,p22
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reactionary also entailedrejection of any progressive role for the ALP,which was still interpretedas representing
the interests of the capitalistclass. Fulminating against Collins House combined with a blurring of boundaries
amongst Collins House, monopoly capital and the bourgeoisie served to portray Australian society in a suitably
leftist,polarised light while at the same time giving the impression that the forces lined up on the side of progress
were formidable, although in reality, and even the Party's own analyses, they were not. The requirements of the
defence of Russia, defined in the Kremlin, included a working class offensive. The ACP complied,
notwithstanding the obstacles presented by its own theory, masking these, probably unconsciously, with a
rhetorical device: castigation of CollinsHouse.
The adoption of the full radical programat the 1948 ACP Congress, therefore had the following consequences for
Communist ideas about the class structureof Australian capitalism. Not only did the Party's nationalismbecome
moreextreme,it also believedthat class tensions were heightening to such an extent that the question of socialism,
or at least the establishment of a "People's Democracy" was on the agenda. The Communistpicture of the class
structure of Australian society also becamemorepolarised. On the one hand there was the conspiratorial Collins
House clique, with its American connections, on the other stood the Communist Party, the only remaining,
genuinerepresentative of Australian nationalism. In rhetoric the main enemyof the progressivemovement was
thus limited to a smallergroup thaneven the "monopolies".
The emphasison Collins House as the main enemyof the Australian people started at the 1948ACPCongress. It
did not figure in the draft resolution or in Sharkey's report but was a majorconcernin Blake's report70 and, subse-
quently, the Congress resolutions.71 The idea to focus all attacks on Collins House apparently was Sharkey's.
AfterpraisingBlake's report in his reply to the Congress discussion he said that:
"I think we must consider whether we cannot make the name of CollinsHouse stink, make it have
the same significance to every Australian that the 400[sic] families had to the French People in the
days of the PopularFront, whether we can centraliseall our campaigns to show the real enemiesof
the people, the organisers of fascism and war... and we must make Collins House the centre of
everything that is againstthe interests of the massesof the Australian people" .72
Subsequently "Collins House" was used as a synonym for the ruling class, reaction or the main enemy. It was
Collins House and its mouthpiece, the LiberalParty, that opened a "Savage War On Pay and Hours", sought the
reintroduction of militaryconscription and were "Behind [The] Drive on Unions' BallotRights" .73 At an election
rally during the 1949FederalelectionsBlakesaid that
"The class enemy of the working people in Australia is the small but extremely wealthy and
powerfulgang of monopolycapitalists centredin CollinsHouse,Melbourne.
"In the hands of this small group rests the control of all the economic life of our country and,
consequently, of the political life, including the policiesof all politicalparties,with the exceptionof
the CommunistParty".74
Tribune ran a number of articles by Len Fox, the Party's expert on relationships amongst the wealthy after
Rawling's departure, exposingthe activities of the Collins House and other monopolists. These articles followed
along the lines of his 1946 Wealthy Men and, in their analysis and conspiracy theory, owed at least some
inspiration to Anstey's Money Power analyses. In an article "TwentyMonopolists In Collins House Can Dictate
To Millions Of People" Fox identified three monopoly groups: Collins House, the NSW group and the "British
moneybarons and steel kings",7S This had a close resemblance to Anstey'stripartite division, also employedby
Rawling. About six months later another article included a box quoting a 1933 Smith's Weekly article on the
"MoneyTsars".76 In February 1950 a new versionof Wealth Men was issued as Guilty Men Again, recalling the
title of Fox's war-timepamphlet. In the latterFox revealed that
"Theplot of the GuiltyMen is far more than an Australian plot. It's a worldwide plot. It started in
America-- in the HotelPennsylvania in New YorkCity on September17, 1942",77
Labor News carried a series on "Who's Who In Collins House" during late 1948 and early 1949, as well as
employing the general "Collins House" terminology whenreferring to opponents of the union and the Communist
Party.78
70. t,,'bUM 19/5/48 p3 and]. D. Blake "TheMenace ofCollins House" Communist ReviewJune 1948 pp17S-9. A. Davidson TheCommunist
PartyofAustralia Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1969 p174maintains that"the Collins House Conspiracy of ruling families" wascoined
byB. Pitzpatrick in TheRichGetRicherRawson's Bookshop, Melbourne 1944.
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"The chief centre of reaction in Australia is in Collins House, Melbourne.•. Here are to be found the financiers and
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77.L. FoxGuiltyMen AgainCurrent BookDistributors, Sydney, February 19S0p3.
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The focus on Collins House enabled Party leaders to make statements along the lines of the following title of
Blake's contribution to the special 1948Congressdiscussion in CommunistReview, despitean increasingly hostile
environmentand theParty's own conclusion that the bourgeoisie and ALPhad only recentlygoneover to theside
of reaction: "WeHave GreatTasks And Many Allies".79
When the Party swung back to the right in the early 1950s, again actively seekingallies amongst the ALP left, its
invective against Collins House faded, while that against the monopolies in general remained and eventually
developedinto an analysis of the "SixtyWealthyFamilies".80
"An Economic Crisis,Deeperand More Devastating•••"81
The Communist Party's diagnosis of the health of Australian capitalism" during its radical turn amounted to
warnings that a new depression was nigh and a more convincing assessment of the importance of workers'
struggles overwagesand conditions. The theoryof the two campsprovidedan effective wayfor the Communist
Party to link foreign policyquestions to those of immediate interest to workers: wages and prices, preeminently.
The struggle againstthe monopolies, whose links with US imperialism were stressed and which were blamed for
reactionary, crisis inducing domestic policies,unified actionin these two areas. In SeptemberDixon emphasised
the importanceof economicfights to the CentralCommittee:
"There is an inseparable connection between the fight around the economicissues and the struggle
for Australian independence againstthe threatof American imperialism".82
The developmentof the economicstrugglewouldopen up new possibilities in other spheres. Since it had returned
to its predictions of an'economic crisis in 1945, the ACP had used the imminence of a new depression to justify
workers' demands for improvedwagesand conditions. Every setbackin the Australian or US economy andevery
pronouncement by an economist, conservative or Russian was used to hammer home the message that a new
slump was looming and that workers should thereforeintensify their struggles for wages andconditions.
Communists saw the next slump approaching in the guise of international tradenegotiations restricting Britain's
ability to buy Australian goods83, the spread of crisis to Australia from the US or the rest of the world.84 Some
Communists even took heart from the existenceof a boom. Dixonmaintained that
"The present situation is characterised by a boom, the kind of boom that precedes economic
crisis."8S
In early 1948 the Party was confidentthat the crisis had alreadybegun86,although it later occasionally retreated to
saying the depression was only imminent.87 The statements of a widespectrumof authorities was invokedto sup-
port the contention that a crisis was inevitable. These ranged from "ace Soviet economist" Varga88, not yet shot
down by his Stalinistpeers in publicdebate, through Ben Chifley89 to orthodox economists.so ProfessorHytten's
comments to the Hobart Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science Congress
attractedconsiderable commentthroughout the labour movement Tribunecondemnedhis proposals for eightper
cent unemploymentandcommented:
. "As this banking economist's remarks starkly reveal, Australian capitalists from Collins House
down seek a future in which the Australian workers face, not prosperity but a scramble for jobs,
with hunger,want and homelessness takingthe hindmost".91
Cartoon30 was also a commenton Hytten's remarks. The fall of E. Varga, for over a decade the mostprominent
Soviet economist, can only have driven home the message to Australian Communists that too much stress could
notbe placed on the immmence of a new crisis.92
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Apartfrom the suggestion that the nextdepression wouldcome to Australia as a result of international contagion,
Communists explained the origins of economic crises in radical underconsumptionist terms. Emile Burns'
Communist Review article"Why theBoomWill Bust" resuscitated Marx's "explanation" of the "Last cause of all
real crises..."93 Radical underconsumptionism remained the Party's theoretical explanation of crises,94 through
to the 1960s.95
Havingdemonstrated the inevitability of a new crisis, theParty took care to refute the ChifleyGovernment's and
orthodox economists' arguments that higherproductivity, rather than increased wages, was the need of the hour.
In contrast with Thornton's 1946 position that Chifley's preoccupation with wage-pegging was a personal
idiosyncrasy and that inflation was a figment of his imagination the ACP interpreted inflation as a deliberate
Keynesian policydevicedesigned to cut real wages from 1947.
Communists pointed out that wage increases were not the cause of price increases, despite the arguments of
employers and Labor politicians. In his early 1947pamphlet Raise Wages Reduce Prices Dixon maintained that
risingprices were due to profiteering by capitalists, the monopolies or Collins House,who were takingthis stepto
cut real wages with the assistance of the Government's wage peggingregulations.96 He pointed out, along with
non-Communist unionofficials, that the cost of living indexusedfor the quarterly adjustment of wages was biased
againstgoods whose prices were rising rapidly.97 The Party accurately assessed the significance of the Chifley
Government's wages and prices policy as one designed to contain real wages, associated this strategy with the
Government's Keynesianism andidentified thegrowing conflictover it insidethe ALP. In Sharkey's eyes:
"Both the ACTUand theNSWLaborCouncilhaverepudiated economic Chifleyisrn. That is to say,
thereis a growingdivergence of policywithintheLaborParty itself, between the most important re-
fonnists in the TradeUnionmovement and the "liberal" Keynesian groupthat dominates theFederal
Cabinet".98
The ACP thus rejected the Government's economic program in early 1947 as hastening the onset of a new
depression:
"Basedon the false Keynes economic doctrine, the FederalGovernment's economic policy, far from
preventing a crisis, as Mr. Chifley asserts in his justification for his refusal to grant Trade Union
demands, actually the more speedily brings about the conditions that result in eventual
depression."99
Dixonexplained the mechanism at work: inflation restrictedthe marketat thesame time as Australian production
was increasing.lOO After the wage pegging regulations had been smashed the Party made a somewhatmore far-
fetched analysis of inflation, which the Government claimed to be combating: inflation was itself a deliberate
result of Keynesian policies.
"The policy of raising prices and inflation advocated by Keynes, the mouthpiece of the British
bourgeoisie, as a means of increasing theprofits of thecapitalists andreducing the real wagesof the
workers, is the deliberate policyof the Australian LaborParty leaders, andis pursuedby Liberaland
LaborGovernments alikewithdifferences of degreeandamenability to publicpressure" .
Rising prices and profits combined with declining living standards were "bringing into being the conditions of
economic crisis" )01
The new analysis of inflation drew on Jurgen Kuczynski's 1937critique of Keynes'General Theory. Kuczynski
arguedthat Keyneshad embraced fascism and that the key to his bookwas the use of monetary inflation to reduce
real wages.l02 Kuczynski's seemsto havebeen theonly serious left-wing critiqueof Keynes available at the time.
interpreted the criticisms ofVarga's 1946 Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Resultof tM Second World Waras being anindicator
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number ofyears was out ofthe Cl,uestion. For an account ofVarga's theoretical development see C. Gannage "E. S. Varga and the Theory of
State Monopoly Cat>italism" RevieW of Radical Political Economy 12(3) 1980 pp36-49.
93.Communist ReviewMarch 1947 p455. .. .
94. see, e.g., R. Dixon "The Way Forward" op, ciL p484; LaborNewsJanuary 1949 p6; and Tribune 2815/49 p6.
95. e.g, E. Aarons Economics ForWorkers Current Book Distributors Sydney 1961 Pl'31-2. .
96. R. Dixon RaiseWages Reduc4 Prices Current Book Distributors, Sydney 1947, 300,000 were sold up to the 1948 Congress according to
Reportof thework. . •fromthe14thop, cit. p30. Also see R. Dixon's report to the Central Committee meeting of9-1019/48 Communist Review
October 1948 p304; Tribune 2211214~ pl, 2611149 p7; and E. Thomton TM CaUS4 OfInflation . . •AndTM Answer Current Book Distributors,
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97. also see "Editor's Notes" AmalgamatedEngine4ring Union Journal October 1948.
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Conference" Communist Review August 1947 pp622-4 saw the consolidation ofcontrol by the "extreme right wing" ofthe NSW Party.
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In response to the Government's and general concern about inflation the CommunistParty argued that existing
price controls were inadequate, benefiting employers at the expenseof workers. The ACP called for strictermea-
sures and supportingthe Government's attempt to increase its powers over prices by referendum)03 The Party's
campaign against inflation included the the establishment of the New Housewives Association. J. B. Miles
explained the consequences of the devaluation of the Australianpound in terms of the Party's new interpretation
of inflation. Devaluation wouldnot only increaseAustralia's international competitiveness, but alsocut wages,l04
The Communist rejection of Chifley's productivity drive followed naturally from its critique of Keynesian
theories of inflation. Tribune argued that, despite the improvements in the economic situation by early 1947,
workers' purchasing power had declinedsince the war.105 A year later the newspaperhighlighteda contradiction
in Chifley's economicanalysis: .
"In one breathMr. Chifleypromised the workers a Golden Age if only they would work harder and
produce more.
"In the next breath he lamented that shortages would continue for a long time and confessed that he
did not know how long the dollarcrisis wouldlast".106
The Party argued that wage increases should precede increases in productivity, rather than follow them. Cartoon
31 proclaimed "Industry CAN Afford It". A glut of some consumer goods was already emerging (a sign of
economiccrisis) becauseworkerscould not afford them. Becauseworkers wererecognisingthat inflationwas due
to higher profits, they rejected the assertion that wage rises and fallingproduction were responsible. The cryof
"increasedproduction" would benefit employersand lead to dismissals.107 MoreoverUS imperialismwas at the
bottomof the wholescheme:
"Behind the Federal Government •• Big Business drive for more production from Australian
workers are the MarshallPlan controllers..."108
Suggestions that the labour movement should examine the value of incentive payment schemes and that workers
should save more were similarlyrejected as leadingto sackingsor simplyas "blatantnonsense",109
Although during 1947 the ACP came to reject the Government's economic strategy, certain of the Chifley
Government's Keynesian policy measures were still supported by the Party. The most notable of these, the
decision to nationalisethe banks,was taken after the ACP had entered its radical period, although before the new
policy had ramified throughout the Party's program. The decision was initiallyreceivedwith great enthusiasm by
the Communist Party.110 The first Tribune after the announcement proclaimednationalisation a "challenge to the
dictatorial power of finance-capital" and of benefit to workers because it would allow the "Labor Government
moreeffective controlover capital investment, and thus help to minimisethe effects of the coming crisis on jobs,
wages and living standards". Bank nationalisation was not, however, a socialist measure and "In itself, •.. could
only curb and not break the power of monopolycapitalism".111 The initialresponse was particularlyuncritical of
the Government's Keynesian rationale for bank nationalisation. The SeptemberCommunist Review editorialgave
a more hard headed, theoreticalassessment: bank nationalisation was a response to the spread of depression from
Britain and the USA; Chifley's promises of economic expansion throughwage and price control, public works,
immigration and capital inflow from overseas was a "Keynesianfantasy"; to insulate Australia from the world's
problems widespread nationalisations along the lines of the "new democracies in Europe" were necessary; but
bank nationalisation made the achievement of socialism easier, as Lenin pointed out in the Approaching
Catastrophe.ua (As we have seen, Lenin's position in that essay was something quite different). This analysis
reflected the ACP's general position, until 1948, that certain of the Government's policies were progressive and
could mitigate the effects of the imminent depression,113 It ~as also in accord with the interpretation of Lenin
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"Mass support for bank nationalisation among the Australian people, who see itasameasure tocurb the Money Baron's dictatorship... "
Ill. Tribun.e 19/8/47 pl. Dixon told apublic meeting that "The banks are the centre, the core, the very essence ofmonopoly inpresent day
Australia", TribUM 29/8/47 pl, Also see Tribune 22110/47 p3 on the anti-depression use to which bank credit could be puL
112. Editorial Communist Review September 1947 p643, also see E. W. Campbell "Lenin On Bank NatioJialisation" Communist Review
December 1947 pp761-4, the progressiveness ofbank nationalisation did not mean that itcould off-set economic crisis. Also see L. L. Sharkey
"Pacific Pact IsWar Pact" Communist ReviewJuly 1949 pl97.
113. e.g. Tribun.e 15/11147 pi: "Without labor reforms, flnancial controls and planning the depression would be far worse than the last..",that
is, under aMenzies rather than aChitley GovernmenL The article enjoined Chifley tofollow Curtin's example ofdrawing closer to the trade
unions, warned against the possibility of"something close tofascism" being imposed on the workers by aMenzies Government and concluded
with acall for unity inthe labour movement to"fight the common enemies, the monopolists".
188
1913 then current: that the ALP as a liberal capitalist party could play a progressive role.114 Dixon explicitly
placed bank nationalisation in the context of the ALP's "liberal-bourgeois position".115 Despite increasing
disillusionment with the Government's lacklustre campaign in support of its own legislation116 the Party
continued to campaign in support of bank nationalisation with publications such as E. W. Campbell's People
versustheBanks and R. Lockwood's BankersBackedHitler,117
After the ACP's 1948Congress the Party rejected all aspects of Governmenteconomic policy. The emphasis in
its treatment of bank nationalisation and the existence of "progressive" aspects of Labor policy changed. Sharkey
explainedthat bank nationalisation was taken simply to strengthenAustralian capitalism according to the dictates
of the Government's Keynesian economic plan. The plan had been frustrated by monopoly capital which did not
believe in its efficacy. No progressiveside to bank nationalisationwas mentionedand Sharkey maintained that if
implemented Labor's economic plans could not have prevented depression and were even "inadequate••. to
cushion the effect of depression on the masses".118 The change in the designation of the ALP from "Labor" to
"Labour" Party in Communist Review between December 1947 and January 1948 was a sign of the ACP's
dismissal of Australian social democracy as any kind of progressive force. Everything about the ALP was
rejected, even its spellingof its own name.
The -Communist Party's alternative to Keynesian policy was to advocate wage increases, widespread
nationalisations and planning. From 1947 the Party believed that socialismwas a short-termprospect,119 Thus in
August 1949 L. H. Gould confidently asserted that the current economic crisis was occurring "in the very last
years of the existence of capitalism",120 The Party's calls, during its radical turn, for nationalisations to combat
the crisis should be understood in the context of its belief that the transition to socialism under a People's Front
government, more or less modelled on the eastern European experience, was near at hand. From 1948,calls for
nationalisation to off-set the effects of economic crisis were only directed to the Chifley Government for
propaganda purposes, unlike those in the preceding.period during which the Party thought the ALP might be
convinced,under pressure,of the desirability of such measures,121 A comment on the situationin Britain in 1949
made the ACP's fully fledged radical attitude to nationalisations by Governments like Chitley's explicit:
"Nationalisation, to be effective in the people's interests. must be carried out by a People's government",122
The ACP believed that the working class was still the agency through which socialism could be achieved in
Australia,even ifonly as a tool to be manipulated by the Party. At the heart of the Party's radical policies was its
promotion of the economic struggle, because it increased the possibilities for struggle in other areas,123 .The
ACP's case for wage struggles was summed up in the following. page one headline in Tribune: "Win Gains
Before New Crisis Breaks: Miles' CC Call",124 In the course of the ACP's radical turn working class struggles
for improved wages and conditions replaced progressive legislation as the preferred means of off-setting, though
not preventing. the effects of the crisis,125 Thus the Party press devoted a great deal of attention during 1948 and
114. R. Dixon "The Economic Crisis" op, cit p682 and E. W. C3mpbell "Warning on the Inflation Danger" Communist Review November 1947
p721. InNovember 1947 Tribune contrasted the Chifley Government favourably with the possibility ofaMenzies Government:
"Instead of bank nationalisation and anti-depression programs of public works, as proposed bythe Chifley Government,
Australia would get from the Menzies Government a worse dose ofNiemeyerism and Premiers' Plan wage and social service
cuts.•. Without labor reforms, financial controls and planning the depression would befarworse than the lasL .. " Tribune
15/11147 pI.
115. R. Dixon "The Economic Crisis" op, ciL p682
116. e.g. Tribune 1111147 p6,5/11147 p3, 6112147 p7.
117. E. W.'Campbell People Versus Banks Current Book Distributors, Sydney 1947,63,000 sold upto the 1948 Congress, R. Lockwood
Bankers Backed HitlerCurrent Book Distributors, Sydney (January) 1948. .
118. L. L. Sharkey "The Collapse Of The Labour Government's Economic Policy" Communist Review September 1948 p267. Also see
Tribune 30nJ49p3.
119. J. D. Blake foreshadowed the development ofParty thinking onthese lines inhis T1/4 Communist WayForward State Committee Victoria,
Australian Conimunist Party Melbourne November 1947 pp15-6, his report tothe State Conference. Also see J.D. Blake Report tothe Central
Committee Communist Review July 1947 p596 for anapplication ofthe East European model toAustralia. .
120. L. H. Gould "World Capitalism Moves Into Deep Crisis" Communist Review August 1949 p237. Also seeJ. C. Henry "The Industrial
Front" Communist ReviewJune 1948 p171: "When we set ourselves the perspective ofdeveloping a People's Front inAustralia inthe present
international conditions, we aresetting our course for political power. Not less than this"; J. C. Henry Report tothe Central Committee "The
Role Of Reformism" Communist Review August 1949 p228: B. Taft "The Right Socialists Yesterday and Today" Communist Review
November 19491'34 opens "In the present dusk ofthe capitalist system. .. ":v. Cheprakov "Growth ofaNew Economic Crisis inthe Capitalist
World" Communist ReviewDecember 1949 pp644-71; R. Dixon Report tothe Central Committee Communist Review September 1950 p6S4:
"capitalism ison the verge ofcollapse".
121. J. C. Henry "The Role OfReformism" op. ciL 1'230: "In aperiod ofcrisis, ofcourse, reformism passes into the position ofthe chief social
support ofcapitalism". Some examples ofCommunist calls for nationalisationwere Tribune 1215/48 p3, 8/12148 p3, 2216149 pS, L. H. Gould
"World Capitalism. .• " op, ciL p238. '. .
122. Tribune 811149 p7. See also E. W. Campbell "The Role Of The Labor Party" op. ciL and Tribune 7nJ48 pl,2SI9/48 p6 which quotes
Lenin 1913 tothe effect that the ALP isnot asocialist Party unlike the ACP: "The 'lDlddle ofthe road' pose frequently adopted by the ALP
only serves asaconvenient cloak forits real role asaparty ofAustralian capitalism".
123. R. Dixon Report tothe Central Committee Communist Review October 1948 p304. Blake had anticip'ated this position inMarch 1946, but
was criticised atthat time, see Political Committee Meeting Communist Party ofAustralia Papers Op.Clt. box2 folded and J. D. Blake "The
1949 Coal Strike" Australian Left Review p13. .
124. Tribune 1812147 pl also seeRowe and Wright op. cit. \'16-
125. e.g. Australian Communist Party Social Services op. C1L p31: E. W. Campbell'''Golden Age' IsNow aFading Mirage" 01'. ciL p653: J.D.
Blake T1/4 Communist Way Forward op, ciL pIS: J. R. HUghes "For A Higher Basic Wage" Communist Review July 1948 p201; Tribune
2211149 ~3, 8112148 p3:
'Apartial solution [to capitalism's boom and bust cycle] is immediately possible by raising wages atthe expense of pro~ts,
rigidly pegging prices and nationalising the key industries, particularly coal and steel, as advocated by the AustralIan
. Communist Party."
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1949 to the campaign for an increased basic wage.126 Communists also perceived the similarities between the
policies of the ALP and the Liberal opposition, as Cartoon 32 shows. Unfortunately the Party's wholehearted
endorsement of industrial militancy derivedfrom Communists' loyalty to Moscow and an unrealistic assessment
of the circumstances of Australian capitalism rather than a commitment to working class self-emancipation. It
wasnot, therefore, tempered by a sober assessment of the relation of forces in Australian industry or a democratic
approach to the rank and me of the working class. The experience of the 1948 Queensland railway and 1949
nationalcoal strikes confirmed the ACP in its realisticassessment of theroleof theLaborParty. But the lessons it
drewfor practical activity had little bearing on the reality of the situation. After the defeat of the miners' strike,
under the headline "Miners SmashEmployers' DriveOn LivingStandards", Tribune announced
"... Therewas no shattering of the militant organisation of the workers. On the contrary, therewas
a strengthening, and it was the ALP forces which emergedfrom the struggle split from top to bot-
tom",127
Whenthe Partyonce againturned to the right therewasno significant modification of its economic analyses. The
imminence of economic crisis, the emphasis on the conspiracies of monopoly capital and the importance of the
struggle for Australian independence all remained a part of Communist"theory", if in toneddownform, Today all
but the first are still the core of left nationalist analyses of Australian capitalism in and outside the Communist
Party. The Communist Party rejected its "leftist"stress on working class militancy and criticism of the Chifley
Government as sectarian, when it turned back to the right. Despite a brief revival during the early 1970s, the
ACP's recognition in the late 1940s that working class militancy was the key to the transition to socialism no
longerformsa part of the traditions of Australian leftnationalism.
126.someof the articleson the"301-" campaign over twobrief periods were Tribune 15/9/48 p3, 2519/48 pI, 2/10/4.8 p6,9/10/48 p3, 23110/48
pl and 29/1149 pS,2/2/49p3, 512149 1l6, 9/2/49p3, 1612/49 pll6,7,19/2149 p3.
127.Tribune 1318149 p3. Also see tribune 18/6149 p3; LilborNews 17/8/49 pI; J. D. BlakeThe GreatCoal Strike Australian Communist
Party,Sydney1949andJ. R. Hughes Keepthe Unions Freeop,cit,p26.
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CHAPTERTEN
CONCLUSION: THE ECONOMIC IDEAS OF THE AUSTRALIAN LABOUR
MOVEMENT
Contemporary moderate Laborand left nationalist analyses of the Australian economy emerged in a recognisable
form between the end of the depression and the start of the longpost-war boom. An appreciation of thatperiod
therefore provides insights into the genesis of those analyses and theiradequacy. The economic ideas associated
with the ALP and Communist Party werenot sui generis, nor essentially the products of a few brilliant minds.
Theywereshapedby thenatureof these organisations, theeconomic conditions and thepaceof theclass struggle.
Laborite Economics
Thestructure of theLaborPartydefined important boundaries for laborite economic thought. A distinctive feature
of the Party is that its mass base in the working class is organised into the ALP through the trade unions. This
gives union officials with theirown interests, distinctfrom those of theworking class,greatinfluence in theLabor
Party. The internal structures of the ALP are constituted to implement its strategic commitment to achieving
socialprogress through Parliamentary reformof capitalism. This involves attempting to improve the functioning
of the existing system, oftenexpressed in terms of national development. At times sections of the Party have
arguedthat the Parliamentary strategy is also a means to supersede capitalism. The Party's stategy of improving
social conditions, by making capitalism work moreeffectively, predisposes its leaders to regard class conflict as
unecessary and, at worst, as detrimental to thenational interest. Its socialbasein the working classalsoplaces the
ALPin a betterposition than otherparties to attempt to reconcile working class interests with therequirements of
economic growth under capitalism. The Labor Party's commitment to Parliamentarism gives professional
politicians a vital role in the Party structure. When in Government, with greater responsibility for managing
.capitalism, Labor politicians have a tendency to make the promotion of capital accumulation a more immediate
goalthan the welfare ofthe Party's largely working class constituency. The tension between the ALP's working
class base and its need to assist the process of capital accumulation finds expression in laborite economic ideas,
aboutAustralia'splacein the worldeconomy, the tradecycleand theclass anatomy of Australian capitalism.
During the 1930s protectionism was a clearexpression of theALP's commitment to thenational interest andclass
conciliation. Workers and employers would, it was argued, both benefit from increased local production behind
tariff barriers. It was true that tariffs assisted in Australian economic development after the depression. But
laborites did not convincingly demonstrate that collaboration with employers over tariffs was in the best interests
of workers. They also tended to underestimate the protectionist implications of the Ottawa Agreement. The
changed situation during and afterWorldWar IT meantthatprotectionism was not a majorissuefor theCurtin and
Chifley Governments. Accepting a Keynesian analysis of depressions theysoughtto secure Australian prosperity
by promoting the growth of export markets. This was to be achieved through the adoption of full employment
policies by international conferences and in multilateral agreements. Impelled by the logic of office and the
ALP's Parliamentary strategy the LaborGovernments of the 1940s and the Hawke Government forty years later
demonstrated the same keen appreciation of the interests of Australian capital accumulation and of the
international nature of capitalism. On questions of international trade the Curtin and Chifley Governments
expressed support for a reduction of protectionism around the world, qualified by Australia's particular needfor
tariffs. TheHawkeGovernment expressed similar sentiments, though its qualifications werepractical rather than
verbal. Its plans for the steel and automobile industries embodied a balance between protection and a little more
international competition as a means to, or at least rationale for, increasing efficiency and labourproductivity, as
wellas the reduction of the workforces in these industries.
Facedwith the hostility of left nationalists, the ChifleyGovernment nevertheless went aheadwith the ratification
of the Bretton Woods Agreement in order to increase Australian access to international financial resources.
Reformof the banking systemduring the 1940s was a manifestation in domestic policyof Labor's pursuit of the
national interest. Preoccupation with bank reform was conditioned by the experience of the depression and its
transmission to Australia through themechanism of overseas loans. TheHawke Government allowed theentry of
foreign banks into Australia for the same reason the Chifley Government ratifiedBretton Woods,to secure an
inflowof foreign capital, and to increase competitiveness in the finance industry. No doubt it was influenced by
the dramatic fluctuations in foreign investment during the 1970s andtheimportance of capitalinflows. Despite its
free-trade rhetoric the Hawke Government prescribed that the new banks should operate in partnership with
Australian enterprises.
Theories of the trade cycleand capitalist criseshave intimate implications for theirproponents' attitudes to wage
struggles. The question of wages could give rise to tensions for laborite union officials, whose daily activity
exposed them to pressure from rank andfile workers, employers andofteninstitutions of thestate. During thelate
1930s many unionofficials alleviated such tensions, in the realm of economic theory, by means of trade union
underconsumptionism. Theyheld that increased wages couldalsoprevent depressions and the ensuing disruption
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of business activity. Trade union underconsumptionism had a popular appeal to the working class because this
ideology expressed the immediate interests of that class and could even justify industrial struggles. But it entailed
an acceptance of the existing capitalist order. Because it's appeal to employers was limited indeed, it constituteda
reconciliation of workingclass and capitalist interests primarily for a working class audience.
Politicians were further removed from working class pressure, but at the very least needed to maintain enough
credibility to win their own seats and, hopefully, for the Party to win elections. During the 1930s FederalLabor
politicians argued the need for increased wages. They were in opposition and were attempting to overcome the
divisions and splits in the Party which had eroded its support. Yet their underconsumptionist accounts of
depressions gave weight to the role of governments in preventing economic crises, not only by means of wage
increases but also through monetary and fiscal policies, notably reform of the banking system and public works
programs. "Governmental underconsumptionism" provided less scope for working class mobilisation and put the
spot-light onto the politicians but offered workers the hope of improved living standards and higher wages. Some
of the more substantial measures of state intervention advocated by moderate Labor leaders accorded with the
needs of Australian capital and the international tendency towards "state capitalism". Keynesian economics
provided rigorous and respectable expressions of these aspects of laborite thought. During the 1930s it also
seemed to countenance immediate wage increases.
The Curtin Government made the successful management of Australian capitalism an immediate task for the
politicians. In office the politicians gave more emphasis than previously to the pursuit of the national interest as
against the sectional interests of their largely working class constituents. Keynesian economics seemed to provide
an effective guide for the conduct of economic activity during the War and the Party leaders" embrace of the new
economics, elucidated for them by their public service advisors, expressed their changed priorities.
Around the end of the War the situation of laborite trade union officials became extremely difflcult, with strong
pressure from the Government for industrial restraint and vehement demands for action from their members. The
Government was concerned to prevent inflation and to promote Australia's international competitiveness,
especially in the face of the balance of payments difficulties associated with the dollar crisis. Working class
interests were expressed in the disconnected forms of a rising level of class struggle and therenewed popularity of
socialism. The Government's prestige and adherence to Keynesian economics ensured that the intellectual
embarrassment of the Scullin Government when it was constrained to participate in attacks on working class
living standards was not repeated when Chifley attempted to restrain wages, isolated and eventually physically
coerced militant workers and their leaders. The Keynesian ideology of the Government also made a
counterposition of trade union underconsumptionism to official pronouncements more difficult than during the
late 19308,although some officials did have recourse to the old ideology.
The last year of the Whitlam Government saw another Labor regime accommodate to the recent fashions in
economic orthodoxy. The Whitlam Government's 1975 (Hayden) budget was formulated in the light of
monetarist economics. It sought to restrain inflation by limiting the growth of the money supply and by making
cuts in welfare spending which foreshadowed those of Malcolm Fraser's Liberal Government. The Labor
Government of the early 1970s also succeeded in introducing a policy of wage restraint, called Wage Indexation,
with the support of union offIcials. This move, like Chifley's understanding with laborite union offlcials after
1947, succeeded in dampening down the level of industrial struggle. Fraser, like Menzies, reaped the benefits of
this shift in the balance of class forces to increase the share ofprofits in national income. The 1983 Prices and
Incomes Accord between the Hawke Labor Government and the ACTU did not truncate a period of widespread
industrial disputes, rather it pre-empted one. The Accord was signed while the Australian economy was in a
cyclical trough and levels of unemployment were at a post-war peak. During the next recovery stage the
agreement between unions and the Government on the maintenance of wages and an increased "social wage"
(essentially health, education and welfare spending) led to a lower level of strikes than the incomes policies of the
Curtin, Chifley or Whitlam Governments. This was contrary to the usual pattern during an economic recovery. As
a result wages rose at a slower rate than the Consumer Price Index. The share of profits in national income
recovered again, having been reduced during the rapid economic growth of the late 19708early 1980s "resources
boom".l A key theme of the Hawke Government's economic pronouncements, like those of the Governments of
the 1940s, was that wages could only rise if the economy was to enter a period of sustained growth. The parallels
between the behaviour of Labor in office during the 1940s and the 19808 has implications for the general
relationship between the ALP and the working class. The reconciliation of ALP Governments to the requirements
of Australian capitalism and their acceptance of the prescriptions of orthodox economics even when these are at
odds with the working class's short-term interest in maintaining or improving living standards and working
conditions (let alone its objective interest in the supersession of capitalism through its own activity) is not an
aberrant phenomenon but rather a normal pattern.
1. On the effectsof the Prices and Incomes Accord see T. O'Lincoln Into the Mainstream Stained WattlePress, Sydney 1985 ppI74-9. R.
Kuhn"Whose Boom" International Socialist 12,Summer 1981-82 dealswiththe resources boom.
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Left Nationalist Economics
The ineffectiveness and intellectual embarrassment of the Scullin Government combined with industrial weakness
and desperate circumstances had given rise to a political mobilisation of the working class around the role of the
banks and the figure of Jack Lang. The simple solutions of Money Power theory, its focus on a small,
conspiratorial section of the capitalist class (mainly resident overseas) and reliance on the actions of a great man.
as a substitute for the working class's own strength had a militant ring, while reconciling the interests of capital
and labour. Money Power theory could therefore appeal to groups in different classes, although its radical rhetoric
and the extent of the working class mobilisation behind Lang scared capitalists and members of the middle class.
After Money Power populism had gone into decline, the recognition by economists, some conservative politicians
and individual capitalists that the fmancial system was far from perfect reinforced and legitimised moderate la-
borites' concern with the reform of banking. Some left nationalists continued to adhere to Money Power theory
pure and simple. The rhetoric, ifnot the substance, of 1930s concern about the Money Power was revived around
the issue of bank nationalisation in 1947. During the late 1930s other left nationalists recognised that capitalism
was changing and came to emphasise the role of monopolies. Some came to this conclusion on the basis of
Money Power theory, the Communist Party did so by hammering Lenin's analysis of finance capital into the
mould of the Popular Front. Communists adopted conspiracy rhetoric and nationalist ideas, like those of Money
Power theory, to become the main exponents of left nationalism. Unlike Money Power theorists, however,
Communists were initially somewhat equivocal about Australian nationalism.
The Communist Party of Australia had been established to express and advance working class interests by
promoting the class struggle. Its relationship with the Communist International meant that the fate of the
Australian Party's revolutionary politics was institutionally tied to the fate of the Russian revolution. With the
fmal demise of workers' power in Russia during the late 1920s the communist parties of the world were
. progressively transformed into instruments of the Stalinist foreign policy of the USSR. But they were instruments
whose effectiveness depended on the extent to which they could establish and sustain a substantial following
amongst the workers of different countries. The international circumstances of the mid-1930s led Russia's rulers
to seek allies amongst the ruling classes of the western democracies. The CPA now had to accommodate its
behaviour to the Australian national interest (interpreted as lying within the British Empire) as well as the working
class, in the cause of Russian foreign policy. This, combined perhaps with residual internationalist feelings,
constrained Communist expressions of the anti-imperialist nationalism characteristic of many Money Power
theorists.
To justify its reconciliation with the national interest the CPA had to explain the "reactionary" or even "fascist"
policies of the Lyons Government. It did so by identifying a conspiracy of Australia's rich families and
monopolists. The Party defined its immediate task as replacement of the monopolistic regime of Lyons by a
progressive Labor Government. It continued to encourage most industrial struggles, but the struggle for socialism
was to be postponed until this task was completed.
The German invasion of Russia, Pearl Harbour and the attenuation of links with the international communist
movement during the War resulted in the adoption of a less equivocal nationalism by the CPA. The polarisation
of world politics around the USA and USSR after the War sustained this development. It meant that vehement
opposition to Australia's imperialistallies, Britain and especially the USA was now compatible with the interests
of Russian foreign policy. This remained the case during the 1950s and 1960s. Nationalist perspectives and
arguments were a normal feature of the Stalinist CPA's life. The Party's break with Moscow in the late 1960sdid
not entail a rejection of its ingrained nadonalismz
During the 1970s and 1980s left nationalists have been amongst the foremost advocates of protectionism.
Moderate laborites have recognised that the development of Australian capitalism can be advanced by securing the
best possible terms for Australian integration with the world economy. Left nationalists, by way of contrast have
tended to favour the isolation from international economic influences. This has reflected its hostility to US
imperialism and the belief that the Australian economy would be both better off and more amenable to socialist
reforms if its links with the world capitalist economy could be reduced.J
Contemporary left nationalist thinking has achieved a thorough reintegration of its analyses of Australia's place in
the world and of the classes which characterise Australian capitalism. For Money Power theorists Australia was
the victim of the fmancial oligarchy's international conspiracy. The Money Power was an international threat to
national independence and the key reactionary force at home too. The CPA identified the international and
domestic forces of reaction with fascism, understood in Dmitrov's terms as the dictatorship of the most
reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie. Within this framework, the Party elaborated accounts of Australia's rich
. families. After the War the Communist Party, for several decades the leading exponent of left nationalism,
denounced US imperialism as the most important threat to Australian independence and associated it with local
monopolists and rich families. During its left turn of the late 1940s the ACP focused particularly on Collins
2. Fortheevolution of theCPAfromStalinism to liberalism seeO'Lincoln Into the Mainstream op.cit.
3. Fora critique of leftnationalist protectionism seeKuhn "Whose Boom" op,cit. .
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House. Laterit placed more emphasis on the wider group of rich families again. For several decades, therefore,
thelocal andforeign enemies were institutionally distinct in left nationalist thought evenif it was argued thatthey
worked in concert. Especially during the 1970s left nationalists reintegrated their international and domestic
analyses by focusing on the role of multi- (or trans-) national corporations. The foreign and domestic threat to
independence andprogress were, once again identical.s .
The demand for higher wages has generally been a straight forward matter for left nationalists, so long as the
credibility of the ALP was not at stake, as for ordinary workers. During the late 1930s workers justified their
demands in terms of theirown needs, while Communists could point out that wage labour was the origin of
society's wealth. There was no necessary relationship between eitherrationale and a theory of the trade cycle.
TheCPA's radical underconsumptionism andinsistence on thenecessity and imminence of another crisis allowed
little scope for any serious analyses of cyclical economic movements. This restricted the possibilities for the
conscious adjustment of industrial tactics in the lightof economic conditions. Communists supported industrial
struggles and were amongst the best militants. But where a dispute involved the ALP. they tried to avoid
embarrassing it. Thus Communists dropped theiractive opposition to theNational Register (a measure to prepare
for the mobilisation of labour in caseof war) in 1?39, following Curtin's success in persuading the ACTU to do
so.
With the advent of the Great Patriotic War against Fascism, PearlHarbour and the Curtin Government in 1941,
left nationalists and especially the Communist Party, far from providing an alternative perspective on industrial
struggles, conceded the validity of the Government's main economic pronouncements. Communists for a period
accepted that a Labor Government couldsecure full employment, with the elimination of economic crises under
capitalism and thata Parliamentary roadto socialism might exist.
AftertheWarand under the influence of theemerging coldwar, theCommunist Partybecame progressively more
radical. It eventually returned to its radical underconsumptionism, theendorsement of militant industrial struggles
and a recognition that the Chifley Government was an obstacle to the improvement of working class living
standards and the achievement of socialism. But this came too late to politically reorient substantial sections of
theworking classin the lightof the struggles of themid-1940s. TheParty's approach to thequestion of economic
crises with its revolutionary implications was, moreover, accompanied by concessions to Australian nationalism
evenmore substantial than those of the Popular Frontperiod and a rhetorical hostility to Collins House, an even
smaller section of the capitalist class than the rich families of the 1930s. The Communist Party's economic
perspectives inadvertently assisted in theisolation anddefeat of themostmilitant sections of theworking class.
During the 1960s the CPA disengaged fromRussia. One aspect of theParty's shift towards liberalism was the
abandonment of radical for reformist underconsumptionism. The Party returned to its war-time position that a
progressive government couldeliminate crises under capitalism. The distance between laborite left nationalists
and Communists was thus significantly narrowed. With the tug of Russian foreign policy eliminated as a
significant force in the Australian labour movement, the advent of Labor Governments during the 1970s
and 1980s sawleft nationalists more prepared to make concessions on wages in the hope that this would pave the
way for radical social change; a preparedness always qualified by the level of pressure from the working class.
Willingness to compromise on working class living standards, found its fullest expression in the endorsement of
thePrices andIncomes Accord bymostleftnationalists.s
Working Class Economic Ideas v, Working Class Economic Practice
It is relatively easy to identify thebasis of the economic ideas of the labour movement in objective circumstances.
Suchan approach is a necessary part of any study of labour movement economics. But it does not provide an
accurate guide to the working class's economic practice. There wasno oneto onerelationship between economic
theory, however widely accepted, andtheactual activities of ordinary workers.
Economic ideas, premised on class collaborationism and the interests of classes other than the proletariat, while
widespread in the labour movement didnotprevent thecontinuation of theclassstruggle. Theimmediate interests
of the working class, in better wages, hours and conditions, can be deduced from struggles necessitated by
workers' conditions of life. It is similarly possible to impute an interest in theoverthrow of capitalism. Butwhere
short-term interests can be pursued with somesuccess, without a conscious recognition of class interests, this is
notnecessarily thecase for the realisation of thegoals of the working class's imputed class consciousness of the
needto overthrow capitalism. Theenormity of this task andthe degree of co-ordinated activity it requires makes
conscious, theorised action a more important ingredient in its success. To this extent although the labour
movement's economic ideas couldnotprevent theescalation of the class struggle theyconstituted a serious brake
on theheightening andgeneralisation of independent working class action at twopoints between 1934 and1950.
4. For a critique of perspectives based on the left nationalist analysis of the role of trans-national corporations see R. Kuhn "Alternative
Strategies" in JournalofAustralian Political Economy 12113, June 1982.
S. See O'Lincoln loe, cit, '
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The recovery in the level of struggle after the depression was circumvented by the approaches of both the ALP
and the CPA. Laborites looked to Parliament as the agency of socialchange. The rise in the level of industrial
struggle was closely related to the improved fortunes of the ALP, but the politicians generally regarded strike
actionas an embarrassment. Laborite union officials condoned strikeaction as necessary, butheldthat this was in
the interests of the nation and stroveto ensure they never lost controlof events to their rank and me. During the
Popular Front period the CPA was less convincing on the importance of pursuing the national interest than the
ALP, because of its orientation to Moscow and its reiteration of a revolutionary underconsumptionism. Yet it
madeconcessions to nationalism andregarded the election of a progressive government, whose undefined powers
to improve working class conditions were held to be significant, as its priority. Communist economic thought
madeno link between today's struggles and the eventual necessity of socialism. The Party's shortcomings in this
regard were most apparent in comparison with the case it had argued in establishing and building the Minority
Movementonly a few years before.
During World War II thepolitical leaders of the ALP accommodated with the needsof Australian capitalism, not
only in practice,but alsoin theory.. Theymaintained that the lessons of the War, understood in Keynesian terms,
had made possiblethe rational andplanneddevelopment of capitalisteconomies. Within a few years Chifley even
promised the advent of a "golden age". The Communist Party in turn adjusted its economic ideas to the
. Government's, in order to facilitate the prosecution of theGreatPatriotic WarAgainst Fascism.
As the War drew to a close ordinary workers took matters into theirown hands and soughtmaterial recompense
for the sacrifices they had made in the national. interest. The idea that socialism should be made a short-term
priority of the Government gained considerable popularity. This did not accord with the Government's or the
Communists' views on the subordinate place of class differences during theWar. The levelof industrial struggle
rose still further after the War, giving rise to serious tensions inside the ALP, as union officials were caught
between the Government's accommodation to Australian capital and their members' demands for better Wages
andconditions. Workers and soon manyunion officials dealt with the situation by contradicting theirverbal and
electoral supportfor Chifley's economic programin theirindustrial actions. The eventual success of thecampaign
for the forty hour weekand the Victorian metalworkers' margins dispute in 1947 easedthecontradiction between
the ideology and behaviour of large sections of the labour movement, especially laborite union officials. This
facilitated the further extension of a Keynesian hegemony over the labour movement and was followed by the
isolation of industrial militants which soonled to thedecline in the level of classstruggle.
When the Communist Party finally recognised the potential of the situation the scope for advancing and
generalising industrial struggles had narrowed considerably, For several years the Government's campaign for
moderation, restraint and the propagation of Keynesian ideas had not been countered witha convincing critique or
alternative. Consistently argued, such an alternative, built on the basis of workers' own empirical critique of
Government policy in their industrial action, mighthave helpedsustain andextend the post-war strikewave. The
Communist's inadequate attempt to present an alternative was, in any case, belated as it was only started in
earnest after the autonomous dynamic of the strike wave had entered a decline. There was no sustained op-
portunity for theCommunist challenge to the the emerging hegemony of Keynesian ideology to gaincredibility, in
the lightof workers' struggles, beforetheParty wenton to challenge theGovernment's authority.
Between the depression and the boom the labour movement's experience of the11 incorrect ideas" thatforma basis
of its ideology today suggests that the class strugglewill continue and eventually intensify, despite the sway of
protectionist, class collaborationist and reformist notions. The experience of the years between 1934 and 1950
also demonstrates the limitations of renewed struggle in the absence of a coherent perspective, presented to a
working class audience, which seeks to link the economic circumstances of the present to the revolutionary
transformation of society.

APPENDIX
LABOUR MOVEMENT ECONOMICS ILLUSTRATED
Cartoons from the Labour Movement Press
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BEASLEV SAVES THE BOSSES'
BANKS.
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Cartoon 1: The CPA's attitude to bank nationalisation during the Third Period. Workers
Weekly 8/12/33 p4.
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Comrades,
In response to the appeal for funds
for ;the "Workers' Weekly," I am set-
tfng out from Carnival Land .to do my
bit at the Xmas Carnival which is to
. be held to help the Workers' Press
on December 28, from 1 till 11 in the
Communlst Hall, S)·dne:r. .
Now, just get this, Comrades-YOU
must be there. I am bringing a cargo
of good things with me.
rve got bombs .to amuse the babies,
poison gas, guns, shells. and other
::larmle~s trifles for .the children, and,
for the grown-'ups,a tank 'of vodka.
Just in I case, the Customs oftlcials
interfere with my baggage, I want you
'to send whatever lrttle nick-nacks you
can to 395 Sussex St." for the Xmas
Carnival. ,Anything that you can beg,
borrow or 'steal will .be welcome. Any-
thing from a. safety pin to a motor
car. ,
The Carnival will be the grea.test
event of the year, in- fact, the greatest
event since the Ice Age.. ..-,
Hoping to see you all at the Xmas
Carnival, .
Y09r Carnival-land comrade"
SANTA CLAUS.
" .,P.S.: Send what zou can tQ the, "
' . ,XMAS'- ,CARNIVAL COMMITTEE. .
,.:' 395 .~U88ex. Sti'e~t: Sydney. -.. ' . ~ '.'
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Cartoon 3: illustration on the front cover of the first Red Leader, newspaper of the Minority
Movement. Red Leader 2118/31.
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Thl. I. what It looked like after the 1934 "wangling." What will be left when
the Anglo-Amerlcan and Ottawa agreement. are "negotiated"?
Cartoon 4: A laboriteexplanation of the relationship between tariffs and economic prosperity.
. Labor Call 13/9/34 p1S.
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Cartoon 5: The laborite view of the Ottawa Agreement and the fate of tariff protection under
the Lyons Government. Labor Call 16/12/37 pl ,
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VoL 46. No. 6.
TIll· 'IHIIOIC. IIIfIND ...... MM Ale '!HI ... IIHID THI 'I1fIlC*It .
Cartoon 6: A Money Power theorist's understanding of the relationship between the Lyons
Government and British imperialism. Australian Worker 10/2/37 pl.
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The poor millionaires never get a chance.
Cartoon 7: The global influence attributed to the Money Power by some sections of the labour
movement. Labor Call 13/1138 p6.
"Blg Bualn••" will Wake up Som. Day.
Cartoon 8: Real underconsumptionism. Labor Call 1112/37 p3.
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Thl. I. Capita"."". way of ft ndlng pro.perlt>--then what?
Cartoon9: Real underconsumptionism. Labor Call 3113/38 p6.
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Cartoon 10: For laborites the problem of capitalism was the system of finance rather than the
relations of production. Labor Call 6/9/34 pl.
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Cartoon 11: The CPA's Popular Front view of the rich families, behind the iniquities of .
capitalism. Workers Weekly 3/12/37 pl.
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MEN OF STAMINA •
THE WORLD'S GREAT MEN ba.. been IDOl" who
have pcesessed, .beside. remarkable abWty,· th,
spirit of endurance, They have not been discouraged
1)1 mountlnl diJBcultles and shwn. defeats. The1
have always produced that extra som~tblol which
has been able to tum disaster
into victory. They stick to it
and it f, this Invincible Itayin,;·
power which wins in the Ions run .
• • . And in the humbl.,. sphere· 0/
man-mad. gOOtD. endurance is the
ultimate te.' 0/ merit.
STAMINA TROUSERS
ARE NOW AVAILABLe
STAIIII' FOR ENDURANCE • ENDURANCE FOR ECONOMY
Cartoon 12: Communists were so respectable during the War that Stalin could help sell
trousers. Australian Worker 23/8/44 plO.
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Cartoon 14: By 19491aborites and the Chifley Government were prepared to portray coal
miners in general as loafers like the owners had been before the Curtin Government. Labor
Call 22/7/49 p2.
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WHAT HAS FOREIGN POLICY
TO DO WITH EMPLOYMENT?
THE slatus and The Chilley Govem.prestige oC Ails- ment insisls Ihat high
tralia in international and stable levels oC
affairs have never employment in all
heeu as high as they countries with which
are today. Australia has relatlon-
This is due to the in· ships - as well al in
s isten c e of th e Ibe Commonwea'lh it·
Curtin ond Chifley selC - are necessary
Governments that Cor an .enlarged
Australia should volume oC trade, In
actively participate tbis vital matter tbe
ilt all international persistencc and een-
setHeme..ts IIk.ly to Itructlve repl'ftenta-
affect the s.curity. tion. oC Australia'.
prosperity, living DlL D. r. BYATT tabor Government
stanclards and full employm.nt of the have won the Cull aecord and co-operalion .
A."rallan people. of overseas Govemment••
'The tabor Government believe. that
forei&n policy lInd domeatlo policy, are
iDterlocked. II re,,,,, lull employment
. a, bein, "ita' to bolh.
That i. why Lahors torelp policy, i.
direeted towardt the eoDIOlidatlq and
exteDdou' of export. marketi, eat.hll"
menl oCnew secondary IDdaatriet ID A....
InIia, the Il'aIIICtlI' of meneu IDdllltrlee
10 Aallnlia and the al1lftlloe 01 .app1la
etteDIiaI 10 aD 'braD" ofexi.lID. A....
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. C~oon 16: The Labor Governments' foreign economic policies sought to promote
international full employment and thus to boost its domestic popularity. Australian Worker
26/6/46 pS.
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Cartoon 17: A Keynesian view of banking reform. Tribune 7/6/45 p3.
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SAFEGUARD
Cartoon 18: A moderate view of the attempt to nationalise the banks. Labor Call 1119/47 pl.
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LEND YOUR. WEIGHT
By Mahony, ollJtJi,l,T~le"apA. Sydnq.
Loan opens September 26; closes not later dIaD' 0et0IJeI' 11. Of
the amount of £160,000,000 ·so.Cht, £112,501,000 Is reqaiNd '.r
war, and £47,500,000 ID CODvenious 01~ leevl...
Cartoon 19: Chifley's concern about inflation was promoted though the war-time loan drives.
Labor Call 26/10/44 pl.
217
Cartoon 20: Many laborites accepted the Chifley Government's claim that its policies for full
employment had been successful. Labor Call 2/9/49 p1.
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Cross Purposes
\
,
Cartoon21: Contradictions betweenworkers and employers also extendedto the relationship
between workers and the Government during the mid-1940s. Labor Call 16/1147 p2.
219
Cartoon 22: The Communist Party's support foor the War extended to promotion of war loans.
Tribune 4/11143 p3.
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Cartoon 23: During the 1943 elections, the Communist Party claimed its policies could sustain
full employment after the War. Tribune 19/8/43 p3.
Babe in the fBretton) Woods
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Cartoon 24: The Communist Party thought the the ALP left might depose Chifley over the
Bretton Woods Agreement. Tribune 13/12/46 p7.
221
222
Cartoon 25: The Communist Party returned to a radical underconsumptionist analysis after the
War. Tribune 15/7/47.
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Cartoon 26: Between late 1946 and early 1947 the Communist Party began to recognise that
Chifley's wages policy was in the interests of capitalists. Tribune 11/2/47 p7.
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Cartoon 27: Evatt was increasingly seen as the mouthpiece of dollar imperialism by
Communists after the War. Tribune 14/4/48 p5.
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Cartoon 28: The Communist view of the relationship between Australia and the USA. Front
cover ofR. Lockwood Wall Street Attacks Australia Current Book Distributors, Sydney 1947.
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Cartoon 29: Communists saw Coilins House, during the late 1940s, as the central feature of
Australian capitalism. Labor News November 1948 p3.
227
Cartoon30: Laboriteand Communists drew attention to Professor Hytten's comments at the
HobartANZAAS Congress. Tribune 22/1/49 p8.
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Cartoon 31: During its radical turn the Communist Party rejected arguments that productivity
increases should precede wage increases. Tribune 27/11/48 p3
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Cartoon 32: Communists saw a convergence between the policies of the Chifley Government
and the Liberal Opposition. Tribune 13/7/49 p3.

1. Government Publications
2. Newspapers andPeriodicals
3. PrimaryMaterial
4. Secondary Material
a) Monographs
b) ArticlesandEssays
5. Unpublished Material
a) Manuscripts andRecordings .
b) Thesesand Seminar Papers
BffiLIOGRAPHY
232
233
234
244
244
249
254
254
255
231
232
Government Publications
Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.
Australia. Digestof Decisions and Announcements and Important Speeches by the PrimeMinister1941-49.
Australia. CurrentNoteson International Affairs.
Australia, FullEmployment in Australia Government Printer1945.Commo~wea1th Parliamentary Papers11.Session 1945-46 Volume IV.
Australia, InterimReportof the Parliamentary JointCommittee on SocialSecurity Numbers 1.2 and 3, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers
1940-1-2 GroupH No.48 2419/41. No.72 2513142 andNo. 77 2015142
Australia. Report of the RoyalCommission Appointed to Inquireinto the Monetary andBanking Systems at Presentin Operation in Australia
Government Printer1937. Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers Session 1937Volume 5.
Australia. Reportof the Commissioner Appointed to Inquireand to ReportupontheCoalmining Industry Government Printer.1946.
Australia. YearBookof the Commonwealth of Australia Government Printer. various years.
Australian Anny Education Service. PostwarEconomic Problems Melbourne. 1941.
Australian Bureauof Censusand Statistics. The Australian Balanceof Payments 1928-29 to 1949-50 Government Printer1952.
Australian Bureauof Censusand Statistics. LabourReports Government Printer.various years.
Australian Stevedoring Industry Board. ReportGovernment Printer.various years.
Commonwealth GrantsCommission. Seventh ReportGovernment Printer1940.
Department of Labourand Immigration. Labour's Shareof National Product: The Post-War Experience Australian Government Publishing
Service1975.
Department of LabourandNational Service. WageIncentives in Australian Industry: Principles andCasesGovernment Printer1959.
JointCoalBoard,Annual Report, Sydney various years.
Newspapers and Periodicals
Advocate (Brisbane)
ALPDebaters' Bulletin(Brisbane)
Amalgamated Engineering Union Journal (Sydney)
Australian Left News(Sydney)
Australian Worker(Sydney)
Common Cause (Sydney)
TheCommunist (Sydney) newspaper 1920-21, becomes WorkersWeekly
The Communist (Sydney) journal1925-26, 1927-28
Communist Review(Sydney)
Freedom(Melbourne) becomes NewsWeekly
Furnishing TradesJournal(Sydney) becomes Furnishing Worker
Furnishing Worker(Sydney)
Ironworker (Sydney) becomes LaborNews
LaborCall (Melbourne)
LaborDaily(Sydney)
LaborDigest(Sydney)
LaborMonthly(Sydney)
LaborNews(Sydney) published by the NSWALP
LaborNews(Sydney) published by the PIA
LaborReview(Sydney) becomes Communist Review
Militant(Sydney)
Militant Worker(Brisbane)
NewsWeekly(Melbourne)
NorthQueensland Guardian (TownsvilIe)
Pan-Pacific Worker(Sydney)
The Proletarian (Melbourne)
Proletarian Review(Sydney andMelbourne)
Proletariat (Melbourne)
Railroad (Sydney)
RedLeader(Sydney)
Socialisation Call (Sydney)
Standard Weekly(Sydney)
TradeUnionLeader(Sydney)
Tribune(Sydney)
UnionVoice(Melbourne)
Warl WhatFor? (Sydney)
Workers' Information (Melbourne)
Workers Weekly(Sydney) becomes Tribune
233
234
Primary Material
Notethat"Australian Communist Party" material appears under"Communist Partyof Australia".
Aarons, E. Economics for Workers Current BookDistributors, Sydney second edition 1961.
Adier, A. (00.) Theses, Resolutionsi andManifestos of the FirstFourCongresses of theThirdInternational InkLinks, London 1980.
Alien,S. F. Money the author, Sydney 8thedition 1943.
Alien, S. F. PaperMoney: Its UseandMisuse C. and E. IronmongerLtd, Gosford 1945.
Amalgamated Engineering Union, TheUnion'sCasefor WageRestoration LaborDaily,Sydney 1936.
Amalgamated MetalWorkers' and Shipwrights' UnionAustralia Uprooted Sydney 1977.
Anstey, F. FactsandTheories of Finance FraserandJenkinson, Melbourne 19301
Anstey, F. TheKingdom of ShylockLaborCallPrint,Melbourne 1917.
Anstey, F. MoneyPowerFraserandJenkinson, Melbourne 1921.
Armstrong, M. andGriffiths, P. TheCrisis•.. andthe Socialist Alternative to LaborRedback Press,Melbourne June 1984.
Arndt, H. W. "Economic Policy- Stability and Productivity" in A. Davies and G. Serle (eds)Policies for Progress Victorian Fabian Society,
Melbourne 1954.
Arndt,H.W. LaborandEconomic Policy ChifleyMemorial Lecture, Melbourne University ALPCub, Melbourne 1956.9
Clothing andAlliedTrades Union A ShorterWorking Weekfor the Clothing TradesWorkers Melbourne 1931
Australian Council of TradeUnions, All-Australian TradeUnion Congress Melbourne 1934: Policy.
Australian Council of TradeUnions, TheTradeUnions andtheWarMelbourne 19411.
Austra1ian Council of TradeUnions, Whythe40 HourWeekMelbourne 1936.
Australian Council of TradeUnions andMiners'Federation of Australia, TheMineworkers' Future Sydney 1944.
Australian Institute of Political Science, Australia'sPost-war Economy Australasian Publishing Co.,Sydney 1945.
Australian LaborParty,Official Report of Proceedings of Commonwealth Conferences various years.
Australian Labor Party, Federal Executive. Manifesto of the Federal Labor Executive on Unity Negotiations Australian Labor Party,
Queensland Branch1934.
Australian LaborParty,NSWBranch, Yes: Nationalisation Concerns You! WorkerPrint,Sydney 1941
Austra1ian LaborParty, NSWBranch Socialisation Committee, Socialisation of CreditSydney1933.
Australian LaborParty,Victorian Branch, TheCommonwealth BankandLabor'sBanking Proposals Melbourne 1945.
Austra1ian LaborParty,Victorian Branch, LaborAnti-War Committee, Labor'sCaseagainst WarandFascism Melbourne 19351
Austra1ian LaborParty, Western Australia Branch, 4 1/2Yearsof LaborGovernment Perthn.d.
Austra1ian LaborPartyand Australian Council of TradeUnions, Statement of Accord by the Australian LaborPartyand the Australian Council
of TradeUnions Regarding Economic Policy1983.
Australian MadePreference League, Souvenir of the Australian MadeProtection League andthe GreatWhite Exhibition TrainSydney 1926.
Australian MadePreference League, Present DayAustralia 1927Sydney 1927.
Australian National Secretariat of Catholic Action, ForFreedom Advocate Press, Melbourne 1942.
Australian National Secretariat of Catholic Action, TheLandIs YourBusiness Melbourne 1945.
Australian National Secretariat of Catholic Action, Pattern for Peace Melbourne 1943.
Australian Socialist Party,Australia andWorldRevolution Sydney 1920.
Barnes, L. Annals of the Australian Communist PartyAustralian Communist Party1944.
Belloc,H.Essayon the Restoration of Property Distributist League, London 1936.
Belloc, H.TheServileStateT. N. Foulis, London 1912.
Blake. J. D.The Communist WayForward: Reports to the 1947 StateConference Australian Communist Party,Melbourne 1947.
Blake, J. D.The GreatCoalStrikeof 1949Australian Communist Party,SydneyAugust 1949.
Blake,J. D.TheyMust PayCommunist Partyof Australia, Melbourne 1937.
235
Blake, J. D. Unitefor Post-war Progress Australian Communist Party,Sydney October1945.
Blake,J. D. War.WhatFor?Australian Communist Party,Victorian StateCommittee 1949.
Boycott, A. G. The Elements ofImperial Defence GaleandPolden, Aldershot 1936.
Brodney, M. TheFortyHourWeekVictorian LaborCollege, Melbourne 1946.
Boudin, L. S. TheTheoretical System of KarlMarxMonthly Review Press,NewYork1967.
Brown, G. TheWeapon of the Boycott Queensland Preference League, Brisbane 1930?
J. J. BrownandJ. F. Chapple, Bretton Woods Australian Railways Union, Sydney 1947.
Burford, M."PricesandIncomes Policyand Socialist Politics" Journal of Australian Political Economy 14,April1983pp7-32
Bukharin, N. Imperialism andWorldEconomy Monthly Review Press,NewYork1973
Bukharin, N. and Preobrazhensky, E. The ABCof Communism University of Michigan Press, AnnArbor1977.
Bums,E. MoneyInternational Bookshop, Melbourne 1947.
Bums,E. Mr. Keynes Answered: AnExamination Lawrence andWishart, London 1940.
Bums,E. TheOnlyWayOutLawrence, London 1932.
Bums,E. WhatIs Marxism? International Bookshop, Melbourne 1945.·
Burton, J. TheAlternative: A Dynamic Approach to OurRelations withAsiaMorgans Publications, Sydney 1954.
Campbell, D. A. S. (00.) PostwarReconstruction in Australia Australian Institute of Political Science, Sydney 1944.
Campbell, E. W. People versus the BanksCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1947.
Campbell, E. W. The 60 Families WhoOwnAustralia CurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1963.
Cannichael, L. "A Transitional Programme to Socialism" in G.Crouglt, T. Wilshire and T. Wheelwright (OOs) Australia andWorldCapitalism
Penguin, Ringwood 1980.
"Cato"GuiltyMenGollancz, London 1940.
Chandler, H. B.Control Prices and RentsCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1948.
Chandler, H. B.WhyYouShould VoteYesCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1946.
Chesterton, G. K. TheOutline of Reason Methuen, London 1926.
Chesterton, G. K. What'sWrong with theWorldCassell, London 1913.
Chitley,J. B. Banking Bill 1947: SecondReading Speech Delivered on 15thOctober. 1947Government Printer1947
Chitley, J. B.articles on post-war reconstruction, Sydney Morning Herald 1112143,2112143.
Chitley, J. B. Planning for PeaceDepartment of PostwarReconstruction, Canberra 1943.
Chitley,J. B.ThingsWorthFighting ForMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1952.
Childe, V. G. HowLabourGoverns Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1964.
Clarey, P. "Industrial Relations after the War' in Australian Institute of Political Science Australia's Post-war Economy Australasian
Publishing Company, Sydney1945.
. Clark,C. The Advance to Social Security Melbourne University PressandOxford University Press,Melbourne 1943.
Clark,C. Property andEconomic Progress Catholic Social Guild, Melbourne 1945.
Cole,G. D. H. TheIntelligent Man's GuideThrough WorldChaosGollancz, London 1932.
Cole,G.D. H. (eel) WhatEverybody Wantsto KnowAboutMoney Gollancz, London 1933.
Coleman, P.E. Presidential Address to Annual Conference. April 7th 1934Australian LaborParty(Federal), NSWBranch.
Communist International, TheProgramme of theCommunist International Communist Partyof Australia, Sydney1929.
Communist Partyof Australia, AnAnalysis of the Socialisation of Credit: Lang's Partin Signing the Premier'sPlan.Sydney 193?
Communist Partyof Australia, Annals of the Australian Communist Party.Sydney 1944?
Communist Party of Australia, Australia's Part inWorldRevolution Thesesof the Central Committee Plenum, Communist Partyof Australia
June28 and29 1930.
Communist Partyof Australia, A Bookof Communist SongsSydney1945.
Communist Partyof Australia, Catholic Action at Work,Sydney second editionFebruary 1946.
236
Communist Partyof Australia, TheCommunist Wayoutof theCrisis 1931
Communist Party of Australia, Communists in Congress The 14thCongress of the Australian Communist PartyAugust 1945, Current Book
Distributors, Sydney 1945.
Communist Partyof Australia, FactsaboutBanking Refonn Sydney 1945.
, Communist Partyof Australia, Federal Election Policyof the Communist Partyof Australia Melbourne 1943.
Communist Partyof Australia, Handbook for TutorsSydney 1943.
Communist Partyof Australia, An Introduction to Marxist Political Economy: The WorldWe Live in SeriesNo. 2, International Bookshop,
Melbourne fourthedition19401
Communist Partyof Australia, PartyTraining Manual Sydney 1928.
Communist Partyof Australia, ThePeopleagainstMonopoly CurrentBookDistributors, Sydney January 1961.
Communist Partyof Australia, ThePresent Situation andthe Tasksofthe Party7/5139.
Communist Partyof Australia, A Programme for the Peoplefromthe Partyof PeaceSydney 1949.
~ommunist Partyof Australia, Programme of the Australian Communi~t PartySydney June 1944.
Communist Partyof Australia, Programme of theAustralian Communist PartySydney revised edition January 1945.
Communist Partyof Australia, Report of the Workof the Central Committee fromthe Fourteenth to the Fifteenth National Congress Sydney
April1948.
Communist Partyof Australia, Report of theWorkof the Central Committee fromthe Thirteenth to the Fourteenth National Congress Sydney
1945.
Communist Partyof Australia, shopbulletins 1948-49 in Mitchell Library Pamphlet File335.405/A.
Communist Partyof Australia; 16thCongress: Australia's Pathto Socialism Sydney 1952.
Communist Partyof Australia, Social Services and the Struggle against the Economic CrisisCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1948.
Communist Partyof Australia, Speakers' NotesSydney February 1950.
Communist Partyof Australia, Towards Socialism in Australia: Programme of theCommunist Partyof Australia Sydney1979.
Communist Partyof Australia, Towards a Workers' Government: TheCommunist Partyandthe LaborPartySydney 1~29.
Communist Partyof Australia, Unitefor PeaceFreedom andDemocracy Central Committee'Draft Resolutions to the 12thNational Conference
1938, ModemPublishers, Sydney 1938.
Communist PartyofAustralia, Unitefor PeaceFreedom andDemocracy, Forward Press, Sydney 1938.
Communist Party of Australia, A United Working Classanda National Frontfor Victory Resolution of the 13thCongress Communist Partyof
Australia, March1943,Newsletter Printery, Sydney 1943.
Communist 'Party of Australia, The Way Forward Resolutions of the 15th Congress of the Australian Communist Party, Current Book
Distributors, Sydney May 1948.
Communist Partyof Australia, Victorian StateExecutive Communist Planfor Victory andPeaceMelbourne 1945.
Conference of Socialist Economicists, London Working GroupThe Alternative Economic Strategy Pluto, London 1980.
Coombs, H. C. "Australia'sAbility to AvoidBooms andDepressions" Economic Papers 8, 1948.
Coombs, H. C. "ThePatternof Reconstruction" in C. H.Grattan (ed.) Australia University of California Press,Berkeley 1947.
Coombs, H. C. Problems of a HighEmployment Economy Hassell Press,Adelaide 1944.
Coombs, H. C. TheSpecial Problems of Panning Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1944.
Copland, D. B. Balance of Production in the Australian Post-war Economy Economic Record December 1949.
Copland, D. B. Inflation andExpansion Cheshire, Melbourne 1951.
Copland, D. B.TheRoadto HighEmployment Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1945.
Copland, D. B.articleSydneyMorning Herald 9/8145 p2, summary of above.
Copland, D. B. andJanes,C. V. (eds) Australian Marketing Problems: A Bookof Documents 1932-1937 Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1938.
Copland, D. B.andJanes,C. V. (eds) Australian TradePolicy: A Bookof Documents 1932-1937 Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1937.
Copland, D. B. andJanes,C. V. (eds) CrossCurrents in Australian Finance: A Bookof Documents AngusandRobertson, Sydney 1936.
A Correspondent "Australia'sDefence Policy" Australian Asiatic Bulletin 2(2),June-July 1938.
237
Craile, W. Outlinesof the History of the British WorkingClassMovement Australian Railways Union, Victorian Branch, Melbourne 1918.
Crane, F. G. "Bankingand the People" Workers' Information 2, May-July 1938.
Crane,F. G. Education Course Australian Railways Union, Melbourne 1938.
Crane,F. G. "PresentEconomic Tendencies in Australia" Workers' Information I, February 1938.
Crane,F. G. The Workers'Struggle againstCapitalist Crisisand the Wav out Australian Railways UnionEducational and Organising Scheme, .
Brisbane 1937.
Crawford, J. Australian TradePolicy1942-1966 Australian National University Press,Canberra 1968.
Curtin,J. Australia andthe WarAustralian LaborPartyFederalExecutive 1939.
Curtin, J. Australia'sEconomic Crisisandthe L55.000,OOO InterestBillWestralian WorkerPrint,Perth 1930.
Curtin, J. "TheCensusandthe SocialServiceState"in G. V. Portus(ed)Whatthe CensusReveals PreeceandSons,Adelaide 1936.
Curtin, J. GeneralElections 1943: Statement of PolicyAustralian LaborParty,Canberra 1943.
Curtin, J. NationalUnity: WhereLaborstandsFederalParliamentary LaborPartyMay 1941.
Curtin, J. The Policyof the LaborPartyAustralian LaborParty,Melbourne 1940.
Curtin, J. To Buildand Defenda HappyandSelf-Reliant Australia Australian LaborParty,Sydney 1937.
Curtin, J. WhyLabor Opposed the LyonsGovernment's National Insurance Scheme•.. and HowIt CouldBe Improved People's Printing and
Publishing Co. of Western Australia, Perth 1938.
Davidson, J. "Coalin Australia" in Newcastle Chamberof Commerce JournalJune 1952.
Davies, A andSerle,G. (eds)Policiesfor Progress Victorian FabianSociety, Melbourne 1954.
Deary,P. (ed.)Labourin Conflict: The 1949CoalStrikeHaleand Iremonger, Sydney Sydney 1978.
Dedman, 1.Ministerial Speech on Secondaiy Industries 1946.
Degras, J. (ed.) The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents ThreeVolumes FrankCassandCo.,London 1971.
Dixon,R. DefendAustralia'1 ModemPublishers, Sydney1937.
Dixon,R. Franceat the CrossRoadsModemPublishers, Sydney1936.
Dlxon,R. Immigration and the"White" Australia PolicyCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1945.
Dixon,R. Labourin Queensland Communist Partyof Australia" Brisbane 1937.
Dixon,R. RaiseWages,Reduce PricesCurrentBookDistributors, Sydneyi947.
Dixon,R. Towards MilitantUnionism ModemPublishers, Sydney 1935.
DixonR. Unite! DefeatFascism. DefendPeace,Achieve Socialism ModemPublishers, Sydney 1938'1
Dixon,R. WeMustGo Forward Australian Communist Party,Sydney March1945.
Dixon,R. andSharkey,L. L. A FreeWorldwithoutViolence Australian Communist Party,Sydney July 1945.
Dobb,M. Economics of PrivateEnterprise CurrentBookDistributors, Sydney1944.
Dobb,M. ThePolitical Economy of Capitalism Routledge, London1937.
Dorney, N. "An Open Letterto the Prime Ministerof Australia: Why Not FinanceJob Creation by Restoring the People's Bank" Modem
Unionist 8(4), December1983.
Doyle,B. TheTruthaboutCoalConpress, Sydney 1948'1
Ebbels,N. (ed.)The Australian LaborMovement 185o.I9fY1: Historical Documents Haleand Iremonger, Sydney 1983.
Ehler,S.Z. and MorraU, J. B. (eds)Church and Statethrough the Centuries BumsandOates, London1954.
Engels,F. Anti-Duhring ForeignLanguages Press,Peking1976.
Engels,F. TheCondition of the Working-Class in England Progress Publishers, Moscow1977.
Engels,F. TheHousingQuestion Progress Publishers, Moscow1975.
Engels,F. Letters on Historical Materialism: 1890.94 Progress Publishers, Moscow1980.
Engels,F. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany Foreign Languages Press,Peking1977.
Engels,F. Socialism, Utopian andScientific ForeignLanguages Press,Peking1975.
Evatt.H. V. Australia in WorldAffairs: Speeches AngusandRobertson, Sydney1946.
238
Evatt,H. V."Australia'sApproach to Security in the Pacific" in K.M Pannikar, H. V. Evattet al.Reglonalism and Security OxfordUniversity
Press,NewDelhi1948.
Evatt,H. V. Foreign Policyof Australia: Speeches AngusandRobertson, Sydney 1~45.
Evatt,H. V. "Forward" in R. J. Gilmore andD. Warner(eds)NearNorth: Australia anda Thousand Million Neighbours AngusandRobertson,
Sydney 1948.
Evatt,H. V. Post-warReconstnlction: A Casefor GreaterCommonwealth PowersGovernment Printer, Canberra November 1942.
Evatt,H. V.Speechon Constitution Alteration (post-warReconstruction) Bi1I1944 Government Printer, Canberra 1944.
Federated Clerks" Union, Report to Members on theConspiracy in the Clerks' Union25/11/48.
Federated Ironworkers' Association, B.H.P. Sydney 1941.
Fitzpatrick, B. The Australian PeopleMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1946.
Fitzpatrick, B. The BasicWage: Whatis Its Basis?Research Groupof the LeftBook Clubof Victoria, Melbourne June 1941.
Fitzpatrick, B. The BritishEmpirein Australia: An Economic History 1834-1939 Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1941.
Fitzpatrick, B. The British Empire in Australia: An Economic History 1834-1939 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne second edition
1949.
Fitzpatrick, B. Monopoly Business: A Critical Analysis of772 Australian andNewZealand Industrial Institutions Australian Council of Trade
Unions, Melbourne 1941.
Fitzpatrick, B. The RichGet RicherRawson'sBookshop, Melbourne 1944.
Fitzpatrick, B. "Secondary Industry in the Economy" in H. C. (ed.)GrattanAustralia University of California Press,Berkley1947.
Fitzpatrick, B. A ShortHistory of the Australian LaborMovement Macmillan, Melbourne second edition1968.
Fitzpatrick, B. andWheelwright, E. L. The Highest BidderLansdowne, Melbourne 1965.
Fox,L. Australia'sGuiltyMenandTheirConspiracy againstthe LaborGovernment StateLaborParty,SydneyApril 1943.
Fox,L. TheFirstWorldWar- andthe Second? Victorian Council againstWarand Fascism, Melbourne 1935.
Fox,L. GuiltyMenAgainCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney February 1950.
Fox,L. Monopoly Research Department LeftBookClub,NSW,1940.
Fox,L. VoteYesfor Homesand Jobs 1944.
Fox,L. Wealthy Men CurrentBookDistributors, Sydney1946.
Giblin,L.F. The Problem ofMaintaining FullEmployment Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1943.
Giblin,L. F. "Reconstruction - A PisgahView" Australian Quarterly September 1943.
Gramsci, A Selections fromPolitical Writings: 1910-1920 Lawrence andWishart, London1977.
Gramsci, A Selections fromthe PrisonNotebooks International Publishers, NewYork 1975.
Hade,C. EbenezerSydney1932.
Hayden, B. "FacingEconomic Reality" inJ. Northand P. Weller(eds) Labor: Directions for the Eighties IanNovak,Sydney1980.
Henderson, F. The Economic Consequences of PowerProduction GeorgeAlienand Unwin, London 1931.
HenryLawson LaborCollege,Questions on BankNationalisation and the Answers 1947.
Hilferding, R. FinanceCapitalRouUedge andKeganPaul,London 1981.
Hill E. F. Crisisin the Victorian LaborPartyAustralian Communist Party,Melbourne 1944.
Hobson, J. A The Economics of Unemployment George Alienand Unwin, London 1922.
Hobson, J. A The Evolution of ModemCapitalism George Allenand Unwin, London fourthedition1965.
Hobson, J. A Povertyin PlentyGeorgeAllenandUnwin, London 1931.
Holland,S. TheSocialistChallenge Quartet,London 1975.
Hopkins, A and Curtain, R. "The LabourMovement and the Protection versus Restructuring Debate: A Proposal" Journal of Australian
Political Economy 12/13June 1982pp74-92.
HUghes, J. Keepthe UnionsFreeCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney, 1949.
Illawara Tradesand LaborCouncil, The Storyof the SteelStrikeof 19451947.
239
Institute of PublicAffairs, "ImportReplacement Theory" IPAReview October-December 1955ppI2Q-5.
Institute of PublicAffairs, NSWStability andProgress Sydney September 1945.
Institute of PublicAffairs, Victoria TheBalance of Payments and Development Melboume 1959.
Institute of PublicAffairs, Victoria Looking Forward Melbourne 1944.
Intemational Bookshop, TheCapitalist Social SystemTheWorldWe Livein Series No. 1Melbourne 1942
Intemational LabourOffice,Unemployment Problems in 1931 Hersch, Geneva 1931.
Ironworkers Members Defence Committee, lronworkersl FightGestapo Tactics in YourUnionGlenIris 19431
Irvine, R. F. The MidasDelusion HasselI Press,Adelaide 1933.
Judd,E. E. Howto EndCapitalism andInaugurate Socialism Socialist LaborPartyNewSeries No. 1, second editionJuly 1928.
Keracher, J. Economics for Beginners, Kerr,Chicago 1935.
Keynes, J. M. Essays in Persuasion, MacmilIan London 1932
Keynes, J. M. TheGeneral Theoryof Employment. Interest, andMoneyMacmillan, London 1936.
KuczynsId, J. NewFashions inWageTheory: Keynes. Robinson. Hicks.ReuffLawrence andWishart, London 1931.
Kuhn, R. "Alternative Strategies: LeftNationalism andRevolutionary Marxism" Journal of Australian Political Economy 12113, June 1982
pp93-109.
LaborDailyYearBook1933, LaborDailySydney 1933.
LaborDailyYearBook1934-5, LaborDailySydney 1935.
LaborResearch andInfonnation Bureau, TheMarch of theMachine in Australia Sydney 1931.
Laidler, P. Arbitration andthe StrikeAndrade's,Melbourne.
Lang,J. T. Why I Fight! LaborDaily, Sydney 1934.
Laurie, E. A. H. Australia in NewGuineaCurrent BookDistributors, SydneyAugust 1944.
Lazzarini, H. The 'How' in Post-war Reconstruction Westmead 1941
Lenin, V. I., The Collapse of the Second International Progress Publishers, Moscow 1915.
Lenin,V. I., The Development of Capitalism in Russia in his Collected WorksVolume 3 Progress Publishers, Moscow1912.
Lenin,V. I., The Impending Catastrophe andHowto Combat It in his Selected Works Volume 2 Progress Publishers, Moscow 1911.
Lenin,V. I., Imperialism andthe Splitin Socialism Progress Publishers, Moscow 1915.
Lenin,V. I., Imperialism. the Highest Stageof Capitalism in his Selected Works Volume 1Progress Publishers, Moscow 1919.
Lenin,V. I. "In Australia" in his Collected WorksVolume 19,Foreign Languages Publishers, Moscow 1963pp216-1.
Lenin,V. I. The LabourGovernment in Australia International Bookshop, Melboume 1941
Lenin,V. I. The StateandRevolution Foreign Languages Press,Peking1910.
Lenin,V. I. TwoTacticsof Social Democracy inhis Selected Works Volume 1Progress Publishers, Moscow 1919.
Leoxm (pope),"Rerum Novarum" in EhlerandJ. B. Morrall (eds)ChurchandStatethrough the Centuries Burnsand Oates, London 1954.
Leontiev, A. American Expansionism PastandPresent Newsletter Printery, Sydney October 1941.
Leontiev, A. Political Economy: A Beginners Course Lawrence, London 1935.
Leontiev,A.Political Economy: A Beginners Course CurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 19451
Lindsay, J. BasicWageSwindle NSWLaborCouncil, Sydney1941.
Lindsay, J. The Battlefor Production NSWLaborCouncil, Sydney 1941
Lindsay, J. BudgetRobbery NSWLaborCouncil, Sydney 1941.
Lindsay, J. A People'sAustralia andIts Defence NSWLaborCouncil, Sydney 1941
Lindsay, J. WhereYourMoney GoesNSWLaborCouncil, Sydney 1941.
Lockwood,R. Bankers BackedHitlerCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney January 1948.
240
Lockwood, R. WallStreetAttacks Australia Current BookDistributors, Sydney 1941
Lundberg, F. America'sSixtyFamilies Vanguard, NewYork1938.
Luxemburg, R. RosaLuxemburg Speaks Pathfinder, NewYork1970.
Luxemburg, R. "Stagnation andProgress in Marxism" in D. Ryazanoff (ed.) KarlMarxLawrence, London 1927.
MacKenzie, W. H. andHade,M. ThePremiers' Planin Action, ReliefWorksintoIndustry. Smashing of Award Wages andConditions State
Unemployed andReliefWorkers' Council of NSW,Sydney1937.
Mander, A. E. Common Cause Rawson's Bookshop, Melbourne 1946.
MaoTse-Tung,"WhereDo Correct IdeasComeFrom" inhis FourEssays on Philosophy Foreign Languages Press,Peking 1968ppI34-6.
Marcy, M. ShopTalkson Economics Australian Workers'Union, Queensland Branch, Brisbane 1919.
Marcy,M.ShopTalkson Economics Epworth Press,Sydney1930.
Marx,K.Capital Volume I Penguin, Harmondsworth 1976.
Marx,K.Capital II Penguin, Harmondsworth 1978.
Marx,K. Capital ill Penguin, Harmondsworth 1981.
Marx,K. Cass Struggles in France in his Surveys FromExilePenguin, Harmondsworth 1973.
Marx,K. Critique of the Gotha Programme Foreign Languages Press,Peking1972.
Marx,K.EarlyWritings Penguin, Harmondsworth 1975.
Marx,K. Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association inhis TheFirstInternational andAfterPenguin, Harmondsworth
1974.
Marx,K.ThePoverty of Philosophy Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975.
Marx,K. andEngels, F. Manifesto of the Communist PartyProgress Publishers, Moscow 1971.
Marx,K.andEngels, F. TheGerman Ideology Progress Publishers, Moscow 1976.
Marx,K.and Engels, F. TheHolyFamily Progress Publishers, Moscow 1980.
Marx,K.andEngels, F. Selected Correspondence Progress Publishers, Moscow 1982.
MasonandMcShane, TheComing Warin the Pacific 19411
MasonandMcShane, WhatIs ThisLaborParty1Forward Press, Sydney 19401
Melbourne TradesHallCouncil, BankNationalisation (Speakers' Notes) 1947.
Melville, L.G. "TheEconomics of NewOrders" Economic Record December 1942.
Mendelsohn, R. SocialSecurity in theBritish Commonwealth University of London, Athlone Press, London 1954.
Michels, R. PoliticaIParties JarroldandSons,London 1911.
MilitantMinority Movement, CoalCrisis. theMiners'NextStepSydney 1928.
Millis,B. Dollars. Devaluation andYouCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1948.
Moore, H. Australia and theWorldCrisisCommunist Partyof Australia, Sydney 1931.
Morgan, C. A. Monopolies andtheWarEffortUnited Electors, Melbourne 19411
Moroney, T. andChapple, J. F. A TradeUnionPlanfor Post-war Reconstruction Australian Railways Union, Melboumel941.
Nelson,C. andOrr,W. Coal: TheStruggle of theMineworkers Miners'Federation, Sydney1935.
Nelson,T.Towards Socialism in Australia Communist Partyof Australia, Sydney 1939.
NewSouthWalesCombined Colliery Proprietors' Association, Extract fromReport of Conclusions Arrived at underthe Various Termsof
Reference Sydney August1946.
NewSouthWalesFabianSociety, The Casefor BankNationalisation Sydney 1947.
NewSouthWalesFabianSociety, Fighting Inflation Sydney October 1949.
NewSouthWalesFabianSociety, Towards a SocialistAustralia Sydney 1949.
241
NewSouthWalesFabian Society, Workers'ControlSydney 1950.
NewSouthWalesLaborCouncil, BasicWageSydney 1934?
NewSouthWalesLaborCouncil, 40 HourCampaign Committee, Whvthe40 HourWeek? Sydney 1945.
Newcastle Independent Workers' League, PrivateTrading Banks v. the People Hamilton 1947.
Orr,W. CoalFacts: TheMiners'Casefor a NewAgreement Miners'Federation, Sydney 1937.
Paddison, A. C. TheLangPlan: TheCasefor Australia LaborDaily, Sydney(second edition) 1931.
Painters' Union, Victorian Branch, Exposure! Labor Politician SCULLY Serves Bosses Not the People held in the Australian National
University Archives of Business andLabour.
Painters' Union, Victorian Branch, Winwood Finances ALP Groups held in the Australian National University Archives of Business and
Labour.
Pius XI (pope), "Divini Redemptoris" rOn Atheistic Communism') in S. Z. Ehler and J. B. Morra1 (eds) Church and State through the
Centuries BumsandOates, London 1954.
PiusXI (pope), "Quadregesimo Anno" in S.Z. EhlerandJ. B.Morra1 (eds)Church andStatethrough the Centuries BurnsandOates, London
1954.
Prendergast, G. M Laborin Politics: Its Influence on Legislation Australian LaborParty,Victoria Branch, Melbourne 1922.
Production or Poverty: 10Reasons WhyYouShouldIncrease Production NewsWeekly, Melbourne 1946?
Rawling, J. N. Smash theWarMongersl A Replyto W.M. HUghes National Council against War,Sydney1933.
Rawling, J. N. WhoOwnsAustralia? ModemPublishers, Sydney firstedition19371
Rawling, J. N. WhoOwnsAustralia? ModemPublishers, Sydney second edition1937.
Rawling, J. N. WhoOwnsAustralia? ModemPublishers, Sydney thirdedition1938.
Rawling, J. N. WhoOwnsAustralia? ModemPublishers, Sydney fourthedition1939.
Red International of Labor Unions Tasks of the Red Trade Unions and the Minority Movement Resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the
R.I.L.U., Australian Railways Union193?
Revolutionary Workers' Party Manifesto of the Revolutionary Workers' Party aVth International) Sydney July 1943, held in Australian
National University Archives of Business andLabour.
Roberts, N. TheCasefor the ShorterWorking Weekin theEngineering Trades Amalgamated Engineering Union, Melbourne 193?
Robinson, J. PrivateEnterprise or PublicControl Australian LaborParty,Sydney1946-
Rodd,1..C. Australian Imperialism ModemPublishers, Sydney 1938?
Ross,B. Howto GetMoreCoalMiners' Federation, SydneyOctober 1947.
Ross,L. "The~mocratic Challenge to Socialism" Antioch Review September 1949.
Ross,L. Laborin the PostwarWorldAustralian Railways Union, NewSouth WalesBranch, Sydney April1942
Ross,L. "Labour, Catholicism andDemocratic Socialism" Twentieth Century December 1947.
Ross, L. "A New Social Order" in D. A. S. Campbell (ed.) Post-warReconstruction in Australia Australian Institute of Political Science,
Sydney 1944.
Ross,L. The Railway Workers'CharterAustralian Railways UnionLittleLibrary No 2 Sydney 1936.
Ross,L. "Socialism andAustralian Labour- FactsFictionandFuture" Australian Quarterly March1950.
Ross,L. "Workers'Participation in the Ownership and Control of Industry" ChitleyMemorial Lecture 1959, Melbourne University ALP Cub,
Melbourne 1959.
Ross,R. S. WhatNext?Ross's BookService, Melbourne 1921.
Ross,R. S. Revolution in Russia and Australia Ross's BookService, Melbourne 1920.
Rowe,T. and Wright, T. United Action Wins.•. BetterConditions. 40 HourWeekIncreased WagesCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1947.
RowseA. L. Mr. Keynes andtheLabourMovement MacmiUan, London 1936-
Rowthorn, B. "TheAlternative Economic Strategy" International Socialism 2(8),1980.
Russell, R. S. Imperial Preference Falcon Press, London second edition1949.
Santamaria, B. A. TheBarthQurMotherAraluen Publishing Co.,Melbourne 1945.
242
Santamaria, B. A. ThePriceof Freedom Campion Press,Melbourne 1964.
Schreiber, O. TheWagesPolicy of Organised LaborSunNewspapers Ltd,Sydney 19361
Scullin, J. H. Federal Elections 1934: Labor'sPolicy Australian LaborParty, Melbourne 1934.
Sharkey, L. L. Australia Marches OnNewSouthWalesLegalRights Committee, Sydney 1942.
Sharkey, L. L. Australia Marches OnCommunist Partyof Australia, Sydney thirdimpression 1943.
Sharkey, L. L. Australian Communists andSovietRussia Current BookDistributors, Sydney 1947.
Sharkey, L. L. For Australia - Prosperous and Independent Report to the Fifteen th Congress, Australian Communist Party, Current Book
Distributors, SydneyMay 1948.
Sharkey, L. L. History: Communist Partyof Australia Communist Partyof Australia, SydneyNovember 1942.
Sharkey, L. L. LaborBetrayed Current BookDistributors, Sydney 1~46.
Sharkey, L. L. Nationalisation of Banking and Socialisation of Credit. a Critical Analysis of thePolicyof the LaborPartyCommunist Party of
Australia, Sydney1933.
Sharkey, L. L. An OutlineHistory of the Australian Communist PartyAustralian Communist Party,Sydney December 1944.
Sharkey, L. L. TheTradeUnions NewSouthWalesLegalRights Committee, Sydney September 1942.
Sharkey, L. L. and Campbell, B.W.TheStoryof Government BntemriseinAustralia Australian Communist Party, Sydney January 1945.
Socialist Workers Party,Towards a Socialist Australia: Howthe LaborMovement CanFightBackPathfinder, Sydney 1977.
Stalin, J. V.Bconomic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. ForeignLanguages Press,Peking1972.
Stalin, J. V.The Essential StalinCroomHelm,London 1973.
Stalin, J. V.Foundations of Leninism Foreign Languages Press,Peking1970.
Starr,M. A WorkerLooks at Economics London 1925
Stevens, B. S. B. Planning for WarandPeaceAngus andRobertson, Sydney 1940.
Stilwell, F.J. B. "TheEconomic Summit andBeyond" Arena63, 1983ppl6-25.
Stilwell, F.J. B. "Towards andEconomic Strategy" Journal of Australian Political Economy 12113 June 1982pp40-59.
Strachey, J. Contemporary Capitalism Random House, New York1956.
Strachey, J. TheNatureof Capitalist CrisisGollancz, London 1935.
Strachey, J. A Programme for Progress Gollancz, London 1940.
Strachey, J. TheTheoryandPractice of Socialism Gollancz, London 1936.
Strachey, J. WhyYouShould Bea Socialist Gollancz, London 1938.
Strachey, J. andMcNabb, V. Communism or Distributism Distributist League, London 1937.
Swan,T. W."Australian WarFinance andBanking Policy" Economic Record June1940.
Tart,B. "Changes in ModemCapitalism" Australian LeftReviewI, January-July 1966pp4-5.
Taylor, G.C. WarProfiteers UnmaskedInternational Bookshop, Melbourne October 1941.
Theodore, B.G. The LangPlan1931
Theodore, B.G. Labor's Campaign Manual 1928Australian LaborParty,NewSouthWalesBranch, Sydney1928.
Theodore, B.G. "Nationalisation of Credit" Economic Record December 1933ppI76-84.
Theodore, B.G. Socialisation. WhatIt MeansAustralian LaborParty,Queensland Branch, Brisbane 1921
Theodore, Eo G. Unemployment and Its RemedyWorker, Brisbane 19311
Thornton, B.The CauseofIntlation. .• and theAnswer Current BookDistributors, Sydney1951
Trotsky, L. D. TheThirdInternational AfterLeninPathfinder, New Yark1982.
TheTwoWorlds, Political Education Part I, ModemPublishers, Melbourne 1934.
Upward, B.TheRotten Elements Quartet. London 1976.
Varga, B.Changes in Capitalism during theWarCommunist Partyof Australia, Sydney 1941.
Varga, Eo TheDecline of Capitalism Communist Partyof GreatBritain, London 1924.
243
Varga, E. The Great CrisisandIts Political Consequences: Economics and Politics 1928-1934 ModemBooks,London 1935.
Varga, E. Two Systems: Socialist Economy andCapitalist Economy International Publishers, NewYork 1939.
Varga, E. and Mendelsohn, L. NewDatafor V. I. Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stageof Capitalism" ModemPublishers, Sydney 19377
Vernon, H.M. The ShorterWorking WeekRoutledge, London 1934•
.Victorian FabianSociety, TradingBanks, Inflation and Depression Melbourne 1953.
Voigt, E. R. Labour'sAnswerto BroceJointAnti-Referendum Committee of theTradeUnions and the Australian LaborParty,Sydney 1928
Voigt, E. R. Menace of Rationalisation: Showing the Need for the ShorterWorking WeekCouncil of Railway Shop Committees, Sydney
1933.
Voigt, E. R. and Garden, J. S. The 1929Lockout in the TimberIndustry Tomalin andWigmore, Sydney 1930.
Walker,E. R. "Australia'sWar Economy" Economic Record December1939.
Walker, E. R. WartimeEconomics Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1939.
Ward,E. J. Shall the Peopleor the BanksRuleAustralian LaborParty,EastSydneyFederal Electorate Council, Sydney1945.
Weller, P. (ed.)CaucusMinutes. 1901-1949 Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1975.
Wheelwright, E. L. Ownership and Control of Australian Companies LawBookCompany, Sydney 1957.
Wheelwright, E. L. Radical Political Economy: Collected EssaysAustralia andNewZealand, Sydney 1974.
Wheelwright, E. L. and Crough,G. Australia: A ClientStatePenguin, Ringwood 1982.
Wicks, H.M The Eclipse of OctoberChicago1957.
Winspear, W. R. Economic Warfare International Socialist, Sydney 1913.
Wood,G. L. Post-warEconomic PolicyMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1943.
Wood,W. A. W. Prize-Fighting Professors versusKarlMarxCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1948.
Wootton,B.Plan or No Plan?Gollancz, London1934.
Wright, T. We DefendPeacelModemPublishers, Sydney 19381
Zinoviev,G. "TheSocialRootsof Opportunism" New International 1(2),Winter1983-4pp97-117.
244
Secondary Material
a)Monographs
Addison, P. The Roadto 1945Cape,London1975.
Aitkin,D. TheCountryPartyin NewSouthWalesAustralian NationalUniversity Press,Canberra 1972.
Alexander, F. Australiaandthe UnitedStatesWorldPeaceFoundation, Boston1941.
Alexander, F. AustraliaSinceFederation Nelson,Melbourne 1976.
A1examder, F. FromCurtinto Menziesand AfterNelson, Melbourne 1973.
AIlen,V. TheMilitancyof BritishMinersMoor Press,Shipley1982.
Andrews, E. M. Isolation and Appeasement in Australia: Reactions to the European Crises 1935-1939 Australian National University Press,
Canberra 1976.
Angus,I. Canadian Bolsheviks Vanguard, Montrea11981.
Arndt,H. W. A SmallRich Industrial CountryCheshire,Melbourne 1968.
Bacon,E. Outlineof the Post-warHistory of the Communist Partyof Australia: Draftfor Discussion D. B. Young, Sydney1965.
Ball,W.MacMahon Australia andJapan,Nelson,Melbourne 1962.
Barcan,A.The SocialistLeft in Australia 1949-1959 Australian PoliticalStudiesAssociation Occassional Monograph No.2, Sydney1960.
Barrett,R.H. PromisesandPerformances in Australian Politics.1928-1959 Instituteof PacificRelations, New York 1959.
Beazley, K. E. John Cortinan Atypical LaborLeaderAustralian National University Press,Canberra1972.
Bernays,C. A. Oueensland - Our SecondPolitical Century: 1920-30 Angusand Robertson, Sydney1931.
Boehm,E. A.Twentieth CenturyEconomic Development in Australia Longmans, Melbourne 1972.
Brasch,D.J. American Investment in Australian Australian NationalUniversity Press,Canberra1966.
Braunthal, J. Historyof the International 1864-1914 Nelson,London1966.
Burgmann, V. In Our Time:.Socialism and the Riseof Labor1885-1905GeorgeAlienandUnwin,Sydney1985.
Bushnell, J. A. Australian Company Mergers:· 1946-1959 Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1961.
Butlin,N. G. Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 1962.
Butlin,N. G., Bamard,A. and Pincus,J. J. Government and Capitalism GeorgeAllenand Unwin,Sydney1980..
Butlin,S.J. War Economy 1939-1942 Australian WarMemorial, Canberra 1961.
But1in, S. J. and Schedvin, C. B.War Economy 1942-1945 Australian WarMemorial, Canberra 1977.
Cain, N. Australian Kevnesian: The Writingsof E. R. Walker 1933-1936 WorkingPapersin Economic HistoryNo. 13, Australian National
University June 1983.
Calwell,A. BeJust and FearNot Rigby,Melbourne 1978.
Calley,R. andMcFarlane, B. Australian Capitalism in BoomandDepression AlternativePublishing Cooperative, Sydney1981.
Charlesworth, M Church.StateandConscience University of Queensland Press,Brisbane1973.
Oaudin, F. The Communist Movement: FromComintern to Cominform Penguin,Harmondsworth 1975.
Oiff, T. Leninfour volumes, Pluto,London1975,1976,1978,1979.
Ounies-Ross,I. Australia and the Far EastAustralian Institutefo International Affairs, Sydney1935.
Cochrane, P. Industrialisation and Dependence: Australia's Road to Economic Development 1870-1939 University of Queensland Press,
Brisbane1980.
Connell.R.W. andIrving,T. H. Oass Structure in Australian HistoryLongman Cheshire,Melbourne 1980.
Cooksey, R.LangandScoialismAustralian NationalUniversity Press,Canberra1976.
Coombs,H. C. Trial BalanceSun Books,Melbourne 1983.
Crisp,L. F. BenChitleyAngusand Robertson, Sydney1977.
Dabscheclc, B. Arbitratorat Work: Sir William Raymond Kelly and the Regulation of Australian Industrial Relations George AIlen and
Unwin,Sydney1983.
245
Dabscheck, B. andNiland, 1. Industrial Relations in Australia George Alienand Unwin, Sydney 1981.
Davidson, A Antonio Gramsci Merlin, London 1977.
Davidson, A TheCommunist Partyof Australia: A ShortHistory HooverInstitution, Stanford 1969.
Davis, R. EightyYears' Labor, the A. L. P. in Tasmania. 1903-1983 Sassafras Books,Hobart 1983.
Day,R.B.The"Crisis" andthe "Crash": SovietStudies of theWest 1917-1939 NewLeftBooks, London 1981.
de Bronhoff, S.Marxon MoneyUrizen, NewYork 1976.
de Bronhoff, S. State.Capital andEconomic PolicyPluto,London 1978.
Dixson, M. GreaterthanLenin Melbourne 1977.
DraperH. KarlMarx's Theoryof Revolutionj Volume 1 StateandBureaucracy Monthly Review Press, NewYork1977.
DraperH. KartMarx's Theory of Revolutionj Volume 2 ThePolitics of Social Classes Monthly Review Press, NewYork1978.
Drommond, I. M. (ed.)British Economic Policyandthe Empire 1919-1939 George AlienandUnwin, London 1972.
Drummond, I. M. Imperial Economic Policy1917-1939 George Alienand Unwin, London 1974.
Dunn,M. Australia andthe Empire Fontana, Sydney1984.
Eggleston, F. W. Reflections on Australian Foreign PolicyCheshire, Melbourne 1957.
Ellis,U.A History of the Australian Country PartyMelbourne 1963.
Esthus, R. A. FromEnmity to Alliance: U.S.-Australian Relations, 1931-1941 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1965.
Farretl, F. International Socialism and Australian LabourHaleandIremonger, Sydney 1981.
Fine,B.Theories of the Capitalist Economy EdwardAmold,London 1981.
Fitzhardinge, L. F. The LittleDigger, 1914-1952: William Morris HUghes: A Political Biography Volume 2 Angus and Robertson, Sydney
1979.
Fitzpatrick, B. andCahill,R. TheSeamen'sUnionof Australia 1872-1972: A History Seamen'sUnion, Sydney 1981.
Fox,A.The DeepRootsofInflation ActionPress,NewYork1973.
Giblin,L. F. The Growth of a Central BankMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1951.
Gibson, R. My Yearsin theCommunist PartyInternational Bookshop, Melbourne 1966.
Gibson, R. ThePeopleStandUpRedRoosterPress,Melbourne 1983.
Gol1an, R. TheCoalminers of NewSouthWalesMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1963.
Gol1an, R. TheCommonwealth Bankof Australia: OriginsandEarlyHistory Australian National University Press, Canberra 1968.
Gol1an, R. Radical andWorking ClassPolitics: A Studyof Eastern Australia 1850-1910 Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1976.
Gollan, R. Revolutionaries andReformists Australian National University Press,Canberra 1975.
Goodwin, C. D.W. Economic Enquiry in Australia DukeUniversity Press,Durham 1966.
Grattan, C. H. TheUnited Statesandthe Southwest PacificOxford University Press,Melbourne 1961.
Hagan,l. The History of the AC.T.U. Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1981.
Hagan,l. Printers andPolitics Australian National University Press,Canberra 1966.
Haig,B. D. CapitalStockin Australian Manufacturing 1920-1977 Department of Economics, Research School of SocialSciences, Australian
National University, Canberra 1980.
Hancock, W. K. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs Volume 2: Problems of Economic Policy 1918-1939 Oxford University Press,
London 1940.
Hardach, G.,Karras, D.andFine,B. A ShortHistory of Socialist Thought Edward Amold,London 1974.
Hargreaves, W. J. History of the Federated Moulders' (Metals) Unionof Australia 1858-1958 Sydney.
Harman, C. ClassStruggles in Eastern Europe Pluto,London 1983.
Harman, C. Explaining the CrisisBookmarks, London 1984.
Harman, C. PartyandClassSunPres,Highland ParkMichigan 1975.
Harper,N. (ed.) PacificOrbit: Australian-American Relations Since1942Cheshire, Melbourne 1968.
Harris,H. L. Australia'sNational Interests andNational PolicyMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1938.
246
Harris, N.Beliefin Society Penguin, Hannondsworth 1971.
Harris, S.TheNewEconomics: Keynes' Influence onTheoryandPublic PolicyKnopf, NewYork1947.
Hasluck, P. TheGovernment andthe People 1939-1941 Australian WarMemorial, Canberra 1965.
Healey, B. Federal Arbitration in Australia Georgian House, Melbourne 1972.
Healy, G. A.t.P.: The Storyof the tabor PartyJacaranda Press,Brisbane 1955.
Henderson, G.Mr. Santamaria andthe Bishops HaleandIremonger, Sydney 1983.
Hobsbawm. E. J. Worlds ofLabourWeidenfeld, London 1984.
Hobson, J. A.Confessions of an Economic Heretic George AlienandUnwin, London 1938.
Hocking, D.M. and Haddon-Cave C. P. AirTransport in Australia Angus andRobertson, Sydney 1951.
Hudson, W.J. Towards a Foreign Policy: 1914-1941 Melbourne 1967.
Hughes, H. TheAustralian Ironand SteelIndustry Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1964.
Hutson, J. PenalColony to Penal Powers Amalgamated Engineering Union, Sydney 1966.
Isaac, J. E. Trendsin Australian Industrial Relations Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1962.
KeIly, V. G.A Manof the People: FromBoilermaker to Govenor-General: The Careerof the RightHonourable Sir William McKell Alpha,
Sydney 1971.
Kemp, C. D.Big Businessmen Institute of PublicAffairs, Melbourne 1964.
Kenafick, K. J. Maurice Blackburn..• and the No Conscription Campaign in the SecondWorld War Excelsior Printing Works, Melbourne
1949.
Kewley, T. H. Social Security in Australia Sydney University Press,Sydney 1965.
Kieman, C. Calwell: A Personal andPolitical Biography Nelson, Melbourne 1978.
Kindlegerger, C. P. TheWorldin Depression 1929-39 AIlen Lane,London 1973.
Kolko, G.and Kolko, J. The Limits of PowerHarperand Row,NewYork1972.
Kottman, R.N. Reciprocity andtheNorthAtlantic Triangle. 1932-1938 Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1968.
Lee,N. E.JohnCurtinSaviourof Australia Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 1983.
Levi,W. American-Australian Relations University of Minnesota Press,Minneapolis 1947.
Lewis,W.A. Economic Survey 1919-1939 George AlienandUnwin, London 1965.
Lockwood, R.TheStoryof JimHealyCurrentBookDistributors, Sydney 1951.
Louis,L.J. TradeUnions andthe Depression: AStudyof Victoria 1930-1932 Australian National University Press,Canberra 1968.
Love,P. Labour andtheMoney PowerMelbourne University Press, Melbourne 1984.
Lukacs, G.HistoryandQass Consciousness Merlin, London 1971.
McCarthy, J. Australia andImperial Defence 1918-39 University of Queensland Press,Brisbane 1976.
McFariane, B. Professor Irvine'sEconomics in Australian LabourHistory Australian Society for the Studyof LabourHistory, Canberra 1966.
Macintyre, S. Militant: TheLifeandTimesof PaddyTroyGeorge AlienandUnwin, Sydney 1984.
Macintyre, S. Proletarian Science: Marxism in Britain 1917-1933 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1980.
McKinlay, B. TheALP: A ShortHistory of the Australian LaborPartyHeinemann, Melbourne 1981.
Mackinolty, J. (ed.)TheWasted Years?Australia's GreatDepression George AIlen and Unwin, Sydney1981.
Macpherson, C. B. Democracy in Alberta: Social Creditand the PartySystem University of Toronto Press,Toronto1953.
TheMacquarie Dictionary Random House, Sydney 1982.
Mandel, E.LateCapitalism NewLet\ Books, London 1975.
Mansergh, P. N. Surveyof British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy1931-1939 OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford 1952.
Mattick, P. Economic CrisisandCrisisTheoryMerlin, London 1981.
Mattick, P.MarxandKeynes Merlin,London 1974.
May,A. L. TheBattlefor the BanksSydney University Press, Sydney 1968.
247
Mayer, H. (ed.)Catholics andthe FreeSociety Cheshire, Melbourne 1961.
Miliband, R. Capitalist Democracy in BritainOxfordUniversity Press,Oxford 1984.
Miliband, R. Parliamentary Socialism Merlin, London 1972.
Millar, T. B. Australia in PeaceandWar: External Relations 1788-1977 Australian National University Press,Canberra 1978.
Mitchell, B. A. Teachers. Education and Politics: A History of Organisations of Public School Teachers in New SouthWalesUniversity of
Queensland Press,Brisbane 1975.
Molyneux, J. LeonTrotsky'sTheoryof Revolution Harvester Press,London 1981.
Molyneux, J. Marxism andthe PartyPluto,London 1978.
Morrow, F. Revolution andCounter-Revolution in SpainPathfinder, NewYork1976.
Moss,J. Representatives of Discontent: History of the Communist Party in SouthAustralia. 1921-1981 Communist and Labour Movement
History Group,Melbourne 1983.
Murphy, D. J. (ed.) Laborin Politics University of Queensland Press,Brisbane 1975.
Murray, R.The Split: Australian Laborin theFiftiesCheshire, Melbourne 1972.
Murray, R.andWhite,K.The Ironworkers Haleandlremonger, Sydney 1982
National Library of Australia Communism in Australia (bibliography) Canberra 1967.
Nelson, T. The Hungry MileSydney 1957.
Nemmers, E. E. Hobson andUnderconsumptionismNorth-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1956.
Nicholson, D. F. Australia'sTradeRelations Cheshire, Melbourne 1955.
Nolan, T. YouPassthis WayonlyOnceColonial Press, Brisbane 1974.
Norton, W. E. and Brodie, N. W. Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1978-79: 1 Tables Reserve Bankof Australia Occasional Paper
8A,SydneyJuly 1980.
O'Linco1n, T. IntotheMainstream StainedWattlePress,Sydney 1985.
Page,E. TruantSurgeon: TheinsideStoryof FortyYearsof Australian Political LifeAngus andRobertson, Sydney 1963.
Panitch, L SocialDemocracy and Industrial Militancy Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 1976.
Parkin, A. andWarhurst, J. Machine Politics in theAustralian LaborPartyGeorge AlIen andUnwin, Sydney 1983.
Penner, N. TheCanadian LeftPrentice-Hall, Scarborough 1977.
Perlman, M. Judgesin Industry Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1954.
Pervan, R. and Sharman, C. (eds) Essays on Western Australian Politics University of Western Australia Press,Perth1980.
Radek, K. Portraits andPamphlets Wishart, London 1935.
Radi,H. and Spearritt, P. Biographical Registerof theNewSouthWalesParliament 1901-1970 Australian National University Press, Canberra
1979. .
Recorder special issue130 1984-
Reese, T. R. Australia, NewZealand andthe United StatesOxford University Press,London 1969.
Reynolds, D.TheCreation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41 Europe Publications, London 1981.
Richardson, L. The BitterYears: Wollongong during the GreatDepression HaleandIremonger, Sydney1984.
Robertson, 1.1. H. Scullin: A Political Biography University of Westem Australia Press,Perth1974
Robinson, G. A History of theNewcastle Branch of the Boilennakers' Society of Australia 1977.
Roper, G. G. Labor'sTitan: TheStoryof PercyBrookfield: 1878-1921 Warmambool Institute Press,Warmamboo11983.
Rosecrance, R. N. Australian Diplomacy andJapan.1945-1951 Melbourne University Press, Melbourne 1962
Ross,E. A History of theMiners'Federation of Australia Australasian Coaland ShaleEmployees Federation, Sydney 1970.
Ross,E. OfStormandStruggle Australian Publishing Co-operative, Sydney1981.
Ross,L. John Curtin Macmillan, Melbourne 1977.
Rowse, T. Australian Liberalism andNational Character Kibble Books, Malmsbury 1978.
Sawer, G. Australian Federal Politics andLaw: Volume 21929-1949Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1963.
248
Schedvin, C. B. Australia and the Great Depression SydneyUniversity Press,Sydney 1977.
Sch1esinger, R. CentralEuropean Democracy and Its Background International Libraryof Sociology and SocialReconstruction, London1953.
Sendy,R. ComradesComeRallyNelson,Melbourne 1978.
Shaw,A. G. L. The Economic Development of Australia Longmans, London1944.
Shaw,A. G. L. and Bruns,G. R. The Australian CoalIndustryMelbourne University Press,Melbourne 1947.
Shepherd, J. Australia'S InterestsandPoliciesin the Far East International Secretariat, Institutefor PacificRelations,New York 1939.
Sheridan, T. MindfulMilitantsCambridge University Press,Cambridge 1975.
Simms,M. A LiberalNationHale andIremonger, Sydney1982.
Skidelsky, R. Politicians and the SlumpMacmillan, London1967.
Snooks,G. D. Depression and Recovery in Western Australia 1928'29-1938'39University of Western AustraliaPress,Perth 1974.
Starke,J. G. The ANZUSTreatyAlliance Melbourne University Press,Melbourne 1965.
Stubbs,P. The Australian MotorIndustryCheshire, Melbourne 1972.
Thomas,J. John StracheyEyreMethuen, London1973.
Trengrove, A. "What's Goodfor Australia•• !"The Storyof BHPCassell,Stanmore 1975.
Turner,C. B. An Analysisof SovietViewsof JohnMavnardKeynesDukeUniversity Press,Durham1969.
Walker,E. R. The AustralianEconomy in War andReconstruction OxfordUniversity Press,Oxford1947.
Walker,E. R. Unemployment PolicyAngusandRobertson, Sydney1936.
Walker,R. B. Yesterday's News: A Historyofthe NewpaperPress in New SouthWales from 1920to 1945SydneyUniversity Press,Sydney
1980.
Ward,M. GilbertKeith Chesterton SheedandWard,London1944.
Watennan,A. MC. Economic Fluctuations in Australia 1948to 1964Australian NationalUniversity Press,Canberra1972-
Watson, D. BrianFitzpatrick: A RadicalLifeHaleand Iremonger, Sydney 1979.
Watt,A. Australian ForeignPolicyCambridge University Press,Cambridge 1967.
Watt,A. TheEvolution of Australian ForeignPolicy 1938-1965 Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 1968.
White,K. John Cainand Victorian Labor 1917-1957 Hale and lremonger,Sydney1982.
White,R. Inventing Australia GeorgeAlienand Unwin, Sydney1981.
Williams, W. A. Americansin a ChangingWorldHarperandRow,New York 1978.
Wills,N. Shadesof Red Communist Arts Group,Melbourne 1980.
Winch,D. Economics and PolicyWalkerandCompany, New York 1969.
249
b) Articles and Essays
Andrews, E. M. "Australian LabourandForeignPolicy1935-39" LabourHistory9, November 1965.
Artis,M. J. and Wallace, R. H. "A Historical Surveyof Australian Fiscal Policy 1945-66" in N. Runcie (ed.) Australian Monetary and Fiscal
PolicyUniversityof London, London1971.
Ashenden, D. "Evattandthe Originsof the ColdWar" Journalof Australian Studies7, 1980pp73-95.
Bambery, C. "The People's War" SocialistWorkerReviewM~y 1985pp20-1.
Barghoom, F. "The VargaDiscussion and Its Significance" American Slavicand EastEuropean Review6, October1948.
Bell, R. "Australian-American Discord: Negotatiations for Post-war Bases and Security Arrangements in the Pacific 1944-46" Australian
OutlookApril 1973,ppI2-33.
Bell,R. "Australian-American Relations and Reciprocal WartimeEconomicAssistance, 1941-6" Australian Economic HistoryReview 16(1),
March1976.
Beresford, M and Kerr, P. "A TurningPoint for Australian Capitalism: 1942-52" in E. 1..Wheelwright and K. Buckley(eds) Essays in the
Political Economyof Australian CapitalismVolume Four Australian and New ZealandBookCompany, Sydney1980.
Berzins,B."DouglasCreditand the A.L.P."in R. Cooksey(ed.) The GreatDepression in Australia LabourHistory17,1970pp148-60.
Binns,P. "TheNew ColdWar' International Socialism 2(19), 1983pp9-22.
Black,L. "Social Democracy and Full Bmployment' LabourHistory46, May 1984pp34-51.
Blake.J, "The AustralianCommunist Partyand the Comintern in the EarlyThirties" LabourHistory23, November1972pp38-47.
Blake.J, "The 1949CoalStrike"Australian Left Review70, 1979ppI2-8.
Burgmann, M. "Dress Rehearsal for the Cold War' in A. Curthoysand J. Merritt Australia'sFirst Cold War, 1945-1953 Volume 1 George
Alienand Unwin,Sydney1984.
Burgmann, V. "WritingRacismout of History" Arena67,1984, pp78-92
Burton,H. "The Growthof the Australian Economy" in H. C. Grattan(ed)AustraliaUniversity of CalifomiaPress,Berkeley1947.
Burton,H. "The TradeDiversion Episodeof the Thirties" Australian Outlook22(1),April 1968.
Callinicos, A. "The 'New MiddleClass' and SocialistPolitics" International Socialism 2(20) 1983, pp82-119.
Campbell, K. O. "Australian Agricultural Production in the Depression" Economic Record20(38)June 1944.
Carmody, A. T. "The Levelof the Australian Tariff: A Studyin Method"Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic andSocialResearch January1952.
Carrol,B. "William Forgan Smith" in D. J. Murphy and R. B. Joyce (eds) Oueensland Political Portraits University of Queensland Press,
Brisbane1978.
Catholic Worker"The Movement, Its Origins,Aliases,Decline"July 1959.
Churchward, L. G. "Australian-American TradeRelations, 1791-1939" Economic Record26, June 1950.
Cart, D. "E.G. Theodore: His Economics and His Influence" Economics 10(1),March 1975pp27-33.
Cart, D. "Keynesand the Battleof the Plans" Economics 11,August1976.
Cart, D. "Foolsand Madmen" in J. Mackinolty TheWastedYearsGeorgeAlienand Unwin, Sydney1981.
Cart, D. "The Great Depression in Australia" Economics 9(3) October1974.
Cart, D. "Marx versusButlin:SomeComments on the Snooks-Rowse Debate" LabourHistory30,May 1976,pp58.65.
Cart, D. "The PoliticalEconomyof Labor in Office: TheCurtinandChitleyEra"Economics 10(2)June 1975
Cart, D. "Was LangRight?' in H. Radi andP. Spearritt(eds) Jack LangHaleand lremonger, Sydney1977ppI38-59.
CliffT."The Economic Rootsof Reformism" in his NeitherWashington nor MoscowBookmarks, London1982.
Cole,G. D. H. "John A.Hobson;1858-1940" Economic JournalSO, 1940pp351-60.
Collins,J. "ThePoliticalEconomy of Post-warImmigration" in E. L. Wheelwright and K. (eds)Essays in the Political Economy of Australian
CapitalismVolume1 Australia and NewZealandPublishing Company, Sydney1975.
Cook,P. "FrankAnstey: Memoirsof the ScullinLaborGovernment" Historical Studies18(72), April 1979pp365-92.
Crisp, 1.. F. "The Commonwealth Treasury's Changed Role and Its Organisational Consequences" Public Administration December 1961
pp315-30.
Cumpston, I. M. ''The Australian-Japanese Disputeof the Nineteen Thirties" Australian Quarterly 29(2)June 1957.
250
Day,R. "Dialectical Method in the Political Writings of LeninandBukharin" Canadian Journal of Political Science 9,June 1976.
Dedman, J. "Defence Policy Decisions beforePearlHarbour' Australian Journal of Politics andHistory 13(3), December 1967.
Dixson, M. "Class Struggle Ideology during the Great Depression in N.S.W." Arrnidale and District Historical Society Journal and
Proceedings IS, December 1972pp72-6.
Dixson, M."Ideology, theTrades HallRedsandJ. T. Lang" Politics 6(1),May 1971 pp53-6S.
Dixson, M."Rothbury" in R. Cooksey (ed.) TheGreatDepression in Australia LabourHistory 17,1970.
Dixson, M."TheTimberStrikeof 1929" Historical Studies 10(40), May1963.
Dixon,R."Industrial Policyduring the 1930s" Australian LeftReview 27,October-November 1970.
Eggleston, F. W. "TheBritish Empire, Australia and the Pacific" Australian Quarterly 31, September 1936.
Eggleston, F. W. "Foreign Policy" in H. C. Grattan Australia University of California Press,Berkeley 1947.
Encel, S."Powerin Australia" Arena 6,1965.
Fairbanks, G."Menzies Becomes PrimeMinister, 1939" Australian Quarterly 40(2),June 1968ppl8-30.
Farrell, F."DealingwiththeCommunists, 1923-36" in H. RadiandP. Spearritt (eds)JackLangHaleand Iremonger, Sydney 1977.
Finch,L."C.P.A. Women andtheWar!' Hecate 10(1) 1984.
Forster, C. "Australian Unemployment, 1900-1945" Economic Record September 1965.
Gannage, C. "E.S. VargaandtheTheory of StateMonopoly Capitalism" Review of Radical Political Economy 12(3), Fall 1980pp36-49.
Geras, N. "Marxand the Critique of Political Economy" in R. Blackburn (ed.) Ideology in Social Science FontanalCollins, Glasgow 1975
pp284-303.
Gollan, D."TheBalmain Ironworkers' Strikeof 1945 Part2" LabourHistory 22,May 1972.
Gol1an, D."TheBalmain Ironworkers' Strikeof 1945Part2" LabourHistory 23,November 1972-
Gol1an, D."TheDulyandHansford's Strike1943: Findthe Strikers" in Second Women andLabour Conference Papers1980pp341-8.
Goot,M."RadioLANG" in H.RadiandP. SpearrittJackLangHaleandIremonger, Sydney 1977 pp119-37.
Gow,N. "Australian ArmyStrategic Planning 1919-39" Australian Journal of Politics andHistory23(2), August 1977.
Graham, B. D. ''The Placeof Finance Committees in Non-Labor Politics, 1910-1930" in C. Hughes (00.) Readings in Australian Government
University of Queensland Press,Brisbane 1968.
Greenwood, G."Australia'sInterest in the SouthPacificIslands" in H. C. Grattan (ed.) Australia University of California Press,Berkeley 1947.
Groenewegen, P. D. "Radical Economics" in F. Gruen (ed.) Surveys of Australian Economics Volume 2 George Alienand Unwin, Sydney
1979.
Hagan, I. "CraftPower: TheSydney Newspaper Strikeand Lockout of 1944" in I. Iremonger et al. (OOs) Strikes Angus and Robertson, Sydney
1973ppI59-77.
Haig,B. D."Manufacturing Output andProductivity, 1910-194819" Australian Economic History Review 15(2), September 1975.
Hall,N. F. "'TradeDiversion': AnAustralian Interlude" Economica NewSeries5(17),February 1938ppl-Ll.
Harman, C. "StateCapitalism, Annaments and theGeneral Formof the CurrentCrisis" International Socialism 2(16)1982.
Harris,N."TheRoadto 1910" Economv andSociety11(3), August 1982.
Harry,R. L. "Austra1ia's Rolein theEvolving United Nations" Australian Outlook 34(1),1980ppl3-9.
Hart,P. "ThePiperand the Thne" in C. Hazlehurst (00.) Australian Conservatism Australian National University Press,Canberra 1979.
Hawker, C. A. S. ''TheIapan-Australia TradeDisputes" Australian Asiatic Bulletin April1937.
Hobsbawm, E. I. ''MauriceDobb" in C. H. Feinstein (00.) Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth: EssaysPresented to Maurice Dobb
Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 1967.
Holden, E.W. ''TheCensusandSecondary Industry" in G. V. Portus(ed.) Whatthe Census Reveals F.W. PreeceandSons,Adelaide 1936.
HUghes, H. "Industrial Relations in the Austra1ian Iron and Steel Industry 1876-1962" Journal of Industrial Relations 4(2), October 1962
pp120-36.
Irving,R. and Benins, B. "History and the New Left: Beyond Radicalism" in R. Gordon and W. Osmond (eds) The Australian New Left
Heinemann, Melbourne 1970.
Iohnston, C, ''TheCommunist PartyandLabourUnity, 1939-1945" LabourHistory 40,May 1981.
251
Kuhn,R. "Class Struggle in the PublicService"International Socialist 10, 1980.
Kuhn,R. ''Whose Boom" International Socialist12, 1980-81.
Lockwood,R. "The Makingof an Australian Communist" Politics9(1),May 1974.
Lonie,J. "From Liberalto Liberal: The Emergence of the LiberalPartyand Australian Capitalism 1900-4S" in G. Duncan(ed.)Critical Essays
in Australian PoliticsEdwardAmold,Melbourne 1978.
Louis,L. J. "Recoveryfromthe Depression and the Seamen's Strike 1935-6'LabourHistory 41, November1981 pp74-86.
Louis,L. J. "The Victorian CouncilagainstWar and Fascism: A Rejoinder" LabourHistory 44, May 1983pp39-S4.
Love,P. "Niemeyer's Australian Diary"Historical Studies79, 1982.
McCarthy, J. "After Lang,1932-35" in H. Radiand P. Spearritt(eds)Jack LangHaleandIremonger, Sydney1977.
McClelland, J. R. "Experiences of the Australian LaborMovement underGovernment Control" in M. Harrington and P. Jacobs(eds)Labor ina
FreeSocietyUniversity of CaliforniaPress,Berkeley1960.
Macintyre,S. "RadicalHistoryandBourgeoisHegemony" Intervention 2, 1972pp47-73.
Markovic, M. "StalinismandMarxism" in R. C. Tucker (ed.) Stalinism: Essaysin Historical Intemretation Norton,New York1977.
Marks,H. J. "The Sourcesof Reformism in the SocialDemocratic Party, 1890-1914" Journalof ModernHistory11.
Matthews, R. O. C. "WhyHas BritainHad FullEmployment sincethe War?' Economic Journal 78(311)1968ppSSS-69.
Mauldon, F. R. E. "Depression, Unemployment and the ShorterWorkingDay" Economic RecordDecember1933.
Mauldon, F. R. E. Reviewof A. G. L. Shawand G. R. BrunsThe Australian Coal Industry Economic RecordDecember 1948pp238-41.
Megaw,R. "Australiaandthe Anglo-American TradeAgreement, 1938"JournalofImperial andCommonwealth HistoryJanuary1975.
Nordahl,R. "StalinistIdeology: The Caseof the StalinistInterpretation of MonopolyCapitalist Politics" SovietStudies 26(2) 1972.
Nonnington-Rawling, J. "Recollections in Tranquility" OuadrantS(4), Spring 1961pp2S-36.
Osborne,G. "A Socialist Dilemma: Racismand Internationalism in the Victorian Socialist Party" in A. Curthoys and A.MarcusWhoAreOur
Enemies: Racismand theWorking Class in Australia Haleand Irernonger, Sydney1978.
Overacker, L. "Australia's Battleof BrettonWoods"Forum (Philadelphia) May 1947.
Parker,R. S. "Group Interestsand the Non-LaborParties since 1930" in C. Hughes (00.) Readings in Australian Government University of
Queensland Press,Brisbane 1968.
Paul,J. "Albert Dunstan and Victorian Government" in C. Hazlehurst (ed.) Australian Conservatism Australian National University Press,
Canberra1979.
Pearce,B. "From 'Social Fascism' to People's Front" in M Woodhouse and B. Pearce Essaysin the Historyof Communism in Britain New
Park,London1975.
Pervan,R. "Cabinetand Caucus: Laborin WesternAustralia1933-1947" University Studiesin History5(1),1967.
Pervan,R. "LeadershipInfluence on theNature of the politicalParty" LabourHistory20, May 1971.
Piese,E. L. Australia's Dutyto Herself' Austral-Asiatic Bulletin1(2),June 1937.
Playford,J. "Mythof the SixtyFamilies"~ 23, 1970.
Prest,W. "EconomicPolicies" in G. Greenwood and N. Harper(eds)Australia in WorldAffairs 19S0-19SS Chsehire, Melbourne 1957.
Rawson,D. W. "LabourSocialismand the WorkingClass"Australian Journalof PoliticsandHistory7(1),May 1961.
Reddaway, W. B. "AustralianWage Policy, 1929-37" in J. E. Isaacand G. W. Ford(eds)Australian LabourEconomics: Readings SunBooks,
Melbourne 1968.
Reddaway, W. B. "The Australian Economy, 1937and 1965"Economic RecordDecember 1965ppS23-38.
Rees,J. "Struggleand Ideas"SocialistWorkerReviewApri1198S pp22-3.
Richards, G. M. ''Wages anmd the Wages Share: Australian Manufacturing in the 19208" Australian Economic History Review 20(2),
September1980.
Richardson, L. "DoleQueuePatriots" in J. Iremonger et al. StrikesAngusand Robertson, Sydney1973.
Rimmer,M. and Sutcliffe, P. "TheOriginsof Australian Workshop Organisation, 1918-19SI1' Journalof Industrial Relations 23(2),June 1981.
Richardson, L. "LangandWollongong, 1928-39" in H. Radiand P. Spearritt(eds) JackLangHaleandIremonger, Sydney1977.
Roberts,J. W. "Lenin's Theoryof Imperialism in SovietUsage" SovietStudies29(3) 1975.
252
Robertson, J. R. "1930-1939" in F. Crowley (ed.)A New Historyof Australia Heinemann, Melbourne 1976.
Robinson, E. A. G. "JohnMaynard Keynes1883-1946" in R. Lekachman Keynes' GeneralTheory: Reports of Three DecadesSt Martin's
Press,New York 1964.
Rose,D. "TheMovementagainstWar andFascism, 1933-39" LabourHistory38,May 1980.
Ross,L. "Australian Labourandthe Crisis" Economic RecordDecember1932pp217-9.
Ross,L. "Australian Trade Unionism in the Twentieth Century: An'Historical Survey" in Australian Instituteof PoliticalScienceTradeUnions
in Australia Canberra1959.
Ross,L. "The Dilemmaof TradeUnionism" Economic RecordDecember 1934pp183-4.
Ross,L. "FromLaneto Lang- the Evolution of LaborTheory"Australian Quarterly December1934pp52-5.
Ross,L. "The Roleof Labour" in C. H. Grattan(00.) Australia University of California Press,Berkely1947.
Ross,L. "SomeFactorsin the Development of Labor's ForeignPolicies" Australian OutlookMarch1949.
Rowse, T. ReviewofM. SimmsA Liberal Nationin Politics18(2),November1983.
Shaikh, A. "PoliticalEconomy and Capitalism: Noteson Dobb's Theoryof Crisis" Cambridge Journalof Economics 2, June 1978pp233-51.
Sheridan, T. "Labourv, Labor." in J. Iremonger et al. (eds)StrikesAngusand Robertson, Sydney1973.
Sheridan, T. "The 1945SteelStrike:TradeUnions, the NewOrderandMr. Chifley" LabourHistory42,May 1982.
Sheridan, T. "A Study in Complexity: The originsof the 1945Steel Strike in New South Wales" LabourHistory41, November 1981 pp87-
109.
Simington, M. "The SouthwestPacificIslandsin Australian InterwarDefence" Australian Journalof PoliticsandHistory23(2),August1977.
Sinclair, W. A. "Capital Formation" in C. Forster(00.) Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth CenturyGeorgeAlienand Unwin,
Sydney1970.
Sissons, D. C. S. "Manchesterv. Japan: The Imperial Background of Australia's Trade Diverson Dispute with Japan" Australian Outlook
30(3),December 1976.
Skidelsky, R."Keynesand the Reconstruction of Liberalism" Encounter52(4),April 1979.
Staley,A."Victoria" in J. Rorke(00.) Politicsat StateLevel- Australia SydneyUniversity Press,Sydney1970.
Stephens, D. "The Effect of the Great Depression on Federal Labor Governments, 1941-9" Australian Journal of Politicsand History22(2),
August1976pp2S8-70.
Stokes,G. "South Australia: Consensus Politics" in A. Parkin and J. Warlturst MachinePoliticsin the Australian Labor Party GeorgeAlien
and Unwin, Sydney1983.
Stone,J. "BrazenHussiesand God's Police: FeministHistoriography andthe Depression" Hecate8(1),1982 pp6-2S.
Tampke,J. "Pacesetteror Backwater?: GermanLiterature on Australia's LabourMovementand Social Policies, 1890-1914'; LabourHistory
36,pp3-17.
Tripp,E. C. article in DirectAction301Un8 pp10-1.
Turner,I. "Anstey,Francis George" in B. Nairnand G. Serle (eds)Australian Dictionary of Biography 1891-1939: A-ChVolume8 Melbourne
University Press,Melbourne 1979.
Varga,E."PoliticalTestament" New Left Review 62, July-August 1970.
WalkerE. R. "Australiaand the WorldEconomy" in H. C. Grattan(ed.)~ University of California Press,Berkeley1947.
Walker,E. R. "PublicWorksas a RecoveryMeasure" Economic RecordDecember 1935.
Warburton, G. "ShopCommittees in the NewSouthWalesRailways" JournalofIndustrial Relations 17(3),September1975pp2S5~.
Warlturst, J. "Catholics, Communism and the Australian PartySystem"~ 14(Z), 1979.
Waters,W. J. "AustralianLabor's Full Employment Objective, 1942-5" in J. Roe (ed.) SocialPolicy in Australia: Some Perspectives. 1901-
1975Cassell,Stanmore1976.
Waters,W.J. "Labor,Socialismand WorldWar II" LabourHistory16,May 1969.
Watson,1.. "TheUnited Australia Party andIts Sponsors" in C. Hazlehurst (00.) Australian Conservatism Australian NationalUniversity Press,
Canberra1979.
Watt,A. ''The ANZUS Treaty: PastPresentand Future"Australian OutlookApril 1970pp17-36.
Watts,R. "TheOriginsof the Australian WelfareState"in R. Kennedy (ed.) Australian WelfareHistoryMacmillan, Melbourne 1982
253
Watts,R. "Revisingthe Revisionists: the A.L.P. and Liberalism 1941-1945" ThesisEleven7,1983.
Weller,P., L1oyd, B. and Stevens, B. "State Powerand FederalIntervention" in H. Radiand P. Spearritt (eds)Jack Lang Hale and Iremonger,
Sydney19TI.
White,J. "The PortKemblaPig Iron Strikeof 1938"LabourHistory37, November1979.
Wills, N. R. "The Basic Iron and Steel Industry" in A. Hunter (ed.) The Economics of Australian Industry Melbourne University Press,
Melbourne 1965pp215-46.
Wilson,L. "EsmondMacDonald Higgins" Australian QuarterlyMarch 1961 pp7-10.
254
Unpublished Material
a) Manuscripts and Recordings
Australian Councilof TradeUnions, Official Reportof Proceedings of ACTUCongress' 1940-1945.
Australian LaborParty,NSWBranch'Nationalising the Banks' circulars47/191 and 47/192, mimeo1947,held in Mitchel1 Library.
G. Baracchi PapersNationalLibraryof Australia-.
E. A. BarkerPapersMitchel1 LibraryMSS739130.
Btake,J. D.The CPA 1945-63 mimeo,held in National Libraryof Australia.
Cameron, D. 'The SocialistPartyof Australia Its GrowthandDecline' typescriptMay 1958,National Libraryof AustraliaMS 100511.
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission Registry, '1933 Applications for the Restoration of 10% Reduction of Wages'
mimeo.
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission Registry, '1933 Applications for the Restoration of 10% Reduction of Wages,
Transcript of Proceedings'mimeo,
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission Registry, 'Transcriptof 1937BasicWage Applications' mimeo.
Communist Partyof AustraliaPapers,NationalLibraryof Australia MS 3000.
Communist Partyof Australia, 15thNational Congress 1948: Speeches and Documents National Libraryof Australia MS 3000Boxes 1and2.
Evatt,H.V. 'Planningfor Reconstruction' National Talkfrom Station2FC 19/8/41, mimeo,heldin Mitchel1 Library.
Evatt,H. V. 'Speech at the Openingof the BartonElectorate Campaign" mimeo1946,held in Mitehel1 Library.
Forde,F.M. 'Address to CapricomiaDivisional Executive' 1612146 mimeoin Mitchel1 Library.
Healy,J. 'A Brief Historyof the Australian Waterside Workers' Federation Unions 1902-47' in James Healy Papers,Mitchel1 LibraryMSS
1049/3.
Higgins, E.M 'Australia and theWorld' in E. M. HigginsPapersMitchell LibraryMSS74012.
J. Kavanagh Papers,Archives of BusinessandLabour,Australian NationalUniversity.
Lang,J. T. 'Policy Speech' 2614135 held in MitehellLibrary.
Lang,J. T. 'Policy Speechof the Australian LaborParty' 2613138 held in MitchellLibrary.
LeftBook Club,ResearchDepartment, 'EconomicStructure of Australia'mimeo 19401in C. Martin papers,held by K. Turner, University of
Sydney,to be depositedin MitehellLibrary.
MilitantMinorityMovementConference 26112128 'The ClassStrugglein Australia' typescript, MitchellLibrary.
Miller,J. D. B. Mil1er (ed.) Australian Trade Unionism Addresses Delivered at Austra1ia's First Trade Union Schoolat Newport 1952mimeo
heldin OxteyLibrary.
MinorityMovementBrisbane,Papersboundwith PlebsLeaguematerial, Mitchel1 Library.
J. Normington-Rawling Papers,Archives of Business andLabour,Australian NationalUniversity.
O'Lincoln,T. 'Rankand File' photocopy heldby R. A. Kuhn.
O'Lincoln,T. 'The MinorityMovement' photocopy heldby R. A. Kuhn.
Petersen,G. 'The LaborMovement andWorldWar Il' text of lecturedelivered 7/12180 in Sydney, photocopy held by E. Petersen,
Petersen,G. tapedinterviewSydney1319/84, heldby R. A. Kuhn.
Santamaria, B. A. "The Movement ofIdeas of Australia" mimeo1953,held in Mitehel1 Library.
Thistlethwaite, A. 'Report on the FourthInternational in Australia: 1939-45'Mitchel1 LibraryMSS 1037.
Eo J. Ward Papers,NationalLibraryof Australia MS 2396.
Wyner,I. tapedinterviewSydney2619184, heldby R. A. Kuhn.
255
b) Theses and Seminar Papers
Alomes, S. 'The 19308 Background to Post-war Reconstruction' Paperfor Post-war Reconstruction Seminar, Australian National University
31/8-419/1981.
Andrews, E. M. 'Australia andthe Europeans Crises1935-1939' PhD,Australian National University 1966.
Atkinson, M. 'The ALPIndustrial Groups in SouthAustralia, 1946-1951' BAHonours History, Australian National University 1979.
BarcanA 'Trendstowards National Unification, 1921-1942' MA,University of Sydney1954.
Berzins, B. 'The SocialCreditMovement in Australia to 1940'MA,University ofNSW 1967.
Cooksey, R. J. 'The Socialisation Unitsof theNew SouthWalesLaborParty' Government III Honours, University of Sydney 1962
Cornish S. 'Full Employment in Australia: The Genesis of a WhitePaper' Paperfor Post-war Reconstruction Seminar, Australian National
University 31/8-419/1981.
Davidson, A B. 'The Communist Partyof Australia, 1920-35' PhD,Australian National University 1966.
Dunkley, G. R. 'The AC.T.U. 1927-1950' PhD,Monash University 1976.
Dunn, M 'Curtin's Callto America' B~ Honours History, Australian National University 1975.
FaiIbanks, G. 'The Australian Foreign PolicyandDefence Debate, 1931-1941' MA,University of Sydney 1967.
Grey,P. C. "TariffPolicy' BAHonours Government, University of Sydney 1970.
Hewitt, G.C. 'A History of theVictorian Socialist Party'MA, LaTrobeUniversity 1974.
Higgins, E. M. 'Queensland LabourGovernments' MA, Melbourne University 1957.
Inder,R. L. 'A Studyin Anglo-Australian Relations 1918-1930' MA, University of Sydney 1972.
Johnston, C. 'SocialistIdeology and theAustralian Communists 193~1945' BAHonours Government, University of Sydney 1976.
Uoyd, C. 'The Formation andDevelopment of the United Australia Party,1929-37' PhD,Australian National University 1984.
Lockwood, D. 'To the Flinders Station: The Communist Partyof Australia and the Popular Front' BA Honours History, Australian National
University 1976.
Louis,L. J. 'VictorianTradeUnions in the Depression 1930-1932' MA, Melbourne University 1964.
Love,P. 'Laborand theMoneyPower'MA, LaTrobeUniversity, 1980.
McFarlane, E. J. 'The Hughes-Bvans Labor Party in NSW during the Years of Office 193~1940' MA (QiJalifying) History, Australian
National University 1969.
Mamchak, A 'Central Economic Planning and Post-war Reconstruction' Paper for Post-war Reconstruction Seminar, Australian National
University 31/8-419/1981.
Matthews, T. V. 'Reactions of the Federal and NewSouthWalesLaborPartiesto the Depression Octoberl929 to March1931'Government II
essay,University of Sydney1960.
Merritt, J. 'A History of the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia, 1904-1945' PhD,Australian National University 1967.
Mitchell, B. A 'A History of PublicSchool Teachers' Organisations in New SouthWales 1855-1945' PhD,Australian National University
1969.
Morrison, P. 'The Australian Radical Socialist Tradition andthe Australian Communist Party1920-39' PhD,University of Adelaide 1976.
Normington-Rawling, J. 'The Communist Partyof Australia, to 1930' Politics Workin Progress SeminarPaper,Institute of Advance Studies,
Australian National University 4/5/1962.
Nugent, B.R. 'FrankAnsteyandVictorian Politics'MA,University of NewEngland 1974.
Pervan, R.F. 'The Western Australian LaborMovement, 1933-47' MA,University of Western Australia 1966.
Petzall,S. B. 'The Political andIndustrial Roleof theMelbourne TradesHallCouncil, 1927-1949' PhD,LaTrobeUniversity 1978.
Rasmussen, C. A. 'LaborPolitics in Coburg: 1919-1940' MA,Melbourne University 1978.
RaW80n. D.W. 'The Organisation of theAustralian LaborParty" PhD,Melbourne University 1954.
Rechter, M. 'The Strikeof the Waterside Workers in Australian Ports,1928, andthe Lockout of theCoalminers on the Northern Coalfields of
NewSouthWales,1929-30' MA, Melbourne University 1958.
Reeves, A. P. 'Industrial Men: MinersandPolitics in Wonthaggi, 19~1968' MALaTrobeUniversity 1977.
Richard80D L. 'The LabourMovernent in theWol1oDgong~PortKembla Region 1929-41' PhD,Australian National University 1974.
Rose,D. 'A History of the Anti-War Organisations in Victoria 1933-1939' MA,LaTrobe1976.
256
Sheridan, T. 'Australian TradeUnions andPostwarReconstruction' Paperfor Post-war Reconstruction seminar,Australian National University
31/8-419/1981.
Stevens, A.M. 'The Keynesian Revolution thatNeverWas' BAHonours, Macquarie University 1984.
Swan, P. L. 'GeneralMotors-Holden's and theAustralian Automobile Industry in Economic Perspective' PhD,Monash University 1972
Warhurst, J. L. 'The "Communist Bogey": Communism as an Election Issue in Australian Federal Politics, 1949 to 1964' PhD, FIinders
University 1977.
Waters, W. J. 'The Post-war Reconstruction Plansof the Australian LaborPartyduringthe SecondWorldWar' MEc, University of Sydney
1968.
White, K. 'John Cainand Victorian Labor, 1917-57' PhD,Melboume Universityl979.
Young, I. E. 'Conflictwithinthe N.S.W. LaborParty1919-1932' MA,University of Sydney 1961.
